Institutio Oratoria

Or we may admit the judges to our deliberations, a device which is frequently called into play. We may say,

What do you advise?

I ask you,

What, then, should have been done?

Come now, if you had been in his place, what else would you have done?

Imagine this to be a matter which concerns us all, and assume you have been placed in charge of the whole affair.

Sometimes, however, in such forms of communication we may add something unexpected, a device which is in itself a figure, as Cicero does in the Verrines:

What then? What think you? Perhaps you expect to hear of some theft or plunder.

For we may adopt exactly the opposite procedure to that just mentioned, and after raising expectation of a sequel of the most serious nature, we may drop to something which is of a trivial character, and may even imply no offence at all. But since this does not necessarily involve any form of communication, some have given it the name of paradox or surprise.

I do not agree with those who extend the name of figure to a statement that something has happened unexpectedly to the

Gentlemen, I never thought it would come to pass that, when Scaurus was the accused, I should have to entreat you not to allow influence to carry any weight on his behalf.

The figure known as concession springs from practically the same source as communication; it occurs when we leave some things to the judgment of the jury, or even in some cases of our opponents, as when Calvus says to Vatinius,

Summon all your assurance and assert that you have a better claim than Cato to be elected praetor.

The figures best adapted for intensifying emotion consist chiefly in simulation. For we may feign that we are angry, glad, afraid, filled with wonder, grief or indignation, or that we wish something, and so on. Hence we get passages like the following:

I am free, I breathe again,

It is well,

What madness is this?

Alas! for these degenerate days!

Woe is me; for though all my tears are shed my grief still clings to me deep-rooted in my heart,

1. Gape now, wide earth.

Unknown.

and include it among figures of speech. When, however, such exclamations are genuine, they do not come under the head of our present topic: it is only those which are simulated and artfully designed which can with any certainty be regarded as figures. The same is true of free speech, which Corificius [*]( The author of Auct. ad Herennium, iv. 36. ) calls licence, and the Greeks παῤῥησία. For what has less of the figure about it than true freedom? On the other hand, freedom of speech may frequently be made a

For when Cicero in his defence for Ligarius says,

After war had begun, Caesar, and was well on its way to a conclusion, I deliberately, of my own free will and under no compulsion, joined the forces of your opponents,

On the other hand, in the sentence,

What else was our aim, Tubero, than that we might secure the power which he now holds?

By this means we display the inner thoughts of our adversaries as though they were talking with themselves (but we shall only carry conviction if we represent them as uttering what they may reasonably be supposed to have had in their minds); or without sacrifice of credibility we may introduce conversations between ourselves and others, or of others among themselves, and put words of advice, reproach, complaint, praise or pity into the mouths of appropriate persons.

Nay, we are even allowed in this form of speech to bring down the gods from heaven and raise the dead, while cities also and peoples may find a voice. There are some authorities who restrict the term imepersonation to cases where both persons and words are fictitious, and prefer to call imaginary conversations between men by the Greek name of dialogue, which some [*]( Cornific. op. cit. iv. 43 and 52. ) translate

For my own part, I have included both under the same generally accepted term, since we cannot imagine a speech without we also imagine a person to utter it. But when we lend a voice to things to which nature has denied it, we may soften down the figure in the way illustrated by the following passage:

For if my country, which is far dearer to me than life itself, if all Italy, if the whole commonwealth were to address me thus, 'Marcus Tullius, what dost thou?

Your country, Catiline, pleads with you thus, and though she utters never a word, cries to you, 'For not a few years past no crime has come to pass save through your doing!'

It is also convenient at times to pretend that we have before our eyes the images of things, persons or utterances, or to marvel that the same is not the case with our adversaries or the judges; it is with this design that we use phrases such as

It seems to me,

Does it not seem to you?

But we may introduce not only imaginary sayings, but imaginary writings as well, as is done by Asinius in his defence of Liburnia:

Let my mother, who was the object of my love and my delight, who lived for me and gave me life twice in one day [*]( The speech being lost, the allusion in bis — dedit is unintelligible. ) (and so on) inherit nought of my property.

For a will had been read out by the prosecution, in the following form:

Let Publius Novanius Gallio, to whom as my benefactor I will and owe all that is good, as a testimony to the great affection which he has borne me (then follow other details) be my heir.

Again, we often personify the abstract, as Virgil [*](Aen. iv. 174. ) does with Fame, or as Xenophon [*](Mem. ii. 1. ) records that Prodicus did with Virtue and Pleasure, or as Ennius does when, in one of his satires, he represents Life and Death contending with one another. We may also introduce some imaginary person without identifying him, as we do in the phrases,

At this point some one will interpose,

Some one will say.

Or speech may be inserted without any mention of the speaker, as in the line: [*](Aen. ii. 29. The words represent what some Trojan said after the departure of the Greeks. )

1. Here the Dolopian host
2. Camped, here the fierce Achilles pitched his tent.

That cities, like other things, spring from the humblest origins, and that those who are helped by their own valour and the favour of heaven subsequently win great power and a great name for themselves.

which consists in the diversion of our address from the judge, is wonderfully stirring, whether we attack our adversary as in the passage,

What was that sword of yours doing, Tubero, in the field of Pharsalus?

For I appeal to you, hills and groves of Alba,

O Porcian and Sempronian laws.

But the term apostrophe is also applied to utterances that divert the attention of the hearer from the question before them, as in the following passage:

1. I swore not with the Greeks
2. At Aulis to uproot the race of Troy.

Aen. iv. 425. Dido is urging Anna to approach Aeneas and induce Aeneas to postpone his departure. Dido is no enemy from whom he need fly.

With regard to the figure which Cicero [*](de Or. liii. 202. ) calls ocular denonstration, this comes into play when we do not restrict ourselves to mentioning that something was done, but proceed to show how it was done, and do so not merely on broad general lines, but in full detail. In the last book [*]( VIII. Iii. 61 sqq. ) I classified this figure under the head of vivid illustration, while Celsus actually terms it by this name. Others give the name of ὑποτύπωσις to any representation of facts which is made in such vivid language that they appeal to the eye rather than the ear. The

He came into the forum on fire with criminal madness: his eyes blazed and cruelty was written in every feature of his countenance.