The six books of a common-weale

THis question, viz. Whether it be good that the magistrats and officers of a Commonweale should be of accord, or els at discord and variance among themselves? may perhaps seeme altogether needlesse and vaine. For who euer doubted but that it was alwaies expedient, yea and necessarie too, that the Magistrats in euerie Commonweale [*](Reasons to show that magistrats ought to be at vn tie and concord among themselves.) should be of one and the same mind? to the end that they all together might with one consent and heart embrace and seeke after the publike good: And if so it be (as wise men have alwaies thought) that a well ordered Commonweale ought to resemble a mans bodie, wherein all the members are vnited and conioyned with a maruellous bond, euerie one of them doing their office and dutie; and yet neuerthelesse when need is, one of them still aideth another, one of them releeueth another; and so all together strengthen themselves, to maintaine the health, beautie, and welfare of the whole bodie: but if it should happen them to enter into hatred one of them against another; and that the one hand should cut the other, or the right foot supplant the left, and that the fingers should scrape out the eyes, and so euerie member should draw unto it selfe the nourishment of the other next unto it; it must needs fall out, that the bodie in the end must become maimed, lame, and impotent, in all the actions therof: euen so in like manner may a man deeme of the estate of a Commonweale, the honour and welfare whereof dependeth of the mutuall loue and good will of the subiects among themselves, as also toward their soueraigne prince. Which sweet unitie and agreement how is it to be hoped for, if the magistrats which are the principall subiects▪ and such as ought by their example to bind together the rest, be at variance and discord among themselves? But euen to the contrarie the subiects shall become partakers of the factions of the magistrats, they first nourishing secret grudges, and afterward open

enmitie, vntill that at length all breake out into open civill warre, all for the maintenance and upholding euerie one of them of the chiefe of their factions, to the destruction of the Commonweale: or in case stay be made thereof, and that things fall not out altogether so euill, yet must still publike actions by such ambitious discord of the magistrats be hindred, and the Commonweale sore troubled: whereunto it shall happen as it doth unto a maid, for whome (as Plutarch saith) her suters enter into such a ielousie and passion, as that desiring euerie one of them to have her to himselfe, they so in stead of louing and embracing of her, most cruelly rent her in peeces amongst them. And what good successe may a man expect of an armie, or what victorie is to bee hoped for over the enemie, where the captaines and commaunders are at discord among themselves? or what iustice is to be looked for, where the judges are divided into factions? Yea it hath bene oftentimes seene some of them to haue beene of contrarie opinions and aduise unto others, and that upon a verie iealousie and hatred they had among themselves, and so play as it were at hazard with the life, the goods, and honour of the subiects: as Agesilaus king of the Lacedemonians (albeit that hee was one of the most famous of them that euer was) to impaire the credit and authoritie of Lysander whome he hated, reuersed all his iudgements, and gaue sentence quite contrarie, not so much for the iniquitie of the cause (as he himselfe said) as in despight of him his enemie onely. And to make the matter short, most certaine it is, that dissentions and civill warres (the capitall plagues of Commonweales) take foot, root, encrease, and nourishment, of nothing more than of the hatred and enmitie of the magistrats among themselves. Whereof it followeth the unitie and concord of them among thmselues to be unto the subiects not onely profitable, but euen necessarie also. Which may all seeme right profitable arguments and reasons for the one side.

But now they which more subtilly reason of these matters, deeme to the contrarie,[*](Contrary reasons to show that it is good for the Commonweale, that magistrats should be at discord and variance among themselves.) the health, and welfare of the Commonweale to be best preserued and kept by the discord of the magistrats. For why (say they) the force and nature of vertue is such, as that it cannot be contrarie unto vertue; neither that good men, although they bee at neuer so great oddes, can yet be enemies among themselves: but being prouoked by the iniuries of the wicked their aduersaries, do still wel the more and more encrease and flourish: neither is the valour of worthy men any where more euident and manifest, than when they without bitternesse contend among themselves; and so prickt forward with an honest ambition, and enflamed with the heat of men like unto themselves, as with a fire, are by the emulation of their competitors incited to take in hand great matters, and so still to ouercome their enemies in well doing. So when Taxilas king of the Indians had by his ambassadours freely and without resistance offered his kingdome unto Alexander the Great, (then bearing downe all the kingdomes of the East before him) if so be he wanted wealth; and withall refused not to receiue wealth also at his hands, if hee had of it too much: Alexander glad of such a match, said unto him, If we must thus contend and combat together, it shall neuer be said, that you shall take this point of honour from me, as to be accounted more magnificall, more courteous, or more royall, than my selfe: and so gaue unto him another great kingdome, with an infinit masse of treasure. In like manner Tullus Hostilius king of the Romans, said unto Metius Suffetius Dictator of the Albanians, The civill discords which thou obiectest vnto vs, wee deem them as profitable to our citie; for we striue together, whether of vs shall better or more earnestly fight for the good of the Commonweale.

