Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

deny that there are controversial themes of this kind where figures may legitimately be employed, as, for example, the following:

A man was accused of unnatural murder on the ground that he had killed his brother, and it seemed probable that he would be condemned. His father gave evidence in his defence, stating that the murder had been committed on his orders. The son was acquitted, but disinherited by the
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father.
For in this case he does not pardon his son entirely, but cannot openly withdraw the evidence that he gave in the first trial, and while he does not inflict any worse penalty than disinheritance, he does not shrink from that. Further, the employment of the figure tells more heavily against the father than is fair and less against the son. [*]( The sense is quite uncertain. The simplest interpretation is perhaps that the father's action and the figura by which he defends himself show that his evidence in the previous trial was false. The son has been acquitted on the father's evidence, and the father by punishing him has put himself in a hopelessly false position. )

But, while no one ever speaks against the view which he wishes to prevail, he may wish something of greater importance than what he actually says. Thus the disinherited son who asks his father to take back another son whom he had exposed, and who had been brought up by himself, on payment for his maintenance, while he may prefer that he himself should be reinstated, may all the same be perfectly sincere in his demand on behalf of his brother. Again, a kind of tacit hint may be employed, which,

while demanding the utmost rigour of the law from the judges, suggests a loophole for clemency, not openly, for that would imply a pledge on our part, but by giving a plausible suspicion of our meaning. This device is employed in a number of controversial themes, among them the following.

A ravisher, unless within thirty days he secure pardon both from his own father and the father of the ravished girl, shall be put to death. A man who has succeeded in securing pardon from the father of the girl, but not from his own, accuses the latter of madness.

Here if the father pledges himself to pardon him, the dispute falls to the ground. If, on the other hand, he holds out no hope of pardon, though he will not necessarily be regarded as mad, he will certainly give the impression of cruelty and will prejudice the judge against him. Latro

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therefore showed admirable skill when he made the son say,
You will kill me then?
and the father reply,
Yes, if I can.
[*](Si potero is ambiguous. It might mean If I have the heart to do so. Here lies the loophole for clemency to which Quintilian has referred. ) The elder Gallio treats the theme with greater tenderness, as was natural to a man of his disposition. He makes the father say,
Be firm, my heart, be firm. Yesterday you were made of sterner stuff.

Akin to this are those figures of which the Greeks are so fond, by means of which they give gentle expression to unpleasing facts. Themistocles, for example, is believed to have urged the Athenians to commit their city to the protection of heaven, because to urge them to abandon it would have been too brutal an expression. Again the statesman [*](Unknown.) who advised that certain golden images of Victory should be melted down as a contribution to the war funds, modified his words by saying that they should make a proper use of their victories. But all such devices which consist in saying one thing, while intending something else to be understood, have a strong resemblance to allegory.

It has also been asked how figures may best be met. Some hold that they should always be exposed by the antagonist, just as hidden ulcers are laid open by the surgeon. It is true that this is often the right course, being the only means of refuting the charges which have been brought against us, and this is more especially the case when the question turns on the very point at which the figures are directed. But when the figures are merely employed as vehicles of abuse, it will sometimes even be wisest to show that we have a clear conscience by ignoring them.

Nay, even if too many figures have been used to permit us to take such a course, we may ask our opponents, if they

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have any confidence in the righteousness of their cause, to give frank and open expression to the charges which they have attempted to suggest by indirect hints, or at any rate to refrain from asking the judges not merely to understand, but even to believe things which they themselves are afraid to state in so many words.

It may even at times be found useful to pretend to misunderstand them; for which we may compare the well known story of the man who, when his opponent cried,

Swear by the ashes of your father,
[*]( See v. vi. 1. An oath might be taken by one of the parties as an alternative to evidence. In court such an oath might be taken only on the proposal of the defendant. The taking of such a proffered oath meant victory for the swearer. ) replied that he was ready to do so, whereupon the judge accepted the proposal, much to the indignation of the advocate, who protested that this would make the use of figures absolutely impossible; we may therefore lay it down as a general rule that such figures should only be used with the utmost caution.

There remains the third class of figure designed merely to enhance the elegance of our style, for which reason Cicero expresses the opinion that such figures are independent of the subject in dispute. As an illustration I may quote the figure which he uses in his speech [*]( Lost. An allusion presumably to the occasion when Clodius was found disguised as a woman at the mysteries of the Bona Dea. ) against Clodius:

By these means he, being familiar with all our holy rites, thought that he might easily succeed in appeasing the gods.

Irony also is frequently employed in this connexion. But by far the most artistic device

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is to indicate one thing by allusion to another; take the case where a rival candidate speaks against an ex-tyrant who had abdicated on condition of his receiving an amnesty [*]( An example of this theme is preserved in the elder Seneca, Excerpt. controv. 5, 8. One candidate is permitted to speak against another. A tyrant has abdicated on condition of an amnesty and that any one who charged him with having been a tyrant should be liable to capital punishment. The ex-tyrant stands for a magistracy. The rival candidate speaks against him. The irony is in the last sentence. ) :
I am not permitted to speak against you. Do you speak against me, as you may. But a little while ago I wished to kill you.

