Ab urbe condita
Titus Livius (Livy)
Livy. History of Rome, Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.
The following year had as consular tribunes Agrippa Menenius Lanatus, P. Lucretius Tricipitinus, and Spurius Nautius Rutilus. Thanks to the good fortune of Rome, the year was marked by serious danger more than by actual disaster.
The slaves had formed a plot to fire the City in various spots, and whilst the people were everywhere intent on saving their houses, to take armed possession of the Capitol. Jupiter frustrated their nefarious project; two of their number gave information, and the actual culprits were arrested and punished.
The informers received a reward of 10,000 “ ases ” —a large sum in those days —from the public treasury, and their freedom. After this the Aequi began to prepare for a renewal of hostilities, and it was reported on good authority at Rome that a new enemy, the Labicans, were forming a coalition with their old foes.
The commonwealth had come to look upon hostilities with the Aequi as almost an annual occurrence. Envoys were sent to Labici. The reply they brought back was evasive; it was evident that whilst there were no immediate preparations for war, peace would not last long.
The Tusculans were requested to be on the watch for any fresh movement on the part of the Labicans. The[*](War with the Aequi.) consular tribunes for the following year were Lucius Sergius Fidenas, M. Papirius Mugilanus, and C. Servilius, the son of the Priscus in whose dictatorship Fidenae had been taken.
At the very beginning of their term of office, envoys came from Tusculum and reported that the Labicans had taken up arms and in conjunction with the Aequi had, after ravaging the Tusculan territory, fixed their camp on Algidus.
War was thereupon proclaimed and the senate decreed that two tribunes should leave for the war, and one remain in charge of the City. This at once led to a quarrel amongst the tribunes. Each urged his superior claims to command in the war and looked down upon the charge of the City as distasteful and inglorious.
Whilst the senators were watching with astonishment this unseemly strife amongst colleagues, Q. Servilius said, “Since no respect is shown either to this House or to the State, the authority of a father shall put an end to this altercation. My son, without having recourse to lots, shall take charge of the City. I trust that those who are so anxious for the command in the war will conduct it in a more considerate and amicable spirit than they have shown in their eagerness to obtain it.”
It was decided that the levy should not be raised from the whole population indiscriminately; ten tribes were drawn by lot; from these the two tribunes enlisted the men of military age and led them to the war.
The quarrels which had begun in the City became much more heated in the camp through the same eagerness to secure the command. They agreed on no single point, they fought for their own opinions, each wanted his own plans and orders carried out exclusively, they felt mutual contempt for each other.
At length, through the remonstrances and reproofs of the lieutenants-general, matters were so far arranged that they agreed to hold the command in chief on alternate days.
When this state of things was reported at Rome it is said that Q. Servilius, taught by years and experience, offered up a solemn prayer that the disagreement of the tribunes might not prove more hurtful to the State than it had been at Veii; then, as though disaster were undoubtedly impending, he urged his son to enrol troops and prepare arms.
He was not a false prophet. It[*](Defeat of the Romans.) happened to be the turn of L. Sergius to hold command, and the enemy by a pretended flight had drawn his troops on to unfavourable ground close to their camp, in the vain hope of storming it. Then the Aequi made a sudden charge and drove them down a steep valley where numbers were overtaken and killed in what was not so much a flight as a tumbling over each other.
It was with difficulty that they held their camp that day; the next day, after the enemy had surrounded a considerable part of it, they evacuated it in a disgraceful flight through the rear gate.
The commanders and lieutenants-general and as much of the army as remained with the standards made for Tusculum, the others, straggling in all directions through the fields, hurried on to Rome and spread the news of a more serious defeat than had been actually incurred.
There was less consternation felt because the result was what every one had feared and the reinforcements which they could look to in the hour of danger had been got ready beforehand by the consular tribune.
By his orders, after the excitement had been allayed by the inferior magistrates, scouting parties were promptly sent out to reconnoitre, and they reported that the generals and the army were at Tusculum, and that the enemy had not shifted his camp.
What did most to restore confidence was the nomination, by a senatorial decree, of Q. Servilius Priscus as Dictator. The citizens had had previous experience of his political foresight in many stormy crises, and the issue of this war afforded a fresh proof, for he alone suspected danger from the differences of the tribunes before the disaster occurred.
He appointed as his Master of the Horse the tribune by whom he had been nominated Dictator, namely, his own son.
This at least is the statement of some authorities, others say that Ahala Servilius was Master of the Horse that year. With his fresh army he proceeded to the seat of war, and after recalling the troops who were at Tusculum, he selected a position for his camp two miles distant from the enemy.
