The six books of a common-weale

AS in the whole bodie of the law concerning Commonweales, are contained many things right fruitfull and commodious: so also amongst the rest, the reasoning and discourse concerning publike persons, hath alwayes bene thought most profitable: and albeit that many things concerning magistrats are thought common and vsuall, yet lie the same for most part almost wrapped up in obscuritie: For that they which have thereof reasoned, do therein define nothing plainely. Wherefore I haue thought it best to begin this our discourse of their definitions. An Officer therefore is a publike person, who hath an ordinarie[*](What an Officer is? what a Commissioner is?) charge by law limitted unto him. A Commissioner is a publike person, but with an extraordinarie charge limited unto him, without law, by vertue of commissionely. Which definitions so by vs set downe that they may become more plaine, it shall not be amisse to make a diuision of publike persons, euen from the first beginning of them. And first I call them publike persons, who are to attend upon the publike affaires: [*](A publique person who? Two sorts of publique persons.) of whome there are two sorts, one which hath power to commaund, whome they call Magistrats: and another sort which hath no such commaunding power, but is onely to vnderstand or to put in execution the commaundements of the others; and are yet all publike persons also. Howbeit for all that, all publike persons are not Officers, or Commissioners; as Archbishops, Bishops, and Ministers, are publike persons, and beneficed men rather than Officers: which we must not mingle together, considering that the one sort is established for matters diuine, and the other for worldly affaires, which ought not to be confounded. Ioyning hereunto also, that the establishing of them which are employed in diuine matters, dependeth not of the politique edicts or lawes, as the Officers do. Let vs then see the definitions by vs set downe, whether they be good or no, before we enter into the deuision of Officers, for that no man, either lawyer, or of them which have before entreated of the state of Commonweales, hath truely told what an Officer, a Commissioner, or a Magistrat is: which for all that is a thing most necessarie to be vnderstood, seeing that the Officer is one of the most principall parts of a Commonweale, which cannot stand without Officers and Commissioners. But forasmuch as Commonweales were first serued by Commissioners, before they were serued by Magistrats or Officers (as wee will hereafter show) it is fit that we should first speake of Commissioners, and of the difference betwixt them and the Magistrats or Officers.

Aristotle saith, That a Magistrat is he that hath a deliberatiue voice in the Senat,[*](Aristotle his definition of a Magistrat impugned.) and in iudgement, with power also to commaund. He also calleth the magistrat --- which is not proper but to them which are of power to commaund, and agreeth not unto officers that serue, as Vshers, Sergeants, Trumpetors, Scribes and Notaries, whom he putteth into the ranke of Magistrats, and yet have no power to commaund: so that this definition is in that respect too short. Besides that, it is a thing more absurd, that he should not be a Magistrat, which hath no entrance into the priuie councell, neither yet deliberatiue voyce, nor power to iudge: for if it were so, there should be but few magistrats in all Commonweales, considering that there are so few conncellors of the priuie

councell in well ordered Commonweales, and among them not one which hath deliberatiue voice, but by commission: and albeit that they had such voice, yet had they no commaund, as we have before declared.

