The six books of a common-weale

FOrasmuch as both cities, citisens, and Commonweales, vse commonly to be for nothing more turmoiled and troubled than by men for the obtaining of offices and honours, mee thinke this question to bee one of the most profitable and most necessarie of any that can be made in matter of estate, Whether it be better to have annuall or perpetuall Magistratsin a Commonweale? Than which question I know not whether there be any amongst them which concerne a Commonweal more harder to decide, or more pleasant to vnderstand, and therefore not in any wise by vs in this place to be omitted. Which I say not as meaning to take upon me the deciding of this question, but onely to touch the reasons which might well be giuen both on the one side and the other, leauing the resolution therof unto them which heretofore have better sounded the proceeding and consequence thereof. Neither is it mine intent or purpose, either to propound and moue this question, to giue foot unto them which would chaunge the laws alreadie receiued, which the subiects ought to hold for good and wholesome in euerie Commonweale▪ nor for any desire I have to chaunge the estate of Commonweals alreadie established, which have continued by long succession and course of yeares.

Now the first and strongest reason that is to be had to make the magistrats and officers[*](Reasons to show that magistrats ought not to be perpetuall.) annuall, is, for that the first and principall end of euerie Commonweale ought to consist in vertue: and that the scope of euerie good and true law▪ giuer, is to make his subiects vertuous. Which to attaine vnto, it behoueth him to propound unto the view[*](Rewards for vertue ought to be unto all men common.) and sight of the whole world, the rewards of vertue, as the marke whereat euerie man ought to aime in best sort he can.

Now most certaine it is, that honour is no other thing than the reward and prize of vertue, which neither ought nor can by the counterpoise of profit be esteemed: wheras rather to the contrarie vertue hath no more capital an enemie, than profit deuised to arise by honour. If then the honourable preferments, offices and commissions bee taken out of publique place, to be alwayes enclosed & shut up within the particular houses of most vnworthy men, who for favour or money carrie away the same; it is not then to be thought vertue in that estate to be the prize, the corrupt nature of man being such as is right hardly to be drawne unto vertue, what reward or prise soeuer bee deuised for the alluring of men thereto. And thus much for the first point, which ought to moue princes and wise law giuers, to set preferments, offices, and all such other the rewards of vertue, in the eye of all the world, and so to diuide them amongst their subiects, to every man according to his deserts, which they cannot do, if they grant them unto men in perpetuities.

Another point which the wise law giuer ought still to have before his eyes, is, To[*](The root of sedition is by all meanes to be cut up in a Commonweale which can hardly be where magistrats and officers be perpetuall.) cut up the roots, and to take away the seedes of civill sedition, so to maintaine his subiects in good peace and amitie amongst themselves, and one of them with another. Which is a matter of such weight, as that many have thought it to bee the onely end which the good law maker ought to hope after. For albeit that vertue may oftentimes be banished out of Commonweales, for men to live in a disordered licentiousnesse of all kind of voluptuous pleasures: yet in that all men agree, that there is no more daungerous

a plague unto Commonweales, than civill sedition and discord. Forasmuch as it draweth after it the common ruine aswell of the good as of the bad. Now so it is, that the first and principall cause of sedition, is inequalitie; as to the contrarie the mother nurse of peace and amitie, is equalitie; which is no other thing than naturall equitie, distributing rewards, preferments, honours, and all other things common unto the subiects indifferently, and in the best sort that may be. From which equalitie the very theeves and robbers themselves may in no wise depart, if they meane to live together. Hee therefore that shall diuide the honours and offices of estate unto a small number of men, as needs it must be, when they are giuen for tearme of life, hee I say hath lighted the greatest flames of ielousie of one of them against another, and the greatest fire of sedition that can possibly be raised in a Commonweale.

Now if there were no more but the two reasons before alleaged, viz. The enioying[*](Perpetuitie of offices the caus of impunitie of the great officers.) of vertue, with the rewards thereunto due, and the auoyding of sedition, the greatest plague of a Commonweale; yet were they euen sufficient to let, that offices should not be perpetuall, but rather annuall, to the end that euerie man so hauing therein part and interest, might so also have occasion to live in peace. But yet there are farther reasons also, which is, that by such perpetuitie of offices and promotions, not onely the unitie and concord of subiects, and the true rewards of vertue are so taken away, but that the due punishment by the lawes appointed for offendors are thereby also impeached, or rather quite abolished: Whereof the wise law giuer ought to haue a greater regard than of the rewards to vertue due▪ For that the wise and accomplished man looketh for no other reward of his vertuous actions, more than vertue it selfe: which a man cannot say of vice, neither of the vitious. And for this cause the lawes both of God and man, euen from the first unto the last, have commaunded nothing more, than the punishment of the wicked. And what punishment should a man do uppon them, who are alwaies so high mounted, as that it is impossible to come nigh them? Who shall accuse them? who shall imprison them? who shall condemne them? Shall their companions or fellowes in power? will they cut their owne armes, or rip their owne entrals? beleeue it they will neuer be so euill aduised. What if the great ones bee also partakers of their foule robberies, villanies, and extortion? how shall they then punish the others? they will rather blush for shame, and be touched with compassion of them which are like unto themselves, than with the hainousnesse of the offences be enduced to take of them punishment. But if any there be so hardie as to accuse, yea or but so much as to complaine of one of these demie gods, he is in daunger of his life, as a false enformer, if hee by proofe cleerer than the sunne it selfe, proue not villanies done in most obscure darkenesse: and admit that all be by them well proued, and that the guiltie magistrat be conuinced and attainted, yet so it is, that this ordinarie clause Frater noster est, He is our brother, shall suffice to cover and burie all the villanies, deceits, and extortion, of the most vniust magistrat that a man could imagine. So that hardly one of a thousand which had deserued punishment, should in five hundred yeres be brought to execution.

But if the magistrats were annuall, it is most certaine, that the feare to be called to account,[*](Great magistrat and officers in doubt to be called to account where they are but annuall.) would alwaies keepe them in awe, and that they would tremble and quake as often as they heard that thundering threatning which the Tribunes of the people made to Manlius, Priuatum rationem rerum ab se gestarum redditurum, quoniam Consulnoluisset, That he being a priuat man, should giue account of such things as hee had done, for that he would not so do being Consull. And indeed what could a man see more faire, than them which had but a little before administred iustice, and taken charge of the common treasure, with other such publike offices, after that they had put off their

