Ab urbe condita
Titus Livius (Livy)
Livy. History of Rome, Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.
I am speaking of Alexander as he was before he was submerged in the flood of success, for no man was less capable of bearing prosperity than he was.
If we look at him as transformed by his new fortunes and presenting the new character, so to
speak, which he had assumed after his victories, it is evident he would have come into Italy more like Darius than Alexander, and would have brought with him an army which had forgotten its native Macedonia and was rapidly becoming Persian in character.
It is a disagreeable task in the case of so great a man to have to record his ostentatious love of dress; the prostrations which he demanded from all who approached his presence, and which the Macedonians must have felt to be humiliating, even had they been vanquished, how much more when they were victors;
the terribly cruel punishments he in- flicted; the murder of his friends at the banquet-table; the vanity which made him invent a divine pedigree for himself.
What, pray, would have happened if his love of wine had become stronger and his passionate nature more violent and fiery as he grew older? I am only stating facts about which there is no dispute. Are we to regard none of these things as serious draw- backs to his merits as a commander?
Or was there any danger of that happening which the most frivolous of the Greeks, who actually extol the Parthians at the expense of the Romans, are so constantly harping upon, namely, that the Roman people must have bowed before the greatness of Alexander's name — though I do not think they had even beard of him —and
that not one out of all the Roman chiefs would have uttered his true sentiments about him, though men dared to attack him in Athens, the very city which had been shattered by Macedonian arms and almost well in sight of the smoking ruins of `Thebes, and the speeches of his assailants are still extant to prove this? However lofty our ideas of this man's greatness, still it is the greatness of one individual, attained in a successful career of little more than ten years.
Those who extol it on the ground that though Rome has never lost a war she has lost many battle, whilst Alexander has never fought a battle unsuccess- fully, are not aware that they are comparing the actions of one individual, and he a youth, with the achievements of a people who have had 8oo years of war.
Where more generations are reckoned on one side than years on the other, can we be sur- prised that in such a long space of time there
have been more changes of fortune than in a period of thirteen years? Why do you not compare the fortunes of one man with another, of one commander with another?
How many Roman generals could I name who have never been unfortunate in a single battle! You may run through page after page of the lists of magistrates, both consuls and Dictators, and not find one with whose valour and fortunes the Roman people have ever for a single day had cause to be dissatisfied.
And these men are more worthy of admiration than Alexander or any other king.
Some retained the Dictatorship for only ten or twenty days; none held a con- sulship for more than a year; the levying of troops was often obstructed by the tribunes of the plebs; they were late, in consequence, in taking the field, and were often recalled before the time to conduct the elections;
frequently, when they were commencing some important operation, their year of office expired; their colleagues frustrated or ruined their plans, some through recklessness, some through jealousy; they often had to succeed to the mistakes or failures of others and take over an army of raw recruits or one in a bad state of discipline.
Kings are free from all hindrances; they are lords of time and circumstance, and draw all things into the sweep of their own designs.
Thus, the invincible Alexander would have crossed swords with invincible captains, and would have given the same pledges to Fortune which they gave.
Nay, he would have run greater risks than they, for the Macedonians had only one Alexander, who was not only liable to all sorts of accidents but deliberately exposed himself to them, whilst there were
many Romans equal to Alexander in glory and in the grandeur of their deeds, and yet each of them might fulfil his destiny by his life or by his death without imperilling the existence of the State.
It remains for us to compare the one army with the other as regards either the numbers or the quality of the troops or the strength of the allied forces.
Now the census for that period gives 250,000 persons. In all the revolts of the Latin league ten legions were raised, consisting almost entirely of city troops.
Often during those years four or five armies were engaged simultaneously in Etruria, in Umbria (where they had to meet the Gauls as well), in Samnium, and in Lucania.
Then as regards the attitude of the various Italian tribes —the whole of Latium with the Sabines, Volscians, and Aequi, the whole of Campania, parts of Umbria and Etruria, the Picentines, the Marsi, and Paeligni, the Vestinians and Apulians, to which we should add the entire coast of the western sea, with its Greek population, stretching from Thurii to Neapolis and Cumae, and from there as far as Antium and Ostia —all these nationalities he would have found to be either strong allies of Rome or reduced to impotence by Roman arms.
He would have crossed the sea with his Macedonian veterans, amounting to not more than 30,000 men and 4000 cavalry, mostly Thracian. This formed all his real strength. If he had brought over in addition Persian and Indians and other Orientals, he would have found them a hindrance rather than a help.
We must remember also that the Romans had a reserve to draw upon at home, but Alexander, warring on a foreign soil, would have found his army diminished by the wastage of war, as happened afterwards to Hannibal.
His men were armed with round shields and long spears, the Romans had the large shield called the scutum, a better protection for the body, and the javelin, a much more effective weapon than the spear whether for hurling or thrusting.
In both armies the soldiers fought in line rank by rank, but the Macedonian phalanx lacked mobility and formed a single unit; the Roman army was more elastic, made up of numerous divisions, which could easily act separately or in combination as required.
