Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

V. When the ancients used the word sententia, they meant a feeling, or opinion. The word is frequently used in this sense by orators, and traces of this meaning are still found even in the speech of every day. For when we are going to take an oath we use the phrase ex animi nostri sententia (in accordance with what we hold is the solemn truth), and when we offer congratulations, we say that we do so ex sententia (with all our heart). The ancients, indeed, often expressed the same meaning by saying that they uttered their sensa; for they regarded senses as referring merely to the senses of the body.

But modern usage applies sensus to concepts of the mind, while sentcntia is applied to striking reflexions such as are more especially introduced at the close of our periods, a practice rare in earlier days, but carried even to excess in our own. Accordingly, I think that I ought to say something of the various forms which such reflexions may tale and the manner in which they should be used.

Although all the different forms are included under the same name, the oldest type of sententia, and that in which the term is most correctly applied,

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is the aphorism, called γνώμη by the Greeks. Both the Greek and the Latin names are derived from the fact that such utterances resemble the decrees or resolutions of public bodies. The term, however, is of wide application (indeed, such reflexions may be deserving of praise even when they have no reference to any special context), and is used in various ways. Sometimes it refers merely to things, as in the sentence:

There is nothing that wins the affections of the people more than goodness of heart. [*]( Cic. pro Lig. xii. 37. )

Occasionally, again, they may have a personal reference, as in the following utterance of Domitius Afer:

The prince who would know all, must needs ignore much.

Some have called this form of reflexion a part of the enthymeme, others the major premise or conclusion of the epichireme, as it sometimes, though not invariably, is. More correct is the statement that at times it is simple, as in the example just quoted, while at other times a reason for the statement may be added, [*]( The premises of the enthymeme are simple, while those of the epichireme are supported by a reason. See v. xiv. ) such as the following: [*](Sall. Jug. 10. )

For in every struggle, the stronger seems not to suffer wrong, even when this is actually the case, but to inflict it, simply in virtue of his superior power.

Sometimes, again, it may be double, as in the statement that

Complaisance wins us friends, truth enmity.
Ter. Andr. I. i. 41.

There are some even who classify them under ten [*](##) heads, though the principle on which they make this division is such that it would justify a still larger number: they class them as based on interrogation, comparison, denial, similarity, admiration, and the like, for they can be treated under every

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kind of figure. A striking type is that which is produced by opposition:

Death is not bitter, but the approach to death.
Author unknown.

Others are cast in a form of a direct statement,

such as

The miser lacks
That which he has no less than what he has not.
Publil. Syr. Sent. 486.

But they acquire greater force by a change in the figure employed, as in the following:

Is it so bitter, then, to die?
Aen. xii. 646.

For this is more vigorous than the simple statement,

Death is not bitter.

A similar effect may be produced by transference of' the statement from the general to the particular. For example, although the direct statement would be,

To hurt is easy, but to do good is hard.

Ovid [*](In his lost tragedy, the Medea.) gives this reflexion increased force when lie makes Medea say,

I had the power to save, and ask you then
If I have power to ruin?

Cicero [*](' Pro Lig. xii. 38. ) again gives the general statement a personal turn when he says:

Caesar, the splendour of your present fortune confers on you nothing greater than the power and nothing better than the will to save as many of your fellow-citizens as possible.

For here he attributes to Caesar what was really attributable to the circumstances of his power. In this class of reflexion we must be careful, as always, not to employ them too frequently, nor at random, nor place them in the mouth of every kind of person,

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while we must make certain that they are not untrue, as is so often the case with those speakers who style them reflexions of universal application and recklessly employ whatever seems to support their case as though its truth were beyond question.

Such reflexions are best suited to those speakers whose authority is such that their character itself will lend weight to their words. For who would tolerate a boy, or a youth, or even a man of low birth who presumed to speak with all the authority of a judge and to thrust his precepts down our throats?

The term enthymeme may be applied to any concept of the mind, but in its strict sense means a reflexion drawn from contraries. Consequently, it has a supremacy among reflexions which we may compare to that of Homer among poets and Rome among cities.