robes of dignitie, to come in their common attire as priuat men, to giue an account of their actions done in the time of their magistracie. And this is it for which Plutarch hath so highly commended the custome of the auntient Romans, who animated the young men to commence their publike accusations against such as had euill acquited themselves in their publike charges, setting them on as grayhounds upon wolues, or other wild beasts. In which doing not onely the offendors were punished, but euerie man else also upon an emulation and strife, as it were endeuoured him to doe well; but especially they, who had themselves accused others, as well assured that there neuer wanted some, who still right narrowly looked into all their doings, so that it much concerned them to beare themselves most uprightly in the whole course of their lives. Which benefits those estates and Commonweales must neeedes want, which have their magistrats perpetuall, or for tearme of life. For which cause the emperour Claudius wisely renewed an old edict or law, then growne out of vse: which was, That hee to whome the government of any prouince was by lot fallen (as the maner was) should forthwith, all excuses set apart, go vnto his charge; and that the time of his authoritie and charge once expired, he should not forthwith take uppon him any other new publike charge or government, to the intent that the euill behauiour or extortion of the magistrats should not by such continuation of their power and authoritie remaine vnpunished. For whatsoeuer decrees or lawes bee made, the euill magistrats would still[*](Euill magistrats most commonly hold together.) keepe the power in their hands, and doe what they can one for another; in such sort strengthening themselves, as that is a thing almost impossible to have of them any reason. Which was the cause that moued Hannibal that great captaine to present a request vnto the people of Carthage, To make their judges annuall, which before held their places for tearme of life, and that none of them should keepe his place two yeares together, as Liuie reporteth, whose words we thought good thus here to set downe, Iudicum or do ea tempestate dominabatur Carthagine, eo maximè quòd ijdem perpetui iudices: res, fama, vitaque omnium in illorum potestate erat; qui vnum eius ordinis, & omnes aduersos habebat. horum in tam impotenti regno Praetor factus Annibal, vocare ad se Quaestorem; idem pro nihilo habuit; nam aduersae factionis erat: & quia ex qu---stura in iudices potentissimum ordinem referuntur, iam pro futuris mox opibus animos gerebant: id indignum ratus Annibal, viatorem ad prehendendum Quaestorem misit, subductumque in concionem non ipsum magis quam ordinem iudicum (prae quorum superbia atque opibus nec leges quicquam essent, nec magistratus) accusauit, & vt secundis auribus accipi orationem animaduertit, legem extemplo promulgauit pertulitque, The order or companie of the judges (saith he) did at that time beare all the sway at Carthage; and well the more, for that the selfe same men were still perpetuall judges: euerie mans wealth, fame, and life, was in their power; he that had one of them of that order against him, had them al his enemies. In this their so insolent a raigne Hannibal being made Pretor, conuented one of the Questors, or publike receiuers before him, which made thereof no reckoning, for why, he was of the contrarie faction unto him: and forasmuch as out of the Questors choyce was still made into the most mightie order of the judges, they still bare their hautie minds aunswerable unto the wealth and power they were afterwards to enioy. Which Hannibal taking for a great indignitie, sent a sergeant to lay hands upon the Questor, and hauing brought him into the generall assemblie of the people, accused not him more than he did the whole order of the judges (through whose pride and wealth, neither the lawes nor the magistrats were (as he said) any thing at all regarded) and perceiuing his speech to be with the good liking of the people receiued, forthwith enacted, and proclaimed a law, That the judges should be every yeare chosen, and that none of them should be judges two yeares together. And thus farre he. For why, it was otherwise a thing impossible to chastise them, a man still hauing them all his enemies, that should touch but one of them. For that they beeing perpetuall magistrats, and commonly allied one of them unto another, it was impossible to hope to have any of them punished, and much lesse to haue against them iustice, if a man had any thing to do with them: and in case a man refused one of them, hee must in so doing refuse the whole bench of them also. As not many yeares ago in the court of Paris (which at this time consisteth of an hundred and fiftie judges) in a suit betwixt Chr. Thuan, chiefe justice in that court, and Iohn Tili, register of the court (who tooke upon him the defence of his daughter being absent) were, for alliance onely, threescore judges on the one side, and two and fortie on the other, chalenged and reiected▪ and all upon the same bench. And for this cause it was ordained in the assembly of the estates of the countrey of Languedoc, holden at Montpelier in the yeare 1556, where then I was, and charge there giuen to Iohn Durande, atturney for that country, That amongst other his instructions, he should especially moue the king, that it might please him to ordaine, that the nie kinsmen or other of alliance unto the judges, should not from thenceforth be admitted unto the same bench, neither into the same court. Which same request foure yeares after, was by the estates of Fraunce presented unto the king in the parliament at Orleance, howbeit that nothing could therein bee obtained, neither can be, so long as honours and preferments are in perpetuitie giuen in the Commonweale. For it is now two hundred and fiftie yeares since that king Charles the fift, and before him Philip the Faire had ordained, That no man should bee judge in the[*](That o man should be a iudg in his owne countrie.) same countrey wherein he was borne: as in like case Marcus Aurelius made an edict, That no man should be gouernour in his owne countrey. Of which law the profit was thought so great, as that he would have the same afterwards extended euen unto them which were but councellours or assistants unto the gouernours of countries: which was a thing then wel put in execution, as it is at this present in Spaine, & in most[*](The ordinarie iudges in Italie straungers.) of the cities in Italie, where the ordinarie judge is most commonly a stranger. Which was also by the ambassadours of Moscouie requested of the estates of Polonia. Howbeit that the decrees of our kings concerning those matters, were quickly buried, after that the publike offices and charges began to be with vs giuen for tearme of life. And not to search further into the edicts of the Roman emperours, we find also in Caesar his[*](Lib. 7.) Commentaries, that the auntient Gaules, and namely they of Autun, had amongst them an inuiolable law, which expresly forbad the magistrats to be continued in their places aboue one yeare, and that two of one familie could not be magistrats together, nor yet one of them, so long as the other who had alreadie bene magistrat should live. And that more is, it was alwaies expresly forbidden, That two of one familie might be councellors together, neither yet one of them, so long as the other who had alreadie so bene a councellour was alive.

Moreover the thing which ought of all others to be most recommended vnto all[*](The great office and preferments of the Commonweale giuen in perpetuitie breedeth a carelesnes of the Common good both in the magistrats themselves and others) subiects in generall, & euerie one of them in particular, is the preseruation of the Commonweale. And what regard or care of the publike good should they haue, which therein have no part? Such as are themselves excluded, and which see the common preferments and offices giuen in prey to some few in perpetuitie? How should they have any care of that which concerneth them not, neither neere, nor a farre off? And admit that any good and honest man would say, would doe, or vndertake, any thing that were for the common good or profit, being himselfe but a priuat man, who should hearken vnto him? who should support him? who should favour him? So that every man leauing to thinke of the publike, entendeth unto his owne businesse, and hee in that case should be but laughed at, and derided as a foole, which should take more care

of the common welfare than of his owne. As for them who alreadie enioy the publike preferments and offices, they for the most part have no great care of the common good, being now for euer assured of that which they most desired. O but how much more happie should both the subiects and Commonweale be, if euerie man in his degree and according to his qualitie, hauing enioyed conuenable preferments, and so hauing learned true wisedome by the mannaging of worldly affaires, should retire themselves from these vaine and worldly businesses, to occupie themselves in the contemplation of things naturall and diuine? For most certaine it is, that contemplation is the true mother and mistresse of al true wisedome and happinesse, which men altogether wrapped up in worldly affaires, neuer so much as once dreamed or tasted of; and yet for all that this is the end, this is the scope, this the chiefe point of all mans felicitie.

And yet besides these three, there is another great inconuenience also, in that offices[*](One man to have many offices and especially in perpetuitie, not good for the Commonweale.) and preferments are in Commonweales graunted unto men for tearme of life: that is to wit, that some few would have all, and some one would possesse himselfe of many publike charges and offices at once; as it was in auntient time permitted them in Carthage: which for all that seemed both unto Plato and Aristotle a thing right daungerous, For that it is an hard matter for one man well to discharge one office, but well to discharge many no one man can; and is therefore in euerie well ordered Commonweale a thing forbidden. Howbeit that the ambitious desires of men alwayes passeth beyond the prohibitions of the lawes, the most vnworthy most commonly burning with the hoatest flames of ambition; not vnlike the weake stomacke, which is alwaies more desirous of meat which it cannot disgest, than is the stomacke which can better disgest it: thinking it not to stand with their honor and reputation to stay in the meane, or to abate any of their titles and dignities, but contrariwise to mount still higher and higher. In so much that the seigneurie of Venice in some sort to satisfie the ambition of the citisens, gaue leaue unto him which had borne a greater office, to refuse the lesse being laid upon him: which is a daungerous course, to measure the publike charges and offices, by the foot of the subiects ambition, and not by the common profit.

