Ab urbe condita
Titus Livius (Livy)
Livy. History of Rome, Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.
Whilst both sides were making their preparations for battle, a deputation from Tarentum appeared on the scene with a peremptory demand that both the Samnites and the Romans should desist from hostilities. They threatened that whichever side stood in the way of a cessation of arms, they would assist the other side against them.
After hearing the demands which the deputation advanced and apparently attaching importance to what they had said, Papirius replied that he would communicate with his colleague. He then sent for him and employed the interval in hastening the preparations for battle. After talking over the matter, about which there could be no two opinions, he displayed the signal for battle.
Whilst the consuls were engaged in the various duties, religious and otherwise, which are customary before a battle, the Tarentines waited for them, expecting an answer, and Papirius informed them that the pullarius had reported that the auspices were favourable and the sacrifice most satisfactory.
“You see,” he added, “that we are going into action with the sanction of the gods.”
He then ordered the standards to be taken up, and as he marched his men on to the field he expressed his contempt for a people of such egregious vanity, that whilst quite incapable of managing their own affairs, owing to domestic strife and discord, they thought themselves justified in prescribing to others how far they must go in making peace or war.
The Samnites, on the other hand, had given up all thoughts of fighting, either because they were really anxious for peace or because it was their interest to appear so, in order to secure the goodwill of the Tarentines.
When they suddenly caught sight of the Romans drawn up for battle, they shouted that they should act according to the instructions of the Tarentines; they would neither go down into the field nor carry their arms outside their rampart, they would rather let advantage be taken of them and bear whatever chance might bring them than be
thought to have flouted the peaceful advice of Tarentum The consuls said that they welcomed the omen, and prayed that the enemy might remain in that mood so as not even to defend their rampart.
Advancing in two divisions up to the entrenchments, they attacked them simultaneously on all sides. Some began to fill up the fosse, others tore down the abattis on the rampart and hurled the timber into the fosse. It was not their native courage only, but indignation and rage as well which goaded them On smarting as they were from their recent disgrace.
As they forced their way into the camp, they reminded one another that there were no Forks of Caudium there, none of those insuperable defiles where deceit had won an insolent victory over incaution, but Roman valour which neither rampart nor fosse could check. They slew alike those who fought and those who fled, armed and unarmed, slaves and freemen, young and old, men and beasts.
Not a single living thing would have survived had not the
consuls given the signal to retire, and by stern commands and threats driven the soldiers who were thirsting for blood out of the enemy's camp.
As the men were highly incensed at this interruption to a vengeance which was so delightful, it was necessary to explain to them on the spot why they were prevented from carrying it further.
The consuls assured them that they neither had yielded nor would yield to any man in showing their hatred of the enemy, and as they had been their leaders in the fighting so they would have been foremost in encouraging their insatiable rage and vengeance.
But they had to consider the 6oo equites who were being detained as hostages in Luceria, and to take care that the enemy, despairing of any quarter for themselves, did not wreak their blind rage on their captives, and destroy them before they perished themselves.
The soldiers quite approved and were glad that their indiscriminate fury had been checked; they admitted that they must submit to anything rather than endanger the safety of so many youths belonging to the noblest families in Rome.
The soldiers were dismissed to quarters, and a council of war was held to decide whether they should press on the siege of Luceria with their whole force or whether Publilius with his army should visit the Apulians and ascertain their intentions, about which there was considerable doubt.
The latter was decided upon, and the consul succeeded in reducing a considerable number of their towns in one campaign, whilst others were admitted into alliance.
Papirius, who had remained behind to prosecute the siege of Luceria, soon found his expectations realised, for as all the roads by which supplies could be brought in were blocked, the Samnite garrison in Luceria was so reduced by famine that they sent to the Roman consul an offer to restore the hostages, for whose recovery the war had been undertaken, if he would raise the siege.
He replied that they ought to have consulted Pontius, at whose instigation they had sent the Romans under the yoke, as to what terms he thought ought to he imposed on the vanquished.
As, however, they preferred that equal terms should be fixed by the enemy rather than proposed by themselves, he told the negotiators to take back word to Luceria that all the arms, baggage, and beasts of burden together with the non-combatant population were to be left behind; the soldiers he should send under the yoke and leave them one garment apiece.
