The six books of a common-weale

HOw Cities and Commonweales arise; by what meanes they are also encreased; what diuers alterations and chaunges befall every one of them; and by what coniectures the fall and ruine of them is to be by vs gathered, I suppose we have sufficiently before declared. But for asmuch as the presumptions by vs alreadie noted, are not sufficient to make any certaine demonstration of, but rest upon such grounds as are farthest off from the senses and capacitie of the common sort of men: Neither that if they were delivered by way of demonstration, or other more certaine rules, should they therefore inferre any necessitie at all? It remaineth that wee according to that wisedome and discretion wherewith almightie God hath of his goodnes endued men, endeuour our selues to rule Estates and Commonweales, and by all meanes to foresee and decline the chaunges and ruines of them. For why, it is one generall opinion and doctrine of all Philosophers, yea euen of them which idly dispute what is done in heauen: a wise man not to be bound or subiect unto the power or influence[*](Wise men not to be subiect unto the power or influence of the starres, as sensual men be.) of the starres: but onely they which giue the raines unto their disordered appetites, and beastly desires, not suffering themselves to be gouerned by the rule of reason, or of other the best lawes: unto whome Salomon the maister of wisedome hath sharply threatned the torment of the wheele, saying, That God should cause the wheele to passe over them: that is to say, the force and effect of the celestiall Spheres, which over the good should have no power at all. Seeing therefore that the power & influence of the starres may by the power of God, that is, by wisdome (by the gift and goodnesse of almightie God giuen unto men) be auoided: and that wise physitians have found the

meanes to chaunge the diseases, and to alter feuers contrarie unto their naturall courses, to the intent the more easily to cure them, or at leastwise to asswage them; why should[*](The mine of a Commonweale to be by the wisdome of the gouernour preuented, or ls warning thereof to be by him in de time giuen unto his subiects.) not the wise polititian, or gouernour of a Commonweale, foreseeing the conuersions and chaunges which naturally happen unto Commonweales, by good lawes and other convenient remedies preuent the ruine therof: or if the force of the mischiefe be so great, and the destruction so certaine, as that it can by no wisdome of man bee preuented or staied, yet shall he performe that which cunning physitians doe, who by the Symptomes appearing upon the criticall dayes, and by the causes of the disease, doe more certainlie and better guesse of the sicke mans death in what manner it shall bee: and so yet in good rime giueth thereof warning unto his ignorant subiects, lest that they should upon the suddein be vtterly oppressed with the ruine of the falling Estate and Commonweale. And as the most skilfull Phisitions euen in the state of the disease,[*](Wisdome neuer discouraged with the daungers of the Commonweale: so long as they see the state wisely and dis gouerned.) and the greatest griefe therof, do yet put their patients in greater comfort, if the Symptomes, be good then if the griefe or fit without them were but easie and gentle; and as to the contrarie when they see a man in the highest degree of health that may be, they are then in the greatest feare, lest he should suddenly fall unto some extreame sicknesse, as the great phisition Hippocrates saith: So also a wise gouernour of a Commonweale, seeing the state on all sides beset, and almost ouerwhelmed with enemyes, yet if in so great daunger he otherwise see wise men sitting at the helme of the Commonweale, the subiects obedient unto the Magistrats, and the Magistrats unto the Lawes; he taketh courage thereat, and promiseth both unto himselfe and others good successe; the ignorant people & cowards hauing in the meane time lost their patience, and lying as men plunged euen into the bothom of dispaire. In which state the Romaine commonweal stood after the third slaughter of their armie at Cannas, when as now many of the friendly and confederate cites, which before had continued in their fidelitie and allegeance, reuolted from the Romaines, following the fortune and[*](What opinion wise men had of the distressed estate of the Romaine Commonwealea, fet the great ouerthrowe at Cannas.) victories of Hanniball: For why almost all men now despaired of the estate of the Romaine Empire: at which time of distresse, of all others no man more hurt the Commonweale than did Terentius Varro the Consul, who with some few hauing escaped from so great a slaughter (as wherein threescore thousand of the citisens of Rome were slaine) writ letters unto the Senat and people of Capua, That the Roman Commonweale was vndoone, as hauing in that battell lost all the force and flower thereof. Which thing so terrified them of Capua, (although in wealth and power they fa---re exceeded all the rest of the Roman confederates) that they not onely themselves forsooke the Romans, but drew with them many of their allies and confederates also unto Hanniball: when as in deed the Consul should have extenuated the ouerthrow and losse receiued. Whereas Scipio, who was afterwards called Africanus, to the contrarie with comfortable speeches then cheered up diuers of the citisens dispairing of the state of the Commonweale, and by oath constrained such as were about to have abandoned the citie, to stay there still, and not to stirre, but resolutely to aduenture their lives for the defence of their countrie and Commonweale. Neither was the Senate terrified with the feare of so many daungers, as wherewith they were on every side beset and inclosed, but rather seemed with greater wisdome to mannage the Estate than euer it did before. And albeit that the common people (according to their wonted lightnesse and foolish ignorance) almost in every towne and city sung the praises of Hanniball, after his so many and so great victories ouer the Romans: Yet for all that, the Senat of every citie favoured the Romans: For so saith Liuie, Vnus veluti morbus omnes Italiae populos inuaserat, vt plebs ab optimatibus dissentiret: Senatus Romanis faueret, plebs ad Poenos rem traheret, One disease as it were (saith he) had infected all the people of Italie, viz. That the people still dissented from the nobilitie; the Senat still favoured the Romanes; and the people still enclined unto the Carthaginensians. Yea Hiero king of Siracusa, accounted the wisest prince of his age, did then much more carefully than before honour and reuerence the amitie and alliance of the Romaines, not doubting in what he could to helpe and releeue them; yea and in that their desperat estate amongst other things sent them a statue of Victorie (of gold) for a present▪ as he which had oftentimes proued the incredible wisdome of that Senat in the mannaging of their affaires. Wherein a man may see, that the wiser sort seeing the Romans so aduised and so constant in their extreme necessitie, and that their lawes were neuer more straightly kept, or martiall discipline more seuerely obserued, (as Polybius an eyewitnesse of those things, himselfe writeth) were alwaies of opinion that the issue of their affaires would be good: not vnlike the wise physition, who seeing favourable Symptomes in the strongest fit of his patients disease, is yet still in good hope. Whereas Carthage to the contrarie proud of so many and so great victories, mistres of so many countries and nations, and placed in the height of all worldly felicitie, was neuer than then neerer unto ruine and destruction: wherof were most certain tokens, for that in that Commonweale was no place left either for law or vertue, all things being done by the popular rage, or vnruly lust of the common people: so that it must needs shortly after be cast downe headlong from the highest degree of honour, and become subiect unto the Romans, as not long after it did, Scipio beeing then their generall.