Then how much more daungerous is it, to make the magistrats and publike charges perpetuall, onely to serue the ambitious desires of some, and so to make the Commonweale subiect unto the desire and pleasure of some few? For why, it is to be feared least that they who can neuer satisfie their immoderat desires with the multitude of offices and publike charges, but had rather to burst at the table of ambition, than in time to withdraw themselves: It is (I say) to be feared least some hungrie fellowes shall at length say unto them, Depart you hence; or if they will not so doe, plucke them away by force, not without their owne daungers, and troubling of the quiet estate of the Commonweale. At the assemblies of the estates of Rome into the place called Campus [*](Old mn in danger to be thrust off the bridges.) Martius, for the chusing of their cheife magistrats, and other their great officers, certaine narrow bridges were in diuers places laid for the citisens to passe over by, that so the little tables wherein their voices were contained, might the better be of them receiued: at which time such as were threescore yeares old, were still warned to giue place, and not to come to giue their voices, least haply they might by the multitude of the younger sort be oppressed: and not for that such old men were cast headlong from off the bridges into the riuer, as some have thought. But how much more seemely were it for them which have quietly of long enioyed the great offices and preferments in the Commonweale, and which are now growne old therein, sweetly to retire themselves out of those high places, than violently to be thrust out by others? especially considering that there is no place more slipperie or daungerous, than are the places of honour and commaund. Besides that (which worse is) such ambitious men in their falling

draw after them the fall of many others also, together with the ruine of the whole [*](Ambitious men neuer satisfied with honors, oftentimes the cause of great trobles in a Commonweale.) Commonweale▪ as did Marius, who hauing passed through all the degrees of honour, and bene six times Consull (which neuer Roman had bene before him) yet not so content, would needs take upon him the charge of the wars against king Mithridates (which by lot was fallen unto Sylla) howbeit that hee was now growne extreame old, to the intent to obtaine the seuenth Consulship, and to continue a perpetuall commaunding power unto himselfe. But Sylla understanding of the commission giuen to Marius, and of the authority by a tumultuous assembly of the people taken from him now absent (and hauing also an army with him) contrarie unto the law and the custom of their auncestors, straight way returned to Rome with his partakers, seyzed upon the citie, where he made a most horrible massacre; which afterwards in such sort continued, as that all Italie and Spaine was embrued with blood, not onely the captaines and chiefe commaunders of Marius his faction being by Sylla slaine, but euen his companions, friends, and kinsmen also, being most shamefully proscribed, or els banished, and so the Popular estate brought vnto an extreame tyrannie. So euen for the same occasion three hundred yeares before, the Popular estate was there chaunged into a faction of an Oligarchie; not for hauing of offices in perpetuitie for tearme of life, but onely for hauing continued the charge unto the Decemuiri, or ten Commissioners, for two yeares together; men appointed for the reforming and amending of the lawes, who would have so continued the third yeare also, and by force of armes still maintained their commission, encroaching upon the libertie of the people, had they not by force of armes (though not without great daunger of the state) bene againe remoued.

So by the same meanes many Popular and Aristocratique estates were chaunged into[*](Continuation of great offices oftentimes the cause of the change of the estate.) Monarchies, or at leastwise into tyrannicall governments; for hauing giuen the publike charges and commissions unto their magistrats or commissioners, for longer time than was needfull, or for proroguing of them longer than by the law they should; as to Pisistratus in Athens, to Philon in the citie of Argos, to Cypselus in Corinth, to Dionysius at Syracusa, to Panaetius at Leontium, and to Caesar at Rome. Which Aemylius Mamercus the Dictator foreseeing, presented a request unto the people, which passed into the force of a law, whereby it was ordained, That the Censors power from that time forward should continue but for eighteene monethes, which before was established for five yeares: and the next day after that he was created Dictator, deposed himselfe of his Dictatorship, being not willing to hold it more than one day; giuing this reason unto the people of his so doing, Vt scitas quàm mihi diuturna imperia non placeant, That you may know (said he) how little long lasting authoritie and power please me. And for the same occasion the law Cornelia, published at the instance of one of the Tribunes of the people, prouided, That it should not be lawful for any man to seeke to have one and the same office more than once in ten yeares. Neither missed it much but that Gabinius the Tribune had by the Senators themselves beene slaine in the full Senat, for hauing by his request made unto the people, procured commission for five yeares together to be graunted unto Pompey, for the ending of the Piraticall warre: Whereof Dion giueth a notable reason, For that (saith he) the nature of man is such, as that a man hauing for long time borne some honourable charge, commonly hath al other men in contempt and disdaine, neither can well endure to live in subiection after he hath for a long time commaunded. Which thing Cassiodorus almost in the same sence writeth, Antiquitas, prouinciarum dignitatem voluit annua successione reparari, vt nec diutina potestate vnus in solesceret, & multorum prouectus gaudia reperiret, Antiquitie (saith he) would the honour of the prouinces to be repaired with annuall succession, in such sort as that one man should neither grow insolent with long power, and

preferment be a comfort to many. And haply it was not one of the least causes that the Assyrian and Persian empires stood so long, for that they euerie yeare chaunged their lieutenants and generals.

But how then commeth it to passe, that euen children by way of complaint sue to[*](Great inconueniences ensuing by making of offices and dignities hereditarie.) be maintained and kept in the possession of the honours and estates that their fathers and grandfathers had? As in fact hath bene seene in the constables of Campagne, of Normandie, and of Britaigne: in the marshals De la Foy, as they tearme them, in the great chamberlaines, and other infinit, euen unto the sergeants sees of Normandie, as I have before noted. And namely in Aniou, Touraine, and Maine, the house of Roches had made the offices of bailifes and stewards hereditarie, had not Lewes the ninth reuoked them, and made them mutable and iusticiable, by his decree in the yeare 1256. The like is done in Principalities, Dukedomes, Marquisats, and Earledomes, which now are had in perpetuitie, which before were holden but by way of commission, and that during the princes pleasure, which at the first were but annuall, but afterwards perpetuall: and at last by the favour of our kings are become hereditarie. Howbeit that other people also as well as we, have in the same errour offended. So that there is almost no place in all Europe (except in England) where offices and dignities are not now hereditarie, in such sort as that commaunding power and authoritie, with the administration of iustice, is by right of succession fallen euen unto women and children, and so of a thing publike made particular, and to be sold to him that wil giue most, as it must needs be, being once brought into the forme of a patrimonie, which hath giuen occasion more boldly to trucke all estates and offices, when as men see by the lawes and customes euen sacred iustice it selfe prophaned, and set to sale to him that will giue most: Of which inconueniences is proceeded the euill custome of making of all estates and offices perpetuall. For one should doe iniurie to take an office from a marchant, and not restore unto him againe the money that he paid for it. Thus we see the dangers and absurdities one of them as it were linked in another, by the making of the estates and offices of the Commonweale perpetuall. Besides which reasons by me alleaged, we have also the authoritie of the greatest Law makers, Philosophers, and Lawyers, as also the examples of almost all the auntienr Commonweales; as namely, of the Athenians, the Romans, the Celtes, and others infinit, who have flourished, and do yet flourish in diuers places of Italie, Swisserland, and Germanie, as also the authoritie of Sir Thomas Moore, chauncellour of England, who in the Commonweale by him deuised, maketh all the magistrats and officers therein annuall, some from six monethis to six monethes, and othersome from two monethes to two monethes, and all to auoid the inconueniences which I haue before spoke of. And these reasons they for most part vse, which say, That magistrats and officers should not be in a Commonweale perpetuall.

