Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

Nor is it only past or present actions which we may imagine: we may equally well present a picture of what is likely to happen or might have happened. This is done with extraordinary skill by Cicero in his defence of Milo, [*](Ch. 32.) where he shows what Clodius would have done, had he succeeded in securing the praetorship. But this transference of time, which is technically called μετάστασις was more modestly used in vivid description by the old orators. For they would preface it by words such as

Imagine that you see
: take, for example, the words of Cicero [*](Not found in extant works of Cicero.) :
Though you cannot see this with your bodily eyes, you can see it with the mind's eye.

Modern authors, however, more especially the declaimers, are bolder, indeed they show the utmost animation in giving rein to their imagination; witness the following passages from Seneca's treatment of the controversial theme in which a father, guided by one of his sons, finds another son in the act of adultery with his stepmother and kills both culprits.

Lead me, I follow, take this old hand of mine and direct it where you will.

And a little later,

See, he says, what for so long you refused to believe. As for myself, I cannot see, night and thick darkness veil my eyes.
This figure is too dramatic: for the story seems to be acted, not narrated.

Some include the clear and vivid description of places under the same heading, while others call it topography. I have found some who speak of irony as dissimulation, but, in view of the fact that this latter name

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does not cover the whole range of this figure, I shall follow my general rule and rest content with the Greek term. Irony involving a figure does not differ from the irony which is a trope, as far as its genus is concerned, since in both cases we understand something which is the opposite of what is actually said; on the other hand, a careful consideration of the species of irony will soon reveal the fact that they differ.

In the first place, the trope is franker in its meaning, and, despite the fact that it implies something other than it says, makes no pretence about it. For the context as a rule is perfectly clear, as, for example, in the following passage from the Catilinarian orations. [*](I. viii. 19.)

Rejected by him, you migrated to your boon-companion, that excellent gentleman Metellus.
In this case the irony lies in two words, and is therefore a specially concise form of trope.

But in the figurative form of irony the speaker disguises his entire meaning, the disguise being apparent rather than confessed. For in the trope the conflict is purely verbal, while in the figure the meaning, and sometimes the whole aspect of our case, conflicts with the language and the tone of voice adopted; nay, a man's whole life may be coloured with irony, as was the case with Socrates, who was called an ironist because he assumed the role of an ignorant man lost in wonder at the wisdom of others. Thus, as continued metaphor develops into allegory, so a sustained series of tropes develops into this figure.

There are, however, certain kinds of this figure which have no connexion with tropes. In the first place, there is the figure which derives its name from negation and is called by some ἀντίφρασις. Here is an example:

I will not plead against you according to the rigour
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of the law, I will not press the point which I should perhaps be able to make good
[*](Verr. v. ii. 4. ) ; or again,
Why should I mention his decrees, his acts of plunder, his acquisition, whether by cession or by force, of certain inheritances?
[*](Phil. II. xxv. 62. ) or
I say nothing of the first wrong inflicted by his lust
; or
I do not even propose to produce the evidence given concerning the 600,000 sesterces
;

or

I might say, etc.
[*](pro Cael. xxii. 53. ) Such kinds of irony may even be sustained at times through whole sections of our argument, as, for instance, where Cicero [*](pro Cluent. lx. 166. ) says,
If I were to plead on this point as though there were some real charge to refute, I should speak at greater length.
It is also irony when we assume the tone of command or concession, as in Virgil's [*](Aen. iv. 381. Dido to Aeneas. She continues by praying for his destruution. )
  1. Go!
  2. Follow the winds to Italy;

or when we concede to our opponents qualities which we are unwilling that they should seem to possess. This is specially effective when we possess these qualities and they do not, as in the following passage, [*](Aen. xi. 383. Turnus addresses Drances, who has been attacking him as the cause of the war and bidding him fight himself, if he would win Lavinia for his bride. )

  1. Brand me as coward, Drances, since thy sword
  2. Has slain such hosts of Trojans.
A like result is produced by reversing this method when we pretend to own to faults which are not ours or which even recoil upon the heads of our opponents, as for example,
  1. 'Twas I that led the Dardan gallant on
  2. To storm the bridal bed of Sparta's queen!
Aen. x. 92. Juno ironically pretends to have brought about the rape of Helen, which was in reality the work of Venus.

Further, this device of saying the opposite of what

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we desire to imply is not merely restricted to persons, but may be extended to things, witness the whole of the exordium of the pro Ligario and disparaging phrases such as
Forsooth,
ye great gods!
or
  1. Fit task, I ween, for gods!
Aen. iv,. 379. Dido mocks the excuse of Aeneas that he had received the direct command of heaven to leave Carthage.

Another example is provided by the following passage from the pro Oppio,

What wondrous love! what extraordinary benevolence!
Akin to irony also are the following figures, which have a strong family resemblance: confession of a kind that can do our case no harm, such as the following [*](pro Lig. i. 2. ) :
You have now, Tubero, the advantage most desired by an accuser: the accused confesses his guilt
; secondly, concession, when we pretend to admit something actually unfavourable to ourselves by way of showing our confidence in our cause, as in the following passage [*](Verr. v. xliv. 117 ) :
The commander of a ship from a distinguished city paid down a sum of money to rid himself of the fear of a scourging which hung over his head; it shows Verres' humanity
; or again, in the pro Cluentio, [*](pro Cluet. ii. 5. ) where Cicero is speaking of the prejudice aroused against his client,
Let it prevail in the public assembly, but be silent in the courts of law
; thirdly, agreement, as when Cicero, [*]( pro Cluent. xxiii. 63. ) in the same speech, agrees that the jury was bribed.