Wherefore the first rule for the keeping and preseruing of Commonweales in[*](The first rule for the keeping and preseruing of Commonweales in their estates.) their estates, is well to know the nature of every Commonweale, together with the diseases incident unto them: whereof we haue more at large discoursed in the former Booke. For it is not enough to know which kind of Commonweale is better than other, but it behoueth vs also to know the meanes how to maintaine euerie one of them in their estate, if it be not in our power to chaunge the same, or that in chaunging thereof we shall put all to the hasard of vtter ruine and decay. For whie, it is better to have an euill Commonweale than none at all: as with convenient diet in some[*](Violent remedies neuer to be used but in desperat diseases.) sort to preserue the sicke man, than by applying of medicines to an incurable disease so to take away his life quite. For as physitians say, we must neuer apply violent remedies but unto desperat diseases; and that whenas there is now no other hope left. And this maxime taketh place in euerie sort of Commonweale, not onely for the changing of the estate, but euen for the changing of lawes, maners, and customes also: whereunto many hauing no regard have ruinated and ouerthrowne right faire and great Commonweales, allured with the baite of some one or other good law, which they have borrowed from some one Commonweale quite contrarie unto their owne. For as we have before shewed, many good lawes there be good for the maintenance of a Monarchie, and yet fit for to ruinat a Popular estate: as other also there bee good for the preseruation of the Popular liberty, & yet most fitly seruing for the ouerthrow of a Monarchy: for that those Estates by nature contrary, are by quite contrary laws both maintained and ruinated.