But now on the other side, they which maintaine it to bee more for the publike[*](The great inconueniences ensuing of hauing the offices in a Commonweale still annuall or changable.) good, to make the estates and offices in a Commonweale perpetuall, alleage, That nothing can be well done in a yeares space, when as the magistrat must depart out of his charge before he well know his dutie; and hauing begun to vnderstand what belongeth unto his place, must yet forthwith leaue the same unto a new man; and so hee likewise unto another, all still new men; so that the Commonweale is still to fall into the hands of vnsufficient men, and such as want experience. But suppose that the prince or the people, or they which have the choice of the magistrats, commit not the publike charge but unto men knowne to be of good experience, yet seeing so many holy daies, dayes not iudiciall, vacations, daies of election, and of triumph, as take up a great part of the yeares, as well the publike as mens priuat actions must therewith needs be trobled,

warres begun be delaid, iudgements interrupted, actions of the wicked abolished, punishments deferred, & in briefe the Commonweal in the greatest dangers therof to be abandoned. Whereof wee have a million of examples in all histories, both of the Greekes, and of the Latines, which had their offices annuall. And it hath oftentimes happened, that the magistrats and captaines hauing charge to make & performe some warre, were upon a sudden called home againe, and so all was at a stay: as it happened when question was for the sending of one to succeed Scipio Africanus, the people, the Senat, and the magistrats, found themselves therewith greatly entangled; Mutis (saith Liuie) contentionibus & in Senatu, & ad populum acta res est: postremò eò deducta vt Senatui permitterent: patres igitur iurati (sic enim conuenerat) censuerunt vt Consules prouincias inter se compararent, The matter (saith he) was with great contention debated, both in the Senat, and before the people; at length it was brought to that point, as that the people committed it unto the Senat: wherefore the Senators beeing sworne (for so it was agreed) determined, That the Consuls should diuide the prouinces betwixt them. Which was a great noueltie to sweare the Senat thereunto. But Scipio understanding of the decree of the Senat, whereby one of the Consuls was forthwith to succeed him, without farther delay concluded a peace, more to the aduantage of the enemie than hee would otherwise have done, if hee had not feared least his successour should have carried away from him the glorie and honour of his victorie, as it is reported himselfe to have oftentimes said. So the warre against king Mithridates was protracted aboue twentie yeares, by reason of the continuall chaunging of the Roman Generals, the enemie in the meane while (many faire opportunities by him offered, and by the Romans neglected) farre and wide extending his dominion and empire. Yea sometimes the Generall was to giue up his charge, when hee was euen uppon the point to ioyne battell with the enemie, although he had none appointed to succeed him: as it happened unto the great captaines Epaminondas and Pelopidas, whose charge expired euen at such time as they were to giue the enemie battell: who yet neuerthelesse seeing themselves to have an aduantage of the enemie, and that they could not without the most manifest danger of the state leaue their charge, gaue battel, and so obtained a most glorious victorie, whereby the Thebans with their allies were preserued, and the Lacedemonians with a great slaughter ouerthrowne. But returning home, in stead of thanks and triumph, they were both accused of high treason, for that they had holden their charge longer than the time by the law appointed, & so brought unto their triall and conuicted, were by the commissioners condemned to die: howbeit that they were afterwards by the people pardoned. Now who knoweth not how many strong places have bene taken by the enemie, for chaunging of their captaines? how many cities and townes have bene forced, for hauing put into them new gouernours? and especially at such time as the enemie was nie, & readie to besiege the same: as oftentimes it commeth to passe, that the favourites carrying away the honor, the old expert captaines are excluded, who right often in revenge thereof either go over unto the enemie, or els otherwise disfurnish the place of victuals, and other things necessarie.

And yet there is another reason which might well stay the preferments and offices of the commonweale from being mutable, which reason Tiberius the emperour had[*](The reason why Tiberius the Emperor would not have the great officers often chaunged.) still in his mouth, at such time as men complained him to be the first that had for many yeares together continued the estates and offices still in the same mens hands: I do it (said he) to the end that they which are already full of the blood of the people, may as Horseleeches, full and ready to burst, giue the subiects some release, fearing lest such as should come new & all an hungred, should without remorse or respect at all, draw out the rest of their blood, gnaw their bones, and sucke out the very marrow that was yet

left in the subiects. And this unto me seemeth to be a reason of right great importance: for it is an olde and true saing, Non parcit populis regnum breue, a short raigne spareth not the people. And yet in the raigne of Tiberius, offices and other places of commaund, were vsually giuen and not sold; obtained, but not craued, upon men of desert bestowed, and not shamefully set to sale to them that would giue most: which opinion of Tiberius ought to bee of much more force in such places as where port sale is made of all preferments and offices of the commonweale: for it is to bee presumed (as sayth Alexander Seuerus the emperor, & after him Lewes the 12) that the marchants of offices must sel by retaile, & as deere as they can, that which they had before bought in grosse.

And beside that which we have already said, how is it possible that he should commaund with such authority as beseemeth a magistrat, which seeth that by and by after he shall but stand for a cipher (as they say) without any authority or power at all? who shall obey him? who shal feare him? who shall do his commaunds? wheras to the contrary, if the magistrats power be perpetuall, he shall commaund with dignity, hee shall boldly oppose himselfe against the wicked, and giue ayde and succour unto the good: he shall revenge the wrong done unto the oppressed, and resist the violence of tyrants, and that without feare or misdoubt of being thrust out, or dispoyled of his dignity and office, as hath bene seene by some euen of the greatest princes, astonished with the constancy & immutable assurance of the magistrats, not hauing what to reproue him for: neither yet daring to displace them, fearing also the discontentment of their subiects, unto whom the brightnes of Iustice and vertue is alwayes redoubtable, and the integrity of valiant and couragious men right commendable.

