Noctes Atticae

The positive assertion of Julius Hyginus that he had read a manuscript of Virgil from the poet's own household, in which there was written et ora tristia temptantum sensus torquebit amaror and not the usual reading, sensu torquebit amaro.

NEARLY everyone reads these lines from the Georgics of Virgi [*](ii. 246 f.) in this way:

1. At sapor indicium faciet manifestus et ora
2. Tristia temptantum sensu torquebit amaro. [*](But the taste will tell its tale full plainly, and with its bitter flavour will distort the testers' poured mouths.)

Hyginus, however, on my word no obscure grammarian, in the Commentaries [*](Fr. 4, p. 528, Fun.) which he wrote on Virgil, declares and insists that it was not this that Virgil left, but what he himself found in a copy which had come from the home and family of the poet:

1. et ora
2. Tristia temptantum sensus torquebit amaror, [*](But the bitterness of the sensation will distort the testers' soured mouths.)

and this reading has commended itself, not to Hyginus alone, but also to some other learned men, because it seems absurd to say

the taste will distort with its bitter sensation.

Since,

they say,

taste itself is a sensation, it cannot have another sensation in itself, but it is exactly as if one should say, 'the sensation will distort with a bitter sensation.'

Moreover, when I had read Hyginus' note to Favorinus, and the strangeness and harshness of the phrase

sensu torquebit amaro

at once had displeased him, he said with a laugh:

I am ready to swear by Jupiter and the stone, [*](This much discussed oath is best taken as equivalent to per lovem et lapidem; see Fowler, Roman Festivals, p. 231; Nettleship, Essays, p. 35, and others. The locus classicus on the process is Polybius, iii. 25; of. Plutarch, Sulla, 10.) which is considered the most sacred of oaths, that Virgil never wrote that, but I believe that Hyginus is right. For Virgil was not the first to coin that word arbitrarily, but he found it in the poems of Lucretius and made use of it, not disdaining to follow the authority of a poet who excelled in talent and power of expression.

The passage, from the fourth book of Lucretius, reads as follows: [*](iv. 221 f.)

1. dilutaque contra
2. Cum tuimur misceri absinthia, tangit amaror. [*](When we look on at the mixing of a decoction of wormwood in our presence, its bitterness affects us.)

And in fact we see that Virgil imitated, not only single words of Lucretius, but often almost whole lines and passages.

Whether it is correct Latin for counsel for the defence to say superesse se,

that he is appearing for

those whom he is defending; and the proper meaning of superesse.

AN incorrect and improper meaning of a word has been established by long usage, in that we use the expression hic illi superest when we wish to say that anyone appears as another's advocate and pleads his cause. And this is not merely the language of the streets and of the common people, but is used in the forum, the comitium and the courts. Those, however, who have spoken language undefiled have

for the most part used superesse in the sense of

to overflow, be superfluous, or exceed the required amount.

Thus Marcus Varro, in the satire entitled

You know not what evening may bring,

[*](Fr. 340, Bücheler.) uses superfuisse in the sense of having exceeded the amount proper for the occasion. These are his words:

Not everything should be read at a dinner party, but preferably such works as are at the same time improving and diverting, so that this feature of the entertainment also may seem not to have been neglected, rather than overdone.

I remember happening to be present in the court of a praetor who was a man of learning, and that on that occasion an advocate of some repute pleaded in such fashion that he wandered from the subject and did not touch upon the point at issue. Thereupon the praetor said to the man whose case was before him:

You have no counsel.

And when the pleader protested, saying

I am present (supersum) for the honourable gentleman,

the praetor wittily retorted:

You surely present too much, but you do not represent your client.

[*](It is difficult to reproduce the word-play on superesse, be present for and be superfluous. There is a pun also on adesse, be present and help, assist.)

Marcus Cicero, too, in his book entitled On Reducing the Civil Law to a System [*](Fr. 2, p. 980, Orelli2; Fr. 1, Huschke, and Bremer.) wrote these words:

Indeed Quintus Aelius Tubero did not fall short of his predecessors in knowledge of the law, in learning he even outstripped them.