And albeit ihat some lawes there be good and indifferent to all sorts of Commonweales, yet so it is, that the antient question of right wise Polititians is not yet well resolued, viz. Whether a new law being better, be to be preferred before an old antient law [*](A notable question.) that is worse? For the law be it neuer so good, is nothing worth if it cary with it a contempt of it selfe, or of the rest of the lawes: Now so it is, that newnesse in matter of[*](Auntient lawes though worse still of greater esteeme and reuerence than the new though better.) lawes is alwayes contemptible, whereas to the contrary, the reuerence of antiquity is so great, as that it giueth strength enough unto a law to cause it to be of it selfe obeyed,

without the authority of any Magistrat at all ioyned unto it: whereas new edicts and lawes with all the threats and penalties annexed unto them, and all that the Magistrats can do, cannot but with great difficulty find intertainment: in such sort, as that the fruit we are to receiue of a new edict or law, is not oft times so great, as the harme which the contempt of the rest of the lawes draweth after it for the nouelty of some one. And to make the matter short, there is nothing more difficult to handle, nor more doubtful in euent, nor more dangerous to mannage, than to bring in new decrees or lawes. And this reason seemeth unto me very considerable, but yet I will set downe another of no lesse weight, which is, That all the change of laws concerning the estate is dangerous: For to chaunge the customes and lawes concerning inheritance, contracts, or seruitude from euill to good, is in some sort tollerable; but to chaunge the laws which concerne [*](Auntient lawes concerning the estate of a Commonweale not to be without great daunger altered.) the estare, is as daungerous, as to remoue the foundation or corner stones which uphold the whole weight or burthen of the buildings; in which doing▪ the whole fabrike is to be sore shaken, and beside the daunger of falling, receiueth more hurt by the shaking thereof, than it doth good by the new repairation, especially if it bee now become old and ruinous. For euen so it is in a Commonweale now alreadie growne old, wherein if a man neuer so little remoue the foundations that upholdeth the same, he is in great danger of the ruine therof. For the antient maxime of the most wise polititians ought wel to be waied, That we must not change any thing in the laws of a Commonweale which hath long maintained it selfe in good estate, whatsoeuer apparent profit may bee thereby pretended. And for these causes the old law of the Athcnians, which was afterward also receiued in Rome, and passed in force of a law, published at the request of Publius Philo, was the most necessarie law that could be in a Commonweale, viz. That it should not be lawfull for any person upon paine of death to present any request unto the people, without the priuitie of the Senat. Which law is yet better kept in Venice than in any place of the world els, whereas it is not permitted so much as to present any request euen unto the Senat, without the aduise of the councell of the Sages. And yet[*](The extreame daunger he was in, which moued any new law amongst the Locrensians.) in the Commonweale of the Locrensians, this law was much straiter, Where he which would present any request, to have it passe in force of a law, was constrained to moue it before the people with a rope about his neck, wherewith hee was there upon the place to be strangled, if he preuailed not to proue the law by him moued to be good and profitable for the Commonweale. Which was the cause that this estate for a most long time stood and flourished, without any thing added or diminished to or from the most antient laws and customes thereof, no man daring to propound any new law to passe, vntill that one of the citisens which had but one ---ie, made a request unto the people, That he which wittingly should put out his eye which had but one, should therefore himselfe have both his owne put out: For the making of which motion his aduersarie had giuen him cause, hauing oftentimes threatned him to thrust out his eye, and so to depriue him quite of his sight, although he were therefore to endure the penaltie of the law, which was to loose one of his owne. With the equitie, or rather necessitie of whose so reasonable a request the people moued (though with much a do) enacted the law. Whereby yet nothing was derogated from the law called Lex talioni--- (or the law of like punishment) which was then common to almost all nations: For why, it was reason that hee which had maliciously depriued another man of his sight, should himselfe be depriued of his owne sight also.

