Ab urbe condita
Titus Livius (Livy)
Livy. History of Rome, Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.
I am speaking of Alexander as he was before he was submerged in the flood of success, for no man was less capable of bearing prosperity than he was.
If we look at him as transformed by his new fortunes and presenting the new character, so to
speak, which he had assumed after his victories, it is evident he would have come into Italy more like Darius than Alexander, and would have brought with him an army which had forgotten its native Macedonia and was rapidly becoming Persian in character.
It is a disagreeable task in the case of so great a man to have to record his ostentatious love of dress; the prostrations which he demanded from all who approached his presence, and which the Macedonians must have felt to be humiliating, even had they been vanquished, how much more when they were victors;
the terribly cruel punishments he in- flicted; the murder of his friends at the banquet-table; the vanity which made him invent a divine pedigree for himself.
What, pray, would have happened if his love of wine had become stronger and his passionate nature more violent and fiery as he grew older? I am only stating facts about which there is no dispute. Are we to regard none of these things as serious draw- backs to his merits as a commander?
Or was there any danger of that happening which the most frivolous of the Greeks, who actually extol the Parthians at the expense of the Romans, are so constantly harping upon, namely, that the Roman people must have bowed before the greatness of Alexander's name — though I do not think they had even beard of him —and
that not one out of all the Roman chiefs would have uttered his true sentiments about him, though men dared to attack him in Athens, the very city which had been shattered by Macedonian arms and almost well in sight of the smoking ruins of `Thebes, and the speeches of his assailants are still extant to prove this? However lofty our ideas of this man's greatness, still it is the greatness of one individual, attained in a successful career of little more than ten years.
Those who extol it on the ground that though Rome has never lost a war she has lost many battle, whilst Alexander has never fought a battle unsuccess- fully, are not aware that they are comparing the actions of one individual, and he a youth, with the achievements of a people who have had 8oo years of war.
Where more generations are reckoned on one side than years on the other, can we be sur- prised that in such a long space of time there
have been more changes of fortune than in a period of thirteen years? Why do you not compare the fortunes of one man with another, of one commander with another?
How many Roman generals could I name who have never been unfortunate in a single battle! You may run through page after page of the lists of magistrates, both consuls and Dictators, and not find one with whose valour and fortunes the Roman people have ever for a single day had cause to be dissatisfied.
And these men are more worthy of admiration than Alexander or any other king.
Some retained the Dictatorship for only ten or twenty days; none held a con- sulship for more than a year; the levying of troops was often obstructed by the tribunes of the plebs; they were late, in consequence, in taking the field, and were often recalled before the time to conduct the elections;
frequently, when they were commencing some important operation, their year of office expired; their colleagues frustrated or ruined their plans, some through recklessness, some through jealousy; they often had to succeed to the mistakes or failures of others and take over an army of raw recruits or one in a bad state of discipline.
Kings are free from all hindrances; they are lords of time and circumstance, and draw all things into the sweep of their own designs.
Thus, the invincible Alexander would have crossed swords with invincible captains, and would have given the same pledges to Fortune which they gave.
Nay, he would have run greater risks than they, for the Macedonians had only one Alexander, who was not only liable to all sorts of accidents but deliberately exposed himself to them, whilst there were
many Romans equal to Alexander in glory and in the grandeur of their deeds, and yet each of them might fulfil his destiny by his life or by his death without imperilling the existence of the State.
It remains for us to compare the one army with the other as regards either the numbers or the quality of the troops or the strength of the allied forces.
Now the census for that period gives 250,000 persons. In all the revolts of the Latin league ten legions were raised, consisting almost entirely of city troops.
Often during those years four or five armies were engaged simultaneously in Etruria, in Umbria (where they had to meet the Gauls as well), in Samnium, and in Lucania.
Then as regards the attitude of the various Italian tribes —the whole of Latium with the Sabines, Volscians, and Aequi, the whole of Campania, parts of Umbria and Etruria, the Picentines, the Marsi, and Paeligni, the Vestinians and Apulians, to which we should add the entire coast of the western sea, with its Greek population, stretching from Thurii to Neapolis and Cumae, and from there as far as Antium and Ostia —all these nationalities he would have found to be either strong allies of Rome or reduced to impotence by Roman arms.
He would have crossed the sea with his Macedonian veterans, amounting to not more than 30,000 men and 4000 cavalry, mostly Thracian. This formed all his real strength. If he had brought over in addition Persian and Indians and other Orientals, he would have found them a hindrance rather than a help.
