Res Gestae

Ammianus Marcellinus

Ammianus Marcellinus. Ammianus Marcellinus, with an English translation, Vols. I-III. Rolfe, John C., translator. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press; W. Heinemann, 1935-1940 (printing).

Therefore, Constantius, wavering amid the difficulty of pressing affairs, was in doubt what course to pursue, considering long and anxiously whether to go to distant lands against Julian, or to repel the Parthians, who (as they threatened) were soon about to cross the Euphrates; and after hesitating and often taking counsel with his generals, he at last inclined to this plan: that after finishing, or at any rate quieting, the nearer war, and leaving no one to fear behind his back, after overrunning Illyricum and Italy (as he thought), he should take Julian (like a hunter’s prey) in the very beginning of his enterprises; for so he kept continually declaring, to calm the fear of his men.

Nevertheless, that he might not grow lukewarm or seem to have neglected the other side of the war, spreading everywhere the terror of his coming; and fearing lest Africa should be invaded in his absence, a province advantageous to the emperors for all occasions,[*](As the source of the supply of grain for the western provinces.) as if he were on the point of leaving the regions of the East, he sent to Africa by sea the secretary Gaudentius, who (as I have hinted before) had been for some time in Gaul to watch the actions of Julian.[*](Cf. xvii. 9, 7.)

For he hoped that Gaudentius would be able to accomplish everything with prompt obedience for two reasons: both because he feared the adverse side, which he had offended, and because he would be eager to take advantage of this opportunity to commend himself

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to Constantius, who he thought would undoubtedly be the victor; for at that time there was no one at all who did not hold that firm conviction.

So when Gaudentius came there, mindful of the emperor’s injunctions, he informed Count Cretio and the other commanders by letter what was to be done, assembled the bravest soldiers from every hand, brought over light-armed skirmishers from both the Mauritanian provinces, and closely guarded the shores lying opposite to Aquitania and Italy.[*](One would rather expect Sicily (cf. § 5), or perhaps Spain; see crit. note.)

And Constantius made no mistake in adopting that plan, for so long as he lived none of his opponents reached those lands, although the coast of Sicily which extends from Lilybaeum to Pachynum was guarded by a strong armed force, which was ready to cross quickly, if an opportunity should offer.

When these and other less important and trifling matters had been arranged as Constantius thought would be to his advantage under the circumstances, he was informed by messages and letters of his generals that the Persian forces had united with their haughty king at their head, and were already drawing near to the banks of the Tigris, but that where they were intending to break through was uncertain.

Aroused by this news, Constantius left his winter quarters as speedily as pos- sible, in order to act from nearer at hand and so be able to anticipate the coming attempts. He gathered from all sides cavalry and the flower of his infantry, on which he relied, and crossing the Euphrates by Capersana[*](Cf. xviii. 8, 1.) on a bridge of boats, proceeded to Edessa, a city strongly fortified and well supplied with provisions; there he waited for a

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time, until scouts or deserters should give information of the moving of the enemy’s camp.