Res Gestae

Ammianus Marcellinus

Ammianus Marcellinus. Ammianus Marcellinus, with an English translation, Vols. I-III. Rolfe, John C., translator. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press; W. Heinemann, 1935-1940 (printing).

Therefore Theodosius, fearing lest he should involve himself in an unequal contest, and if he confronted a vast horde with only a few troops—for he had under his command only 3500 armed men—might lose them all, wavered between the shame of retreat and the desire for battle; but at last he gradually withdrew and made off, with the horde pressing at his heels.

The foe, tremendously elated by this success, followed persistently[*](A brief lacuna follows which does not greatly affect the sense.) . . . so that he found it necessary to fight; but he himself would have been killed and his army utterly annihilated, had not the enemy, attacking in disorder, seen afar off the auxiliaries of the Mazices, in the van of which were some Romans; so thinking that they were attacked by many columns, they turned in flight and opened to our men ways of escape which before had been blocked.

From there, leading his army safe and sound, Theodosius came to an estate called Mazucanus, where he burned a few deserters alive and mutilated the rest as he had the archers whose hands were cut off;[*](See § 22, above.) and in the month of February he reached Tipasa.

There he made a long halt, and after the manner of the famous Lingerer[*](Q. Fabius Maximus in the Hannibalic war, nicknamed Cunctator because of his policy of caution.) of old took counsel with himself as the circumstances demanded, planning, if chance gave the opportunity, rather through strategy and discretion than by the

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danger of battle, to overthrow an enemy who was pugnacious and effective in the use of missiles.

Nevertheless he constantly sent men experienced in[*](363 ff. A.D.) persuasion to the surrounding tribes, the Baiurae, Cantauriani, Avastomates, Cafaves, Bavares, and other neighbours, to entice them to an alliance, now by fear, now by bribes, and sometimes by promising pardon for their impudence with[*](Here there is a lacuna of three lines, perhaps telling that, strengthened through these tribes, he again took the field.) . . . intending by subterfuges and delays to overcome an enemy who foiled his attacks, as Pompey once vanquished Mithridates.

Therefore Firmus, to avoid imminent destruction, although he was protected by a strong body of troops, abandoned the army which he had got together at great expense; and when the quiet of night gave him the opportunity of concealment, he made his way into the far distant Caprariensian mountains, which are inaccessible because of their steep crags.

In consequence of his secret departure his army scattered and roamed about in small bands without a leader, thus giving our men the opportunity of invading their camp. After this was plundered and those who resisted were killed or received in surrender, the greater part of the country was devastated and our prudent leader put prefects of tried fidelity in charge of the peoples through whose country he was marching.