In briefe, if we would have (as all men ought to wish to haue) magistrats wise, stout, and well experimented in the charge committed unto them, we must wish them to bee perpetual: for why it is impossible that new magistrats should be expert in their charge the first yeare, considering that the life of man is right short, and the nature of authority and power most difficult, whether it be for the training up of the subiects in warres, or for the maintaining of them in peace; for the administration of Iustice, or for the mannaging of the publike reuenues: all which cannot in short time of new magistrats be either throughly learned, or duly practised. For as the ruine of families commonly commeth of new seruitors, euen so the fals of Commonweales also proceedeth from [*](New lords new lawes.) new magistrats, who still bring in new deuises, councels, laws, factions, customs, edicts, stiles, iudgements, ceremonies, actions, and in briefe a new chaunge of all things in the Commonweale; whereof ensueth a contempt of the old laws & customs, as also of the magistrats themselves. All which may well be seene in the antient Commonweals of of the Greeks & Romans, wherein the new magistrats were no sooner placed, but they forthwith forged new edicts & laws, so to cause themselves to be the more spoken of; without regard whether they were profitable for the Commonweal or not: propounding only this unto themselves, how to leaue a remembrance of their names unto posteritie: wheras men so sicke of ambition, are still more desirous of a great than of a good name. Howbeit that it is not needfull to vse many arguments to proue & show as it were unto the sight of the eye, that the magistrats and officers ought to be perpetuall, seeing that we have the law of God, which cannot bee so bound unto places or persons, but that a man therefrom may well draw an example to imitate and follow. Now it is not found, that the magistrats and officers established in the law of God were annuall: neither is it found, that they which were once prouided of honorable places and preferments in the Commonweale, were euer after againe remoued to giue place unto new magistrats, and so to yeeld unto ambition that which is to vertue due. So wee find also, that Plato would that the offices in his Commonweale should

still for the most part be perpetuall. So that in briefe we see the reasons by vs alleaged, to be by the sacred scriptures, as also by long experience and tract of time confirmed, not by the example of small Commonweales, but euen of the greatest and most flourishing monarchies and kingdomes that now are, or euer were in the whole world, as were those of the Assyrians, the Persians, the Aegyptians, the Parthians, the Aethiopians, the Turkes, the Tartars, the Moscouites, the Polonians, the Germans, the French men, the Danes, the Swedens, the Englishmen, the Scots, the Spaniards, the Italians; excepting some few Commonweals, which are still turmoiled with the continual changing of their Magistrats, and perpetuall flouds of sedition and discord for the shortnesse of their offices.

Now it is not like so many people and nations to have failed of the light of nature, of iudgement, of reason, & experience, seeing their estate so wisely managed, and to have so long flourished both in time of peace and war: which could in no wise so long haue stood, had their mutable magistrats bene every moment to have bene anew chosen. And thus we see the reasons both of the one side and of the other, which might moue some to make their magistrats perpetuall, as some others also to make them annuall. unto which reasons sometime are ioyned such flourishes of eloquence, as might at the first well dasse the eyes not onely of the ignorant, but euen of the sharpest witted also, to heare the reasons of the one side, without giuing of eare unto the reasons of the other, which are hereby vs indifferently set downe, that every man might suspend his iudgement, vntill that euerie thing were in equall ballance well weighed▪

But as men oftentimes erre in the maintaining of the societies of men▪ and government[*](Two great errors oftentimes committed in the government of Commonweales.) of cities and Commonweales; so doe they in two notable things also especially: whereof the one is, That they too narrowly looke into the inconueniences of a law, without weighing of the good that ensueth thereof: the other, That they runne from one extreame into another; and so as it were shunning the water, run all headlong into the fire, when as they should have staied in the middest. Plato would, that the magistrats in his Commonweale should bee all perpetuall: which extremitie seemed unto Aristotle blame-worthy, who therefore running himselfe into the other extremitie, and reiecting the opinion of his master Plato, opened a way unto all the citisens, to all the honours and preferments of his Commonweal, saying, That otherwise to do, were to kindle the fire of sedition in the whole estate: whereas yet neither the one nor the other of them hath made any distinction at all of Commonweales, whereof the resolution of this question especially dependeth. And we have seene euen in this our time one* of the greatest persons of this realme, and the chiefe man of his cote, who hauing[*](Michael hospitalis chauncelour of France.) embraced the opinion of Aristotle, hath endeuoured himselfe by all means to change all the offices into commissions, to be holden but by sufferance: who neuer had other thing in his mouth, and yet without any distinction in what forme of Commonweale this chaunge were, without harme to be receiued.

Now most certaine it is, that Commonweales in nature contrarie, are by contrarie [*](Commonweales in nature contrarie, by contrarie meanes to be also maintained.) lawes and meanes to bee also gouerned and maintained (as wee have oftentimes before said, and yet must oft times say) so that the rules and orders proper to maintaine and preserue Popular estates, serue to the readie ruine and ouerthrow of Monarchies and sole governments. The Popular estates are maintained by[*](Annuall magistrats best in a popular Commonweale.) continuall chaunge of officers, to the end that euerie man according to his qualitie might have part in the offices, according as they have part in the soueraigntie, which can in no wise bee where offices be giuen in perpetuitie. Besides that equalitie the nurse of Popular estates is by the annuall succession of magistrates the better maintained, and the long custome of continuall commaund giue not an appetite

or desire to some one or other ambitions citisen to aspire unto the soueraigntie alone. Whereas to the contrarie in Monarchies it is not necessarie, no nor yet wholesome, that subiects hauing no interest in the soueraigntie, should be nourished in ambition, it being sufficient for them to learne to bee dutifull and obedient unto their soueraigne prince, and especially if the Monarchy be Lordlike or Tyrannicall: For that the subiects in the one be the princes naturall slaues, and in the other the tyrants slaues by force, it should be a thing impossible for such a Lordlike Monarch, or tyrant to hold their estates, and to giue such yearely or successiue commanding power unto their subiects.[*](The pollicie and craft of tyrants.) And therefore tyrants, who are no lesse hated and feared of their subiects, than they themselves feare and hate them, hauing little or no trust or confidence in them, for most part guard themselves with straungers onely, and some few of their owne subiects, such as they know to be unto themselves most loyall and faithfull, unto whome they commit the custodie and guard of their owne persons, of their estates, of their forces, and of their wealth, without any desire at all to chaunge them, not onely for that they distrust others, but also for that they would not acquaint them with the sweetnesse of power and command, least so some one or other of them therewith enflamed, should be desirous to dispatch the tyrant of his life, so to obtaine his place: or els otherwise in so doing to gratifie the subiects. Whereas the Lordlike Monarch whome his subiects more willingly obey as his naturall slaues, is not so much hindred or letted from the choice of his magistrats and officers, as is the tyrant, who is not but by force and constraint obeyed of his subiects; and therefore giueth not the preferments or offices of his estates in perpetuitie, neither yet maketh them annuall; but onely bestoweth them as he seeth good, and that for so long as pleaseth him, diuiding them amongst many at his good pleasure, without any law or decree therefore, all depending of his will and pleasure.

But the Royall Monarch, who is in such sort to intreat his subiects, as is the good father[*](The magistrats in a royall monarchie some perpetuall and some annuall.) his louing children, albeit that he be no more bound unto mans lawes, than are the other Monarches, yet will he neuerthelesse of himselfe establish decrees and lawes, for the placing and displacing of magistrats and officers, to the end they might so bee holden; diuiding the honours and rewards of vertue not to all indifferently, without discretion, but unto such as deserue the same; hauing still more respect vnto the experience and vertue, than unto the grace and favour of them who are unto him most of all commended. And yet for all that, shall in all things obserue and keepe the commendable mediocritie, in such sort, as that he shall make many offices perpetuall, and some changeable also from three yeares to three yeares; and othersome to bee euerie yeare also chaunged; as namely the presidents of the parliaments, of the finances or common receit, or gouernours of prouinces, who could neuer otherwise bee punished for their oppression and misdemeanor, if they had their such great authoritie and power in the estate and Commonweale still in perpetuitie. He shall also diuide the honors and p---eferments of the state, unto the richer and nobler sort, albeit that they be not men of so great experience as are some of the poorer and baser sort, so to preuent sturres and seditions: yet for all that prouided alwayes, that unto them which of themselves are not of sufficient capacitie be still associat men of good experience in their charge, so to cover and supplie the defect of the others: And yet is not so bound, unto his own laws, but in case of necessitie hee may againe displace them whome hee hath before ordained to be perpetuall magistrats, finding them of whome he hath so euill made choice, for the weakenesse of their minds or bodies, to be altogether insufficient for the publike charge to be by them sustained, or for to couer the shame of them which are so insufficient, shall giue them some honest meanes to discharge themselves of such their