And as for the lawyers, there be but few of them which have touched this string:[*](The lawiers definitions of magistrats censured.) and namely doctor Iouean confesseth, That it alwaies seemed unto him an hard thing, rightly to define a Magistrat. And indeed in the definition of a Magistrat by him made he is deceiued: For he saith, That a Magistrat is he to whome the prince hath giuen any charge▪ in which sence and sort all Commissioners should be magistrats. But D. Cuiacius▪ beside the definition of Aristotle, promiseth to bring three others: A Magistrat (saith he) is a publike person, who hath preheminence in doing of iustice; or hee which sitteth in seate of iustice; or else he which hath iurisdiction and publike iudgement: so that by his account he appointeth foure definitions, with that of Aristotle. Which is directly against the Maximes of all Philosophie, and contrarie to the principles of Logike, that one should giue more than one definition to one thing: and is also impossible by nature. But if any say, That many descriptious may be giuen of one and the same thing, for that the accidents are manie which are in one thing: true it is, but an hundred descriptions cannot declare and make manifest the substance or nature of a thing: Which in the Art of reasoning is a great fault: but in the knowledge of the law much greater, and especially in the matter of Magistrats and officers, which is the entrance of the law, where the lawyers begin. For the principall marke[*](The principall marke whereby a magistrate is knowne.) whereby a Magistrat is knowne, which is, To have power to commaund; is in these three definitions wanting: and the magistrats lieutenants have the hearing of causes, are presidents in iudgement, and sit in the seat of iustice, and yet for all that are no magistrats at all. The bishops also sit in publike iudgement, and seat of iustice, and have the hearing of causes: For when Lentulus the Great Bishop, made relation unto the Senat, of the decrees of the colledge of Bishops, and the law Clodia, concerning the consecration[*](The auntient bishops in Rom no magistrats▪ and why.) of Ciceroes house, thus he began his speech, Pontifices religionis sunt iudices, legis Senatus, The Bishops (said he) are judges of religion, and the Senat of law. So doe the Cadies, or Mahometane Bishops in the East; and yet for all that they are no magistrats, considering that they had or have no power to commaund, nor to call men before them, to imprison them, or to put their owne iudgements in execution: neither have they any sergeant or officer whome they can commaund, no more than have the Cadies, or Paracadies in Turkie, or the auntient bishops of Rome; which is a thing worth the marking. And sometimes cleane contrarie, some have authoritie and power to commaund, which have no iurisdiction or hearing of the cause at all, as wee will hereafter shortly show. And that more is, the Commissioners of publike extraordinarie causes, in antient time deputed by the people of Rome, whom the law calleth quaestores parricidij, had (as at this present Commissioners appointed by the prince haue) power to heare the cause, to sit in iustice, to iudge, to commaund, to compell, and yet for all that were no magistrats. Which being so, none of the aforesaid definitions can bee good. Besides that there is another fault in them, for not hauing distinguished the magistrats from the other officers, nor made any difference betwixt an officer, & a commissioner; whereof a great confusion and medley of commissioners and officers must needs ensue. Carolus Sigonius, who seemeth more curiously to haue searched into the definition of a Magistrat, is yet therein many waies also deceiued: For he calleth all them magistrats which have any publike charge of worldly affaires, without making of any difference betweene officers and commissioners, or betwixt the magistrats and other officers, which have also publike charge; besides that he giueth power to al magistrats, to iudge, to commaund, and to put in execution, euen unto the Aruspises. Howbeit as a definition

ought not to extend farther, or lesse way, than doth the thing that is defined: so ought also the description of a magistrat in this our treatise of a Commonweale, to agree to all magistrats of all Commonweales indifferently.

Now in the definition by our selues proposed, we first said, all officers (whither they[*](The difference be twixt magistrats and priuat men, as also betwixt magistrates and commissioners.) were magistrats, or magistrats seruants) to be publique persons: who in that differ from priuat men: for that priuat men have nothing to doe with the affaires of the Common weale. We said also the Magistrats to have an ordinarie charge, whereby to differ from Commissioners, who have also publique charge, but yet extraordinarie, according to the occasions in the occurents of time presented: such as were in auntient time the Dictators, criminall Quaestors, and other judges extraordinarily by the people of Rome appointed, at the motion and request of the Magistrats. And last of all we [*](Offices not to be erected, but by expresse edict, or lawe.) said, their ordinarie charge to be to them by law limitted and bounded: for the erection of their publique ordinarie charges, erected by the name of offices, which otherwise should be no offices, if there were not for them an expresse edict or law. A thing alwaies obserued in the auntient Commonweales both of the Greeks and Latins; and now also better than euer: and to this end Princes cause their edicts to be published, in their soueraigne and inferiour courts: and in this realme of Fraunce, the charters of offices newly erected are sealed with greene wax, with labels of greene and red silke, and this style, viz. To all men present and to come, with a continuance perpetuall: whereas the letters pattents of commissions, are sealed with yellow wax, with a labell of plaine parchment, without any perpetuitie. And albeit that all Corporations and Colleges be graunted by the prince with a charge by law limitted for euer, as I haue said; yet so it is, that if the king will augment or increase the number of the corporation or colleges of judges, or other magistrats, yea or of the most base or vile officers: as of Sergeants, criers, trumpetours, land measurers, broakers, and such like, it must be done by publique edict, verified and inrolled: of examples whereof all the records of the courts of justice are full. But whereas we said the lawes concerning officers to be perpetuall,[*](Offices to be perpetuall although that the officers oftentimes chaunge.) that is to be vnderstood of the perpetuitie of the offices, which continue for euer after they be once by edict erected, (what time soeuer it be that is prescribed unto the officers themselves,) vntill that by contrarie edicts or lawes the same offices be againe put downe. Although the officer hold his place but for the space of eighteene moneths, as did of long the Censors their censorship, (which for al--- that was at length prorogued for five yeares, for that so great an office could not in lesse time well be discharged,) or for a yeare: as did all the other offices in Rome, by the law Villia: or for six moneths, as did the Senators of Florence, after it was a popular estate: or for two moneths, as did the six Counsellours of the seignorie which are assistant unto the duke of Venice: or for one day onely, as the Captaines of the two fortresses of the castle of Rhaguse,[*](Lawes neuer awhit the stronger for being written) whose office is perpetuall, albeit that their commaund last but for one day. But howsoever it be that offices be erected with ordinarie and publique charge, it must still be done by law: not for that it is needfull to have parchment to write it in, or greene waxe to seale it with, or yet magistrats to publish the edicts concerning the erection of such offices: for the writing, the seale, the verification, albeit that they giue credit unto the lawes which are made, yet make they no lawes; no more than they doe other acts and contracts. But to the contrarie there were neuer lawes more strong or better kept, than those of the Lacedemonians, which Lycurgus forbad to be written, and were for that cause called Rhetes: for so he was persuaded that they should the rather remaine inuiolat and of long continuance, if they were once writ in the hearts of his citisens, and not in tables, in their mindes, and not in bookes. The Athenians in like case had a certeine forme of presenting their requests unto the people, which if the people receiued,