We must remember also that the Romans had a reserve to draw upon at home, but Alexander, warring on a foreign soil, would have found his army diminished by the wastage of war, as happened afterwards to Hannibal.
His men were armed with round shields and long spears, the Romans had the large shield called the scutum, a better protection for the body, and the javelin, a much more effective weapon than the spear whether for hurling or thrusting.
In both armies the soldiers fought in line rank by rank, but the Macedonian phalanx lacked mobility and formed a single unit; the Roman army was more elastic, made up of numerous divisions, which could easily act separately or in combination as required.
Then with regard to fatigue duty, what soldier is better able to stand hard work than the Roman? If Alexander had been worsted in one battle the war would have been over; what army could have broken the strength of Rome, when Caudium and Cannae failed to do so?
Even if things had gone well with him at first, he would often have been tempted to wish that Persians and Indians and effeminate Asiatics were his foes, and would have confessed that
his former wars had been waged against women, as Alexander of Epirus is reported to have said when after receiving his moral wound was comparing his own fortune with that of this very youth in his Asiatic campaigns.
When I remember that in the first Punic war we fought at sea for twenty-four years, I think that Alexander would hardly have lived long enough to see one war through.
It is quite possible, too, that as Rome and Carthage were at that time leagued together by an old-standing treaty, the same apprehensions might have led those two powerful states to take up arms against the common foe, and Alexander would have been crushed by their combined forces.
Rome has had experience of a Macedonian war, not indeed when Alexander was commanding nor when the resources of Macedon were still unimpaired, but the contests against Antiochus, Philip, and Perses were fought not only without loss but even without risk. I trust that I shall not give offence when I say that, leaving out of sight the civil wars, we have never found an enemy's cavalry or infantry too much
for us, when we have fought in the open field, on ground equally favourable for both sides, still less when the ground has given us an advantage.
The infantry soldier, with his heavy armour and weapons, may reasonable fear the arrows of Parthian cavalry, or passes invested by the enemy, or country where supplies cannot be brought up,
but he has repulsed a thousand armies more formidable than those of Alexander and his Macedonians, and will repulse them in the future if only the domestic peace and concord which we now enjoy remains undisturbed for all the years to come.
M. Foslius Flaccina and L. Plautius Venox were the next consuls. In this year several communities amongst the Samnites made overtures for a fresh treaty. These deputations, when admitted to an audience, prostrated themselves on the ground, and their humble attitude influenced the senate in their favour.
Their prayers, however, were by no means so efficacious with the Assembly, to which they had been referred by the senate.
Their request for a treaty was refused, but after they had spent several days in appealing to individual citizens, they succeeded in obtaining a two years' truce.
In Apulia, too, the people of Teanum and Canusium, tired of the constant ravages which they had suffered, gave hostages and surrendered to the consul, L. Plautius.
It was in this year also that prefects were first appointed for Capua and a code of laws given to that city by the praetor, L. Furius.
Both these boons were granted in response to a request from the Campanians themselves as a remedy for the deplorable state of things brought about by civic discord.
Two new tribes were formed, the Ufentine and the Falernian. As the power of Apulia was declining, the people of Teate[*](this form of the nameLivy probably found in the annalist whom he was consulting at the time. It is, however, in all probability the Teanum mentioned above which is found inscribed on coins as Teate.) came to the new consuls, C. Junius Bubulcus and Q. Aemilius Barbula, to negotiate for a treaty.
They gave a formal undertaking that throughout Apulia peace would be maintained towards Rome, and the confident assurances they gave led to a treaty being granted, not, however, as between two independent states; they were to acknowledge the suzerainty of Rome.
After the subjugation of Apulia —for Forentum, also a place of considerable strength, had been captured by Junius —an advance was made into Lucania, and the consul, Aemilius, surprised and captured the city of Nerulum.
The order introduced into Capua by the adoption of Roman institutions had become generally known amongst the states in alliance with Rome, and the Antiates asked for the same privilege, as they were without a fixed code of laws or any regular magistrates of their own. The patrons of the colony[*](Probably Romans of high standing, who were chosen by individual cities or by cantons to act as their agents-general in the City. Or possibly the term denotes the three comissioners (triumviri) who had supervised the settlement of the colony.) were commissioned by the senate to draw out a system of jurisprudence. Not only the arms of Rome but her laws were spreading far and wide.