Now if contention and emulation be thus good and profitable amongst valiant & good citisens, and wholesome for Commonweales, how much more then ought it to be thought necessarie for most base and abiect men, for the stirring of them up to vertue,[*](The fruit of oes.)

and deterring of them from vice. For of all the great profits which men vse to reap from their enemies, none is greater than so to live as that we seeme not to exceed them in vices, or be ouercome of them in vertues. But if such discord and contention be both honourable and profitable in a citie or Commonweale, wherein the princes and magistrats are all good men, and striue but for vertue onely; how much more then shall the contention be profitable, where the good striue against the euill? But in case that all the magistrats be euill, then is discord and contention amongst them not onely profitable, but euen necessarie also, least otherwise they beeing at unitie and concord among themselves, and in possession of the government, might freely and without feare make hauocke and spoile both of the publike and priuat affaires. In which case it cannot fall out better either for the subiects, or for the whole Commonweale, than if they by their mutuall hatred and accusations shall openly detect and lay open unto the world, their owne filthinesse, their foule extortions and robberies, as the sheepe are neuer more assured, than when the wolues deuoure one another; as it happened saith Philip Commines in England, that whilest the great lords slew or condemned one another, the poore people in the meane while remained safe from their inuasion. Which was the wise councell of Cincinnatus, seeing the Consull Appius openly to withstand the people to hinder them for the doubling the number of their Tribunes: Let be (said Cincinnatus) for the moe they shall be, the worse they will agree. And right needfull oftentimes it was the power of the Tribunes to bee broken and weakned by their owne diuision, when as by the opposition of any one of them, all the proceedings of the rest were so hindered and stayed. And truely Cincinnatus therein said wisely, for so the Commonweale stood and flourished, the Tribunes oftentimes being at discord and varience among themselves, which (they being at unitie and concord) would have in a moment fallen: and so long it well stood vntil that Pub. Clodius a most wicked man, about foure hundred yeares after presented a request unto the people, which passed into the force of a law, whereby it was ordained, That from thenceforth the opposition of one of the Tribunes should not hinder the proceeding of the rest of his fellow Tribunes. And therfore Cato the Censor, the beautie of the Romane wisedome (and one to whome was giuen the chiefe prayse for wisedome and vertue amongst the Romans) could neither endure the agreement of his seruants in his familie, nor of the Magistrats in the Commonweale, but slily and secretly still sowed hatred and sedition amongst them; that so the wicked and offendors might with their accusations as with mutuall wounds fall, and the good so gaine praise. For why, he thought it a thing almost impossible in so great an accord of slaues and of magistrats, but that the one of them should make spoile of the Commonweale, and the other of his priuat substance, especially being in hope to escape vnpunished, and our of feare for being accused. And therefore doubted not fiftie times to accuse offendors, hee himselfe being also fortie times by others accused: howbeit that he still bearing himselfe upon the integritie of his forepassed life, and the commendable things by him done, easily auoided all the slanders by his aduersaries against him fasly surmised. Neither was that Commonweale euer after fuller of good and valiant citisens, than it was in his time. Yea the Senat of Rome allotted a great summe of money to Mar. Bibulus to buy his Consulship, and the voyces of the people, to the intent to oppose him against Caesar his knowne enemie, who had cunningly set up Luceius his friend (whome the Senat would have had excluded) that so hee might doe all things as he thought good, his friend and fellow in office agreeing thereunto. And not to go farther, we have herefore the witnesse of Iulius Caesar, who in his Commentaries[*](Lib..) saith, The Gaules to have had a most auntient custome amongst them, to stirre up their great lords one of them against another, to the intent that the common people (which were as he reporteth but slaues) might so bee safe and free from their outrages and robberies. For so one of them opposing himselfe against another, and euill controlled by the good, and the wicked by themselves; there should be no doubt but that the Commonweale should so be in much more safetie and assurance, than if they were of one accord among themselves. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, the discord of princes and magistrats to have alwaies bene unto Commonweals wholesom: as the meane whereby the wicked (as we said) may by the vertue of the good, or their owne mutuall accusations be weakned. Which seemed a thing profitable not onely unto the Romans, and our auncestours, but euen vnro Lycurgus the wise law giuer also, who therefore himselfe set dissention betwixt the two kings of Lacedemonia, and appointed also, That there should alwaies two enemies be sent ambassadours for the state; to the intent they should not by their mutuall consent and good agreement betray the Commonweale: but that being at variance, they might still one of them bee controlled by the other. As for that which is said, the parts of mans bodie which represent a well ordered Commonweale, to bee neuer at discord among themselves, is quite contrarie; for were not the humors of mans bodie much contrarie, a man should quickly perish: the preseruation thereof dependeth of the contrarietie of hoat & cold, of moisture and drought, of bitter choller to sweet flegme, of beastly desires to diuine reason; as also the preseruation of the whole world next unto God dependeth of the contrarietie, which is in the whole and every part thereof. Euen so the magistrates in a Commonweale ought in some sort to be at difference among themselves, albeit that they otherwise be right good men, for that trueth, the publike good, and that which is honest, best discouereth it selfe by that which is thereunto contrarie: and is still to bee found in the middest betwixt two extreames. And it seemeth that the Romans had this principall end before their eyes, ordinarily making choyce of their magistrats that were to bee placed in the same charge, still enemies one of them unto another; or at leastwise of quite contrarie humors and dispositions, as is in all their histories to be seene. As when the Senat foresaw that Claudius Nero should carrie away the Consulship, an hoat and sturting man, and withall a most valiant and couragious captaine to oppose against Hannibal: the Senat (I say) procured to have ioyned unto him for his companion or fellow in office Liuius Salinator an old captaine, and a man of great experience, but yet as cold and staid, as was the other hoat and terrible, and yet fit to heat the old age of Liuius, now a little too cold for the warres: who so ioyned and vnited together, gained a most notable victorie against Hannibal, which was the ruine of the Carthaginians, and the preseruation of the Roman estate. These two men also afterwards were by the people made Censors together; who still at discord, noted one of them another of infamie, a thing neuer before seene: and yet they thus still at variance, were in all mens iudgements two of the most famous and vertuous men that then were in Rome. With like wisedome the Romans ioyned together Pabius Maximus, and Marcus Marcellus, in their warres against Hannibal, both of them right great and most expert captaines, but the one of them being a cold, and the other an exceeding hoat man; the one alway still desirous of battell, and the other still seeking for delay; the one called the Roman Sword, and the other the Bucklet; the one a fierce warrier, and the other a long lingerer: by which contrarie humors of these two so great personages the estate was not onely preserued from ruine and destruction, which must needs otherwise vndoubtedly have ensued, but farre and wide enlarged also. If then the emulation and discord of the most vertuous magistrats be so profitable unto a Commonweale, what then is to bee hoped for, when the good magistrats shall oppose themselves against the wicked?

