The six books of a common-weale

A Senat is a lawfull assemblie of Councellors of Estate, to[*](The definitio of a Senat.) giue aduise to them which have the soueraigntie in euerie Commonweale. For so order requireth, that hauing before spoken of them which have the power of soueraigne maiestie, and of the markes thereof, and also touched the diuersitie of Commonweales: We should now also speake of the Senat, as of the chiefe and principal part of a Commonweal, next unto the prince. Not for that a Commonweale cannot altogether be without a Senat or Councell: for a prince may be so wise and discreet, as that he cannot find better councell than his owne: or els hauing not whome to trust, taketh aduice neither of his owne people nor of strangers;[*](That a wise prince needeth not allwaies to be aduised by his counsell. The wonderfull secresie of Iulius Caesar in all his affaires.) but of himselfe alone, as we read of Antigonus king of Asia, and of Lewes the eleuenth the French king; whome the emperour Charles the fift doubted not in that to imitat: as also of Caius Iulius Caesar among the Romans; who neuer spoke any thing unto others, of the enterprises he had in hand: nor of his iourneies, no not so much as of the day of battell; and yet performed great matters, albeit that he were beset with many great and right puissant enemies: and was therefore the more redoubted, for that his designes were so close and couert, as that they were still executed before they enemy could perceiue them: who still was by that meane ouertaken, and ere hee were aware surprised. Besides that, the captaines and souldiors reposing themselves in the wisedome of such a prince or generall, were alwaies in expectation, prest, and readie euen in a moment, to performe whatsoeuer he should command, but with the holding up of his hand. No otherwise than the members of a bodie well composed are alwaies readie to receiue & put into execution whatsoeuer reason shal commaund them, although they be no whit partakers of the concell thereof.

Now many have (and that in mine opinion) without cause doubted, Whether it were better for the Commonweale to have a most wise and vertuous prince to gouern the same without councell; or a dull and vnfit man of himselfe for government, but well prouided of a graue and wise councell? And truely unto the wise neither the one nor the other seemeth any thing worth. But if the prince be so wise as they suppose, as

that he greatly needeth not of councell: yet the greatest point for his aduantage ---n matters of any consequence is, to keep his designes and resolutions secret, which once[*](Secrecie in a prince most needfull.) laid open and so made knowne, serue no more but as mines discouered; causing ofttimes the ruine and decay of most famous cities and states. And therefore the wisest princes have still used to speake and talke most of such things as they meant least. And as for an heauie headed and foolish prince, how should he be well prouided of a graue and wise councell, sith that the choice thereof dependeth of his owne will? and that in a prince there is no greater signe of wisdome, than to know well how to make choice of wise men, whose councell he may vse and follow.

But forasmuch as the brightnesse and beautie of wisedome is so rare amongst men,[*](Whether it be lesse daungerous unto a Commonweale to have a good prince assisted with counsel, or an euill prince directed by good counsell.) and that we must with all obedience reuerence such princes as it shall please God to send vs; the fairest wish that they can make is, That they may have a graue and wise councell. For it is not by much so dangerous to have an euill prince and a good councell, as it is to have a good prince misseled by euill councellours; as said the emperor Alexander. Wherefore we say, that a prince ought to follow the good aduise and councell of his graue and wise councellors, not onely in his more great and weightie affaires, but euen in his meane and least matters also (albeit that in truth nothing can be meane or little, which concerneth the Commonweale) For there is nothing that[*](The great benefit that a prince hath by following the good aduise of his wise counsel, and the daungers to him ensuing by the reiecting therof:) giueth greater credit and authoritie unto the lawes and commandements of a prince, a people, or state, or in any manner of Commonweale, than to cause them to passe by the aduise of a graue and wise Senat or Councell: and the rather, if it be doubtfull whether it be profitable or no, which the prince or state would haue done. And that of all others, Charles the fift the French king, was woont best to doe: For hauing a purpose to driue out of his kingdome the Englishmen, who in fealtie held all the castles and townes in Aquitaine; and now prouided of all things, which he thought needfull for the doing thereof, he receiued the complaints of the Frenchmen of Aquitaine (the king of England his subiects) against the English gouernours, directly contrarie unto the treatie of Bretignie: who for such appeales and complaints unto the king, had used them euill. upon which occasion, whether of purpose sought for, or by chaunce offered, the king tooke hold: but yet would not vndertake the warre, without the councel and good liking of the nobilitie and people, whose helpe he was to vse therin. Wherfore he commanded them all to be assembled unto the parliament of Paris, pretending that he had sent for them to have their aduise, and by their wisedome to amend what had by himselfe not altogether so wisely bene done or considered of. Which warre by that councell decreed, prospered in his hand, and tooke good successe. But when the subiects see things done either without councell, or contrarie to the will and decrees of the Senat or councell, then they contemne them and set them at naught; or els fearfully and negligently do the commaunds of their princes and magistrats: of which contempt of lawes and magistrats, ensue the seditious and slaunderous speeches of the people; and so at length most daungerous rebellion, or els open conspiracie against the prince, drawing after it the vtter subuersion of all estates. And so Hiero king of Sicilie was together with all his kindred and friends most cruelly slaine, for that hee so proudly and insolently contemned the Senat, nor in any thing asked the aduise therof; by the aduise whereof (his grandfather hauing inuaded the soueraigntie) had before gouerned the state fiftie yeares and more. The same errour committed Caesar, not only in the time that he was Consull, but in his dictatorship also, neuer vsing the aduise or councell of the Senat: The principall occasion that was taken for the killing of him, being for that he vouchsafed not to rise unto the whole bodie of the Senat (consisting of about a thousand Senators) comming at once unto him; too arrogantly and

indeede too foolishly done; not that Caesar was by nature or disposition so prowd, but for that when he would have risen up unto the Senate, he was by Cornelius Balbus (his flattering claw-backe, and a man of all other most inward with him) persuaded not so to doe. For which selfesame cause, also the Romans had long before slaine their first king and founder of their cittie, and driuen out their last king the prowd Tarquin: for that both of them contemning the Senate, did all things on their owne heads and the latter of them seeking also quite to suppresse the Senate, by putting of the Senatours to death: which thing was not dangerous onely unto those princes which wee have now spoken of, but also vnto Lewes the eleuenth the French king, who in nothing asked the aduice of his Counsell, but had thereby (as hee afterward confessed) brought himselfe within an inch of his vtter ruine: for which cause, hee would not that his sonne Charles the eight, should vnderstand any more but three words of Latine (and those, such as are razed out of the historie of Philip Comines,) to the end that mistrusting of his owne wisedome, he should rest himselfe upon the graue counsell of others, and so by their aduice to mannage his affaires rather than by his owne. For it is right[*](Great learning in a prince somtime daungerous.) certaine, that great learning in princes is often times a thing no lesse dangerous than a knife in a mad-mans hand, except he be by nature well giuen, and more vertuously instructed and brought up. Neither is there any thing more to be feared, than great learning accompanied with iniustice, and armed with power. There was neuer yet prince lesse learned (except in deedes of armes) than Traian, neither any of greater knowledge than Nero; and yet for all that, this man had neuer his peere for crueltie, nor the other for bountie: the one of them deadly hating the Senat, and the other in all things following the aduice thereof. Seeing therefore that a Senat is a thing so profitable in a Monarchy, and so necessarie in all Popular and Aristocraticall estates, as is in man wit and reason, without which his body cannot long gouerne it selfe, or have at all any being: let vs first speake of the qualities requisite in Senatours or Counsellors; then what number they ought to be, and whether there ought in a Commonweale to bee moe Counsells than one, and of what things they are to counsell of: and last of all, what power is to be giuen unto the Senat or Counsell in a Commonweale.

First we said the Senat to be a lawfull assemblie: which is to be vnderstood of the[*](Senators from whom they have their lawfull power.) power which is giuen them by the prince, or soueraigntie in other states, to assemble themselves in time and place to them appointed. As for the time and place when and where they are to meet, it is not much materiall, sith that the diuers occasions and opportunities of occurrents doe oft times of themselves require, and as it were point out the same. Yet is the decree of Lycurgus in the mean time to be commended, forbidding any pourtraitures or pictures to be in the place where the Senat shuld consult, for that the obiect of such things as wee behold, often times distract the phantasie, and transport reason else where, which ought wholy to be intentiue unto that which then is to be consulted of. We said moreover in the definition of a Senat, That they should be Counsellors for the estate: to put a difference betwixt them and other counsellours and magistrats of the Commonweale, who are oftentimes called to giue their aduise unto the counsellours of estate, yea and unto the prince himselfe, every one according to his qualitie and vocation; and yet are not for all that counsellours for the estate, but onely upon occasion men extraordinarilie called. And as for the name and title of Senatour, it signifieth a man well strucken in yeares: as also the Greeks call the Senat[*](Whereof a Senator tooke name: and that a Senate ought to consist of men wel strucken in yeares.) ---, which showeth well that the Greeks and Latins composed their Senats of seniors or aged men, whom our countrie men call Seigneurs, for the authoritie, reuerence, and dignitie, which hath alwaies beene giuen unto the auntients, as unto the wiser sort, and men of greatest experience: upon that hope and opinion that they