At the termination of their year of office the consuls did not hand the legions over to their successors, Sp. Nautius and M. Popilius, but to the Dictator, L. Aemilius.
In conjunction with M. Fulvius, the Master of the Horse, he commenced an attack on Saticula, and the Samnites at once seized this opportunity to renew hostilities.
The Romans were threatened by a double danger; the Samnites, after getting a large army together, had entrenched themselves not far from the Roman camp in order to relieve their blockaded allies, whilst the Saticulans suddenly flung their gates open and made a tumultuous attack on the Roman outposts.
The two bodies of combatants, each relying more on the help of the other than on its own strength, united in a regular attack on the Roman camp. Though both sides of the camp were attacked, the Dictator kept his men free from panic, owing to his having selected a position which could not easily be turned, and also because his men presented two fronts.
He directed his efforts mainly against those who had made the sortie, and drove them back, without much trouble, behind their walls. Then he turned his whole strength against the Samnites.
Here the fighting was more sustained and the victory was longer in coming, but when it did come it was decisive. The Samnites were driven in disorder to their camp, and after extinguishing all the camp fires they departed silently in the night, having abandoned all hope of saving Saticula. By way of retaliation they invested Plistica, a city in alliance with Rome.
The year having expired, the war was thenceforward carried on by the Dictator, Q. Fabius, whilst the new consuls, like their predecessors, remained in Rome. Fabius marched with reinforcements to Saticula to take over the army from Aemilius.
The Samnites did not remain before Plistica; they had called up fresh troops from home, and trusting to their numbers they fixed their camp on the same ground as in the previous year and endeavoured to distract the Romans from their siege operations by a series of harassing attacks.
This made the Dictator all the more determined to press the siege, as he Considered that the reduction of the place would largely affect the character of the war; he treated the Samnites with comparative indifference, and merely strengthened the pickets on that side of the camp to meet any attack that might be made.
This emboldened the Samnites; they rode up to the rampart day after day and allowed the Romans no rest. At last they almost got within the gates of the camp, when Q. Aulius, the Master of the Horse, without consulting the Dictator, charged them furiously from the camp with the whole of his cavalry and drove them off.
Though this was only a desultory conflict, Fortune influenced it so largely that she inflicted a signal loss on both sides and brought about the deaths of both Commanders.
First, the Samnite general, indignant at being repulsed and put to flight from the ground over which he had ridden with such confidence, induced his cavalry by entreaties and encouragement to renew the combat.
Whilst he was conspicuous amongst them as he urged on the fighting, the Master of the Horse levelled his lance and spurred his horse against him with such force that with one thrust he hurled him from his saddle dead.
His men were not, as often happens, dismayed at their leader's fall. All who were round him flung their missiles on Aulius, who had incautiously ridden on amongst them, but they allowed the dead general's brother to have the special glory of avenging his death.
In a frenzy of grief and rage he dragged the Master of the Morse out of his saddle and slew him.
The Samnites, amongst whom he had fallen, would have secured the body had not the Romans suddenly leaped from their horses, on which the Samnites were obliged to do the same. A fierce infantry fight raged round the bodies of the two generals in which the Roman was decidedly superior; the body of Aulius was rescued, and amidst mingled demonstrations of grief and joy the victors carried it into camp.
After losing their leader and seeing the unfavourable result of the trial of strength in the cavalry action, the Samnites considered it useless to make any further efforts on behalf of Saticula and resumed the siege of Plistica. A few days later Saticula surrendered to the Romans and Plistica was carried by assault by the Samnites
The[*](Fighting round Sora.) seat of war was now changed; the legions were marched from Samnium and Apulia to Sora.
This place had revolted to the Samnites alter putting the Roman colonists to death. The Roman army marched thither with all speed to avenge the death of their countrymen and to re-establish the colony.
No sooner had they arrived before the place than the reconnoitring parties who had been watching the different routes brought in reports one after another that the Samnites were following and were now at no great distance.
The consul marched to meet the enemy, and an indecisive action was fought at Lantulae.
The battle was put a stop to, not by the losses or flight of either side but by night, which overtook the combatants while still uncertain whether they were victors or vanquished.
I find in some authorities that this battle was unfavourable to the Romans, and that Q. Aulius, the Master of the Horse, fell there. C. Fabius was appointed Master of the Horse in his place and came with a fresh army from Rome. He sent orderlies in advance to consult the Dictator as to where he should take up his position and also as to the time and mode of attacking the enemy.