Now if any man should say, That many lawes must oft times of necessitie bee changed,[*](Lawes concerning ordinarie pollicie may oftntimes be changed but not lawes concerning the estate.) as the lawes concerning victuals, or the bringing in, or carrying out of marchandise, or concerning the augmenting or diminishing of the punishment to bee inflicted upon offendors, which are euen in a short time to be chaunged; I therein agree with

him, for that necessitie hath no law: first, if new lawes giue good hope of fruit and profit of them to arise, as of good corne yet in the blade, then are they not to be reiected: but here question is not of lawes concerning ordinarie policie, but of such as concerne the very estate it selfe. Which I both would and wish, if possibly it might be, that they should still be most firme and immutable: not for that the Commonweale ought to serue the laws, seeing that they are al made for the maintenance of the Commonweale, and of the societie of men: neither that any man wisheth the safetie and preseruation of the lawes, but for the Commonweales sake. For why, the first and chiefe law of all[*](The chiefe lawe of all Commonweales.) Commonweales, is this, SALVS POPVLI SupREMA LEX ESTO, The welfare of the people, let that be the last law. For what reason moued Themistocles to fortifie the citie of Athens with walles and bulwarkes, euen the verie same reason induced Theramenes to persuade the Athenians to rase their walles, viz. the welfare of the people: whereas otherwise the Lacedemonians had vndone the citisens together with the citie. Wherefore no law is so sacred, but that upon vrgent necessitie it is to be changed. And therefore Solon after he had published his lawes, caused the Athenians to sweare to[*](No lawe so sacred but that upon vrgent necessitie it is to be chaunged▪) obserue and keepe them for the space of one hundred yeare: giuing them thereby to vnderstand, that lawes could neuer be made immutable, neither were to be all at once together chaunged. Lycurgus also in like maner tooke an oath of the Lacedemonians his subiects, to keepe his lawes vntill his returne from the Oracle of Apollo, from whence he afterwards neuer returned, but went himselfe into voluntarie exile, out of his natiue countrey; so to bind his citisens so much as possible was to the perpetuall [*](Better to suffer euill lawes by little and little to growe out of vse; then upon the soden with daunger to abrogate them all at once▪) keeping of his lawes. And albeit that the iniquitie of some auntient law bee by right euident, yet is it better to endure it, vntill that it in time by little and little of it selfe loose the force, than upon the sudden by violence to repeale it. For so did the Romans by many the lawes of the twelue tables, which they would not abrogat, but onely by not obseruing them, in that they were vnprofitable or vniust, suffered them so to grow out of vse: which they so did, least in abrogating of them, they might seeme to impaire the credit and authoritie of the rest of the same lawes. Yet after that they had by tract of time bene of long buried as it were in obliuion (which was seuen hundred yeares after that they were first published) it was at the motion of Aebutius the Tribune, decreed, That such of those lawes as were as it were of themselves growne out of vse, should be reputed as repealed and abrogated, to the end that no man should with them yet standing in force be entangled.

But for that the nature of man as of all other worldly things also, is most slipperi--- [*](Neither are old lawes to be altogether sodenly without daunger abrogated: or newe lawes rashly stablished.) and vnconstant, running still headlong from good to euill, and from euill to worse; vices by little and little still encreasing, not vnlike unto euill humors, which without sencible feeling encrease mans bodie, vntill it be full of them, breedeth in it many most daungerous diseases, and so at length bringeth it unto vtter destruction. For remedie where of new lawes must of necessitie be deuised: which must yet for all that by little and little be done, and not violently all at once. As Agis king of Lacedemonia vnwisely attempted to have done: who desiring to reestablish in the Commonweale the auntient discipline of Lycurgus, now by the negligence of the magistrats almost grown quite out of vse, caused all the obligations and scedules of priuat men to be uppon a sudden brought out & burnt: which done, he was about to have proceeded to the making of a new diuision of lands, to the end to have so made an equalitie of wealth and goods amongst the citisens, as Lycurgus had before done: which although it were a thing desired of many in the Lacedemonian Commonweale (which had indeed so bene founded) yet so it was, that in making too much hast in the doing thereof, he not onely fell from his hope, but thereby kindled such a fire of sedition also, as burnt up his whole