And these reasons may on both sides seeme probable, but what in trueth is to bee [*](The resolution of the former question.) resolued upon, is not so easie to iudge which to do, not onely the qualitie of the magistrats themselves, but the diuers formes of Commonweales, is to bee also considered. And yet I suppose, that in euerie kind of Commonweale it is good that the inferiour magistrats and officers, being under the power and authoritie of the greater, should stil be at variance and discord among themselves, and that more in a Popular estate than in any other: For that the people hauing none but the magistrats to gouerne them, is most easie to be pilled and polled, if the magistrats bee not one of them by another controlled. And in a Monarchie it is expedient also, that euen the greatest magistrats should sometime be at oddes, considering that there is a soueraine prince to chastise and correct them; so that hee bee not mad, furious, or a child, or one otherwise subiect unto another mans power. But in an Aristocratike or Popular Commonweale it is most daungerous, that the great magistrats should bee at discord among themselves, and that especially if they bee not good men, who neuer have any such contention or debate amongst them, as may hurt the estate or Commonweale: but such as was the honourable difference betwixt Scipio Affricanus, the elder, and Fabius Maximus: betwixt Scipio the younger, and Cato; betwixt Liuius and his companion Nero; or the contention of Lepidus with Fuluius, of Marcus Scaurus with Catulus; or of Themistocles with Aristides: whose notable contention for vertues sake was alwayes unto the Commonweale wholesome. But if the greatest magistrats in a Popular estate bee euill and wicked men, or that their ambition be founded uppon an euill ground, it is then daungerous least that their differences bee cause of civill warres; as it happened betwixt Marius and Scylla, betwixt Caesar and Pompey, Augustus and Marke Anthonie, Thucidides and Pericles. And yet much more dangerous such contentions are in an Aristocratie, than in a Popular Commonweale: For that the gouernours, which are alwaies the fewer in number in an Aristocratique estate, and yet commaund the rest, have still to doe with the people: who upon the first occasion take up armes against their lords, if they once enter into quarrels. For a few lords in an Aristocratie are easily drawne into two parts, by the great magistrats, who if they fall into sedition among themselves, as also with the people, it cannot otherwise bee, but that the chaunge of the estate must thereof needes ensue; the leaders of the factions oppressing their enemies: or else the government of the estate falling wholly into one mans hands, which is not so much to bee feared in a Monarchie, whereas the soueraigne prince under his power keepeth all the magistrats in awe.