Another common device is to introduce an oath, like the speaker who, in defending a disinherited man, cried,

So may I die leaving a son to be my heir.
[*]( By this wish he expresses his disapproval of such acts as the disinheritance of a son. ) But this is not a figure which is much to be recommended, for as a rule the introduction of an oath, unless it is absolutely necessary, is scarcely becoming to a self-respecting man. Seneca made a neat comment to this effect when he said that oaths were for the witness and not for the advocate. Again, the advocate who drags in an oath merely for the sake of some trivial rhetorical effect, does not deserve much credit, unless he can do this with the masterly effect achieved by Demosthenes, which I mentioned above. [*](§62.)

But by far the most trivial form of figure is that which turns on a single word, although we find such a figure directed against Clodia by Cicero [*](pro Cael. xiii. 32. The word is amica, which means either mistress or friend. ) :

Especially when everybody thought her the friend of all men rather than the enemy of any.

I note that comparison is also regarded as a figure, although at times it is a form of proof, [*]( See v. xi. 32 (where for hredem read heredi with MSS.) The man to whom the usufruct of a house has been left will not restore it in the interests of the heir if it collapses: just as he would not replace a slave if he should die. ) and at others the whole case may turn upon it, [*](E.g. when the accused admits that he is guilty of a crime, but seeks to show that his wrongdoing was the cause of greater good. ) while its form may be illustrated by the following passage from

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the pro Murena: [*](pro Muren. ix. 22. )
You pass wakeful nights that you may be able to reply to your clients; he that he and his army may arrive betimes at their destination. You are roused by cockcrow, he by the bugle's reveille,
and so on.

I am not sure, however, whether it is so much a figure of thought as of speech. For the only difference lies in the fact that universals are not contrasted with universals, but particulars with particulars. Celsus, however, and that careful writer Visellius regard it as a figure of thought, while Rutilius Lupus regards it as belonging to both, and calls it antithesis.

To the figures placed by Cicero among the ornaments of thought Rutilius (following the views of Gorgias, a contemporary, whose four books he transferred to his own work, and who is not to be confused with Georgias of Leontini) and Celsus (who follows Rutilius) would add a number of others, such as:

concentration, which the Greek calls διαλλαγή [*](διαλλαγή is corrupt, but the correct term has not yet been discovered. MSS. ΔΙΑΜΑΤΗΝ, ΔΙΑΜΑΠΗΝ, etc. ) a term employed when a number of different arguments are used to establish one point: consequence, which Gorgias calls ἐπακολούθησις and which I have already discussed under the head of argument [*](See v. xiv. 1.) : inference, which Gorgias terms συλλογισμός threats, that is, κατάπληξις exhortation, or παραινετικόν But all of these are perfectly straightforward methods of speaking, unless combined with some one of the figures which I have discussed above.

Besides these, Celsus considers the following to be figures: exclusion, asseveration, refusal, [*]( The meaning of detrectare is uncertain It may mean refuse to deal with some topic, or simply detract. ) excitement of the judge, the use of proverbs, the employment of quotations from poetry, jests, invidious remarks or invocation to intensify a charge (which is identical with δείνωσις ) flattery,

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pardon, disdain, admonition, apology, entreaty and rebuke.

He even includes partition, proposition, division and affinity between two separate things, by which latter he means that two things apparently different signify the same: for example, not only the man who murders another by administering a deadly draught is to be regarded as a poisoner, but also the man who deprives another of his wits by giving him some drug, a point which depends on definition.

To these Rutilius or Gorgias add ἀναγκαῖον that is, the representation of the necessity of a thing, ἀνάμνησις or reminding, ἀνθυποφορά that is, replying to anticipated objections, ἀντίῤῥησις or refutation, παραύξησις or amplification, προέκθεσις which means pointing out what ought to have been done, and then what actually has been done, ἐναντιότης, or arguments from opposites [*]( See IX. iii. 90. For enthymemes κατ᾽ ἐνατίωσιν, see v. xiv. 2. and note on ex pugnantibus, Vol. II. p. 524. ) (whence we get enthymemes styled κατ᾽ ἐναντίωσιν ), and even μετάληψις, which Hermagoras considers a basis. [*]( See III. vi. 46. The term is not used here in the same sense as in VIII. vi. 37, but rather = translatio, see III. vi. 23. Lit. translatio means transference of the charge : the sense is virtually the same as that of exceptio (a plea made by defendant in bar of plaintiffs action). Competence is perhaps the least unsatisfactory rendering. ) Visellius, although he makes the number of figures but small, includes among them the enthymeme, which he calls commentum, and the epicheireme, which he calls ratio. [*](See note on v. xiv. 5, Vol. II. p. 524.) This view is also partially accepted by Celsus, who is in doubt whether consequence is not to be identified with the epicheireme.

Visellius also adds general reflexions to the list. I find others who would add to these διασκευή [*](Apparently some form of exaggeration.) or enhancement, ἀπαγόρευσις or prohibition, and παραδιήγησις or incidental narrative. But though these are not figures, there may be others which have slipped my notice, or are yet to be invented: still, they will be of the same nature as those of which I have spoken above.

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