which were elder than the rest, should also in wisedome exceed the rest. For so it is prouided for, in the lawes of Charles the great; Nulli per sacramentum fidelitas permittatur, nisi nobis & vnicui{que} proprio seniori: Let credit be giuen to no man upon his oath, but unto vs and every proper elder: whereby he meant the manumised mens patrons, rather than the Senators; as if honour and reuerence were due rather unto the elder, than the yonger. Also by the custome of the Athenians, when the people were assembled to giue their aduice, the huisher with a loud voice called all them that were fiftie yeares old together, to consult of that which should be good and profitable for the Commonweale. And not only the Greeks and Latins haue giuen this prerogative unto the aged, to giue counsell unto the Commonweale, but also the Aegiptians, Persians, and Haebrewes, who taught other people well and wisely to gouerne their estates. And what more diuine order would we have than that of God? who when he would establish a counsell unto the Israelits his people▪ [*](Deut. Cap. 1.) Assemble unto me (saith he) seauentie of the most auntient of the people, wise men, and fearing God. For albeit that a man might find a number of discreet, wise, and vertuous yong men, experimented also in the affaires of the Commonweale (a thing for all that right difficult,) yet so it is that it should yet be a thing right perilous to compose of them a Senat (which were rather to be called an assemblie of yong men) for that their counsell should not be receiued, either of the yong or of the old: for that they of like age would esteeme themselves as wise as they, and the other themselves much wiser than such yong counsellours. And in matters of state (if in any thing in the world) opinion hath no lesse, yea and oftentimes more force than the trueth it selfe. The common people thinketh, and that right well, yong men neuer, or else right seldome to excell in wisedome: but they which are such, can neither gouerne the people, nor chastice the offendours, or in the open assemblies of the people persuade them unto that which is good and profitable. Neither is there any thing in a Commonweale more dangerous, than the subiects to have an euill opinion of the Counsell or magistrats which commaund over them: for then how shall they obey them? and if they obey them not, what issue is[*](Youngmen by Solon forbidden to be admitted into the Senat, seemed they neuer o wise.) thereof to be expected. And therefore Solon forbad any yong man to be admitted into the Senat seemed he neuer so wise; which the Graecians in their owne language have better set downe than the Latins▪ ---. And Licurgus before him, had composed his Senat of the elder sort. And not without cause have the lawes giuen the prerogative of honour, priuileges, and dignities unto the Elders; for the presumption we ought to have that they are wiser, of better understanding, of more experience, and fitter to giue counsell than the yonger sort. Yet for all that, is not that graunted to all old men: no not to them which hauing before excelled in vertue and wisedome, are now growne so old and decrepit, as that their naturall forces faile them, and their braines weakned, can no longer do their dutie, but are now as men destitute of wit and iudgement, vnable longer to vse the instruments by nature giuen them to reason with, so that in them their verie mind seemeth to be with age both weak and sicke; whom Plato himselfe, who appointed the Elders to be keepers of his Commonweal, hath excused from any longer bearing of charges in the Commonweal, or for any more giuing of counsell. It is also said in the holie Scripture, That God hauing chosen seauentie Elders, powred upon them aboundance of wisedome: for which cause the Hebrewes call their Senators, the Sages, or wise men. And Cicero elegantly (as he doth all things) calleth the Senat the soule, the reason, and understanding, of a[*](The Senat the soule of the commonweale.) Commonweale; meaning thereby to conclude, that a Commonweale can no more maintaine it selfe without a Senat, than the bodie can it selfe without a soule, or a man himselfe without reason: and that Senators should by long experience and practise be able and readie, to heare, consider, and resolue of the greatest affaires of the Common weale. For whatsoeuer things are notably done in warre, or peace, in making of lawes, in appointing the orders and degrees of the subiects, in reforming the manners and conditions of the people; and in briefe in the whole disposing of the Common weal, are all nothing else but the execution of such things as are by a wise counsell deuised and resolued upon: which the Greeks for that cause called ---,[*](Politique wisedome euer to be ioyned with fait and justice.) as if nothing could be more sacred than good counsell, and the Hebrewes ---, as who should say, the most sure foundation of all things, whereupon all faire and commenda ble actions are built, and without which all things fall, and are turned upside downe. When I say a wise counsell, my meaning is that politique wisdome should bee euer ioyned with faith and justice: for it is no lesse, and I know not whether more dangerous, to have a Senat or Counsell consisting of euill and wicked men, how wise and expert soeuer they be; than of the ignorant and foolish: for that these as they cannot much profit, so can they not much hurt the Commonweal; whereas the other by their mischieuous counsell to revenge themselves, make no question or doubt to endanger or ouerthrow the whole state of the Commonweal, so that they onely may stand safe in the middest of the ruines thereof, yea and many times contrarie to their own conscience, stick not most earnestly to crosse their aduersaries opinions▪ although most profitable to the Commonweal, turning their priuat hatred unto the common destruction? albeit that they reap no other profit thereby, then the triumph which they account themselves to have gotten of the shame of them, whom they have in counsell vanquished, drawing them of their owne faction as it were in a string after them.

An other sort of Senators there are also which are led neither with enuie, hatred,[*](A Senatour to too much conceited of his owne opinion, a thing unto the Commonweale dangerous.) nor loue of any man, but with an obstinate conceit and loue of their owne opinions, from which they will not by any reason or perswasion suffer themselves to be remoued, and therefore come into the Senat armed with such a force and multitude of arguments, as if they were euen there to combat with their enemies; least that they should seeme to have erred in their discourses, or lightly to have changed their opinions. And that worse is, such strong conceited men, account it a great shame to them, to agree with any other man in opinion; but thinke themselves to have most brauely acquited themselves, if as when men driue but one naile with another, they also shall obtrude one opinion to another: than which I cannot tell whether any thing can bee worse, being a thing no lesse to be shunned, than a rocke in the deepe sea But as a wise maister in a wrought sea, if he cannot by reason of the tempest in safetie put his ship into the desired port, yeeldeth then unto the wind, and taketh in all his sailes, lest otherwise carried away by force of tempest he suffer shipwracke: and so trieth it out, vntill the sea be againe calmed, and more favourable winds arise: Euen so the irremouable resolution of a Councellor, in consultations of matters of state, was neuer of wise men commended; but alwaies deemed as a thing ioyned not onely with a certaine obstinacie, but also arrogancie of mind: Whereas to the contrarie, sometimes to change a mans opinion, is not onely commendable, but also wholsome and profitable unto the Commonweale: and according to the new occurrents of time, to apply also the deuises of new councels: sometime with the agreeing voices, approuing the opinion euen of the more ignorant and simple sort. And therefore Sir Thomas Moore in the Vtopian Commonweale by him deuised, wisely set downe, That nothing should bee disputed or reasoned upon, the same day it was propounded, but to be still reserued unto the next assembly of the Senat▪ to the end, that he which had rashly and vnaduisedly delivered his opinion, should not afterward enforce himselfe to maintaine the same, rather

than to yeeld to reason.

Wherefore it beseemeth a wise Senator, euen in the entrance of the Senat, to lay[*](The dutie of a wise Senator.) downe all favour towards his friends, all hatred towards his enemies, and all high conceite of himselfe; ayming at no other end, but to the aduancement of the glorie of God, and the welfare of the Commonweale. Wherein the manner of the Lacedemonians was to be commended, who were so readie to defend whatsoeuer was once decreed for the good of the Commonweale, as that they which had before impugned the same, would now so conforme themselves for the establishing thereof, as that they would themselves refell what they had before to the contrarie commended: and all because it was not lawfull for them to dispute of the lawes once established by the Senat: which manner of custome the Achaeans and Florentine Commonweales, afterwards borrowed from the Lacedemonians. And albeit that learning be alwaies necessarie[*](Learning necessarie for a Senator, but upright integritie more.) for a Senat or Councellor, especially the knowledge of antiquitie, and of the estates of Commonweals: as also to be seene in the lawes of his owne country, which he ought not to be altogether ignorant of, yet is a sound iudgement ioyned with faith iustice, and integritie more necessarie: by meanes whereof he may easily persuade any thing without much eloquence. But aboue all things a Senator must beware that hee[*](That a Councellor of estate ought not to be pensionar to another prince.) suffer not himselfe to be corrupted with the bountie of forren princes: neither bee beholden to any forren lord or prince, for any thing that he holdeth of him, whether it be by fealtie and homage, by mutuall obligation, or by pention, which hee receiueth: which although it be a thing most daungerous in a Commonweale, and ought therefore to be capitall: yet for all that there is nothing than that more common in the Councell of princes. Except in the citie of Venice, which hath a Senat so free from this kind of base corruption, as that euen for that cause their priests (bee they neuer so free or nobly borne) out from comming into the Councell of state; for that they are thought to be sworne to doe nothing against the commoditie or profit of the bishop of Rome. Whereupon it is, that commonly the citisens before the giuing of their voyces, crie out alowd [*](Out of doores with the priests.) For a i Preti. And namely they banished Hermolaus Barbarus their ambassadour unto the pope; as they did not long ago cardinall Mule, their ambassadour unto him also, for that they had of him receiued the cardinals hat, without leaue from the Seigneurie. But I find, that in this realme there have bene thirtie five chauncellors, which have bene cardinals or bishop at least: and so in England the like. And in Polonia, where the archbishop of Gnesne is by inheritance alwaies chancellour of the realme: the kings of that country have bene glad to make a lay man their vicechauncellor, by no oath bound unto the bishop of Rome. As for pentions giuen by straungers unto the minions or ambassadors of other princes, it is a thing so ordinarie, as that it is growne into a verie custome. Yea Mounsier Cotignac the French ambassadour into Turkie, was so bold as to presume to marrie a Greeke gentlewoman, without making of the king at all acquainted therewith. And not long after, another also at the instigation of Mhemet Bassa, and the duke of Naxo, would likewise have married the prince of Valachia his sister: which poore prince for refusing to giue his consent thereunto, which he for feare had before graunted, was by the Bassa thrust out of his estate, and Stephen Bathor (who now gouerneth the kingdome of Polonia) placed in his stead. All which, with other such like enterprises, are dangerous in an estate, and therefore in a well ordered Commonweale, in no wise to be suffered. And these unto me seeme to be the chiefe qualities and ornaments of a good Councellour of Estate.

But beside these, in many Commonweales nobilitie of birth is alwaies in a Senator required; as at Venice, Rhaguse, and Nuremberg: and amongst the Polonians it was

by Sigismundus Augustus, in the yeare 1550 by law prouided, That no man should [*](Nobility of birth and also wealth to be in a Senator required.) be chosen a Senator, except he were nobly descended, by the fathers side at least, & had also borne armes. In other places choyce was made of them by their wealth, as at Genes, and in auntient time in Atheus by the lawes of Solon: and so almost in all other auntient Commonweales. And namely Augustus the emperour, would not that a Roman Senator of his time should be lesse worth than thirtie thousand crownes, supplying of his owne bountie what the wise Senators being poorer wanted: not that it was so necessarie unto their Councell, but that so they might have wherewith to maintaine their estate, aunswerable unto their calling: as also least the rest proud of their wealth, should contemne the other which were poorer, as commonly it falleth out in the Aristocratique estate, where the Senator is chosen by his wealth. And by the auntient order of the Romans also, no man could be made a Senator, except he had before borne some honourable place or charge in the Commonweale. And therefore the Censors from five yeares to five yeares, registred in the roll of the Senat, all them which had borne any great or honourable office or place in the Commonweale; viz. such as had bene Consuls, Praetors, Aediles, or at least Quaestors. And for that in the ouerthrow of Marius 90 Senators were slaine; Sylla created Dictator, to supply the order of the Senators, which he favoured, created twentie Quaestors, and Caesar fortie, who at the same time should be made Senators, with power also to giue voyces, which before was not lawfull, vntill they had by the Censors bene nominated and registred. Which indeed is a laudable custome, and in many well ordered Commonweals at this present obserued. As in Polonia none is receiued to be a Senator, which is not a Palatine, a Bishop, a Castellan, or Captaine; or else before hath beene imployed in some honourable ambassage, or bene generall of an armie. Neither hath any man place in the Great Turkes Diuano or Councell, but the foure Visier Bassaes, the two Cadilisquiers or Chauncellors, and the twelue Beglerbegs, gouernours of great prouinces.