In this passage superfuit seems to mean

he went beyond, surpassed and excelled his predecessors in his learning, which, however, was excessive and overabundant

; [*](It was superfluous in being more than he needed for the practice of his profession.) for Tubero was thoroughly versed in Stoic dialectics. Cicero's use of the word in the second book [*](An error of Gellius; the reference is iii. 32.) of the Republic also deserves attention. This is the passage in question:

I should not object, Laelius, if I did not think that these friends wished, and if I myself did not desire, that you should take some part in this discussion of ours, especially since you yourself said yesterday that you would give us even more than enough (te superfuturum). But that indeed is impossible: we all ask you not to give us less than enough (ne desis).

Now Julius Paulus, the most learned man within my recollection, used to say witll keenness and understanding that superesse and its Greek equivalent had more than one meaning: for he declared that the Greeks used perisso/n both ways, either of what was superfluous and unnecessary or of what was too abundant, overflowing and excessive; that in the same way our earlier writers also employed superesse sometimes of what was superfluous, idle and not wholly necessary, a sense which we have just cited from Varro, and sometimes, as in Cicero, of that which indeed surpassed other things in copiousness and plentifulness, yet was immoderate and too extensive, and gushed forth more abundantly than was sufficient. Therefore one who says superesse se with reference to a man whom he is defending tries to convey none of these meanings, but uses superesse in a sense that is unknown and not in use. And he will not be able to appeal even to the authority of Virgil, who in his Georgics wrote as follows: [*](iii. 10.)

1. I will be first to bear, so but my life still last (supersit),
2. Home to my native land . . .

For in this place Virgil seems to have used that word somewhat irregularly in giving supersit the sense of

be present for a longer or more extended period,

but on the contrary his use of the word in the following line is more nearly the accepted one: [*](iii. 126.)

1. They cut him tender grass,
2. Give corn and much fresh water, that his strength
3. Be more than equal to (superesse) the pleasing toil.

for here superesse means to be more than equal to the task and not to be crushed by it.

I also used to raise the question whether the ancients used superesse in the sense of

to be left and be lacking for the completion of an act.

For to express that idea Sallust says, not superesse, but superare. These are his words in the Jugurtha: [*](lxx. 2.)

This man was in the habit of exercising a command independently of the king, and of attending to all business which had been left undone (superaverant) by Jugurtha when he was weary or engaged in more important affairs.

But we find in the third book of Ennius' Annals: [*](v. 158, Vahlen2.)

1. Then he declares one task's left over (super esse) for him,

that is, is left and remains undone; but there superesse must be divided and read as if it were not one part of speech, but two, as in fact it is. Cicero, however, in his second Oration against Antony [*](Phil. ii. 71, cum praescrtim belli pars tanta restaret.) expresses

what is left

by restare, not by superesse.

Besides these uses we find superesse with the meaning

survive.

For it is so employed in the book of letters of Marcus Cicero to Lucius Plancus, [*](The tenth book of the Epist. ad Fam. contains numerous letters of Cicero to Plancus and of Plancus to Cicero.) as well as in a letter of Marcus Asinius Pollio to Cicero, [*](Ad Fam. x. 33.5. It should be Gaius Asinius Pollio.) as follows:

For I wish neither to fail the commonwealth nor to survive it (superesse),

meaning that if the commonwealth should be destroyed and perish, he does not wish to live. Again in the Asinaria of Plautus that same force is still more evident in these, the first verses of that comedy: [*](v. 16.)

1. As you would hope to have your only son
2. Survive (superesse) you and be ever sound and hale.

Thus we have to avoid, not merely an improper use of the word, but also the evil omene, in case an older man, acting as advocate for a youth, should say that he

survives

him.

Who Papirius Praetextatus was; the reason for that surname; and the whole of the entertaining story about that same Papirius.

THE story of Papirius Praetextatus was told and committed to writing in the speech which Marcus Cato made To the soldiers against Galba,[*](xxxix, Jordan.) with great charm, brilliance and elegance of diction. I should have included Cato's own words in this very commentary, if I had had access to the book at the time when I dictated this extract. But if you would like to hear the bare tale, without the noble and dignified language, the incident was about as follows: It was formerly the custom at Rome for senators to enter the House with their sons under age. [*](The toga praetexta, with a purple border, was worn by senators and also by boys of free birth until they assumed the toga virlis.) In those days, when a matter of considerable importance