charge: as did the most wise emperor Augustus unto a great number of the Senators, who vnworthy of their so honourable places, by that meane cleanely displaced themselves, without any force or sturre; or at leastwise shall appoint them deputies for the executing of their charge: yet in the meane time suffering the magistrates and officers themselves, to enioy still their titles of their offices, and woonted priuileges. And to the intent that iustice, the principall and chiefe ground of an estate[*](That the colleges and companies of iudges ought to be petuall.) or Commonweale may bee the more religiously distributed, hee shall for the administration thereof appoint perpetuall colledges and companies of Iudges, and especially of such as are without appeale to iudge of the lives, fame, and goods of the subiects: not onely that these judges should so be the better experimented (as well for hearing the opinion of diuers, as for their long exercise in iudgement:) but also that so their seuerall power might be in some sort weakened (for feare they should abuse the same) and that so being many of like authoritie and power, they should not so easily be corrupted: not unlike to a great deale of water which is more hardly corrupted than is a little. For as Plinie sayth: Nemo omnes, neminem omnes vnquam fefellerunt: meliùs omnibus quàm singulis creditur. No man euer deceiued all men, neither did all m---n euer deceiue any man: better it is to beleeue all than one. Howbeit, yet that by the wisedome and vertue of some one good judge, a whole companie, or bench of judges of the same court is oftentimes releeued: and their factions and secret practises broken; or being otherwise good men, yet misse-enformed by false accusers and pettie foggers, cannot know or vnderstand the truth: but are by the wisedome of some one of their companie the better enformed. As I have knowne one judge alone to have caused the whole companie of judges to change their opinion, being before resolued and set downe to have put a poore innocent woman to death: whom yet for all that he by most pregnant and lively reasons clearely and fully acquited of that shee was in danger to have beene condemned for. Who therefore well deserueth to be named: and was Potier a learned judge of great integritie and vertue: who hath left unto his countrey his two sonnes inheritours of their fathers vertues: one of them Master of the Requests: and the other, Secretarie of the Finances; in vertue not inferior unto their father. Besides that, the experience of many worlds of yeares hath giuen vs sufficiently to understand many judges, by conferring their opinions together, to giue therby a better and sounder iudgement, than where they iudge every one of them apart. Howbeit that Aristotle thinketh it better to have every judges opinion considered of apart by it selfe: and that he saith to have beene the vsuall manner of iudgement in many the cities of the Greeks. Now the Romans to have holden both these fashions and manners of iudgements Asconius Paedianus is the Authour, where he saith: Aliam esse rationem cum vniuersi Iudices constituunt, aliam cum singuli sententiam ferunt, It to be one manner of proceeding when all the judges together determine of a matter, and another when every one of them deliver their opinions apart. Wherefore causes are more indifferently and uprightly discided in Europe by a competent number of judges together: then by seuerall judges in Asia and Africke, whereas one particular[*](Better many iudges then one alone.) judge of a Prouince according to his will and pleasure determineth of all appeales made unto him from the other particular and inferiout judges in that prouince. And albeit that in Grand Caire (one of the greatest cities of the world) there be foure judges which have their diuers and seperate iurisdictions, and every one of them have also their diuers Deputies, who iudge also of causes apart and by themselves, yet are the appeales still brought unto the first judge chiefe of the foure; who alone without any companion or assistant by him selfe at his pleasure discideth all appeales: whom it is no great matter for him to winne, that standeth in his good grace, or that hath the greatest presents to giue him. Howbeit that the two Cadeleschers are the chiefe of all the judges, and may at their pleasure place or displace any of the rest of the judges, yea and all of them together also so long as it shall please the Grand Seignor▪ For why amongst the Turkes all power and commaund is but by sufferance and during pleasure both giuen and receiued.

Now we have before said that in the royall Monarchie all the Magistrates and Officers[*](Good that inferiour Magistrats & officers should be perpetuall.) should neither be perpetuall, neither all still mutable: For that it is not needfull to chaunge the meane officers, as Clarks, Sergeants, Vshers, Notaries, and such other like, who for that they have no power or authoritie to commaund, cannot hurt the Estate: and yet neuerthelesse the experience of their charge which cannot but in long time and by great practise be got, requireth that they should bee perpetuall. And so might a man say of other inferiour officers also, being still subiect unto the power and authoritie of the greater, but cannot yet oft times be chaunged without the great hurt of the Commonweale, and many priuate mens hinderance. The Senators and Councelours of estate also, whose dexteritie for the mannaging of the great affaires of the Commonweale is not but by long experience to be gotten; we see them to have [*](That Senators and Counsellors of estate ought to be stìll perpetual.) beene in Rome, in Lacedemonia, and amongst the Areopagi in Athens, perpetuall: and so I thinke they ought to be every where else, so that in the perpetuall chaunge of mutable magistrates, the Senate should still be constant, firme, and immutable, and that upon it the other mutable offices and magistrates should as upon a most sure slay rest: which was not so well prouided for by * Plato, who would have his Senate to be [*](Lib. de Legibus Cap. 174.) every yeare by lot chosen. But now as for such great magistrates and officers as acknowledge no commaund more than the soueraigne Princes alone, whither it be in martiall affaires, the administration of iustice, or the charge of the publique receit if the royall Monarch shall keepe them but one, two, or three yeares in their charge at the most, he shall so leaue open a way unto his iustice, for the examining of their actions, and by the same meanes shall cause the wicked and corrupt magistrates to quake, standing alwayes in dread to be called to giue an account of their doings. And for that Magistrats and Officers are not to be chaunged all at once (for that all sudden chaunges in a Commonweale are daungerous) and that the publique actions be not interrupted, the chaunge of such great Magistrates as are in corporations and colleges together is to be made by the succeeding of them one of them unto an other: as they doe in the Commonweale of Rhaguse, where the Senate is perpetuall, and the Senators who are also soueraigne judges, are not but every one of them one yere in charge: who yet chaunge not all at once, but successiuely, and as it were insensiblie; and in their turne after that they have for a certaine time lived as priuate men, returne more fresh unto the same charge againe.