But whereas we have before said, that Senators are to be chosen out of such as have before borne some honourable place or office in the Commonweale: that concerneth not them which shamefully buy their offices, neither the Commonweale wherein honours and offices are bought for money: for those vertues which we said to bee required in a Senator; namely iustice, faith, integritie, wisedome, experience, and knowledge in the lawes both of God and man, are things so sacred and diuine, as that they cannot for any reward or money be bought. Now that a Senator should by the Senat be examined or tried, is a new and vnwonted thing: as men whome either the Censors, or the other offices and honours by them before obtained, had sufficiently alreadie tried. Yet in the time of the Gothes, the Commonweale being by them chaunged, we read it to have bene done: For so ---aith Theodoricus, with Cassiodore, Admittendos in Senatum examinare cogit solicitus honor Senatus, The carefull care we have of the honour of the Senat, causeth vs to examine such as are to be admitted into the Senat.

As for the number of Senators it cannot be great, considering the perfection requisit [*](The number of Senators commonly oe in an Aristocratique or popular Com monweale, than in a Monarchie.) in a Counselour of estate. True it is, that in popular and aristocratique Commonweales, to auoid seditions, and to feede the enraged famine of the ambitious, which have part in the soueraignetie: they are oft times enforced to augment the number of the Senatours; as in Athens by Solons law, they by lot every yeare made choice of foure hundred Senatours; whereunto it pleased them afterwardes to adde another hundred, that so fifty might by lot yearely bee drawne out of every one of the ten tribes: unto whom they ioyned also another hundred, to make up the full number of 600. After that they had unto the ten tribes ioyned two others, namely the tribes of

Antigonus and Demetrius, albeit that in the time of Pericles, there were not in the citie aboue 13 thousand citisens, and 20 thousand in the time of Demonsthenes. For which cause (as I have said) Plato in his popular Commonweale: by him set downe, appointeth the Senate to consist of an hundred threescore and eight of the better and wiser sort, which was the thirtith part of 5040 citisens the full number of them, of whom he would have his Commonweale to stand. And in like case, Romulus tooke the thirtith part of his subiects to make the first Roman Senate of, choosing out of 3000, (the whole number that then was of the citisens) an hundred, and them also by him chosen not by lot, but by discretion, euen of the nobler sort of his people: viz. such as whose auncestours had neuer serued as slaues. But afterward, the Sabins being according to the league receiued into the citie, hee added vnto the former number another hundred; unto whom, after the kings driuen out, Brutus also put to an hundred moe, which number of three hundred Senatours, so continued by the space of almost foure hundred yeares, without increasing or diminishing. But in the time of Cicero, it is manifest that there were about five hundred, by that he writeth foure hundred and fifteene Senatours, to haue giuen voices when Pub. Claudius, who was afterwards tribune, was brought in question for hauing polluted the sacrifices of Bona Dea, by committing of adultery with Pompeia: at which time, when the Senatours were not constrained to be present in the Senate, no man can doubt, but that many of them then dispersed into all the prouinces of the Roman empire, or otherwise busied with their owne affaires, or letted with age and sicknesse, were then also absent. And after that, Caesar to have moe beholden unto him, and for the better establishing of his owne gouernement, augmented the number of the Senatours unto a thousand, chusing into that honourable order, not onely citisens of all sorts, but euen Frenchmen and other strangers also, namely Lu. Licinius the Barber, as saieth Acron. But Augustus (after the Commonweale againe pacified) seeing the danger of so great a number of Senatours, brought them to the number of sixe hundred, with purpose to have brought them also to the antient number of three hundred, which was not much more then the ten thousand part of the whole number of the citisens, being then almost infinite.

Wherefore the number of Senatours is not to bee appointed, according to the [*](Of whom it is fittest to make choice for Senators in an Aristocratique or popular Commonweale.) multitude of the people, neither to serue the ambitious desire of the ignorant; and much lesse for the drawing of money from them, but onely for the respect of the vertue and wisedome of them which have deserued the place; or if it be not possible otherwise to satisfie the ambition of them, which have part and interest in the estate of popular and aristocratique Commonweales, but that of necessitie the gate of the Senate must bee opened unto the multitude, that it be yet so ordered, that none should therein have deliberatiue voices, but such as had borne the greatest offices▪ and charges in the state: as in the Cretensian popular Commonweale, all the citisens had free accesse and enterance into the Senate, and there might franke and freely deliver their opinions, but not with authoritie to determine any thing, that power being still reserued unto them onely which then were, or had before beene the great magistrates. And in the Senate of the Achaeans, none but the generall and the ten Dimiurgi, had power to determine of such things as were in counsell propounded. Howbeit a wise lawegiuer will neuer[*](The daunger of hauing many Senators.) goe so farre, if hee may otherwise auoid the popular sedition: for beside the manifest daunger, which is for reuealing of counsell communicated to so many persons: it giueth also occasion unto the factious for troubling of the state, if they which have the power to determine and resolue upon matters, shall in opinion differ from them which have but voices consultatiue; which indeede are accounted as nothing: for preuenting of which dangers, both the one and the other, the antient Greekes in their Commonweales

still created a counsell apart, of the grauest and wisest of their Senators (whom they called --- and ---) to consult of the more secret and vrgent matters of state; as also by themselves to dispose of the greatest affaires of the Commonweale, and to consider what thing were to be consulted of in the open Senat, or publikely to be propounded unto the people. Besides that, what an hard matter it was of such a multitude of Senatours, to assemble so many as were requisite, and to make them to agree when they were assembled; the estate in the meane time standing in danger & the oportunitie for the well mannaging of matters passing. The Senators office amongst the Romans was most glorious and full of honour; and yet could Augustus the emperour neuer bring to passe, that the Senators should be present at the ordinarie Senat, which was holden the calends or ides of euerie moneth at the farthest; albeit that he set great fines upon them that were absent, and gaue not their assistance: which grew so heauie upon the offendors, as that he was glad to take of them so offending euerie fift man by lot. And Ruscius Caepio the rather to inuite them to that their dutie, by his last will and testament left a certaine summe of money to them that came into the Senat. For it was requisit that there should be fiftie Senators at the least for the making of any decree, and oftentimes an hundred, or two hundred, yea and sometimes foure hundred, which was two third parts of six Senators; as in corporations and colledges the manner is. Howbeit Augustus the emperour at length taking away the necessitie of so great a number, appointed two hundred to be sufficient, beeing two thirds of three hundred; which was the lawfull number of the Senators appointed by Brutus. Moreover the Senat was not ordinarily assembled but three times a moneth; and if it pleased not the Consull (without whose commandement the Senat might not assemble it selfe) or the greatest magistrat in the absence of the Consull, sometime an whole yeare passed without calling together of the Senat: as Caesar did in his first Consulship, hauing the Senat bent against him; and yet in the meane time by prodigall bountie caused euen what he would to be decreed by the people. Whereas Solon had much better prouided for the matter among the Athenians, hauing beside the ordinarie Senat of 400, euerie yeare to be changed, appointed also a priuie and perpetuall[*](The counsel of the Areopagi i Athens.) Councell of the Areopagi, consisting of threescore of the wisest and grauest sort of the citisens, men without reproach, who by all the degrees of honour were risen to have the mannaging of all the most secret affaires of the state, and to foresee that in time of daunger the Commonwealth should take no harme. Of which councell how great the need was, was then well vnderstood, when as Pericles to gaine the favour of the common sort, had taken away the authoritie from the Areopagits, and translated the same unto the people: for shortly after, the state of that Commonweale sore shaken both with forren and domesticall warres, began forthwith to decline and decay. Wee find also, that the Aetolians, beside their great Councell, which they called Panaetolium, had also their priuie Councell chosen of the grauest and wisest men amongst them; of whome Liuie speaking, saith, Sanctius est apud Aetolos consilium eorum quos apocloets appellant, There is among the Aetolians a more sacred (or priuie) Councel, of them whom they call apocletos: and immediatly after, Arcanum hoc gentis Consilium, This is the secret[*](* Select counselours.) Councell of the nation: Whereas before he had said, Legibus Aetolorum cauebatur, ne de pace belloue, nisi in Panaetolio & Pilaico Consilio ageretur, It was prouided by the lawes of the Aetolians, that nothing should be entreated of concerning peace or warre, but in their Panaetolio, or Pilaican Councell. Wee read also, that the popular Commonweale of the Carthaginensians, beside their Senat of foure hundred Senators, had also a particular or priuie Councell of thirtie Senators, men of greatest experience[*](The counsel the Carthaginensians.) in their publike affaires and matters of state: Of whome Liuie thus saith, Carthaginenses xxx legatos seniorum principes adpacem petendam mittunt: id erat sanctius apudeos Consilium, maximaque ad Senatum regendum vis, The Carthaginensians (saith he) send thirtie ambassadors, the princes of their elders to sue for peace: and that was the more sacred Councell with them, and the greater power for the ruling of the Senat: which manner of Councell the Romans wanted. And therefore Liuie wondereth (as at a right strange thing) that the ambassadors of Greece and Asia, which came to Rome, could of so great a number of Senators vnderstand nothing of that which king Eumenes then plotted in the full Senat, against Perseus king of Macedon, Eo silentio curia clausa erat, The court (saith he) was with such silence shut up: Whereby he sufficiently sheweth, that in his time, as also long before that, nothing was done or agreed upon in the Senat, which still was not by one or other of so great a number reuealed. For which cause the Senators themselves sometimes were constrained to become clarkes and secretaries in the secret affaires of the state, and to take of euerie man an oath, not to reueale any such thing as was in the Senat decreed, vntill such time as it was put in execution: For as yet no capitall punishment was appointed for such as shuld reueale or bewray the secret councel of princes. And indeed how could any thing there be kept secret, where five or 600 Senators were priuie to all that was done in the Senat, beside the clarks and secretaries for the state? When as also the yong Senators children, before the time of Papyrius Praetextatus might come into the Senat, & carrie the news of such things as were there done, unto their mothers. Augustus was the first, who out of the Senat made choice of some few of the wiser sort to be of his priuy coūcel, without giuing the rest of the senat to vnderstand, that he would with them resolue[*](Augustus the first in Rome who out of the whol body of the Senate made choice of some fewe of the wiser sort, to be of his priuie counsels) of the most important and secret affaires of state, but onely to have their aduise concerning such things as were to be afterward propounded in the open assemblie of the Senat. Immediatly after whose death, Tiberius the emperour requested of the Senat, to have twentie Senators appointed him, with whome he might (as he would have them to beleeue) consult of such things as the Senat was further to bee moued of. Whose example the wiser sort of the emperours afterwards followed; namely Galba, Traian, Adrian, Marcus Aurelius, and Alexander Seuerus: of whome Lampridius speaking, He neuer (saith he) made decree without the aduise of twentie lawyers, and diuers other of the Senators, (men of great euidently and understanding in matters of state) euen to the number of fiftie, to the end there might be no fewer than were necessarie for the making of a decree of the Senat. Whereby it euidently appeareth, that in that priuat Councell of fiftie Senators, with the prince, were the greatest matters dispatched; and that it was not onely to consult of that which was to be in the Senat propounded, but euen to resolue and determine of the most secret and important affaires of the state, and so by little and little to draw them from the Senat, unto the more priuat councel of the prince. By which meanes was also prouided for another difficultie (otherwise in a Monarchie ineuitable) which is the multitude of Senators, which could not still follow the prince; unto whome for all that his councell ought to bee alwaies assistant, especially in a Monarchie, where the prince is to visit diuers his prouinces: or is himselfe in person busied in his warres. For which cause and no other, the auntient diuines and poets, have faigned Pallas alwaies to sit on the right hand of Iupiter, but not Iupiter on the right hand of Pallas: to giue vs thereby to vnderstand, That the Councell ought alwaies to be present with the prince, but not the prince to bee tied to the place where the Councell is resident: which were a thing not onely not agreeable with the maiestie of a soueraigne prince, but also impossible. And albeit that there bee many things in euerie Commonweale dispatched by the priuie Councell, wherewith it is not needfull either the people or the rest of the nobilitie to be made acquainted: yet so it is, that in a Monarchie it is expedient and requisit that the prince should himselfe vnderstand them: or at leastwise that euerie man should thinke that he so doth, so to giue the greater authoritie and credit unto such things as are by the Councell decreed, and that the subiects should not complaine and say, The king vnderstandeth not hereof. And for this cause the Grand Signior of the Turkes hath alwaies a lattise or grate, opening into the Diuano, or chamber wherein his Councell sitteth, to the intent to keepe his Bassaes and them of his councell in awe; whilest they thinke him their prince alwaies to see them, and to obserue their proceedings and doings.

