Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

Tile term enthymeme [*](For this chapter see note prefixed to Index.) is applied not merely to the actual argument, that is to say, the matter adduced to prove something else, but also to its expression, the nature of which, as I have already pointed out, is twofold. [*](cp. v. x. 2. ) It may be drawn from denial of consequents, when it will consist of a proposition immediately followed by a proof, as in the following passage from the pro Ligario; [*]( vi. 19. The cause helped by heaven is that of Caesar. cp. Lucan's victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni. )

At that point the justice of the cause was doubtful, since there was something to be said on both sides. But now we can only regard that cause as superior, which even the gods supported.

Here we have a proposition and a reason, but no formal conclusion: it is therefore tile incomplete syllogism known as an enthymeme.

It may on the other hand be drawn from incompatibles, in which case the proof will be much stronger; indeed some restrict the title of enthymeme [*](cp. v. x. 2. ) to this form of argument. The following passage from the pro Milone [*](xxix. 79. The death is that of Clodius.) of Cicero will provide a parallel:

You are then sitting there to avenge the death of a man whom you would refuse to restore to life, even if you thought it within your power to do so.

This form of argument may even at times consist of a number of clauses, as in the following passage from the same speech [*](xvi. 41.) :

Was he resolved then to kill to the dissatisfaction of some a man whom he refused to kill to the satisfaction of all? Are we to believe that he did not hesitate, in defiance of the law and
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despite the unfavourable circumstances both of time and place and the risk involved to his own life, to kill one whom he did not venture to kill when he might have done so legally, at his own time and place and without the least danger to himself?

The most effective kind of enthymeme seems however to be that in which a reason is subjoined to a dissimilar or contrary proposition as in the following passage from Demosthenes [*](in Androt. § 7; in Aristocr. § 99. ) :

For if at any time an act has been committed contrary to law and you have imitated it, it does not therefore follow that you should go scot free; on the contrary it is an additional reason why you should be condemned. For if any of those who transgressed the law had been condemned, you would not have proposed this, and further, if you are condemned, no one else will propose anything of the kind.

As regards the epicheieme, some authorities hold that it consists of four, five, and even six parts. Cicero [*](de Inv. I. xxxvii. 67. ) urges that there are not more than five at most, i.e. the major premise and its reason, the minor premise and its proof, and fifthly the conclusion. But since at times the major premise does not require a reason nor the minor a proof, while occasionally even the conclusion is not necessary, he holds that the epicheireme may consist of only four, three, or even two parts.

Personally however follow the majority of authorities in holding that there are not more than three parts. For it follows from the very nature of reasoning that there must be something to form the subject of enquiry and something else to provide the proof, while the third element which has to be added may be regarded as resulting from the agreement of the two previous

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elements. Thus the first part will be the major, the second the minor premise and the third the conclusion. For the confirmation and development of both premises may reasonably be included in the parts to which they belong.

Let us then take an example from Cicero [*](de Inv. 3. xxxiv. 58. ) of the epicheireme consisting of five parts.

Those things which are controlled by reason are better governed than those which are not.

This they call the first part and consider that it requires to be established by various reasons and a copious display of eloquence. Personally I hold that the whole of this together with its reason forms but one part. Otherwise, if the reason is to be treated as a separate part and if there are a variety of reasons, this will involve an addition to the number of parts. Next he produces the minor premise:

But there is nothing better administered than the universe.

The proof of this minor premise is treated as the fourth part of the epicheireme. My criticism of this statement is identical with my criticism of the preceding.

The fifth place they assign to the conclusion which either merely makes the necessary inference from the preceding parts ( i.e.

Therefore the universe is governed by reason

) or after briefly bringing major and minor premise together adds what is deduced from them with the following result:

But if on the one hand things that are controlled by reason are better governed than things which are not and on the other nothing is better administered than the universe, then it follows that the universe is governed by reason.

As regards this part of the epicheireme I agree.

I have said that the epicheireme consists of three parts: its form is not however invariable. There is

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firstly the form in which the conclusion is identical with what has already been stated in the major premise.

The soul is immortal, since whatever derives its motion from itself is immortal. But the soul derives its motion from itself. Therefore the soul is immortal.