it then passed into the force of a law: which they used to ingraue in brasse, and to fasten it unto a pillar, lest any man should under the colour of ignorance excuse him selfe in transgressing the same. So when question was for the erecting of an hundred new Senators in Athens out of the two new Tribes of Antigonus and Demetrius, the law for the erection of them was published unto the people: which was also done in the erection of all other offices as is to be seene in Thucydides, Plutarch, and Demosthenes. [*](Al offices in Rome erected by one or other expresse lawe.) The like is to be said of the Roman magistrats: for the Consuls were created by the law Iunia: and the Tribunes of the people by the law Duillia: and when question was for the creating of one of the Consuls out of the people, it was done by the law Licinia. And afterward the Praetor for the administration of justice in the citie was made by the law Sextia. And the foure Praetors for publique criminall causes, (beside the other before erected) by the lawes Cornelia and Baebia. So may we also see of all the other Magistrats erected by the Emperours: that it was alwaies done by expresse Edict, wherein the time, the place, and their ordinarie charge are limitted. As in all the first & twelft bookes of the Code, and in the Edicts of Iustinian it appeareth where every magistrat hath his particular Edict.

We have put also into our definition of an Officer, that he must have an ordinarie[*](An officer alwaies hath an ordinary charge, and in that he differeth from commissioner whose charge is alwaies extraordinarie.) charge, for that the commaunds of the people of Rome granted by commissions and extraordinarie charges were aswell called by the name of Lawes, as were those that were made for ordinarie offices: the charge, the time, and place being still limitted by commission: as a man may see by the commissions granted unto the Dictators, which were sometime made by the decree of the people, as I have before shewed. And also by the commission granted to Pompee for five yeares, therein to end the Pirats warre: with commaund over all the coasts and hauen townes of the Mediterranean Sea, all granted vnto him by the law Gabinia. As also by commission giuen him for the warre against king Mithridates, granted by the law Manilia. But forasmuch as these were not but extraordinarie charges, a man could not call them offices, which are still ordinarie and perpetuall. And for because those warres were in short time to be ended, it was not meete therfore to create a new magistrat, whose office and charge should be perpetuall, but onely extraordinarily to commit the care of that warre unto a most sufficient Captaine and Generall: unto whom fiue yeares time was limitted at the request of Catulus: to the intent that Pompee in that time might end the warre, and not longer to protract it to be so alwaies in imployment: Or if the warre were sooner ended, that then his commission should end also. And all such extraordinary charges we call by the name of Commission. The Dictatorship was also a charge giuen by commission, and not an ordinarie power: for why, the Dictator was not but extraordinarily and without law nominated by the Interrex or Consul, some great matter so requiring: and for that all offices ceased the Dictator being created, his commission was limitted but unto six moneths at the most, and if he had soner dispatched the businesse for which he was appointed Dictator, his commission then also expired, and his authoritie ceased; as we have by many examples before declared. And as a man may see by [*](Liui lib..) Aemilius Mamercus, who chosen Dictator, and the same day hauing dispatched the businesse for which he was chosen, the verie next day following gaue up his charge: showing therein how little he liked of long rule or authoritie. Howbeit such is the nature and power of all Commissions, as that according to the pleasure of[*](Commissions to depend of the pleasure of him or them that have the soueraigntie in the state.) him that hath the soueraigntie, they may be either reuoked or proroged. And albeit that commissions in Popular and Aristocratique Commonweales are almost still li mitted unto a certaine time: yet in a Monarchie that extraordinarie and permissiue charge is tyed to no time at all: for why, in Popular and Aristocratique estates and