But it may be (may some man say) that a Commonweale may be so little, and men[*](In small Commonweales the priuie Counsell is not to be divided from the Senat.) of experience in it so few in number, as that not a Senat, but euen such a priuie Councell as we spake of, cannot therein be made. In which case of so strait a Commonweale, it is not needfull to diuide the Senat apart from the priuie Councell. As in the Commonweale of the Pharsalians (which was within most narrow bounds shut up) there were but twentie persons which had the soueraigntie, who in that state serued for the nobilitie, the Senat, and priuie Councell. And yet neuerthelesse in the Lacedemonian Commonweale alwaies both before and after the conquest of Greece, there were but thirtie lords, both for the state and the Senat: and yet out of this number of thirtie, they made choice but of twelue for the mannaging of the secret affaires of their state, as we read in Xenophon: establishing the same forme of government in Athens also, where they deputed thirtie lords for the government of that state, as they did in all the rest of the cities of Greece, except some little ones, over whome Lysander placed ten chiefe men, without any other Senat or priuie Councell. And the reason was, for that they had resolued to chaunge all the popular states of Greece, into Aristocraties; which they could not have done in the lesser townes, if they should in them have erected a seignorie, a Senat, and a priuie Councell. But for the present there is almost no Commonweale, be it Popular or Aristocratique, which hath not a Senat and particular or priuat Councell: yea and oftentimes beside both them, a Triumuirat of some few, for the mannaging of the more secret affaires of state, and that especially in a Monarchy. For so Augustus the emperour (albeit that he surpassed all the rest that came after him, both in wisdome, and happinesse) beside the Senat, which he had filled with 600 Senators, [*](Maecenas and Agrippa▪ the onely men with whom Augustus the emperour resolued of his greatest affaires.) and the priuat councell of twentie select men, had also another neerer and more inward councell of Maecenas and Agrippa, with whome he resolued of his highest affaires, calling unto him none but them two after the victorie of Actium▪ to resoluè with, Whether he should still hold, or discharge himself of the empire. So Iulius Caesar, had none but Q. Pedius, and Cornelius Balbus of his most inward councell, unto whom also he gaue his manner of writing in secret caracter, for them the better to vnderstand his secrets thereby. So Cassiodorus speaking of the secrets of princes, saith, Arduum nimis est principis meruisse secretum, Too high a thing it is (saith he) to have deserued to be of the princes priuitie. We see in like case, that the court of the parliament of Paris,[*](Diuers counsels at diuers times erected in France for matters of state.) was the auntient Senat of the realme of Fraunce: but when it tooke pleasure in deciding of civill controuersies, nor could not well bee remoued from the citie; the kings appointed another councell, which for that it handled matters of greatest importance, in the time of Charles the seuenth, was called the Great Councell: which when it was also entangled with deciding of extraordinarie suits and controuersies, by the lawes of Charles the eight, and much more by the lawes of king Lewes the xij, who appointed a court of twentie judges; king Francis the elder remoued that Great Councell from medling with the secret affaires of state, hauing got unto himselfe another councell of certaine select princes his friends: which of the Latines is called; The Familiar Councell, and of our countrey men, The princes priuat Councell. But Francis

being dead, Henrie his sonne got another councell also: which for that it consisted of few, was called the narrow or strait Councell. But at last, when that Familiar or priuat Councell, was thought to exceed also with the multitude of Councellors, Henrie the third, the sonne of Henrie ordained another Councell, which for that it was only to consult of matters concerning the state of the Commonweale, and not of suits and controuersies, was called the Councell for the State. Beside these, it was thought meet that there should also be a more secret or chamber Councell, wherein the king rising from his bed, should confirme or reiect such things as were by the Councell decreed: there are princes letters opened, ambassadors reported, and messages delivered. There is also apart another Councell of the Finances instituted by Henrie the second, and by little and little taken from the auditors, wherein are assistant the intendants and secretaries of estate of the Finances, and the treasuror for the common treasure. Beside all which princes have alwaies had a more strait Councel, of two or three of their most inward and faithfull friends; who so highly stand in the princes favour, not so much for their youth or person, as for their wisedome and vertue. As for the chamber Councell whereof we spoke, it consisteth but of a few, and albeit that by the decree of Charles the ninth, made in Nouember, in the yere 1563, it is in the first article expressed, that so soone as the king was up, all the princes and the councell might come into the chamber, yet was not that his decree therein obserued or kept.

Which pluralitie and diuersitie of Councels in the kingdome of Fraunce, ought [*](Seauen counsels in Spaine.) not to seeme straunge, seeing that in Spaine there be seuen, beside the strict and inward Councell, which are alwaies in diuers chambers neere unto the king, and yet within the compasse of the same house or lodging; to the intent, that the king going from one of them to the other, may the better be enformed of his affaires: as namely the councell of Spaine, the councell of the Indies, the councell of Italie, and the councell of the Low countries, the councell for the warres, the councell for the order of Saint Iohn, and the Inquisition. Now if any man there be, that thinke the greatnesse of that kingdome (than which neuer yet was any greater) to require so many councels: I denie it not, but yet so he may see also in Venice, which hath no verie great territory, foure councels, beside the Senat and Great Councell: viz. the councell of the Sages for matters at sea, the councell of the Sages for matters at land, the councel of the Decemuiri, or ten men, [*](Diuers counsels in Venice.) and the councell of the Septemuiri, or seuen men; where the duke maketh the seuenth man, which they cal the Seignorie, when it is ioyned with the councell of the ten men, and the three presidents of the fortie, beside the Senat of sixtie; which with the magistrats may come to the number of six score. And what then should let, but that where there be but few men worthy to be of councell for the state, but that the Senat may be made right little, and the priuie councell lesse, and yet divided from the Senat also. The state of the Rhagusians is but strait, & comprised almost within the same bounds, wherewith the wals of the citie are enclosed, and yet the Senat consisteth of threescore. In the citie of Nuremberg is a Senat of twentie six Senators, and a priuie councell of thirteene, beside another councell of the seuen Bourgomasters. The Canton of[*](The counsel of the Cantons of the Swistars.) Schwits is the least of all the Cantons, and yet for all that beside the Senat of fortie five persons, it hath a priuie councell of seuen, of whome the Aman is chiefe. Which selfe same forme of councell is also kept in the canton of Vti. As for the cantons of Zurich, Berne, Schafluse. Basill, Soleurre, Friburg, and Lucerne, they have alwaies beside the Great Councell, a little councell also. The Great Councell of Berne consisteth of two hundred Senators; and the little of twentie six: At Lucerne of an hundred, and the little of twentie eight: At Saint Gal also the Great Councell is of sixtie six, and the little of twentie foure: At Coire the Senat is of thirtie, and the priuie

councell of fifteene. And without going so farre, it is well knowne, that the state of [*](The counsel of Geneus.) Geneua is enclosed within the compasse and circuit of a mile, yet for all that beside the councell of two hundred, it hath a Senat of sixtie; and after that a priuie councell of twentie fiue. Neither is there any canton so little, (except the three cantons of the Grisons, gouerned by the common popularitie) which hath not a priuie councell beside the Senat, wherein some have three, and some have foure. As in the canton of Bafill, where the secret affaires of state are mannaged by two Bourgomasters, and two other chiefe men of their colleges, whom they call Zunfft maisters. And in like case at Berne the two Auoyers, and foure ensigne bearers, have the ordering of all the secret businesse of their state; as hath the priuie councell in a Monarchie. And namely in the diets and assemblies of the thirteene cantons, there is none but the priuie councell of the ambassadours, which make their decrees, and direct their commissions, concerning their common affaires: I say then that it is a thing most profitable in euerie Common[*](A priuie counsell besids the Senat necessarie in euerie Commonweale.) weale, to have at the least one priuie councell beside the Senat, sith that the auntient rulers of both the Greekes and Latines have so taught vs, reason so shewed vs, and experience therein confirmed vs.

But there is a notable difference betwixt the Senat of a popular or Aristocratique[*](The manner of consultation in the Senat of a popular or Aristocratique estate, and in the Senat of a Monarchie much different.) Commonweal, and the Senat of a Monarchie: for in them the diuises and consultations are had in the secret or priuie counsell; but the resolutions and decrees are all made in the great Counsell, or in the assemblie of the States, or of the people, if the matter be such as is to be unto them published: whereas in a Monarchie the manner of proceeding is quite contrarie, wherein nothing is communicated or imparted to the people, or the nobilitie, but such things as seeme unto the Senat doubtfull, or being of greater importance, are still referred unto the priuie Counsell; and if the matter concerne the soueraigntie, it is reserued unto the iudgement of the soueraigne prince onely. And albeit that the Senat or Counsell in a Monarchie seeme to do all the rest of it selfe, yet still we see all to depend of the princes commaund. And this which we have said concerning the manner of consultation, is almost no where better put in practise then[*](The manner of the proceding in their consultations in matters of state, in Venice.) in Venice: where if any difficultie arise in the counsell of the sages, it is commonly discided by ioining of the Decemuiri vnto them, (and therefore unto such decrees as are by them made are ioined Con la Giunta) and if they cannot so agree, but still rest among themselves in opinion divided, they call unto them the Septemuiri or counsell of seauen: but if so nothing can be decreed for the diuersitie of opinions, the matter is then propounded in open Senat: And sometimes also (although but seldome) if the matter be of such consequence, or so much concerne the maiestie of the State, as that the authoritie of the Senat seemeth not to be thereunto sufficient, or that the Senat be thereupon divided, it is propounded in the great counsell of all the gentlement of Venice, where it taketh the last and finall resolution; which as Aristotle writeth, was also the auncient custome of the Carthaginensians, where if the Senat could not agree, the difference was disputed, debated, and discided by the people.