house, and so afterward dispoiled of his estate, and by his rebellious subiects together with his mother and other his friends and partakers strangled; made away for a sort of mad and euill minded fellowes to inuade the state, hauing so depriued his countrey of himselfe a good and vertuous prince. Whereas he should before have made himselfe maister of the forces, or if that had not bene possible, yet to have sounded the minds of them of the geater sort, and by meanes to have gained them unto him one after another, as had Lycurgus done before him; and then to have forbidden them the vse of gold and siluer, that so it might have growne into as little estimation as iron: and in some time after that, to haue forbidden all sumptuousnesse in apparell, and rich furniture, and not at once to have encroached upon the libertie of the people, to have proued their patience, and chaunged their discipline: For that to vse such a violent letting of blood, before the corrupt humors purged, or so strong a medicine, before any preparatiue giuen, is not the way to cure the diseases, but to kill the diseased. Wherefore in the governments of Commonweales, and healing the diseases thereof, we must imitat not the Physitians onely, but euen nature it selfe, or rather the great God of nature whom we see to do all things by little and little, and almost insensibly. The Venetians right wisely during the life of Augustin Barbarin their duke, attempted not in any thing to abridge his power, though by them much misliked and feared; least in so doing they should eithe--- have offered some disgrace unto him their prince, now growne old, or els have raised some new sturres, and so haue troubled the quiet of their Commonweale. But he once dead, before they proceeded unto the new election of Loredan, the seignorie caused such new lawes and decrees to be published, as whereby the power of the dukes was right greatly impeired and diminished. The same wee have shewed also to have bene done in the elections of the German emperours, the kings of Polonia, and of Denmarke, who of soueraigne Monarches are now brought unto the small estates of Generals in chiefe, some of them more, and some lesse: which the more closely to hide, they have left unto them the imperiall and roiall markes and cognisances in their habits, in their titles and ceremonies, but in few things els in effect and deed.

But as it is a daungerous thing for the subiects all at once to abridge or cut short[*](Dangerous for a prince upon the soden to displace or caste offe the anntient seruitor of his predecessours, or great magistrats of the estate.) the power of a soueraigne prince or magistrat, who yet hath the power in his hand: so is it also no lesse daungerous for a prince upon the sudden to displace or cast off the antient seruitors of his predecessours, or els at once to thrust out some part of the great magistrats and officers of the estate, and to retaine the rest, they which are new chosen or retained, resting over charged with enuie, and the other with euill doing or ignorance, and withall depriued of the honour and good, which they have bought full deere. And it may be that one of the fairest foundations of this monarchy is, that the king dying, the officers of the crowne continue still in their charge, who by that means still maintaine the Commonweale in the estate thereof. And albeit that the officers of the kings house be at the pleasure of the successour to be chaunged, so ought hee yet therein to vse such discretion, as that they which are remoued have not occasion to innouat or moue any thing as men disgraced, or at leastwise have no power left them so to doe, albeit that they were thereunto willing. In which point the emperour Galba being deceiued, and hauing thrust Otho out of the hope hee had conceiued of the empire, to adopt Piso to succeed him in the government, and yet for all that without disarming of Otho, he was shortly after by the same Otho (a man in great fauor with the Pretorian souldiours) slaine together with Piso, whome he had before adopted to succeed him in the empire and government of the state. All which perils and daungers are lesse to be feared in an Aristocratike or Popular estate, for that in them they which have the soueraigntie neuer die; howbeit that there is in them no lesse danger in chaunging of