This process occurs not merely in individual arguments, but in whole cases, provided they are of a simple character, and also in questions. [*](See III. vi. 9, 10.)

For cases and questions always have first a major premise, such as

You have committed sacrilege,

Not everyone who has killed a man is guilty of murder.

Second comes a reason, which is stated at greater length in cases and questions than in separate arguments, while finally comes the conclusion in which as a rule they set forth the point they have proved either by enumeration of particulars or in the form of a hasty conclusion. In this type of epicheireme the major premise is doubtful, since it is still under investigation.

There is another form of conclusion which is not actually identical with the major premise, but has the same force

Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved into its elements is devoid of' feeling, and that which is devoid of feeling is nothing to us.

There is a third form in which the major premise and the conclusion are different.

All animate things are better than inanimate, but there is nothing better than the universe, wherefore the universe is animate.

It may be thought that in this case there is no real major premise, since it would be possible to state the reasoning in the following form:

The universe is animate, for all things animate are better than inanimate,

etcetera.

This major premise is either an admitted fact as in the last example or requires

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to be proved as in the following:

He who wishes to live a happy life, must be a philosopher

: for this is not an acknowledged truth, and the premises must be established before we can arrive at the conclusion. Sometimes again the minor premise is an admitted fact, as for instance,

But all men wish to live a happy life,

while sometimes it requires to be proved, as for example the statement quoted above,

That which is dissolved into its elements is devoid of feeling,

since it is doubtful whether the soul is immortal after its release from the body or only continues to exist for a time. Some call this a minor premise, some a reason.

There is no difference between the epicheireme and the syllogism, except that the latter has a number of forms and infers truth from truth, whereas the epicheireme is frequently concerned with statements that are no more than credible. For if it were always possible to prove controversial points from admitted premises, the orator would have little to do in this connexion.

For what skill does it require to say,

The property is mine, for I am the only son of the deceased,

I am the sole heir, since possession of the testator's estate is given by the law of property in accordance with the terms of his will: the property therefore belongs to me

But when the reason given is itself disputable, we must establish the certainty of the premises by which we are proposing to prove what is uncertain. For example, if our opponent says

You are not his son

You are illegitimate

You are not his only son

; or, again,

You are not his heir

The will is invalid

You are not entitled to inherit

You have co-heirs,

we must prove the validity

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of the reason on which we base our claim that the property should be adjudicated to us.

But when a reason of unusual length intervenes, it is necessary to state the final conclusion, otherwise the major premise and the reason would suffice.

Laws are silent in the midst of arms, and do not require us to await their sanction when the circumstances are such that he who would await their sanction is certain to be the victim of an unjust penalty before ever the just penalty can be claimed.

[*](pro Mil. iv. 10. ) Hence it has been asserted that the form of enthymeme which is based on denial of consequents resembles a reason. But sometimes, again, it is sufficient to state a single proposition as in the example just quoted,

The laws are silent in the midst of arms.

We may also begin with the reason and then proceed to the conclusion as in another passage from the same speech [*](ib. iii. 9. ) :

But if the Twelve Tables permitted the killing of a thief by night under any circumstances, and by day if he used a weapon to defend himself, who is there who will contend that the slayer must be punished under whatever circumstances a man has been killed?

'The process is still further varied by Cicero, and the reason placed third, as in the phrase,

When he sees that the sword is sometimes placed in our hands by the laws themselves.

On the other hand, he places the various parts in the regular order in the following instance:

How can it be unjust to kill a robber who lies in wait for his victim?

[*](ib. iv. 10. ) Next comes the reason:

What is the object of our escorts and our swords?

Last comes the conclusion resulting from the major premise and the reason:

Which we certainly should not be permitted to have, if we were absolutely forbidden to use them.

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This form of proof may be countered in three ways, that is to say it may be attacked in all its parts. For either the major premise or the minor or the conclusion or occasionally all three are refuted. The major premise is refuted in the following case:

I was justified in killing him, as he lay in wait for me.

For the very first question in the defence of Milo is

whether it is right that he who confesses that he has killed a man should look upon the light of day.