Now all this differing of resoluing and determining, proceedeth from the diuersitie of the soueraigntie, and of them which have the mannaging of the government: for what the Senat decreeth in an Aristocratique, or popular Commonweal, that the nobilitie, or people ratifieth and commaundeth if the matter so require: contrarie to that we see to be done in a Monarchie, where the wiser the prince thinketh himselfe, the lesse he vseth the counsell of the Senat: (albeit that he oft times aske the aduise thereof, to make his doings the more acceptable, or for the easing of himselfe, committeth unto them commissions for extraordinarie justice, or the iudgement of inextricable matters and causes of appeales) especially if the Senat be so great as that the prince by publishing

of his secrets to so many persons, shall not come to the point of his designes. By [*](The policie of the Romain emperours to drawe the Senat from matters of state by busiyng it with other extraordinarie causes.) this meane Tiberius the Emperour sought to kepe the Senat busied in disciding of great and extraordinarie causes, to make it by little and little to forget the understanding of matters of state. And after him Nero likewise ordeyned that the Senat should have the hearing of Appeales which before were made unto himselfe, and that the fine for the offence set downe by the Senat should be as great, as if he had heard the cause himselfe; By this meane making of a Senat an ordinarie court and iurisdiction of Iudges: who in the time of freedome of that popular Commonweal neuer used to judge, except ordinarilie in conspiracies, and other such like great offences against the state: or that the people which had the hearing of many causes, had committed the understanding thereof unto the Senat. For which cause Cicero accusing Verres saith in this sort, Quo confugient socij? quem implorabunt? ad Senatum deuenient, qui de Verre supplicium sumat? non est vsitatum, non est Senatorium: Whither shall our friends and allies flie? whom shall they aske help of? shall they come vnto the Senat, to take punishment of Verres? it is no thing in vse, it appertaineth not unto the Senat. Wherein many deceiue themselves, which think that the Senat judged, when they saw that the Senatours were drawne by lot to judge of publike and criminall causes, sometimes by themselves, sometime with the knights, by the law Liuia, and afterwards with the knights and the Treasurours, by the law Aurelia: for there is great difference betwixt the bodie of the Senat, and the Senatours taken in the qualitie of judges, and betwixt the priuie Counsell, and the counsellours thereof comming into the soueraigne courts to judge. For before Nero the Senat neuer had so much as ordinarie iurisdiction or[*](The Senators of Rome as Senators no iudges, but when they were thereunto extraordinarilie by commission appoynted.) power to judge of any matter; And namely Augustus would not that the Senat should trouble it selfe, with the judging of the honour, or of the life of Senatours, albeit that he were thereunto importuned by his friend Moecenas. And albeit that Tyberius the emperour often times sent vnto them such causes, yet was it but extraordinarie and by way of commission; which Adrian the emperour afterward caused to passe into the forme of an ordinarie iurisdiction. We see in like case that Philip the faire, or as some others say Philip the long, to discharge himselfe of the Court of parlament, and easilie to take from it the dealing with the affaires of state, made it an ordinarie Court, giuing it iurisdiction, and a fitting place in Paris: which Court was in auntient time the Senate of Fraunce, and yet at this day calleth it selfe the Court of Peeres, erected by Lewes the yong, (according to the truer opinion) to giue counsell unto the king; as we may see by the creation of Countie D' Mascon for a Peer, by king Charles the fi---t, in the yeare 1359, where it is said that the king of Fraunce ordained the twelue Peers, to giue them their counsell and aide, and tearmed it selfe, as yet it doth at this present, (by way of prerogative of honour) the Court of parlament (without any other addition)[*](The court of Paris sometime the auntient Senat of Fraunce by the king forbidden to deale with matters of state.) as it is to be seene in the letters which it wrote unto the king: whereas the other Courts of later time established, vse their particular additions; As, The Parlament of Tholouse, of Roan, of Burdeaux, of Dion, of Gratianople, and Aquasexia. But in the raigne of Charles the ix, at such time time as the Court of Paris liked not of the decree of the Senat, whereby the king in the Court of Roan was by the voices of the princes declared sufficient for the government of the kingdome without a Regent, according to the law of king Charles the first: the king yet under age, aduised the court, to meddle only with the desciding of controuersies, and the equall administration of justice: for that the king his predecessours had for that onely purpose appointed that Court, and there placed them, and not to become his tutors, or protectors of the realme, or keepers of his towne of Paris: and therefore commaunded such lawes and edicts as hee had appointed to be proclaimed in the court of Paris, to be published: wherein if any thing should be contained that seemed not to stand with right and reason, he could (as he said) be content to be thereof tould; but yet so as that after he had vnderstood the matter, if it were his pleasure to have the law proclaimed, they should forthwith without farther reply do that they were commaunded: with which the kings edict the court was wonderfully troubled; and for that the judges were equally divided into two opinions: the one being willing to have the kings edict published, and the other denying the same. The Court thought good againe to aduise the king, that the court might not be enforced to allow or publish such things as should thereunto seeme vnreasonable or vniust. Wherewith the king displeased, caused his priuie Counsell to be called, and by the authoritie thereof a decree to bee made the xxiiij. of September, whereby the parlament of Paris was forbidden once to call in question the lawes or decrees proceeding from the king concerning matters of state: which was also before by king Francis decreed in the yeare 1528. In like case the great Counsell which was not almost employed but in affaires of state, in the raigne of Charles the seauenth, and Charles the eight, was by little and little so filled with sutes, that Charles the viij. made it an ordinarie court of seauenteene counsellours; whom Lewes the xij. made up xx. beside the Chauncelour, who was President thereof, (in such sort, that under king Francis there was but a President in steed of a Chauncelour) who were not imploied but in hearing of extraordinarie causes by way of commission, or remitting of the priuie[*](The priuie counsel of Fraunce almost brought into the forme of an ordinarie court by hearing of priuat and particular causes) counsell, and ordinarily the appeales of the Prouost of the houshold. We se also the priuie Counsell it selfe to be as it were brought into the forme of an ordinary court, by heating the differences betwixt the Townes and the Parlaments, and oft times betwixt particular men, euen for small matters: to the end that such a great companie of the nobilitie, and men of marke, should be busied with some thing, hauing as it were lost the understanding of the affaires of state, which can neuer sort to good end, if they be communicated to so many persons: where the wiser sort are commonly over ruled by the greater part, ioining hereunto also, that it is impossible, to keepe the counsell[*](Matters of state not without daunger to be communicated vnto many.) of the state secret: or to know in such a multitude who it is that discouereth the same, nor to cast them out who are holden for suspect: Except by vsing the custome of the auntient Athenians, by vertue whereof the Senatours by a secret iudgement which they called --- might with all libertie, and without displeasure condemne the blabbing Senator, or him that had defiled the honour of his estate. As in like case the Roman Censors without forme or fashion of processe, had accustomed to remoue the vnworthie Senators, and by that meanes to exclude them out of the Senat; except they would put themselves upon their triall before the judges which were aboue the Censors, or that the people had giuen some new office, or honorable charge to him that was so remoued by the Censors, or condemned by the judges. But the Romans were much to blame, both for too easie receiuing and remouing of the Senatours, and that in too great number: For Fabius Buteo made Dictator to supply the defect of the Senat, at one time receiued in an 177 Senatours. Whereas Lentulus and Gellius Censors at one dash remoued 64. Howbeit, it were more seemly and agreeing with the dignitie and honour of a Senat to receiue into it few, and them also chosen and culled out as pearles; than to exalt unto so high degree of honour men worthie[*](Senator or coun selours of estate not easily to be admitted nor without greate cause to be againe displaced. The auntient counsel of England in number fewe.) and vnworthie, and afterwards to cast them downe againe with eternall infamie and dishonour, unto whom they had before giuen their helping hands: Besides that it cannot alwaies be done without danger and sedition, or the dishonour of him that ruleth. It is foure hundred yeare since that the Priuie Counsell of England, at the instance and ---ute of the Archbishop of Canterburie (then Chauncelour) established, there were there into but fifteene persons then chosen; neither hath it euer since passed the number of twentie; and yet by meanes of that little Counsell they have retained their state most faire and florishing in times both of peace and warre, as is by their histories to be seene; and by the treatie of peace made betwixt Lewes the ix, and Henry the first, king of England; which for the more assurance thereof was sworne by the Prince and the xvij priuie Counsellors: viz. one Archbishop, one Chauncelor, one Bishop, six Earls, and six other Lords, with the great Treasurour, and a magistrat whom they call chiefe Iustice of England. Now I doubt not but that in every Commonweale, many by vaine ambition, favour, impudency, or corrupt briberie, in sort euen against the Prince and peoples will find meanes to enter into the sacred Senat; against which inconuenience remedie might be well prouided, if we would but vse Solons law. For he would have none to bee admitted into the Senat of the Areopagits, but such as had without touch, by all the degrees of honour ascended unto the highest places and preferments of the Commonweale: for so he deemed him to be well able to hold a place in the Senat without staggering or falling, that could hold himselfe upright in such dangerous and slipperie wayes. And that is it for which all the auntients both Greeks and Latins, have so highly commended the Senat of the Areopagits, composed of sixtie persons, as we read in Athens. The same manner is yet vsed among the five lesser cantons of the mountaine Swissers, that they which haue passed through all the honourabre estates should continue Senators for euer: but this is not the way to have good resolution, and yet lesse to keepe the affaires of state in secret, in that the Senators of the little cantons, which are fortie five in Zug, and an hundred sixtie foure in Appenzel, and more or lesse in the others, when question is of matters of importance, may euerie one of them bring with him into the councell two or three of the citisens, such as he liketh best of. Whereby it commeth to passe, that sometime there are foure or five hundred, part Senators, part others, assembled together into the Senat, and yet all have deliberatiue voices therein. Whereas multitude is euer an enemie, unto wise resolutions.