In doing this, he said, he was subjecting them to no novel disgrace but simply retaliating upon them one which they had themselves inflicted.
They were compelled to accept these terms and 7000 men were sent under the yoke. An enormous amount of booty was found in Luceria, all the arms and standards which had been taken at Caudium, and what created the greatest joy of all —they recovered the equites, the hostages whom the Samnites had placed there for security.
Hardly any victory that Rome ever won was more noteworthy for the sudden change that it wrought in the circumstances of the republic, especially if, as I find stated in some annals, Pontius, the son of Herennius, the Samnite captain-general, was sent under the yoke with the rest, to expiate the disgrace he had inflicted on the consul.
I am not, however, so much surprised that uncertainty should exist with regard to this point as I am that any doubt should be felt as to who really captured Luceria;
whether, that is to say, it was Lucius Cornelius, acting as Dictator, with L. Papirius Cursor as Master of the Horse, who achieved those successes at Caudium and afterwards at Luceria, and as the one man who avenged the stain on Roman honour celebrated what I am inclined to think was, with the exception of that of F. Camillus, the most justly earned triumph that any down to that day had enjoyed, or whether the glory of that distinction should be attributed to the consuls and especially to Papirius.
There is a further mistake here owing to doubts as to whether at the next consular elections Papirius Cursor was re-elected for the third time in consequence of his success at Luceria, together with Q. Aulius Corretanus for the second time, or whether the name should really be L. Papirius Mugilanus.
The[*](Reduction of Satricum.) authorities are agreed that the remainder of the war was conducted by the consuls. Aulius finished the campaign against the Frentanians in one battle. Their routed army fled to their city, and after giving hostages the consul received their surrender.
The other consul was equally fortunate in his campaign against the Satricans. Though admitted to Roman citizenship they had revolted to the Samnites after the Caudine disaster and allowed them to garrison their city.
But when the Roman army was close to their walls they sent an urgent request, couched in very humble terms, for peace. The consul replied that unless they handed over the Samnite garrison or put them to death they were not to go to him again. The severity of this reply created more terror amongst them than the actual presence of the Roman army.
They repeatedly asked him by what means he thought that such a small and weak body as they were could attempt to use force against a strong and well-armed garrison. He told them to seek counsel from those through whose advice they had admitted the garrison in the first instance. After having with some difficulty obtained his permission to consult their senate, they returned to the city.
There were two parties in the senate: the leaders of the one were the authors of the revolt from Rome, the other consisted of loyal citizens.
Both, however, were equally anxious that every effort should be made to induce the consul to grant peace. As the Samnite garrison were not in the least prepared to stand a siege, they intended to evacuate the city the following night.
The party who had introduced them thought it would be quite sufficient to let the consul know at what hour and by what gate they would leave; the others who had been all along opposed to their coming actually opened the gate to the consul that very night and admitted his troops into the city.
The Samnites were unexpectedly attacked by a force concealed in the woods through which they were marching whilst the shouts of the Roman were resounding in all parts of the city; by this double act of treachery the Samnites were slain and Satricum captured within the space of one short hour and the consul became complete master of the situation.
He ordered a strict inquiry to be made as to who were responsible for the revolt, and those who were found to be guilty were scourged and beheaded.
The Satricans were deprived of their arms and a strong garrison was placed in the city. The writers who tell us that it was under Papirius that Luceria was recovered and the Samnites sent under the yoke,
go on to inform us that after the capture of Satricum he returned to Rome to celebrate his triumph.
And indeed he was, undoubtedly, a man deserving of all praise for his soldierly qualities, distinguished as he was not only by intellectual force but also by his physical prowess.
He was especially noted for his swiftness of foot, which gave him his cognomen[*]( “Cursor"="the runner.” ); he is stated to have beaten all those of his own age in racing. Owing either to his great strength or the amount of exercise he took he had an enormous appetite.
Under no commander did either horse or foot find service harder, for he himself never knew what it was to be tired. On one occasion the cavalry ventured to ask him to excuse them some of their fatigue duty in consideration of their having fought a successful action.
He replied: “That you may not say I never excuse you anything, I excuse you from rubbing your horses' backs when you dismount.”