Then with regard to fatigue duty, what soldier is better able to stand hard work than the Roman? If Alexander had been worsted in one battle the war would have been over; what army could have broken the strength of Rome, when Caudium and Cannae failed to do so?
Even if things had gone well with him at first, he would often have been tempted to wish that Persians and Indians and effeminate Asiatics were his foes, and would have confessed that
his former wars had been waged against women, as Alexander of Epirus is reported to have said when after receiving his moral wound was comparing his own fortune with that of this very youth in his Asiatic campaigns.
When I remember that in the first Punic war we fought at sea for twenty-four years, I think that Alexander would hardly have lived long enough to see one war through.
It is quite possible, too, that as Rome and Carthage were at that time leagued together by an old-standing treaty, the same apprehensions might have led those two powerful states to take up arms against the common foe, and Alexander would have been crushed by their combined forces.
Rome has had experience of a Macedonian war, not indeed when Alexander was commanding nor when the resources of Macedon were still unimpaired, but the contests against Antiochus, Philip, and Perses were fought not only without loss but even without risk. I trust that I shall not give offence when I say that, leaving out of sight the civil wars, we have never found an enemy's cavalry or infantry too much
for us, when we have fought in the open field, on ground equally favourable for both sides, still less when the ground has given us an advantage.
The infantry soldier, with his heavy armour and weapons, may reasonable fear the arrows of Parthian cavalry, or passes invested by the enemy, or country where supplies cannot be brought up,
but he has repulsed a thousand armies more formidable than those of Alexander and his Macedonians, and will repulse them in the future if only the domestic peace and concord which we now enjoy remains undisturbed for all the years to come.
M. Foslius Flaccina and L. Plautius Venox were the next consuls. In this year several communities amongst the Samnites made overtures for a fresh treaty. These deputations, when admitted to an audience, prostrated themselves on the ground, and their humble attitude influenced the senate in their favour.
Their prayers, however, were by no means so efficacious with the Assembly, to which they had been referred by the senate.
Their request for a treaty was refused, but after they had spent several days in appealing to individual citizens, they succeeded in obtaining a two years' truce.
In Apulia, too, the people of Teanum and Canusium, tired of the constant ravages which they had suffered, gave hostages and surrendered to the consul, L. Plautius.
It was in this year also that prefects were first appointed for Capua and a code of laws given to that city by the praetor, L. Furius.
Both these boons were granted in response to a request from the Campanians themselves as a remedy for the deplorable state of things brought about by civic discord.
Two new tribes were formed, the Ufentine and the Falernian. As the power of Apulia was declining, the people of Teate[*](this form of the nameLivy probably found in the annalist whom he was consulting at the time. It is, however, in all probability the Teanum mentioned above which is found inscribed on coins as Teate.) came to the new consuls, C. Junius Bubulcus and Q. Aemilius Barbula, to negotiate for a treaty.
They gave a formal undertaking that throughout Apulia peace would be maintained towards Rome, and the confident assurances they gave led to a treaty being granted, not, however, as between two independent states; they were to acknowledge the suzerainty of Rome.
After the subjugation of Apulia —for Forentum, also a place of considerable strength, had been captured by Junius —an advance was made into Lucania, and the consul, Aemilius, surprised and captured the city of Nerulum.
The order introduced into Capua by the adoption of Roman institutions had become generally known amongst the states in alliance with Rome, and the Antiates asked for the same privilege, as they were without a fixed code of laws or any regular magistrates of their own. The patrons of the colony[*](Probably Romans of high standing, who were chosen by individual cities or by cantons to act as their agents-general in the City. Or possibly the term denotes the three comissioners (triumviri) who had supervised the settlement of the colony.) were commissioned by the senate to draw out a system of jurisprudence. Not only the arms of Rome but her laws were spreading far and wide.
At the termination of their year of office the consuls did not hand the legions over to their successors, Sp. Nautius and M. Popilius, but to the Dictator, L. Aemilius.
In conjunction with M. Fulvius, the Master of the Horse, he commenced an attack on Saticula, and the Samnites at once seized this opportunity to renew hostilities.
The Romans were threatened by a double danger; the Samnites, after getting a large army together, had entrenched themselves not far from the Roman camp in order to relieve their blockaded allies, whilst the Saticulans suddenly flung their gates open and made a tumultuous attack on the Roman outposts.
The two bodies of combatants, each relying more on the help of the other than on its own strength, united in a regular attack on the Roman camp. Though both sides of the camp were attacked, the Dictator kept his men free from panic, owing to his having selected a position which could not easily be turned, and also because his men presented two fronts.
He directed his efforts mainly against those who had made the sortie, and drove them back, without much trouble, behind their walls. Then he turned his whole strength against the Samnites.
Here the fighting was more sustained and the victory was longer in coming, but when it did come it was decisive. The Samnites were driven in disorder to their camp, and after extinguishing all the camp fires they departed silently in the night, having abandoned all hope of saving Saticula. By way of retaliation they invested Plistica, a city in alliance with Rome.