And thus much concerning the number of Councellors of estate: let vs now also breefly speake of them that are to propound matters in the Senat; and then of such[*](Who they be that ought to propound matters in the Senat or counsel.) things as are there also to bee propounded. As touching the first, men of auntient time have alwaies had great regard unto the qualitie of them which were to propound any thing in the Senat. For we see that to have bene the proper charge of the greatest magistrats in Rome, whome for that cause they called Consuls: or in their absence the greatest magistrat that was in Rome (to wit, the Praetor of the citie) supplied the place of the Consull: receiuing the particular requests both of the citisens and straungers, of ambassadours from forren princes, and allies letters from the gouernours of their prouinces: which letters he read in the Senat, asked euerie mans opinion, commaunded the decrees of the Senat to be written, & also dismissed the Senat. Amongst the Grecians the greatest Praetor executed the same office▪ who among the Athenians was called ---; & the rest as they were created in some places --- ---, who bare almost the same office that do the prouiditors in the cōmonwealth of Rhaguse, & the sages in the state of Venice: howbeit that there the three Auogadors ordinarily propounded unto the senat, that wherof it is to consult. In the councel of the Greeks the president caused to be cried aloud by a sergeant, That if there were any person that had any thing to say concerning the good of the state, he should speake: which Titus Liuius speaking of the Achaeans affirmeth generally of all the Greeks. But as for[*](A notable custome of the Aetolians in propounding of matters in their Senat.) the Aetolians, their custome was most notable, worthy to be of all men regarded, being highly commended and approued by Philipemen generall of the Achaean league; which was, that the presiden---, or hee which in full councell propounded any thing

which seemed unto himselfe good, should therein have no voice himselfe. A great meanes to take away the practises and couert traines, which are commonly made in Popular and Aristocratique estates, where the busiest heads easily draw others to their opinions. Howbeit I cannot commend the fashion and custome of them of Genes,[*](The custome of Genes discommended.) where none but the duke alone hath power to propound in the Senat that which pleaseth himselfe. For beside the difficultie of speaking with the duke on euerie side beset, and troubled with infinit affaires, and to lay before his eyes a thousand diuers reasons for the debating of the matter in the councell: it is also daungerous to giue so great authoritie to one person, that he may open or keepe secret to or from the Senat, whatsoeuer himselfe pleaseth; it being not lawfull for any man to propound any matter but himselfe. It is also much perilous one citisen, who first delivereth his opinion to be of such authoritie and power, as that the rest which are to speake after him, dare not freely say what indeed they thinke. And that is it for which it is wisely prouided in the realm[*](The laudable custome for the propounding of matters used in Fraunce.) of Fraunce, that it is permitted to all them which have accesse into the councell (although they therin have neither deliberatiue voice nor place) euerie man to propound his owne requests, & to aduertise the councell of that which is profitable for the Commonweale; to the end it may be the better prouided for. And oftentimes their opinion is also thereof demanded, and then afterward the aduise of the councellors of the estate, which in councell have place and deliberatiue voice, in such sort and order, as that the great lords deliver their opinions last; to the end, that the libertie of the lesser should not be impaired by the authoritie of the greater princes or magistrats, and especially by the power of ambitious and factious men, who cannot in any case abide to be contradicted. In which course they which have onely voyces consultatiue, make way for them which have voyces deliberatiue: and oftentimes broach unto the councell good and lively reasons: and where they in any thing erre, they are without ie lousie againe by the others brought into the right. Which is a custome much more commendable than that of the Romans, where the Consull first demaunded the opinion of the chiefe man in the Senat, or els of him that was appointed Consull for the yeare following. And yet neuerthelesse the contrarie was used before the people: for first the particular men delivered their opinions, and after them the lesser magistrats, and last of all the greatest, to the intent that the libertie of the lesser should not be preuented by the authoritie of the greater. Ioyne hereunto also, that the ambition to speake first doth oftentimes draw after it the enuie of some, and the ielousie of others. So wee see the cruell emperours to discharge upon the Senat, the discontentment that the people had of their cruelties, caused such things as they would have done to bee propounded or red in the Senat: which to gainesay or seeme to dislike of was death. Which was not to demaund the aduise of the Senat, but indeed most imperiously to command the same. Where of an auntient Senator complaining saith, Vidimus curtam elinguem, in [*](* Plinius iunior in pangirico. ) qua dicere quod velles periculosum: quod nolles miserum esset, We have seene (saith hee) the court dombe, wherin to speake that thou wouldest was daungerous; and to say that thou wouldest not, was a thing right miserable: For that the emperor Dometian, (vnus solus censebat quod omnes sequerentur) alone decreed what all men should follow: and commendeth Traian (quod eo rogante, sententias libere dicere liceret, vinceretque sententia non prima, sed melior) for that he propounding of matters, euerie man might freely speake his mind: and that opinion preuailed not which was first, but best. By the custome of the auntient Hebrewes, the king refrained from comming into the Senat, least any should bee contrarie unto him, or hee to any; for so they writ in their Commentaries.

It were also to be wished, that the Councell should sit in the morning yet fasting,

for that is not to be holden for a councell well disgested, which is done after dinner, as [*](The fiittest time for counselours to sit in councell) saith Philip de Commines, and especially in countries where the people are subiect unto wine. Salomon detesteth those princes, who when they ought in the morning to feed their mind with religious contemplation of high and diuine matters, doe with full feeding pamper the inordinat desire of their languishing & broken lust, & with new nourishment kindle the fire of new desires: Which he in three words declareth, Wo (saith he) unto princes which cate early. Which is a thing so much the more to be detested, by how much many thinke it to be the greatest brauerie, to bee well whitled with wine. For what can be more beastly than was the old maner of the Germans, who neuer used to consult of their greatest affaires but in middest of their cups persuaded so that every one of them warme with wine, should discover the verie secret of his hart, and to be the more eloquent to persuade what they thought to bee most expedient. Which custome they have now well changed, insomuch that euen their priuat and domesticall contracts made when they are in drink, are to none effect or purpose, it being alone a[*](What things are in the Senat or councell of the state to be cheifly consulted of.) sufficient cause for the iudge to reuoke them being so made. Now as concerning such things as are to be consulted of in the Senat, they depend of such occasions & affairs, as in course of time present themselves. The antient Romans first consulted of matters concerning their religion, as the marke and end wherat all humane actions ought both to begin and end. There was neuer also, saith Polybius (he himselfe being an Atheist) a people more deuout than this: adioining therunto moreouer, That by meanes of religion they had established unto themselves the greatest monarchy in the world. Then after matters of religion, and worship of the immortall gods, are to be entreated of the greatest and most vrgent affaires of state, and most concerning the Commonweale, as the making of peace or war: in both which, long delay is no lesse dangerous, than is too[*](A good rule by the auntient well obserued in all their consultations for matters of state.) hastie resolution. In which case, as in all things doubtful, the antients had a rule which suffered no great exception, which was, That we ought not to do, neither to councell any thing to be done, wherof we doubt whether it be iust or iniust, profitable or hurtfull; or if the harme that may ensue bee greater than the profit that may come of the enterprise that is to be taken in hand: but if the harme be euident, & the profit doubtful, or contrariwise, there is then no deliberation to be had or doubt made which to chuse. But the doubt is greater, when as that which we are to consult of, hath in show moe & greater profits, if we can bring it to good effect, than it hath hurt if wee faile therein. Howbeit the more wholsome opinion of the antients is to bee preferred, viz. That when question is of matters of estate, things doubtfull, or subiect to the change of fortune,[*](Things doubtful or subiect to fortune, in consultation of matters of state not to be at al embrased.) are not at al to be embraced. And therfore the subtiller sort, cause thē that be more simple, to propound and persuade in councell such things as seeme vnto themselves doubtfull; to the intent that so the blame may rest upon them, if things fall out euill: & yet the honor redound unto themselves if it fall out wel. Howbeit nothing ought to be[*](Nothing ought of right to be praised by the euents.) thought commendable and well done, which dependeth of the euent. For it behoueth vs by most certaine arguments and reasons to show wherfore this or that is to be done, and not by the euent: yea it behoueth a wise man rather to feare vnfortunat euents, than to presume of happie successe. And therfore a wise councellor neuer resteth himselfe upon the chances of fawning fortune, or upon aduentures, but still forceth himselfe by good and wise discourse to gather the true effects of precedent causes: albeit that hee oft times see, the most aduenturous and rash, to be the most happie & fortunat in their attempts. And therefore the antient diuines (who couered wisedome in fables) doubted not to exclude that goddesse whom they called Fortune, out of the coūcell of the gods; least that which should be sought for by wisedome, should seeme to have bene obtained by the rashnesse of fickle fortune. And yet for all that wee see nothing to be more cōmended or blamed, than the good or euil end of mens actions: and so wisdome measured by the foot of fortune. But if the law condemne the souldior that ---ighteth with the enemie without the commaundement of his captaine, although hee carrie away the victorie; how much more dangerous ought it to be, to put the hope of councels, & state of the Commonweal in the vncertaine hope of fortune? Besides that, such continuall aduentures do oftentimes draw after them the ruine of aduenturous princes. And therefore to auoid that nothing should be rashly or vnaduisedly decreed in the councel, I like well the aduise of sir Thomas Moore, To propound the day before what was in the Senat to be resolued on the day following; to the end that such deliberations might the better be disgested: prouided for al that, That question be not of the particular interest of any of them which have voice in the councell: for in that case it is much better to resolue upon the matter the same day, & without delay, than to attend vntil the sound iudgement of some be preuented by the subtilties of others, & that men come prepared with long traines of reasons, to reuerse that which ought of right to be concluded. For as the truth, the more naked and simple it is produced, the fairer it is; so is it most certaine, that they which disguise it by figures or colours of Rethorique, take from it the lustre and naturall beautie thereof: a thing which a man ought aboue all things in matters of councell to shun. True it is, that to vse oloquence, in the assemblies of the people, and with the sweetnes of speech to delight the ears of the ignorant multitude, or with faire words to blind their eies, or with pleasing reasons to turne their minds from rage and furie to peace and quietnes, is a thing not onely commendable, but necessary also. But al these things are far to be remoued from a Senat or councell, if aduise be to be sought for or required of such Senators as we have spoken of, that is to say of wise men. And the Lacedemonian breuitie full of good reasons, is to be vsed, that they all may have time to speake: & that no orator hauing got the possession of speaking, shold with long discourse or speech exclude the best & wisest of the senators. And therefore by an old decree of the Areopagits, it was not lawfull in that graue councell, to vse either any induction or after-speech. As for the delivering of their opinions by secret suffrages, as amongst the Venetians; or by changing of places, as amongst the Romans, I cannot greatly commend of either, but especially if the matter in consultation consist of many points, of which some are to be liked of, and othersome to be reiected: so that it is necessarie to propound euerie article or point apart, which the Latins terme diuidere sententiam, and so to cause the Senators to passe & repasse from one side to another. Into which difficulties the Venetians falling, are oftentimes constrained to leaue their secret voices giuen by lots, and to giue the same by word of mouth; which they vse to do, when question is of the life, fame, or fortune of any man, according to the maner of the antient Greeks & Romans; a thing which cannot by secret voices, by lot, without iniustice be done, for the infinit varietie of cases which may present themselves to be iudged upon. Now as the Senat of a Commonweale is not bound to the certaine[*](That the Sena ought not to intermedie with the iurisdiction of the magistrat.) hearing and deciding of causes, so ought it not to trouble it selfe with intermedling with the iurisdiction of the magistrats, except it be in the controuersies of the greatest magistrats, or soueraigne courts among themselves. And for this cause Tiberius the emperour, in the beginning of his raigne protested in the Senat, That he would not alter any thing in the course of iustice, neither have to do with the iurisdiction of the ordinarie magistrats. And they which make a confusion of a Senat & priuie councel, do greatly diminish the dignitie & honor therof, for that it ought to be regarded as to confirme the princes actions, & wholly to attend the publike affairs: worke enough to busie a senat, except it be when question is of the life or honour of the greatest lords and princes, or of the punishment of cities, or other such causes of like consequence and importance, as may well deserue the assemblie of the Senat; as in auntient time the Roman Senat, by commission from the people, had the hearing of the treasons and conspiracies of their allies, against the state, as we see in [*](Liuius lib. 26) Liuie.