After becoming thoroughly acquainted with the Dictator's plans, he halted his army in a place where he was well concealed.
The Dictator kept his men for some days confined to their camp, as though he were enduring a siege rather than conducting one. At last he suddenly displayed the signal for battle. Thinking that brave men were more likely to have their courage stimulated when all their hopes depended upon themselves, he kept the arrival of the Master
of the Horse and the fresh army concealed from his soldiers, and as though all their prospects of safety depended upon their cutting their way out, he said to his men:
“We have been caught in a position where we are shut in, and we have no way out unless we can open one by our victorious swords. Our standing camp is sufficiently protected by its entrenchments, but it is untenable owing to want of provisions; all the places from which supplies could be obtained have revolted, and even if the people were willing to help us the country is impassable for convoys.
I shall not cheat your courage by leaving a camp here into which you can retire, as you did on the last occasion, without winning the victory.
Entrenchments are to be protected by arms, not arms by entrenchments. Let those who think it worth their while to prolong the war hold their camp as a place of retreat; we must have regard to nothing but victory.
Advance the standards against the enemy, and when the column is clear of the camp those who have been told off for the purpose will set it on fire.
What you lose, soldiers, will he made up to you in the plunder of all the surrounding cities which have revolted.” The Dictator's words, pointing to the dire necessity to which they were reduced, produced intense excitement, and rendered desperate by the sight of the burning camp- the Dictator had only ordered some spots nearest to them to be set on fire —they charged like madmen, and at the first onset threw the enemy into confusion.
At the same moment the Master of the Horse seeing the burning camp in the distance —the agreed signal —attacked the enemy in the rear. Thus hemmed in, the Samnites fled in all directions, each as best he could.
A vast number, who had crowded together in their panic and were so close to one another that they could not use their weapons, were killed between the two armies.
The enemy's camp was captured and plundered, and the soldiers, loaded with spoil, were marched back to their own camp. Even their victory did not give them so much pleasure as the discovery that with the exception of a small part spoilt by fire their camp was unexpectedly safe.
They then returned to Sora, and the new consuls, M. Poetilius and C. Sulpicius, took over the army from the Dictator Fabius, after a large proportion of the veterans had been sent home and new cohorts brought up as reinforcements.
Owing, however, to the difficulties presented by the position of the city, no definite plan of attack was yet formed; a long time would be needed to reduce it by famine, and to attempt to storm it would involve considerable
risk. In the midst of this uncertainty a Soran deserter left the town secretly and made his way to the Roman sentinels, whom he requested to conduct him at once to the consuls.
On being brought before them he undertook to betray the place into their hands. When questioned as to the means by which he would carry out his undertaking, he laid his proposals before them and they appeared quite feasible.
He advised them to remove their camp, which was almost adjoining the walls, to a distance of six miles from the town, this would lead to less vigilance on the part of those who were on outpost duty during the day and sentry duty at night. The following night, after some cohorts had been ordered to conceal themselves in some wooded spots close under the town, he conducted a picked body of ten men by a steep and almost inaccessible path into the citadel.
Here a quantity of missile weapons had been collected, far more than would be required for the men who had been brought there, and m addition there were large stones, some lying about as is usual in craggy places, others piled in heaps by the townsmen to use for the defence of the place.
When he had posted the Romans here and had pointed out to them a steep and narrow path leading up from the town, he said to them: “From this ascent even three armed men could keep back a multitude however large.
You are ten in number, and what is more you are Romans, and the bravest of them. You have the advantage of position and you will be helped by the night, which by its obscurity makes everything look more terrible. I will now spread panic everywhere; you devote yourselves to holding the citadel.”
Then he ran down and created as great a tumult as he possibly could, shouting: “To arms, citizens! Help, help! The citadel has been seized by the enemy, hasten to its defence!”
He kept up the alarm as he knocked at the doors of the principal men, he shouted it in the ears of all whom he met, of all who rushed out terror-struck into the streets. The panic which one man had started was carried by numbers through the city.
The magistrates hurriedly sent men up to the citadel to find out what had happened, and when they heard that it was held by an armed force, whose numbers were grossly exaggerated, they gave up all hopes of recovering it.
All quarters of the city were filled with fugitives; the gates were burst open by people who were only half awake and mostly without arms, and through one of these the Roman cohorts, roused by the shouting, rushed in and slew the frightened crowds who were thronging the streets.