But yet generally in every Commonweale this rule hath alwayes place without exception,[*](A generall and necessarie rule to be kept in every Commonweale.) viz. That the perpetuall Magistrats & Officers should have either no power at all, or else verie little power to commaund, or else some companion ioyned with them: and that they to whom great power is giuen, have the same but for a short time, and by the law limitted to some few monethes or yeares. By which tempering and moderation of power and commaund, the difficulties and daungers shall cease, which might otherwise ensue by the sudden chaunge of all the Magistrates at once, for the interruption of publique actions. Neither need we so to feare lest the Commonweale should be without Magistrates, as a ship without a master to gouerne the same: as it often times chaunced in Rome, for the sute of the magistrates, who one of them hindered an other, or els the same day entered all into their charge, as they all at one and at the selfe same instant departed out of the same together. Neither need we to feare

also lest the wicked by briberie mounted unto the more hie degrees of honour, should escape vncorrected: or that the ignorant or vnskilfull should carie away the preferments of the estate and Commonweale: they which before had charge, hauing for certaine yeares rested themselves, still returning againe with much greater experience then before. Now they which wish for annuall Magistrats, annuall Senators, annuall powers and commaunds, forsee not that (beside the difficulties and daungers by vs before alleaged to ensure thereof) by this meanes either rude artificers or such like ignorant and vnskilfull men, must be called unto such publike charges as they are neuer able to discharge, or else that the Commonweale must needs be full of most wise men, and such as are of greatest experience and knowledge. Howbeit that cannot by nature be, that all men can do all things: wheras we see particular men scarcely well to discharge their particular charges; and in other some to rest great wisedome, who yet have no skill in government at all. But in doing that which wee have said there shall not easilie any default fall out, neither shall the subiects have any iust cause whereof to complaine; the rewards of honour being so exposed to every mans sight, as the marke whereat every one should ayme, though few there bee which hit the same, and the fewer officers and rewards there should be, and the dearer that they were prized, the more they should be of all desired: when as every man should for his vertue be called upon, and that there should be no cause of sedition, no man being excluded from the merite and reward of his vertue and sufficiencie, so that the causes of sedition so taken away, the subiects may still live in all peace and tranquillitie. And if need be we may vse Commissioners or Syndiques, as they did in the time of Lewes the ix, and Philip the faire, for the chastising of the officers, and the calling of them to account.

Now some difficulties concerning the chaunging of Magistrats and Lawes are by vs before set downe, and more I suppose will be imagined: yet were it vnreasonable to looke into the discommodities of a law (and so for the same to reiect it) without consideration[*](No lawe so good but that it draweth after it some discommoditie.) also of the profits thereof, seeing that there is no law so good (as saith C---o the Censor) which draweth not after it some incommodities. And in mine opinion that law may alwayes be accounted good and profitable, if the good which may ensue[*](That a good law is not to be changed for some one discommoditie ensuing thereof.) thereof be manifest, and greater then the harme that is to be feared thereof: wherein many often times offend, which thinke it impossible to have all discommodities quite taken out of the lawes, the Commonweale yet neuerthelesse still standing in safetie,[*](Dangerous to change all the cheife magistrats of a Commonweale at once.) but so falling into such daungers as they before thought not of, straight waies blame the lawes, and often times chaunge the same, when as in truth they should have accused & chaunged them selues. So some good Princes euill aduised often times to their harme cancell a good Law for some one incommoditie they have seene therein▪ Whereof we will vse no other example then that of Lewes the xj, who comming to the Crowne at once displaced all his fathers auntient seruitours, and remoued also the princes his nie kinsmen from the government of the state: who therefore with a wonderfull consent conspired with the enemy against him, and brought him to such a strait, as that they had almost strucke the crowne from his head, and by force wrested the roiall scepter out of his hands. But these sturres againe quieted, and all things well pacified and set in order, fearing lest his sonne should fall into the like daunger, charged him neuer to chaunge them whom he had aduanced; and yet not so contented, made a law, whereby he decreed all offices to be perpetuall; and that such as were once preferred thereunto, should not be againe displaced, otherwise then by resignation, death, or forfaiture: And by an other Edict declaring the former, published the xx. of September in the yeare 1482 decreed, That no officers hauing forfeited their offices, for what cause soeuer, should be enforced to yeeld up their offices, except it were so before

adiudged, and the parties condemned. Which edict hee commaunded to stand in force, not onely whilest he himselfe yet lived, but also during the raigne of his sonne Charles. And albeit that he could not so bind the hands of his successour, yet so it is neuerthelesse, that this his decree & law hath euer since bene inuiolably kept, although the auntient clause, So long as it shall please vs, remaine still in all letters of office. Which words declare no perpetuall power to be giuen unto the magistrats or officers, but by sufferance onely, except by law or custome it be otherwise prouided. Yet still remaineth that idle clause, that thereby it may be vnderstood, all power and authoritie to have in auntient times bene giuen by our kings during their pleasure, and so to have of the magistrats bene holden but by sufferance onely. And albeit that in the raigne of Philip the Faire this string was againe touched, for the giuing of offices in perpetuitie, yet for all that the matter still rested vndecided. But Philip Valois reuoked the commissions, and ordained, That from that time forward the royall offices should bee perpetuall; which well declareth them before to have beene mutable at the pleasure of the kings, albeit that the officers had not forfeited them. And amongst those praises which they giue unto king Robert, one of the greatest is, That he neuer displaced officer, if he had not for some foule and infamous fact before forfeited his office. Whereby it is to be gathered, king Robert his auncestours to have used other lawes and customes.

But yet haply it may seeme unto some, that if offices should still be giuen with that clause, During the Princes pleasure, the magistrats would better discharge their charges for the hope they should haue by this meane to continue still in their places, proceeding still from better to better, and bearing themselves uprightly, for feare otherwise to be displaced. Whereunto I agree, in a well ordered Lordly Monarchy: but the daunger should be greater to open such a gap under a prince on every side beset with flatterers, and compassed in with clawbackes: For why, euerie man seeth, that princes so beset, must either make a most filthy gaine and traffique of their offices, or else take such places and power to commaund, from good men, who almost alwaies have the courtiers life (polluted with all manner of vices) in hatred and detestation. Besides that[*](That offices in a royal Monarchie are rather to be bestowed by order of law, than by the Princes will & pleasure onely.) this bestowing of offices during pleasure, sauoureth somewhat of tyranny, or of a Lordlike government, rather than of a Royall Monarchy; which (so much as possible is) should by lawes, and not by the princes will and pleasure onely bee gouerned: So as many a Lordly Monarchie, where the subiects being naturall slaues adore and feare their soueraigne prince, as a god come downe from heauen, accounting his commaunds as the lawes of nature it selfe. Whereas in a Royall Monarchy, where the subiects are as children, it is needfull to rule and gouerne all things by law, as much as possible may be: for otherwise if the king shall without cause exclude some one more than some other from some office or preferment, he that should bee so excluded should hold himselfe iniured, and so rest discontented with his prince; who ought rather to be beloued than feared of his subiects: which to bee, he ought to take away all occasion of discontentment that men might have against him; and better meanes is there none, than to leaue all that may be to the disposition of the lawes and customes, no man so hauing iust cause to complaine of the prince.