Yet resteth the last point of our definition, that is to say, that the Senat is established[*](What power a Senat or counsel of stateis of right to have in a well ordered Commonweale.) to giue aduise and councell to them which have the soueraigntie in euerie Commonweale. To giue aduise (I say) and councell; for that the Senat in a well ordered Commonweale, ought not to have power to commaund, nor to direct out their mandats, neither to put into execution their aduises and consultations, but onely to make report thereof unto them which have the soueraigntie. Now if a man should aske, Whether there be any Commonweale wherein the Senat hath such power? It is a question but of fact: but if demaund were made, whether of right it ought so to have or not? our opinion is, that in a well ordered Commonweale it is in no wise to be suffered: for that it cannot be without impeaching of the soueraigntie, and that much lesse in a Monarchie, than in an Aristocratie, or a Popular estate. And in that the maiestie of a soueraigne prince is knowne, in that he can, and his wisedome, in that he knoweth to weigh and iudge the aduise of his councell, and so conclude according to the resolution of the wiser part, and not of the greater.

Now if any man thinke it straunge or inconvenient for all other magistrats and soueraigne[*](Why magistrates and soueraign courts have a greater commaunding power then hath a Senat or counsel of state.) courts, to have power to commaund, in their owne names to direct out their commissions, and the Senat that iudgeth of their authoritie and controuersies, to be depriued of this power: let him consider that unto such magistrats and courts, power is giuen them euen by their institution, election, and creation, and by the charters and grants unto them made for the limiting of their charge and power, without which neither martiall nor civill or domesticall affaires can well be gouerned: whereas there was neuer Senat in any auntient well ordered Commonweale, which had any power to commaund by vertue of the institution thereof. So we see, that in the kingdoms of Fraunce, Spaine, and England, the priuie councell is not erected or instituted in forme of a bodie politique or colledge; neither to have power by the election or ordaining thereof, to order or commaund any thing, so as is necessarie for all magistrats, as we shall hereafter declare. And as for that that some will say, That the priuie councell may disanull and reuerse the iudgements and decrees of the magistrats and soueraigne courts: and so conclude, that it is not without great authoritie and power: mine answere is, that the decrees of the councell depend not in any thing of the councell it selfe; but of the royall power, and by commission onely, in qualitie of extraordinarie iudges for the execution of iustice, besides that the commission and authoritie of the priuie councell is alwayes ioyned with the person of the king. And therefore we see in a Monarchie all the decrees of the priuie councell to carrie these words with them, By the king in his priuie councell: which can do nothing if the king bee not present or at leastwise confirme the acts of his councell. But wee have before shewed the power of all magistrats and corporations to cease, and bee suspended in the presence of the prince. Now if the power of the Senat be nothing in the absence of the prince, and much lesse in his presence, where then is the Senats power? And if the Senat cannot of it selfe decide and determine a controuersie; how can it then dispose of such things as belong unto the state of the Commonweale? and that is it wherfore we see such things as are decreed upon by the Senat, to be still referred unto the prince: or if they bee of lesse importance, yet to be still confirmed with the princes authoritie, hand, and seale. Which is no new matter, but of auntient time done. For we see an old charter making mention of one Endobalde, countie of the Pallace of king Clotoire, who sitting in councell with the Senat, was to report the decrees thereof unto the king, to the end to

have them by him either approued or reiected.

But the doubt is greater, whether the Senat in a Popular or Aristocratique estate[*](Whether the Senat in a popular or Aristocratique estate ought to have more power then in a Monarchie.) ought to haue more power than in a Monarthie, or not? considering the great difference there is betwixt one lord and many, or betwixt one prince the soueraigne commaunder of his people; and an infinit number of men; as in a Popular estate. Besides that, we read also, that in the Roman Commonweale (which is holden to haue beene one of the most flourishing and best ordered that euer was) the Senat had power to dispose of the common treasure, and publike reuenue (one of the greatest points of soueraigntie) to appoint lieutenants and gouernours of princes, to grant triumphs, and to dispose of religion. And for this cause Tertullian saith, That neuer any God was receiued in Rome, without the decree of the Senat. And as for ambassadours of kings and people, none but the Senat receiued and dismissed them. And that which more is, it was forbidden upon paine of treason, to present any request unto the people, without the aduise of the Senat before had, as we have before declared. Which was not onely in Rome obserued, but also in all the Graecian Commonweales. For offending wherin Thrasibulus was in Athens accused of treason, as was afterwards also Androtian by[*](What power the Senat or counsel ought to have in a popular or Aristocratique estate.) Demosthenes. Which order is euen at this time better obserued and kept at Venice, than euer it was in Rome or Greece. And yet notwithstanding all this I say, that the Senat of the Popular or Aristocratique estates ought not to have but the aduise and consultation of matters of state onely, the power still depending of them, which had the soueraigntie. And as for that which is said of the power of the Roman Senat, that which it had, was nothing else but dignitie, authoritie, councel, and not power: for that[*](That the Senat of Rome had no power to commaund in matters of state.) the people of Rome might when it saw good confirme o--- repeale the decrees of the Senat, which had no power to commaund, and much lesse to execute the decrees therof; Dionysius Halycarnassaeus hath well noted, and Liuie himselfe oft times vsing this forme of speech, Senatus decreuit, populus iussit, The Senat decreed, and the people commanded. Wherein Festus Pompeius is deceiued, interpreting the word iussit, commaunded, for decreuit, or decreed. So that it belonged to the Senat to decree, and to the people to commaund. As when Liuie speaking of the authoritie of Scipio Africanus, saith, Nutus eius pro decretis patrum, pro populi iussis esse, His beck was in stead of the Senators decrees, and the peoples commaunds. And that the least Tribune of the people, opposing himselfe against the Senat, might stay all the decrees thereof. I have here before noted certaine places out of Titus Liuius: whereby it euidently appeareth, that the Senat could in nothing commaund: and especiall by the decree where it is said, That the Consull if he should thinke it so good, should present the request unto the people, for the making of a dictator: and if it pleased not the Consull, then the Praetor of the citie should take that charge upon him: who if he would therin do nothing, that then one of the Tribunes should do it. The Consuls (saith Liuie) would therein doe nothing, and forbad the Praetor also to obey the Senat: Now had the Senat had so much power to commaund, as had the Consull, or one of the Tribunes of the people, it would neuer have used such kind of speech; neither would the Consul have forbidden the Praetor to obey the Senat. For indeed the Senat could not commaund the Praetors, but used these or like words, If it should so seeme unto them good; or if so it were their pleasure. So the same man in another place saith, Decreuerunt patres vt Marcus Iunius Praetor vrbanus si ei videretur, Decemuiros agro Samniti, Appuloque, quoad eius publicum erat metiendo, deuidendoque crearet, The Senators decreed, that Marcus Iunius, Praetor of the citie, if he should thinke it so good, should appoint ten men for the measuring and diuiding of so much of the Samnite and Appulian land, as belonged to the Commonweale.

Now if any man should say that these words, Si ei videretur (if it should so seeme unto him good) imported a commaund: the contrarie is proued in that, that Liuie speaking of the punishment of the Campanians, saith, That the Consull Fuluius hauing red the decree of the Senat which caried these words: Integram rem ad Senatum reijceret si ei videretur: interpretatum esse, quid magis è Republica duceret, aestimationem sibi permissam: That he should, if he thought it so good, referre the whole matter unto the Senat: to have so interpreted the decree, as if the matter had beene committed to his discretion, to deeme what he should think best and most expedient therein to doe for the Commonweale: at which time question was of the lives and goods of all the Campanians, part of whom the Consull of himselfe without farther authoritie from the Senat caused to be put to death, and the rest to be sold by the drume. But that the dignitie of the Magistrats was in the Roman Commonweale greater than the Senats, it appeareth by that, that such as writ letters unto the Senat and people of Rome,[*](The dignitie of the great magistrats in the Romaine Commonweale greater then the dignitie▪ of the Senat.) if they therein comprehended the Magistrats also, they still placed them in order before the Senat; as is manifest by the inscription of their letters, in this sort; Cn. Plancus Imp. Cos. desig. S. P. D. Coss. Pret. Tribb. pleb. Senatui, Populo, plebiquè Romano: Cn. Plancus Generall, Consull elect, unto the Consuls, Pretors, Tribunes of the people, the Senat, People, and Comminaltie of Rome sendeth greeting. Wherefore Cicero doth but orator like taunt Vatinius, when he saith, Art not thou a most certein murtherer of thy countrey? thou leftest not unto the Senat, that which neuer man tooke from it; that Legates should be appointed by the authoritie of that order. And he in * Liuie [*](ib. 28.) when as he speaketh of Triumphes, saying, It was neuer before by the people determined of triumphes, the estimation and bestowing of that honour hauing alwayes beene with the Senat: no not the kings themselves to have impaired the maiestie of that order: he speaketh (I say) but like an orator: for that there was nothing which might not be taken from the Senat, the magistrat propounding a request to the contratie unto the people: as we have by examples before declared. But how soeuer the Senat for the maintenance of the authoritie thereof made decrees, yet could it not commaund or put in execution any of those things that were by it decreed: neither had it so much as any Lictors or Sergeants, the true markes of them which have power to commaund. But the Magistrats hauing the decrees of the Senat in their hand, directed their owne mandats and commissions for the execution thereof, if they thought it so good: assuring themselves to be out of blame in doing that the Senat had before decreed, it being alwaies readie to maintaine them in so doing: So the Senat being no way able to restraine Caesar, tooke their refuge to that auntient decree of the Senat, which was commonly made but in the dangerous times of the Commonweale, viz. Videant Consules ac caeteri Magistratus ne quid detrimenti capiat Respublica: Let the Consuls and other magistrats foresee that the Commonweale take no harme: with which decree of the Senat (saith Caesar) the Consuls armed, sodenly raised their power and took up armes against Caesar: by which words it appeareth, authoritie to have beene in the Senat, but the chiefe commaund in the Magistrats. But if any Tribune[*](The great power in the Tribunes of Rome.) of the people once opposed himselfe against the decree of the Senat, not onely the authoritie of the Senat, but of the Consuls and other magistrats also ceased. And for that cause there were ordinarily some of the Tribunes at the gate of the Senat, (before that the law Atinia gaue them entrance into the Senat house) unto whom the decrees of the Senat were brought and showed, for them to confirme by writing over them this letter T, or reiect by putting thereunto this word Veto, that is to say, I forbid it. So that the Senat did nothing but by sufferance of the people, or of the Tribunes, who were as it were espials of the Senat, and keepers of the libertie of the people, hauing alwaies free power to take exception to whatsoeuer was decreed, if the people by expresse law tooke it not from them, permitting the whole disciding of the matter propounded, unto the Senat, without the interruption of the Tribunes. As it did at the request of Tiberius Graccus Tribune of the people, giuing leaue unto the Senat for that yeare to dispose of the Consularie prouinces, with expresse prohibition unto the Tribunes for the opposing of themselves, for that time onely. For after that time the people oft times gaue the prouinces and governments, without the aduise or authoritie of the Senat. Now to say that the Senat had the disposing of the common treasure, true it is, but that was but upon sufferance, and so long as it pleased the people; as we may see by the law Sempronia, whereby the people decreed that the souldiours should be apparelled of the charge of the common treasure. And he that hath no power but by sufferance, and by way of intreatie hath no power at all, as we have before said. So in like case we see the Auogadours or Triumuiri in the Venetian state often times to oppose themselves, not onely against the proceedings of the Sages and Decemuiri, but euen of the Senat also, and so cause the matter to be brought unto the hearing of the graund Counsell.