governments, the greater the charge is giuen by commission, the more need it is to have it in short time expired; least longer power might giue occasion to ambitious[*](The greater the charge is that is giuen by com mission the shorter time it ought to endure.) minds to take unto themselves the government, and so to oppresse the libertie of the state. And therefore the dictatorship was but for six moneths, neither was that power euer longer proroged to any man in that free Commonweale, except to Furius Camillus. For at such time as the people of Rome had extraordinarily created the Decemuiri with a yearely and soueraigne power, for the reforming of their old lawes and customes, and the making of new and more commodious for the state: their commission[*](Large and long commissions daungerous to the state.) which should not haue passed, a yeare being expired, was againe by the people for another yere proroged, with absolute and soueraigne power: and all other magistrats suspended during the time of their commission; vntil that out of the best lawes of other cities they had gathered the lawes of the twelue tables. upon which continuance of bearing rule, these Decemuiri tooke occasion to oppresse the libertie of the state, and to take upon themselves the soueraigntie, had it not by force againe bene wrong out of their hands, and that no without the great trouble and turmoile of the citie. For which cause the people from thenceforth erected the offices of the Tribunes of the people, as defendors and keepers of their libertie; who alone of all the magistrats held their places after the creation of the dictator, all other magistrats and officers being for that time suspended. The Florentines did otherwise, who almost euerie sixt yeare extraordinarily created eight or ten Commissioners, with soueraigne power, and without limitation of time, for the ordering of their Commonweale, and the reforming of the abuses therein: who being once created, all other their magistrats ceased. By which meane these ambitious in effect tooke upon themselves the government, albeit that in outward appearance they made faire show of the giuing up of their charge. For the suspending of all magistrats in generall, is a thing right dangerous, not onely in Popular and Aristocratike estates, but euen in a Monarchie also: which yet I neuer knew to have happened in this kingdome of Fraunce, but at such time as king Iohn was taken prisoner by the Englishmen: For then Charles the fift hauing gotten of his father the government of the kingdome, appointed fiftie commissioners for the reforming of the Commonweale, with power to examine the doings and abuses of all the other magistrats, from whome as then all power was taken. At which time the Commonweale destitute of gouernours, was by the seditious wonderfully disturbed: but more of these things in their place.

But the better and the more easily to vnderstand the difference betwixt an office and[*](The difference betwixt an office and a commission.) a commission, a man may in some sort say, that an office is a thing borrowed, which the owner cannot demaund againe before the time it was lent for bee expired: but a commission is a thing which one hath but by sufference, end as it were by leaue, which the owner may againe demaund when he seeth good. And that is it for which Tacitus merily speaking of the raigne of Galba, which continued but three moneths, saith, Praecarium seni imperium, & breui transiturum, The old mans empire was but by sufference and in short time to passe away: not for that he had indeed his empire by sufferance, but for that he was now growne extreame old, and being vnfit for the government of the empire, foresaw that in short time it must againe by naturall death bee taken from him, although he had not (as indeed he was) bene before slaine. Howbeit a Commission is of such nature, as that it expireth so soone as the charge thereof is executed, although it be not reuoked, or that the time was graunted longer for the execution therof, and yet neuerthelesse may be alwaies reuoked, whensoeuer it shall please him that graunted it, whether the matter for which it was graunted be yet entire or not, as wee have before showed by the example of the Dictators. And to this purpose there is an

old deeree of parliament yet extant in the records of the court of Paris, against the purseuants sent to Troy with the judges for the publike extraordinary causes, being indeed none of the bodie of the court, who (the commission expired) neuerthelesse yet bearing themselves as purseuants, were by the court commaunded to resigne up their office, and a decree made them to be no officers at all.