their soueraigne magistrats, or generals (as we have before declared) or in making of lawes which may tend to the impairtng of the power of the people▪ or which may any way seeme profitable unto the nobilitie, and preiudiciall or hurtfull unto the people: or in case that victuals and prouisions faile, or that some great extreame dearth arise; in which cases there is alwaies daunger of popular commotions and rebellions. So that[*](All alterations of lawes or other great matters in a Commonweale are best to be made by little and little.) in briefe, when question is for the displacing of great magistrats, or for the suppressing of corporations or colledges, or for the cutting short of priuileges, or the augmenting of punishments, or for the reforming of disorders amongst the people, or for the calling of great men to account, or for the reducing of religion to▪ the former course and beginning thereof; which by succession of time, following the naturall corruption of man, hath bin altered & changed from the first puritie therof: there is no better means than to come thereunto by little and little, without forcing of any thing, if it were possible, as by way of suppression. Whereof we have a notable example of king Charles the fift (euen he that was surnamed the Wise) who at such time as he was Regent in France (his father being as then prisoner in England) by the euill councell of some, ignorant in matters of estate, at one chop suspended all the officers in Fraunce, of whome also hee suppressed the greatest part, appointing fiftie commissioners for the hearing of such accusations as should be laid against them for the extortion and briberie by them committed and vsed: whereupon all Fraunce was in such tumult and up---ore (for the infinit number that then were of male contents) as that shortly after for remedie thereof, hee by a decree in the high court of parliament at Paris, whereunto all the nobilitie were assembled, abrogated the former law. Which decree is yet extant in the act of that his court, to this effect and purpose, Cùm regiae potestati & procurationi, quam gerimus, non modò quae ab alijs, sed etiam quae a nobis ipsis & in Rempublicam, & in singulos peccantur emendare consentaneum sit, rebus planè perspectis & cognitis, quae de imperio magistratibus adempto noua lege iussimus, placet abrogari; vt quidem abrogamus, & apertè declaramus, legis illius, quae importunis quorumdam rogationibus erepta est, nullam vim fore, & quae acta gesta sunt, cum magno nostro dolore acta gesta fuisse; nec illam magistratuum ac honorum abrogationem, quam non iure factam esse censitemur cuiquam fraudi esse: aut cuiusquam ius ac dignitatem violare nos vlla ex parte voluisse: ac proinde legem illam iure a nobis rescindi & abrogaritestamur, vt omnibus magistratibus salua omnia & integra restituantur, Whereas by the regall power and authoritie which we beare, it is fitting for vs to correct and amend, not onely such things as by others, but euen by our selues also are trespassed against the Commonweale, or other men in particular: all things throughly looked into, and tried, our pleasure is, That what we have by a new law commaunded concerning power and authoritie taken from the magistrats, to be againe abrogated, as indeed we abrogat, and plainely declare the force of that law (which was by the importunat suit of some wrested from vs) to be nothing: and that such things as were then done, to have bene done to our great griefe: neither that that depriuation of offices or honours, which we confesse to haue bene not lawfully done, to bee impu---ed to any man: neither that our will was in any part to violat any mans right or honour: And therefore we freely protest, that new law to be of vs rightly repealed and abrogated: and that so all things safe and whole, may so againe bee unto the magistrats restored. And thus much he. But Charles the ninth comming unto the crowne, and seeing the number of officers through the libertie of the times growne almost infinit, to[*](The wise course taken of Charles the IX for the abating of the infinite number of officers in the Commonweale.) the great hurt of the Commonweale, in such sort, as that it seemed a thing almost necessarie to have depriued them of their honours and fees, yet did he not so, for that it could not without great iniurie be done, when as the money they had before paid for them, could not by reason of the want of coine in the common treasurie, bee againe repaid unto them: neither if it could haue bene, could he yet be without imputation & disgrace, that was so without cause displaced. Besides that, unto many their credit & reputation was in more esteeme & deerer than was their profit, and much the more was it to be feared, that if they should both of their money and preferment be together spoiled, least their present credit and profit being impaired, and the hope also of the recouerie of the money they had paid lost▪ should minister unto many of them occasions for them to raise rebellions and new sturres in the estate of the Commonweale. Wherefore the want of money in the common treasurie profited vs then mindfull of other things, and fortune so favoured our vnskilfulnesse and ignorance, as in auntient time it did a painter, who painting of an horse, when as he not knowing how cunningly to expresse the foame of the horses mouth, and wearie of his worke not well sorting to his mind, in an anger cast his wet spunge at it, and so by fortune expressed that which he by cunning could not do: euen so it pleased that king to lessen the multitude of his officers stil as they died, by chusing no new in their steads, when as he could not againe restore unto them the money they had paid for their offices; neither yet if the princes wealth &[*](Not good for a prince to vse the greatnesse of his power in displacing of the great officers of his realme and state.) power had bene so great, as with his becke or a wink of his eye, to cause all his subiects to tremble, and so to be able to doe what thing soeuer he list, should he yet seeme to do wisely by force to take away the offices and places before sold unto his magistrats and officers: For that not onely they which have receiued the iniurie, but euen other his subiects also, are oft times much moued and incensed with iniuries and wrongs done vnto other men: Besides that, the mightier that a man is, the more iustly and temperately he ought to behave himselfe towards all men, but especiall towards his subiects.[*](Religeous houses with great wisdome quietly suppressed at Basill and Coire.) Wherefore the Senat and people of Basil did wisely, who hauing renounced the Bishop of Romes Religion (which they now detested) would not upon the sodaine thrust the Monkes and Nunnes with other the Religious persons out of their Abbies and Monasteries: but onely tooke order, that as they dyed, they should die both for themselves and their successors, expresly forbidding any new to be chosen in their places; that so by that meanes their colledges might by little and little by the death of the fellowes be extinguished. Whereby it came to passe, that all the rest of the Carthusians of their owne accord forsaking their cloister, yet one of them all alone for along time remained therein, and so quietly and without any disturbance held the right of his couent, being neuer enforced to chaunge either his place, his habit, or old ceremonies, or religion before by him receiued. The like order was taken at Coire in the diet of the Grisons: wherin it was decreed, That the ministers of the reformed religion should be maintained of the profits and reuenewes of the church, the religious men yet neuerthelesse still remaining in their cloisters and couents, to bee by their death suppressed, they being now prohibited to chuse any new in stead of them which were dead: as I have learned by the letters of the ambassadour of Fraunce, who was then at Coire. By which meanes both they which professed the new religion, and they which professed the old, were both prouided for: whereas otherwise it had beene an vnreasonable thing to have thrust them, who had learned not onely to live idly, but euen to doe nothing at all (as Lucilius merrily saith) hauing neither trade nor occupation to live uppon, out of the old possession of their lands, were it neuer so vniust. Whereof beside the iniurie unto them done, daunger might have also ensued, least they not hauing whereof to live, and so brought into dispaire, might have attempted some thing against the state; and so haply drawne after them all their friends and allies alo, to the great trouble of the whole Commonweale. For the same cause the king hauing giuen leaue for the free exercise of the new religion in this realme of Fraunce, and seeing that they which under the colour thereof were gone out of ther cloisters, demanded a portion in the lands and inheritance of their parents or neere kinsmen: it was decreed, and that upon great paine, That they should againe returne unto their cloisters: which seemed to be a thing directly contrarie unto the law, whereby free libertie was giuen for euerie man that wold, to professe the new reformed religion. Howbeit that this was indirectly to stop the mouthes of them which departing out of their monasteries, sought to trouble the estate, and under the vaile and colour of religion, to trouble the most great and noble houses of this realme: besides that it had beene also necessarie in all the customes of this realme, to rase the article concerning the religions, who both by the cannon and civill laws, as also by all our lawes and customes, are excluded and shut out from all hope of inheritance.