Sora was already captured when in the early dawn the consul appeared and accepted the surrender of those whom Fortune had spared from the nocturnal massacre.
Amongst these two hundred and twenty-five were sent in chains to Rome as they were universally admitted to have been the instigators of the murder of the colonists and the revolt which followed. The rest of the population were left uninjured and a garrison was stationed in the town.
All those taken to Rome were scourged and beheaded to the great satisfaction of the plebs, who felt it to be a matter of supreme importance that those who had been sent out in such large numbers as colonists should be safe wherever they were.
After[*](Suppression of Movements in Ausonia, Campania, and Apulia.) leaving Sora the consuls extended the war to the cities and fields of Ausonia, for the whole country had become restless owing to the presence of the Samnites after the battle of Lautulae.
Plots were being hatched everywhere throughout Campania, even Capua was not free from disaffection, and it was found upon investigation that the movement had actually reached some of the principal men in Rome.
It was, however, as in the case of Sora, through the betrayal of her cities that Ausonia fell under the power of Rome.
There were three cities —Ausona, Menturnae, and Vescia — which some twelve young men belonging to the principal families there had mutually agreed to betray to the Romans.
They came to the consuls and informed them that their people had long been looking forward to the arrival of the Samnites, and after they had heard of the battle of Lautulae, they looked upon the Romans as vanquished and many of the younger men had volunteered to serve with the Samnites After the Samnites,
however, had been driven out of their country they were wavering between peace and war, afraid to close their gates to the Romans lest they should provoke a war and yet determined to close them if a Roman army approached their city. In this state of indecision they would fall an easy prey.
Acting on their advice, the Romans moved their camp into the neighbourhood of these cities, and at the same time soldiers were despatched, some fully armed, to occupy concealed positions near the walls, others in ordinary dress, with swords hidden under their togas, were to enter the cities through the open gates at the approach of daylight.
As soon as the latter began to attack the guards the signal was given for the others to rush from their ambush. Thus the gates were secured, and the three towns were captured at the same time and by the same stratagem.
As the generals were not there to direct the attack, there was no check upon the carnage which ensued, and the nation of the Ausonians was exterminated, just as if they had been engaged in an internecine war, though there was no certain proof of their having revolted.
During this year the Roman garrison at Luceria was treacherously betrayed, and the Samnites became masters of the place.
The traitors did not go long unpunished. A Roman army was not far away, and the city, which lay in a plain, was taken at the first assault.
The Lucerines and Samnites were put to death, no quarter being given, and such deep indignation was felt at Rome that when the question of sending fresh colonists to Luceria was under discussion in the senate many voted for the complete destruction of the city.
Not only the bitter feeling towards a people who had been twice subdued but also the distance from Rome made them shrink from banishing their countrymen so far from home.
However, the proposal to despatch colonists was adopted; 2500 were sent. Whilst[*](Prosecutions for Treason.) disloyalty was thus manifesting itself everywhere, Capua also became the centre of intrigues amongst some of her principal men.
When the matter came up in the senate, there was a general feeling that it ought to he dealt with at once.
A decree was passed authorising the immediate opening of a court of inquiry, and C. Maenius was nominated Dictator to conduct the proceedings. M. Foslius was appointed Master of the Horse. The greatest alarm was created by this step, and the Calavii, Ovius, Novius, who had been the ringleaders, did not wait to be denounced to the Dictator, but placed themselves beyond the reach of prosecution by what was undoubtedly a self-inflicted death.
As there was no longer any matter for investigation at Capua, the inquiry was directed to those who were suspected in Rome.
The decree was interpreted as authorising an inquiry, not in regard to Capua especially, but generally in respect of all who had formed cabals and conspiracies against the republic, including the secret leagues entered into by candidates for office. The inquiry began to embrace a wider scope both with respect to the nature of the alleged offences and the persons affected, and the Dictator insisted that
the authority vested in him as criminal judge was unlimited.
Men of high family were indicted, and no one was allowed to appeal to the tribunes to arrest proceedings. When matters had gone thus far, the nobility — not only those against whom information was being laid, but the order as a whole —protested
that the charge did not lie on the patricians, to whom the path to honours always lay open, unless it was obstructed by intrigue, but on the novi homines.
They even asserted that the Dictator and the Master of the Horse were more fit to be put upon their trial than to act as inquisitors in cases where this charge was brought, and they would find that out as soon as they had vacated their office.