had been discussed and was postponed to the following day, it was voted that no one should mention the subject of the debate until the matter was decided. The mother of the young Papirius, who had been in the House with his father, asked her son what the Fathers had taken up in the senate. The boy replied that it was a secret and that he could not tell. The woman became all the more eager to hear about it; the secrecy of the matter and the boy's silence piqued her curiosity; she therefore questioned him more pressingly and urgently. Then the boy, because of his mother's insistence, resorted to a witty and amusing falsehood. He said that the senate had discussed the question whether it seemed more expedient, and to the advantage of the State, for one man to have two wives or one woman to have two husbands. On hearing this, she is panic-stricken, rushes excitedly from the house, and carries the news to the other matrons. Next day a crowd of matrons came to the senate, imploring with tears and entreaties that one woman might have two husbands rather than one man two wives. The senators, as they entered the House, were wondering at this strange madness of the women and the meaning of such a demand, when young Papirius, stepping forward to the middle of the House, told in detail what his mother had insisted on hearing, what he himself had said to her, in fact, the whole story exactly as it had happened. The senate paid homage to the boy's cleverness and loyalty, but voted that thereafter boys should not enter the House with their fathers, save only this Papirius; and the boy was henceforth honoured with the surname Praetextatus, because of his discretion in keeping silent and in speaking, while he was still young enough to wear the purple-bordered gown.

Three epitaphs of three early poets, Naevius, Plautus and Pacuvius, composed by themselves and inscribed upon their tombs.

THERE are three epitaphs of famous poets, Gnaeus Naevius, Plautus and Marcus Pacuvius, composed by themselves and left to be inscribed upon their tombs, which I have thought ought to be included among these notes, because of their distinction and charm.

The epitaph of Naevius, although full of Campanian [*](This has been regarded as evidence that Naevius was a native of Campania; but Campanian arrogance was proverbial.) arrogance, might have been regarded as a just estimate, if he had not written it himself: [*](The authorship of all these epitaphs is questioned: Gudeman thought they came from Varro's Imagines; see Trans. Amer Phil. Assoc. xxv, 150 ff.; cf p. 296. 3, Bährens.)

1. If that immortals might for mortals weep,
2. Then would divine Camenae [*](The Latin equivalent of the Greek Muses.) weep for Naevius.
3. For after he to Orcus as treasure was consigned,
4. The Romans straight forgot to speak the Latin tongue.

We should be inclined to doubt whether the epitaph of Plautus was really by his own hand, if it had not been quoted by Marcus Varro in the first book of his work On Poets: [*](p. 296. 4, Bährens.)

1. Since Plautus has met death, Comedy mourns,
2. Deserted is the stage; then Laughter, Sport and Wit,
3. And Music's countless numbers [*](Numeri innumeri was formerly rendered unrhythmic measures and applied to Plautus' supposed irregularities in scansion; it rather refers to the variety of his metres.) all together wept. [*](The metre of the Latin is dactylic hexameter; final a in deserta is lengthened, and s in ludus is suppressed.)

Pacuvius' epitaph is the most modest and simple, worthy of his dignity and good taste: [*](p. 296, 5, Bährens.)

1. Young man, although you haste, this little stone
2. Entreats thee to regard it, then to read its tale.
3. Here lie the bones of Marcus, hight Pacuvius.
4. Of this I would not have you unaware. Good-bye.

Marcus Varro's definition of the word

indutiae

; to which is added a somewhat careful investigation of the derivation of that word.

MARCUS VARRO, in that book of his Antiquities of Man which treats Of War and Peace, [*](xxii, fr. 1, 2, Mirsch.) defines indutiae (a truce) in two ways.

A truce,

he says,

is peace for a few days in camp;

and again in another place,

A truce is a holiday in war.

But each of these definitions seems to be wittily and happily concise rather than clear or satisfactory. For a truce is not a peace—since war continues, although fighting ceases—nor is it restricted to a camp or to a few days only. For what are we to say if a truce is made for some months, and the troops withdraw from camp into the towns? Have we not then also a truce? Again, if a truce is to be defined as only lasting for a few days, what are we to say of the fact, recorded by Quadrigarius in the first book of his Annals, that Gaius Pontius the Samnite asked the Roman dictator for a truce of six hours? [*](Fr. 21, Peter.) The definition

a holiday in war,

too, is rather happy than clear or precise.