He was as much of a martinet to the allies of Rome as he was to his own countrymen.
The commander of the Praenestine detachment had shown a lack of courage in bringing his men up from the rear into the fighting line . Papirius, walking in front of his tent, ordered him to be called up, and on his appearance told the lictor to get the axe ready. The Praenestine, on hearing this, stood paralysed with fear.
“Come, lictor,” said Papirius, “cut out this root; it is in the way of people as they walk.” After almost frightening him to death with this threat, he dismissed him with a fine.
No age has been more prolific in great and noble characters than the one in which he lived, and even in that age there was no one whose single arm did more to sustain the commonwealth. Had Alexander the Great, after subjugating Asia, turned his attention to Europe, there are many who maintain that he would have met his match in Papirius.
Nothing[*](Comparison of the Strength of Rome with that of Macedonia under Alexander the Great.) can he thought to be further from my aim since I commenced this task than to digress more than is necessary from the order of the narrative or by embellishing my work with a variety of topics to afford pleasant resting-places, as it were, for my readers and mental relaxation for myself.
The mention, however, of so great a king and commander induces me to lay before my readers some reflections which I have often made when I have proposed to myself the question, “What would have been the results for Rome if she had been engaged in war with Alexander?”
The things which tell most in war are the numbers and courage of the troops, the ability of the commanders, and Fortune, who has such a potent influence over human affairs, especially those of war.
Any one who considers these factors either separately or in combination will easily see that as the Roman empire proved invincible against other kings and nations, so it would have proved invincible against Alexander.
Let us, first of all, compare the commanders on each side. I do not dispute that Alexander was an exceptional general, but his reputation is enhanced by the fact that he died while still young and before he had time to experience any change of fortune.
Not to mention other kings and illustrious captains, who afford striking examples of the mutability of human affairs, I will only instance Cyrus, whom the Greeks celebrate as one of the greatest of men. What was it that exposed him to reverses and misfortunes but the length of his life, as recently in the case of Pompey the Great?
Let me enumerate the Roman generals —not all out of all ages but only those with whom as consuls and Dictators Alexander would have had to fight —
M. Valerius Corvus, C. Marcius Rutilus, C. Sulpicius, T. Manlius Torquatus, Q. Publilius Philo, L. Papirius Cursor, Q. Fabius Maximus, the two Decii, L. Volumnius, and Manlius Curius. Following these come those men of colossal mould who would have confronted him if he had first turned his arms against Carthage and then crossed over into Italy later in life.
Every one of these men was Alexander's equal in courage and ability, and the
art of war, which from the beginning of the City had been an unbroken tradition, had now grown into a science based on definite and permanent rules. It was thus that the kings conducted their wars, and alter them the Junii and the Valerii, who expelled the kings, and in later succession the Fabii, the Quinctii, and the Cornelii.
It was these rules that Camillus followed, and the men who would have had to fight with Alexander had seen Camillus as an old man when they were little more than boys. Alexander no doubt did all that a soldier ought to do in battle, and that is not his least title to fame.
But if Manlius Torquatus had been opposed to him in the field, would he have been inferior to him in this respect, or Valerius Corvus, both of them distinguished as soldiers before they assumed command?
Would the Decii, who, after devoting themselves, rushed upon the enemy, or Papirius Cursor with his vast physical courage and strength?
Would the clever generalship of one young man have succeeded in baffling the whole senate, not to mention individuals, that senate of which he, who declared that it was composed of kings, alone formed a true idea?
Was there any danger of his showing more skill than any of those whom I have mentioned in choosing the site for his camp, or organising his commissariat, or guarding against surprises, or choosing the right moment for giving battle, or disposing his men in line of battle and posting his reserves to the best advantage?
He would have said that it was not with Darius that he had to do, dragging after him a train of women and eunuchs, wrapped up in purple and gold, encumbered with all the trappings of state, He found him an easy prey rather than a formidable enemy and defeated him without loss, without being called to do anything more daring than to show a just contempt for the idle show of power.
The aspect of Italy would have struck him as very different from the India which he traversed in drunken revelry with an intoxicated army; he would have seen in the passes of Apulia and the mountains of Lucania the traces of the recent disaster which befell his house when his uncle Alexander, King of Epirus, perished.