The learned Budeus who was of opinion that it were best to have the magistrats and offices still changeable, without hauing regard vnto the law made by Lewes the xi. hath holden, That in auntient time the Presidents and counsellors of the parliament of Paris were but annuall: and that the solemne oath which they still take the 12. day of nouember, and the letters patents which they still are to have from the king for the opening of the Parliament, show sufficiently that their estates were not perpetuall, but still at the pleasure of the prince to bee reuoked, and so to bee by them holden but by

sufferance: and so by these reasons drew many to be of the same opiniō with him, who [*](The erection of the parliament of Paris.) had they but turned over the records of the court, and of the chamber of accounts, they should have found that that Parliament which before was ambulatorie & moueable, and which had no power but by commission, was by Philip the long ordayned to be an ordinarie Court, with ordinarie power, circuite, and iurisdiction; in the erection whereof was expressed that it should still have therein one or two Presidents, of whom the first was the Earle of Burgundie the kings nie kinsman, as in like sort the President in the Imperiall chamber, is alway one of the princes of the Empire. And so for a long time also the President of the court of Paris was still a martiall man and not a gowne man as he now is: and euen yet at this present the Great Praetor of the court of Paris, whom we call the chiefe President, is still honored with the qualitie and title of a martiall man, as of a knight, or as the Latins call it Miles, or a souldiour, although he neuer drew sword: which title the other judges of that court haue not, who then were but three score, but now are an hundred and fiftie. Whereby it is plaine the court of Paris so founded to have an ordinarie and perpetuall power, neither to have need of the Princes annuall rescripts, or letters patents for the disciding and determining of controuersies. Howbeit that king Henry the second comming into the Parliament for the publishing of certaine Edicts and lawes, which in that court could hardly find passage (hauing it put into his mouth by certaine flatterers) said openly, That the Parliament had at all no power, if it pleased not him by sending of his letters Patents every yeare to giue opening unto the same; which his speech astonished many. But certaine it is that the letters patents which are sent to this end, and the annuall oath which the Presidents and Councelours take, is but a matter of formalitie and custome, necessarie at such time as the parliaments were not holden but by commission: But afterwards that they were erected into the forme of ordinarie courts, such auntient solemnities are no more necessarie: for why the annuall Magistrats are to take an annuall oath; whereas they which are perpetuall Magistrats are to take it but once for all, without any needlesse reiteration of the same. So the continuall Roman Magistrats every yeare tooke their oath, for that their power was but annuall: wheras the Senators tooke it but once for all, for that their dignitie was perpetuall and during the whole time of their lives. The same might be said of the forme of the commissions and decrees of that court, conceiued under the name and seale of the king, and namely of the letters missiue of the court: which although they bee conceiued in the name of the court, are yet neuerthelesse sealed with the little royall seale with the flowredeluce: howbeit that all the other magistrats, seneschals, bailiefes, prouosts, and gouernours of countries, hauing power of ordinarie commaund or by commission, direct the same under their owne names, and their owne seales; which is yet retained of the auntient forme, euer since that the parliament was but the kings priuie councell, which councell for that it had no ordinarie power, did nothing of it selfe, and the commissions are alwaies graunted in the name of the king, as hauing the onely power to commaund in his councell, as we have before shewed. Which forme hath bene euer since followed in the erection of other parliaments, euen unto the court of Aides, who giue out all their commissions, under the kings name--- which hath moued some to say, That the parliaments have nothing but an extraordinarie power by way of commission onely. Howbeit that it sufficiently appeareth by that which is by vs before said, them to have an ordinarie and perpetuall power, which they still hold the king beeing dead: Which if it were but a power holden upon sufferance, (as some would have it) it should then together with the death of the king take end, as all other powers and commissions else doe. But these courts and the ordinarie magistrats thereof, the king being dead neither chaunge their attire, nor vse any mourning garments, or other signes of sorrow: yea that more is, the first confirmations of the new king are alwaies graunted unto the Courts of Parliament; as hath beene alwaies used since the time of Lewes the eleuenth, in such sort as that their power is not onely ordinarie, but perpetuall also, not onely in the whole bodies of themselves, but euen in every one of the members, officers, and ministers of the said Courts of Parliament.[*](The giuing of offices during the princes pleasure not to be discommended.)

And yet for all that is not the manner of those Princes to be discommended, who unto their Officers and Magistrates giue their power but by sufferance, which they (if cause be) at their pleasure againe take from them, as the kings of England have used to doe. For albeit that the auntient and moderne Commonweales, especially the Popular and Aristocratique (more straitly bound unto the lawes than are Monarchies) have their Magistrates and officers for the most part annuall, and that none of them was againe displaced, without iust cause why; yet so it was for all that, that the people sometimes reuoked their former choice made, and placed some others whom they knew to be more fit for the charge they were to vndergoe: as it did in establishing the Dictators and others their Captaines and Gouernors, reuoking sometimes (as I say) euen their ordinarie magistrates; as it did Octacilius the Consul, who at the request of Fabius Maximus was remoued from his charge, as a man not sufficient for the mannaging of so great and daungerous a warre as the State had then in hand. Neither had they for the remouing of their magistrat, regard onely if he had in any thing trespassed, and so deserued to be remoued; but euen unto the insufficiencie of him also, whither it were knowne or vnknowne when they receiued him into the Estate, or that it were befallen him afterwards; deeming also weaknesse, or age, madnesse, or other like diseases, such as let and hinder mens reasonable actions, to be sufficient also to displace them from their offices. And namely Lucius Torquatus chosen the third time Consul excused himselfe before the people for the infirmitie of his eyes; saying, That it was not reason to put the government of the Commonweale into his hands, who could not see but by other mens eyes. But O how many are there of the blind, deafe, and dumbe, not hauing in themselves any light of nature, neither wisedome, nor experience so much as to gouerne themselves, who are not yet content to guide the sayles and tackles, but desire also to lay hands euen upon the verie helme also of the Commonweale?

Now that which we have said concerning the meane that ought to be kept in the chaunge and continuation of Magistrats and Officers, hath not onely place in royall Monarchies, but euen in Popular and Aristocratique estates also, where the offices[*](That in every commonweale there ought to be some estates and magistrats perpepetuall.) almost all, or for the most part, ought to be every yeare, or from two yeares to two yeares still mutable: as they do among the Swissers, and diuers other Commonweals. Yet neuerthelesse for the preseruation of the same, there must still be some estates in the Commonweale perpetuall: as namely those whose experience and wisdome is alwayes necessarie for the stay of the rest, such as be the Councellors of estate: And this is it, for which the Senat in Rome, in Athens, and in Lacedemonia, was still perpetuall. And why, the Senators still during their lives held their charge and places: for as the hookes and hinges whereupon great burdens rest, must of themselves be strong and vnmoueable; euen so the Senat of the Areopagi, and of other Commonweales also, were as most strong and sure hinges, whereupon as well all the mutable officers as the whole waight of the Estate and Commonweale rested & reposed themselves. The contrarie whereof is to be done in Monarchies, wherein the greater part, and almost all the estates ought to be perpetuall, except some few of the chiefe and principall: as they doe in the kindome of Spayne, where they well know how to

keepe this mediocritie or meane proper unto the royall estate. And so for the same cause the Venetians which have an Aristocratique estate, make their officers every yeare chaungeable, and some of them from two moneths to two moneths; and yet neuerthelesse have their Duke, the Procurators of S. Marke, the Chauncelour, and foure Secretaries for the Estate, perpetuall; which the Florentines ordayned in their Estate also (after that they were by Lewes the xij, delivered from the most cruell tyrannie of Countie Valentinus Borgia) taking order that their Duke should from that time forward be perpetuall, to the entent that the Commonweal before in perpetuall motion and chaunge of all their estates and offices, might yet have some thing firme and stable whereupon to rest and stay it selfe: which good order being in short time after by the most turbulent Florentines abolished, they fell againe into greater tumuls and civill warres then euer they were in before: whereas if they had had but a perpetuall Senate at the least, and the Senators continued in their charge, (who from six moneths to six moneths were stil chaunged and rechaunged) and had but kept a certaine meane betwixt these two extremities, of generall chaunge, and still continuing of all their offices, their estate had beene much the more assured, neither had their Commonweale beene still so tossed and turmoyled with so many and so great surges of sedition, and tempests of civill warres. But these things thus by vs declared, let vs now see also whether in a wise and well ordered Commonweale it be good that the Magistrates should be all at unitie, and of one accord among themselves or not?