Now the Greeks, more significantly and more pointedly, have called such an agreement to cease from fighting e)kexeiri/a, or

a staying of hands,

substituting for one letter of harsher sound a smoother one. [*](That is, e)kexeiri/a instead of an original e)xexeiri/a, from e)/xw and xei/r, the first x, an aspirate, being reduced to the smooth mute k, since in Greek an aspirate may not begin two successive syllables.) For since there is no fighting at such a time and their hands are withheld, they called it e)kexeiri/a. But it surely was not Varro's task to define a truce too scrupulously, and to observe all the laws and canons of definition; for he thought it sufficient to give an explanation of the kind which the Greeks call tu/poi (

typical

) and u(pografai/ (

outline

), rather than o(rismoi/ (

exact definition

).

I have for a long time been inquiring into the derivation of indutiae, but of the many explanations which I have either heard or read this which I am going to mention seems most reasonable. I believe that indutiae is made up of inde uti iam (

that from then on

). The stipulation of a truce is to this effect, that there shall be no fighting and no trouble up to a fixed time, but that after that time all the laws of war shall again be in force. Therefore, since a definite date is set and an agreement is made that before that date there shall be no fighting but when that time comes,

that from then on,

fighting shall be resumed: by uniting (as it were) and combining those words which I have mentioned the term indutiae is formed. [*](The correct derivation seems to be from *in-du-tus (cf. duellum for bellum), not in a state of war.)

But Aurelius Opilius, in the first book of his work entitled The Muses, says: [*](p. 88, Fun.)

It is called a truce when enemies pass back and forth from one side to another safely and without strife; from this the name seems to be formed, as if it were initiae, [*](This derivation is clearer from the older form induitiae; see the critical note.) that is, an approach and entrance.

I have not omitted this note of Aurelius, for fear that it might appear to some rival of these Nights a more elegant etymology, merely because he thought that it had escaped my notice when I was investigating the origin of the word.

The answer of the philosopher Taurus, when I asked him whether a wise man ever got angry.

I ONCE asked Taurus in his lecture-room whether a wise man got angry. For after his daily discourses he often gave everyone the opportunity of asking whatever questions he wished. On this occasion he first discussed the disease or passion of anger seriously and at length, setting forth what is to be fund in the books of the ancients and in his own commentaries; then, turning to me who had asked

the question, he said:

This is what I think about getting angry, but it will not be out of place for you to hear also the opinion of my master Plutarch, a man of great learning and wisdom. Plutarch,

said he,

once gave orders that one of his slaves, a worthless and insolent fellow, but one whose ears had been filled with the teachings and arguments of philosophy, should be stripped of his tunic for some offence or other and flogged. They had begun to beat him, and the slave kept protesting that he did not deserve the flogging; that he was guilty of no wrong, no crime. Finally, while the lashing still went on, he began to shout, no longer uttering complaints or shrieks and groans, but serious reproaches. Plutarch's conduct, he said, was unworthy of a philosopher; to be angry was shameful: his master had often descanted on the evil of anger and had even written an excellent treatise Peri\ )Aorghsi/as; [*](On Freedom from Anger; the work has not survived.) it was in no way consistent with all that was written in that book that its author should fall into a fit of violent rage and punish his slave with many stripes. Then Plutarch calmly and mildly made answer: ' What makes you think, scoundrel, that I am now angry with you. Is it from my expression, my voice, my colour, or even my words, that you believe me to be in the grasp of anger? In my opinion my eyes are not fierce, my expression is not disturbed, I am neither shouting madly nor foaming at the mouth and getting red in the face; I am saying nothing to cause me shame or regret; I am not trembling at all from anger or making violent gestures. For all these actions, if you did but know it, are the usual signs of angry passions.' And with these words, turning to the man who was plying the lash,

v1.p.119

he said: 'In the meantime, while this fellow and I are arguing, do you keep at it.'

Now the sum and substance of Taurus' whole disquisition was this: he did not believe that a)orghsi/a or

freedom from anger,

and a)nalghsi/a, or

lack of sensibility,

were identical; but that a mind not prone to anger was one thing, a spirit a)na/lghtos and a)nai/sqhtos, that is, callous and unfeeling, quite another. For as of all the rest of the emotions which the Latin philosophers call affects or affectiones, and the Greeks pa/qh, so of the one which, when it becomes a cruel desire for vengeance, is called

anger,

he did not recommend as expedient a total lack, ste/rhsis as the Greeks say, but a moderate amount, which they call metrio/ths.