But now that which we have said, That the multitude of officers, or of colleges, and companies, of priuileges, or of wicked men, which through the sufferance of princes, or the negligence of the magistrat, are by little and little growne to the hurt of the Commonweale, are by the same meane to be againe suppressed; hath place in all things which concerne the publike state, and hath a reference unto the nature of the lawes,[*](The best and surest way for the suppressing of a tyrant.) which have no force nor effect but for the time to come. And albeit that tyrannie bee a thing most cruell and detestable, yet so it is, that the surest way and meane to suppresse the same, if the tyrant have neither children nor brethren to succeed him, is together with the death of the tyrant to abolish also the tyrannicall government; & not by force whilest he yet liveth to striue to take from him the government, with the hazard of the ruine of the whole estate, as oftentimes it chaunceth. But if the tyrant have children, and doth what he may to destroy the good, and to put the great men one after another to death (as Tarquin the proud, and other tyrants following his steps used commonly to doe) or to suppresse the magistrats or other great officers which might stay the course of his tyrannie, to the end that hee may without let or controlement doe whatsoeuer him pleaseth: then in this ease violent remedies are to bee vsed, but with such limitation and restriction as we have before set downe, and not otherwise, least so wee might seeme rashly to arme the subiects against their princes.

We ought then in the government of a well ordered estate and Commonweale,[*](The wise polititian in the government of the estate is to imitate the works of God in nature who by litle and litle bringeth great things to perfection.) to imitat and follow the great God of nature, who in all things proceedeth easily and by little and little, who of a little seed causeth to grow a tree for height and greatnesse right admirable, and yet for all that insensibly; and still by meanes conioyning the extremities of nature, as by putting the Spring betwixt Winter and Sommer, and Autumne betwixt Sommer and Winter, moderating the extremities of the times and seasons, which the selfe same wisedome which he vseth in all other things also, and that in such sort, as that no violent force or course therein appeareth. But if it be oftentimes daungerous to chaunge the lawes of an estate or Commonweale, as wee have before declared: Let vs now see also, if it be not in like sort daungerous oftentimes to chaungethe magistrates, or that it is much better to have them perpetuall and without chaunge.