This last form of figure becomes more striking when we agree to something which is really likely to tell in our favour; but such an opportunity can only occur through weakness on the part of our opponent Sometimes we may even praise some action of our opponent, as Cicero does in his prosecution of Verres [*](Verr. xvii. 37. i.e. Apollonius deserved it. ) when dealing with the charge in connexion with

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Apollonius of Drepanum:
Nay, it is a real pleasure to me to think that you took something from him, and I say that you never did a juster action in your life.

At times we may exaggerate charges against ourselves which we can easily refute or deny; this device is too common to require any illustration. At other times we may by this same method make the charges brought against us seem incredible just because of their gravity: thus Cicero in his defence of Roscius, [*](Roscius of Ameria was accused of parricide.) by the sheer force of his eloquence, exaggerates the horror of parricide, despite the fact that it requires no demonstration.

Aposiopesis, which Cicero [*](See quotation in IX. i. 31.) calls reticentia, Celsus obticentia, and some interruptio, is used to indicate passion or anger, as in the line: [*](Aen. i. 135. Neptune rebukes the winds for raising a storm, but breaks off without actually saying what he would do to them. )

  1. Whom I—
  2. But better first these billows to assuage.
Or it may serve to give an impression of anxiety or scruple, as in the following: [*]( Now frequently inserted in pro Mil. xii. 33. But it is quite possible that the words formed part of the speech actually delivered, and do not belong to the existing speech, from the MSS. from which they are absent. The law proposed to give freedmen the right to vote in all thirty-five tribes and not as before in the four city-tribes only. )
Would he have dared to mention this law of which Clodius boasts he was the author, while Milo was alive, I will not say was consul? For as regards all of us—I do not dare to complete the sentence.
There is a similar instance in the exordium of Demosthenes' speech in defence of Ctesiphon. [*]( § 3. ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοὶ—οὐ βούλομαι δὲ δυσχερὲς εἰπεῖν οὐδέν. )

Again it may be employed as a means of transition, as, for example, [*]( From thepro Cornelio. )

Cominius, however— nay, pardon me, gentlemen.
This last instance also involves digression, if indeed digression is to be counted among figures, since some authorities regard it as forming one of the parts of a speech. [*](cp. xv. iii. 12. ) For at
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this point the orator diverges to sing the praises of Gnaeus Pompeius, which he might have done without any recourse to aposiopesis.

For as Cicero [*](From the passage quoted IX. i. 28.) says, the shorter form of digression may be effected in a number of different ways. The following passages will, however, suffice as examples:

Then Gaius Varenus, that is, the Varenus who was killed by the slaves of Ancharius:—I beg you, gentlemen, to give careful attention to what I am about to say [*]( From the lost pro Varcno. ) ;
the second is from the pro Milone [*](xii. 33.) :
Then he turned on me that glance, which it was his wont to assume, when he threatened all the world with every kind of violence.

There is also another kind of figure, which is not aposiopesis, since that involves leaving a sentence unfinished, but consists in bringing our words to a close before the natural point for their conclusion. The following is an example [*](pro Lig. iii. 9. ) :

I am pressing my point too far; the young man appears to be moved
; or [*]( A free quotation from Verr. v. xliv. 116 )
Why should I say more? you heard the young man tell the story himself.
The imitation of other persons' characteristics,

which is styled ἠθοποιί͂α or, as some prefer μίμησις may be counted among the devices which serve to excite the gentler emotions. For it consists mainly in banter, though it may be concerned either with words or deeds. If concerned with the latter, it closely resembles ὑποτύπωσις while the following passage from Terence [*](Eun. I. ii. 75. ) will illustrate it as applied to words:

I didn't see your drift. 'A little girl was stolen from this place; my mother brought her up as her own daughter. She was known as my sister. I want to get her away to restore her to her relations.'

We may, however, imitate our own words and deeds in a similar fashion by relating some

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act or statement, though in such cases the speaker more frequently does so to assert his point than for the sake of banter, as, for example, in the following, [*](Div. in Caec. ii. 4. Cicero ironically suggested to the Sicilians that Caecilius should undertake their case. He was a bogus accuser put forward by Verres himself, whose quaest or he had been in Sicily. )
I said that they had Quintus Caecilius to conduct the prosecution.
There are other devices also which are agreeable in themselves and serve not a little to commend our case both by the introduction of variety and by their intrinsic naturalness, since by giving our speech an appearance of simplicity and spontaneity they make the judges more ready to accept our statements without suspicion.

Thus we may feign repentance for what we have said, as in the pro Caelio, [*](xv. 35.) where Cicero says,

But why did I introduce so respectable a character?
Or we may use some common phrase, such as,
I didn't mean to say that.
[*](Verr. IV. xx. 43. ) Or we may pretend that we are searching for what we should say, as in the phrases,
What else is there?
or
Have I left anything out?
Or we may pretend to discover something suggested by the context, as when Cicero [*](pro Cluent. lxi. 169. ) says,
One more charge, too, of this sort still remains for me to deal with,
or
One thing suggests another.