But in euerie Commonweale it is expedient and necessarie, that the numbet of the[*](That the number of the soueraigne magistrats in a Commonweale should still be odd.) soueraigne magistrats, or of them which come neere unto the soueraigntie, should still be odd, to the end that the dissention amongst them might still be composed by the greater part or number of them; and that the publike actions be not by the equalitie of them hindred or letted. And that is it for which the Cantons of Vrie, Vnderuald, Zug, and Glaris (which of all others are most Popular) have beene glad to make in euerie one of them three soueraigne magistrats, whom they call Amans, & not two, for that the third may easily reconcile two being at variance betwixt thēselues: in stead whereof they of Schwits have foure, as they of Geneua have also their foure Sindicques, and they of Berne, Lucerne, Friburg, and Solure their two Auoyers: and Zuric, Basil, Schaffouse, their two Bourgomasters: as some there were which thought it better to have of such great magistrats moe than foure, and yet in odd number also; as in auntient time the Athenians had their nine Pretors, whome they called Archontas; that so the fewer might still yeeld unto the rest, or be in number ouercome, which

cannot be where onely two beare the sway, except they had alternatiue power to commaund each of them his day by turnes, so as had the Carthaginensians Suffetes, and the Roman Consuls, so as we have before said. And therefore by our laws also are three appointed for the common receit, that so the third might still reconcile the other two his companions at difference betwixt themselves, or els by ioyning himselfe to one of them, make that part the greater. Which odd number of great magistrats is more necessarie in a Popular or Aristocratike estate, than in a Monarchy; and the discord and dissention of them lesse in this state to be feared than in the other. For that as almightie God the Father of the whole Fabrike of the world, and of nature, doth with an admirable concord and agreement gouerne this world, composed of the contrarie conuersions and motions of the celestiall orbes among themselves, as also of the different natures of the starres and elements, and of the contrarie force and power of planets and of other liuing creatures: euen so also a king (the liuing image of God himselfe the prince of all things) should of the dissimilitude of magistrats, in some sort, at variance among themselves, keepe and maintaine the welfare of his subiects and people. And as in instruments, and song it selfe, which altogether out of tune, or all in the selfe same tune, the skilfull and learned eare cannot in any sort endure, is yet made a certaine well tuned discord, and agreeing harmonie, of most vnlike voices and tunes, viz. of Bases, Trebles, and Meanes, cunningly confused and mixt betwixt both: euen so also of the mightie, and of the weake, of the hie, and of the low, and others of the middle degree and sort betwixt both; yea euen of the verie discord of the magistrats among themselves ariseth an agreeing welfare of all, the straitest bond of safetie in euerie well ordered Commonweale. So Caesar making sharpe warre upon them of Beauuis, hauing in his armie two captaines deadly enemies one of them unto the other, commaunded them to turne all that their hatred upon their enemies, who so in his verie sight with great emulation gained a notable victory over their enemies, which their dissention had giuen unto their enemies, had they not had a generall aboue them, who kept them both in awe. Which as it oftentimes happeneth, so did it also chaunce to Lewes the twelfth the French king, who gained the estates of Bolonia, and ouerthrew the Popes armie, by reason of the discord betwixt the cardinall of Pauie, and the duke of Vrbin, who through iealousie of one of them against the other, so hindred & entangled themselves, as that they gaue victorie unto the French: into which daunger the Roman estate was like to haue fallen, by the contention risen betwixt Fabius Maximus, and Minutius the Roman generals, which had vndoubtedly giuen Hannibal the victorie, and the Romans the ouerthrow, had not Fabius for the good of the Commonweale forgot his displeasure, and by his valour delivered his rash companion together with the Roman armie, from a most certaine and present destruction.