But here againe a man may say, that if the Senat in bodie or lawfull assemblie had[*](What an authoritie was among the Romans.) no power to command, there was then no difference betwixt the decrees of the Senat, and that which they call The authoritie: for so it was that if there were lesse then foure hundred Senatours, by the decree of Augustus, (who were afterward brought to the number of fiftie) that they agreed upon, was called an Authoritie, but not a Decree of the Senat. As also we may see by the law Cornelia, published at the request of a Tribune of the people: whereby it was forbidden the Senat any more to graunt priuileges or dispensations, except there were two hundred Senatours at the least present. Whereby it is to be gathered, that the Senat in such number had power to commaund: whereunto I say that a decree in the nature of it selfe carrieth with it no commaund, no more then the sentence of the judge, if the commission be not on foor. Now the Senat neuer iudged or determined, neither could giue out any commission or mandate; and therefore neuer had the power to commaund their decrees to be put in execution, without the power and authoritie of the magistrats still being of none effect. And yet whatsoeuer decree the Senat had made, and were it neuer so well by the power of the magistrat confirmed; was but annuall as Dionysius Halicarnasseus hath well written; and not perpetuall as Conan supposeth.

But how then (might some man say) did the Senat cause three hundred souldiours citisens of Rome, which remayned of the Legion that had sacked Rhegium in Sicilie where they were left in garrison, to be led away, and being stript and beaten, to be all afterward beheaded before the people, without any regard had unto the opposition of the Tribunes, or appeales of the condemned, most miserably crying out, the sacred lawes to be therein broken and troden vnder foot. But herein question was of militarie discipline, which in that respect hath nothing common with domesticall lawes and[*](Martiall discipline respecteth not the common or domesticall lawes.) customes. Beside that it was done but by the aduise of the Senat, the execution thereof being performed by the magistrats, who were not bound to obey the Senat, if they had not beene thereunto willing. Yea moreover such was the crueltie and horriblenes of the villanie by the garrison souldiours committed at Rhegium, who themselves most cruelly rifled the citie, which they ought with their blood to have defended against the assaults of the enemie: as that it caused all the ordinarie power of the lawes to cease: no punishment being thought sufficient to revenge the same. Which cases when they chaunced, the tittles and querks of lawes were little at all regarded, especially in the midest of such a noise of weapons. But as oft as the Senat or Consuls

attempted to infringe the soueraigntie of the people, or to breake the laws, as oft times they did the Tribunes, were straight waies readie to oppose themselves against them. For in that Caius Cornelius Tribune of the people, made a request unto the people, that the Senat from that time forward, should not decree any thing against the libertie of the people, and the maiestie thereof: it sufficiently declareth the Senat oft times before contrarie vnto the law, to have vsurped the rights of soueraigntie: howbeit therein is not to be respected what was done, but what of right ought to have bene done. Howbeit it is manifest, that the Senat in the latter times thereof had power to make lawes: but then it had left off to be a Senat, and was then become rather an ordinarie court of judges. And yet the magistrats themselves, as the Praetors, the Aediles, yea and the famous lawyers also made a great part of the Roman law, albeit that they had no power to commaund at all: but all this dependeth fo the good liking of the prince or people, without whose authoritie and commaund, the force of the law, edict, or decree made, was nothing. Seeing then that the Senat in a Popular estate hath no ordinarie power to commaund, nor to do any thing but by sufferance; much lesse power shall it have in an Aristocratique estate, or in a Monarchie: and so much the lesse in a Monarchie by how much kings are more ielouse of their estates, than are the people, and better know than they, how to defend their owne soueraigntie.

But whereas we said, It was not lawfull without the priuitie of the Senat, to propound any request unto people, that indeed was so prouided by the law Popilia and Hortensia: yet was it lawfull alwaies without the priuitie of the Senat, to propound requests unto the Comminaltie: and although that by the Consularie law Cornelia, it was also forbidden without the priuitie of the Senat, to propunnd any request unto the Comminaltie, yet was that law shortly after againe by the law Pompeia repealed and abrogated. Wherein many with great libertie abuse the words Populi ac Plebis Romanae, (the People and Comminaltie of Rome) and especially the Greekes, and such as ignorant of the Roman antiquitie, interpret the Greeke writers.

That is also worth the noting, that albeit that the request which the magistrats were about to propound unto the people, were disliked of the Senat, yet might they neuerthelesse lawfully moue the same unto the people, after they had once made the Senat acquainted therewith. The same may serue also for an aunswere to that which Iosephus the historiographer saith, That Moyses forbad the king to denie any thing concerning the publike, without the aduise of the Senat, and the high priest (howbeit that this article is not to be found in all the law) yet thereof it followeth not, that the king was thereby of necessitie bound to follow their aduise. For albeit that the Roman emperours terme themselves the principall Senators, or chiefe of their councell; yet[*](Why the Romain emperours somtime called the Senators their companions, or good lords.) such additions in nothing diminished their maiestie. Yea albeit that they called the Senators their companions, or good lords and maisters; as did Tiberius, who in the beginning of his raigne called the Senators, Indulgentissimos dominos, His most louing Lords, as we read in Tacitus. But how much princes gaue unto the Senat, and the Senat unto princes, Plinie the younger doth in two words (as it were) declare; where hee thus speaketh of a certaine decree of the Senat, Voluntati tamen principis sui, cui in nulla re fas putaret repugnare, in hac quoque re obsequi, but to obey the will of their prince, whereunto they thought it not lawfull in any thing to resist, euen so in this this thing also to show themselves obedient.

And further also, the Senators or Councellors of the estate, to speake properly are no where accounted either as officers or commissioners: neither in [*](Viz Fraunce. Senators neither officers nor commissioners.) this realme are they by any law, or edict, or charter of the kings made councellors, but only by a short briefe without any seale, signed with the kings hand, expressing in few words, that the

king during his pleasure giueth them place and deliberatiue voice in his councell. But the king being dead, they must have another such briefe for the holding of their places, except such as for their calling, or the charge they have in the Commonweale, have accesse and entrance into the councell.

Now if any man aske, Why a Senat in a well ordered Commonweale, should not[*](For what reason a Senat in a well ordered Commonweal should not have also power to commaund.) have also power to commaund? The principall reason is, for that if it should have power to commaund also what it had in councell decreed, the soueraigntie should rest only in the councell: and so the councellors of the estate, in stead of councellors should ther of become maisters, hauing the mannaging of the affaires, and power to dispose of all at their pleasure; a thing impossible to be done, without the impairing, or to say better the vtter subuersion of all soueraigntie and maiestie: which is so high and so sacred, as that it belongeth not vnto subiects, of what estate or condition soeuer, once to touch it either nie, or a farre off. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, them that giue commaund unto a Senat, to go about the destruction of the Commonweale, and vtter ruine of the state. And for this cause the Great Councell of Venice (wherein the maiestie of their state consisteth) seeing the Decemuiri to take upon them aboue that which was committed to their charge, forbad them upon pain of high treason to commaund or determine of any thing concerning the state, nor so much as to write their definitiue letters; but to have therein recourse unto the Seignorie, vntill the Grand Councel were assembled. For which selfe same reason, and that moe of the citisens also might be partakers of that honour, hey have decred, That the six councellors of estate, assistants unto the duke, shall not be but two moneths in that so honourable a charge: to the end that the custome to commaund should not breed in them a desire still to continue the same,[*](That the Senato counsell of estate ought to be perpetual, and not every yeare chaunged: with the daungers that ensue of such yearely chaunge) as also to aspire higher. Howbeit I am not of opinion so to have the councellours of estate changed and rechanged; but rather to have them perpetuall, as they were of antient time at Rome, Lacedemonia and Pharsalia, and yet are in Polonia and Geneua. For the yearely chaunging which they made in Athens, and yet make in Venice, Rhagusium, Luques, Genes, Nuremberg, and diuers other townes of Germanie, doth not onely greatly obscure the glorie of the Senat, which ought to shine as the sunne, but also draweth after it the ineuitable daunger of disclosing and publishing of the secrets of the estate: ioining hereunto also, That the Senat, all new, cannot bee enformed of affaires passed, neither yet well continue the entertainment of the affaires present. Which for that it seemed unto the Florentines a thing verie daungerous, they at the request of Peter Soderin their Gonfalonier (and a chiefe man in the reforming of their estate) decreed, That all the Senat of fourescore, should from six moneths to six moneths bee remoued; excepting such as had before bene Gonfaloniers or chiefe officers in the Commonweale, whome they appointed perpetuall Senators, of purpose to instruct the other new Senators in the affaires of state. The same order they of Genes are faine also to take in their mutable common Senat, wherein such as have bene dukes and Syndics are perpetuall Senators. Wherein the Rhagusians are better prouided of their Senat than are the Venetians, whose example they seeme to have followed in the forming of their Commonweale: For in Venice the Senat changeth every yeare all at once: but in Rhaguse the Senators which are also but one yeare in charge, change still one after another, and not all in one yeare. But if the desire of honour bee so great, as that the citisens cannot otherwise be satisfied, except they all by turnes may have place in the Senat, we must then imitat that which Solon did; who in the Popular estate of the Athenians by him framed, appointed a mutable▪ Senat of foure hundred citisens every yeare to be changed: but withall hee made a perpetuall priuie Councell of the Areopagits, to the intent, that that mutable Senat, and yearely change of all the other

magistrats might thereupon rest, as upon a most firme and sure stay. And thus hauing spoken of a Senat, order requireth that we should also speake of the Officers and Commissioners in a Commonweale.