The[*](Capture of Labici.) arrogance and carelessness which the Roman generals had shown had now passed over to the Aequi in the hour of their success.
The result appeared in the very first battle. After shaking the enemies' front with a cavalry charge, the Dictator ordered the standards of the legions to be rapidly advanced, and as one of his standard-bearers hesitated, he slew him.
So eager were the Romans to engage that the Aequi did not stand the shock. Driven from the field in headlong flight they made for their camp; the storming of the camp took less time and involved less fighting than the actual battle.
The spoils of the captured camp the Dictator gave up to the soldiers. The cavalry who had pursued the enemy as they fled from the camp brought back intelligence that the whole of the defeated
Labicans and a large proportion of the Aequi had fled to Labici.
On the morrow the army marched to Labici, and after the town was completely invested it was captured and plundered. After leading his victorious army home, the Dictator laid down his office just a week after he had been appointed. Before the tribunes of the plebs had time to get up an agitation about the division of the Labican territory, the senate in a full meeting passed a resolution that a body of colonists should be settled at Labici.
One thousand five hundred colonists were sent, and each received two jugera [*](jugera. —One and a quarter acres, nearly. The jugerum=nearly 5/8 of an acre.) of land. In the year following the capture of Labici the consular tribunes were Menenius Lanatus, L. Servilius Structus, P. Lucretius Tricipitinus-each for the second time- and Spurius Veturius
Crassus. For the next year they were A. Sempronius Atratinus-for the third time- and M. Papirius Mugilanus and Sp. Nautius Rutilus- each for the second time. During these two years foreign affairs were quiet, but at home there were contentions over the agrarian laws.
The[*](Agrarian Proposals.) fomenters of the disturbance were Sp. Maecilius, who was tribune of the plebs for the fourth time, and M. Metilius, tribune for the third time; both had been elected in their absence.
They brought forward a measure providing that the territory taken from an enemy should be assigned to individual owners. If this were passed the fortunes of a large number of the nobility would be confiscated.
For as the City itself was founded upon foreign soil, it possessed hardly any territory which had not been won by arms, or which had become
private property by sale or assignment beyond what the plebeians possessed.[*](Only land fit for garden tillage or fruit trees was assigned to individual owners, i. e., plebeians. The forests, wastes, and pastures were State lands, i. e., occupied (not owned) by the patricians. As only land for tillage was allotted, a common pasture was absolutely necessary.) There seemed every prospect of a bitter conflict between the plebs and the patricians.
The consular tribunes, after discussing the matter in the senate and in private gatherings of patricians, were at a loss what to do, when Appius Claudius, the grandson of the old decemvir and the youngest senator present, rose to speak.
He is represented as saying that he was bringing from home an old device well known to his house. His grandfather, Appius Claudius, had pointed out to the senate the only way of breaking down the power of the tribunes, namely, through the interposition of their colleagues' veto.
Men who had risen from the masses were easily induced to change their opinions by the personal authority of the
leaders of the State if only they were addressed in language suitable to the occasion rather than to the rank of the speaker. Their feelings changed with their fortunes.
When they saw that those of their colleagues who were the first to propose any measure took the whole credit of it with the plebs and left no place for them, they would feel no hesitation in coming over to
the cause of the senate, and so win the favour not only of the leaders but of the whole order. His views met with universal approval; Q. Servilius Priscus was the first to congratulate the youth on his not having degenerated from the old Claudian stock.
The leaders of the senate were charged to persuade as many tribunes as they could to interpose their veto. After the close of the sitting they canvassed the tribunes. By the use of persuasion, warning, and promises, they showed how acceptable that action would be to them individually and to the whole senate.
They succeeded in bringing over six. The next day, in accordance with a previous understanding, the attention of the senate was drawn to the agitation which Maecilius and Metilius were causing by proposing a bribe of the worst possible type.
Speeches were delivered by the leaders of the senate, each in turn declaring that he was unable to suggest any course of action, and saw no other resource but the assistance of the tribunes. To the protection of that power the State in its embarrassment, like a private citizen in his helplessness, fled for succour.
It was the glory of the tribunes and of the authority they wielded that they possessed as much strength to withstand evil-minded colleagues as to harass the senate and create dissension between the two orders.
Cheers arose from the whole senate and the tribunes were appealed to from every quarter of the House. When silence was restored, those tribunes who had been won over made it clear that since the senate was of opinion that the proposed measure tended to the break-up of the republic, they should interpose their veto on it.
They were formally thanked by the senate. The proposers of the measure convened a meeting in which they showered abuse on their colleagues, calling them “traitors to the interests of the plebs” and “slaves of the consulars,” with other insulting epithets. Then they dropped all further proceedings.