Under these circumstances, Maenius, more anxious to clear his reputation than to retain his office, came forward in the Assembly and addressed it in the following terms: “You are all cognisant, Quirites, of what my life has been in the past, and this very office which has been conferred upon me is a testimony to my innocence.
There are men amongst the nobility —as to their motives it is better that you should form your own opinion than that I, holding the office I do, should say anything without proof —who tried their utmost to stifle this inquiry.
When they found themselves powerless to do this they sought to shelter themselves, patricians though they were, behind the stronghold of their opponents, the tribunician veto, so as to escape from trial.
At last, driven from that position, and thinking my course safer than that of trying to prove their innocence, they have directed their assaults against us, and private citizens have not been ashamed to demand the impeachment of the Dictator.
Now, that gods and men alike may know that in trying to avoid giving an account of themselves these men are attempting the impossible, and that I am prepared to answer any charge and meet my accusers face to face, I at once resign my Dictatorship.
And if the senate should assign the task to you, consuls, I beg that you will begin with M. Foslius and myself, so that it may be conclusively shown that we are protected from such charges, not by our official position, but by our innocence.” He then at once laid down his office, followed by the Master of the Horse.
They were the first to be tried before the consuls, for so the senate ordered, and as the evidence given by the nobles against them completely broke down, they were triumphantly acquitted.
Even Publilius Philo, a man who had repeatedly filled the highest offices as a reward for his services at home and in the field, but who was disliked by the nobility, was put on his trial and acquitted.
As usual, however, it was only whilst this inquisition was a novelty that it had strength enough to attack illustrious names; it soon began to stoop to humbler victims, until it was at length stifled by the very cabals and factions which it had been instituted to suppress.
The[*](Defeat of the Samnites in Campania.) rumour of these proceedings, and, still more, the expectation of a Campanian revolt, which had already been secretly organised, recalled the Samnites from their designs in Apulia.
They marched to Caudium, which from its proximity to Capua would make it easy for them, if the opportunity offered, to wrest that city from the Romans.
The consuls marched to Caudium with a strong force. For some time both armies remained in their positions on either side of the pass, as they could only reach each other by a most difficult route.
At length the Samnites descended by a short detour through open country into the flat district of Campania, and there for the first time they came within sight of each other's camp.
There were frequent skirmishes, in which the cavalry played a greater part than the infantry, and the Romans had no cause to be dissatisfied with these trials of strength, nor with the delay which was prolonging the war.
The Samnite generals, on the other hand, saw that these daily encounters involved daily losses, and that the prolongation of the war was sapping their strength.
They decided, therefore, to bring on an action. They posted their cavalry on the two flanks of their army with instructions to keep their attention on their camp, in case it were attacked, rather than on the battle, which would be safe in the hands of the infantry.
On the other side, the consul Sulpicius directed the right wing, Poetilius the left. The Roman right was drawn up in more open order than usual, as the Samnites opposed to them were standing in thinly extended ranks in order either to surround the enemy or to prevent themselves from being surrounded.
The left, which was in a much closer formation, was further strengthened by a rapid manoeuvre of Poetilius, who suddenly brought up into the fighting line the cohorts which were usually kept in reserve, in case the battle was prolonged. He then charged the enemy with his full strength.
As the Samnite infantry were shaken by the weight of the attack their cavalry came to their support, and riding obliquely between the two armies were met by the Roman cavalry who charged them at a hard gallop and threw infantry and cavalry alike into confusion, until they had forced back the whole line in this part of the field.
Sulpicius was taking his part with Poetilius in encouraging the men in this division, for on hearing the battleshout raised he had ridden across from his own division, which was not yet engaged.
Seeing that the victory was no longer doubtful here he rode back to his post with his 1200 cavalry, but he found a very different condition of things there, the Romans had been driven from their ground and the victorious enemy were pressing them hard.
The presence of the consul produced a sudden and complete change, the courage of the men revived at the sight of their general, and the cavalry whom he had brought up rendered an assistance out of all proportion to their numbers, whilst the sound, followed soon by the sight of the success on the other wing, re-animated the combatants to redouble their exertions.
From this moment the Romans were victorious along the whole line, and the Samnites abandoning all further resistance, were all killed or taken prisoners, with the exception of those who succeeded in escaping to Maleventum, now called Beneventum Their loss in prisoners and slain is stated by the chroniclers to have amounted to 30,000.