Wherefore the contentions of the greater Magistrates are most daungerous in a[*](The contention of the great magistrats most dangerous in a popular Commonweale: and their too great friendship to be no lesse perilous also.) Popular estate or Commonweale, (where there is no other head to commaund them but the multitude) and especially if he seeke how to serue their owne proud and ambitious desires, rather then the common good. And therefore the Roman Senat seeing Marcus Lepidus, and Q. Fuluius mortall enemies chosen Censors together, went unto them in great number to perswade them now at length for the Commonwealth sake to become friends, or at least wise to suspend their enmitie, so the better to attend unto their office, being the fairest and of greatest importance in the whole Commonweale. The like whereof we read to have beene often done by the Senat, in setting the busie Tribunes, and proud Consuls agreed, at such time as their dissentions seemed to tend unto the daunger of the State. But as it is not good that the greatest magistrates in a Popular estate should be too great enemies; so also is it not convenient that

they should be too great friends, especially if they be not good men, and that for the reasons by vs before alleaged. Which was the cause that the yonger Cato seeing Pompee, Caesar, and Crassus so straitly allied together, and that they so conioyned, were too strong for all the rest of the people; cried out aloud the Commonweale by such combyning of the great ones to be bought and sold; foreseeing as it were out of a watch tower the stormes and tempests thereof then at hand. Yet true it is that of two extremities it is better that the great Lords and magistrats in a Popular or Aristocratique estate should be of one accord then at discord: for that being of accord, they will alwaies like better to commaund others, and so in some sort or other to preserue the Estate such as it is, than together with the Commonweale, quite to ouerthrow their owne power, whereunto their discord would bring them, when they had once giuen sayles unto the tempest. In such sort as Liuie said of Caluinus the Campanian: Improbum hominem, sed non ad extremum perditum, qui mallet incolumi quàm euersa patria dominari, A wicked man (saith he) but not altogether desperate, who had rather to rule ouer his countrie yet standing upright, then over the same ouerthrowne. So albeit that Mar. Tullius said, The three-headed alliance of Caesar, Crassus, and Pompee to be a thing greatly to be feared: Yet when he saw Crassus the moderator with the Roman legions slaine in Chaldea, and Iulia Caesars daughter Pompee his wife by vntimely[*](Philip. 2.) death taken away, he cried out: Vtinam Cn. Pompei, amicitiam cum Caesare nunquàm coisses, aut nunquàm diremisses, I would to god, O Pompee, (said he) thou haddest either neuer made friendship with Caesar, or hauing once made it, haddest neuer broken it. For why their friendship much diminished the Popular power, but their enmitie altogether ruinated the same; one of them being in no wise able to endure his equall, nor the other his superiour, vntill that so by civill warre the state was quite at length ouerthrowne, and Caesar become master of all. And as for that which Caesar writeth, our auncestours the auntient Gaules to have thought the dissention of their princes and great gouernours to have beene profitable unto their estates, I can hardly be perswaded therein: when as by the report euen of Caesar himselfe, the dissention of the princes and of the estates of Fraunce, (then for the most part gouerned by Aristocraties) wrought their owne destruction; some of them praying aide of the Germans, and some of them of the Romans, being long a prey both to the one and to the other, and in the end unto the Romans alone as the onely conquerors. Neither is it true the mutuall slaughters of the Nobilitie of England to have beene commodious and profitable unto the comminaltie and inferiour sort, as Philip Comines writeth; yea at such time as I was Embassadour in England, I vnderstood by some of the inhabitants there, them to feare nothing more then the factions of the Nobilitie and their civill discord: for the better appeasing and repressing whereof they have often times used to assemble the high court of Parliament, whereunto all the States are assembled. And thus we have declared in what sort the Magistrates ought to behave them selues towards their Prince, as also how they ought to beare them selues one of them towards an other, as also towards other priuate men; and whether they ought to be at unitie among them selues or not. Now it remaineth for vs briefly to show also, how the Prince ought to behaue him selfe towards his subiects; and whither it be expedient that he should him selfe iudge them, or be him selfe conuersant among them.