I stand longer upon this point, which although it may seeme easie unto men of experience, yet unto others it may seeme strange: yea two of the greatest orators of their time, namely Demosthenes and Aeschines grounded the state of their orations and pleas upon this point. For when Ctesiphon had presented a request unto the people, That it would please them, that Demosthenes for his good deserts towards the Commonweale (and namely for hauing most strongly fortified the walles and castles of the citie of Athens) might in the open theater be rewarded with a crowne of gold. Aeschines Demosthenes his greatest enemie, opposed himselfe against the entertainment of the request, alleaging for the cause thereof, That by the law no man was to be rewarded, except he had first giuen an account unto the people of his office well discharged, as all magistrats were bound to do. Demosthenes for that it concerned his owne honour and reputation, taking the matter in hand, made of all others a most excellent oration for Ctesiphon, or more truely to say, for the crowne he would have had, alleaging, That the law spake not but of Magistrats; and that charge of repairing and fortifying of the wals and other fortresses, was no magistracie or office, but onely a simple commission; and therefore in his vulgar tongue saith, ---. [*](To fortifie is no magistracie but a certaine charg and ministrie.) Which the Latines properly called Curatio, which is to say a Commission. Wherby it appeareth, that publike charge, for repairing of the walles, not to have bene an ordinarie matter, but extraordinarie, for that there is not still need for to repaire them. Neither ought it to seeme strange, if Demosthenes well knew to distinguish and put a difference betwixt a commission and an office (as hauing bene of long time exercised in the publike affaires, and as it were in the middest of the Commonweale) both which Aristotle altogether confounded. The one of them also hauing alwaies mannaged the affaires of state; and the other as saith Laertius, neuer intermedling therein. And that is it for which Nicholaus Grouchius, and Carolus Sigonius, for not hauing vnderstood the difference betwixt an office and a commission, have so much troubled themselves with replies and reioynders, without any resolution at all, as men ignorant in the knowledge of matters of law and of state. All which shall I hope be well manifested, by that which shall be set downe in this booke.

In the laws of Charlemaigne Commissioners were called missi, a mittendo; which signifieth sent; which the Germans call by an old word Skaken: whereof they called the court of judges, which were extraordinarily sent into the prouinces (& were indeed nothing else but Commissioners) Scacarium. But here perhaps may some man say, That the Commissioners of the castle of Paris, and judges of the court of Requests of the Pallace, are also officers: which being so, how could it then be, that an office and a commission should not be also all one? Whereunto I answere, That of antient time [*](Commissioners turned into iudges, and yet still knowne by the name of commissioners) those judges were but simple commissioners, with authoritie and power during pleawho yet afterwards for the common good and profit were made perpetuall officers, with an ordinarie and perpetuall charge and power committed unto them them: their old and former name of commissioners, yet by abuse or for the honor of that court still remaining: whereby those judges of the court of Requests, are yet called the Commissioners of the Parliament; as judges appointed, and againe to be reuoked at the pleasure of the prince. Which judges of the court of Requests (for all that) cannot now be reuoked by the king himselfe, except they first bee by capitall iudgement

condemned, or willingly of themselves resigne their places: for so it was by the law of Lewes the eleuenth prouided. Not for that commission is incompatible with an office, most part of compassions being not directed but unto magistrats or officers: but for that an officer in the qualitie of an officer, cannot be also a commissioner, for the self same charge limited vnto him by his office. For such commissions as they call Excitatiues, extraordinarily directed unto officers for matters concerning the reuiuing the iurisdiction, or authoritie of their offices, are not properly commissions, if the time or the place be not by the commission altred; as to iudge according to the latter proceedings, and to leaue the former: for after that the time and order appointed by the law, is altered by the authoritie of the prince or magistrat, it is to be now determined by commission. Now the difference herein which the lawyers hold, is nota---le, as▪ That if any officer have iudged of a fact contained in his commission, in the qualitie of an officer, that his iudgement is naught: but yet that is to be vnderstood in a thing which concerneth not his office: For if there bee a concurrence of the commission Excitatiue, with the charge contained in the erection of his office, the ordinarie hearing of the cause is to be preferred before the commission, euen as the qualitie of the officer is to be preferred before the qualitie of the Commissioner; and the acts of the officers more assured than the acts of the Commissioners. And so in such concurrence of authoritie, if the officer commissionat also in a matter belonging to his owne charge, have not declared in what qualitie he had the hearing of the cause: the act by him done shall be taken, as the act of an officer, to the intent it may be the more firme and sure. It is also [*](Extraordinarie commissions extenuating the authoritie of the magistrate odiou.) manifest, extraordinarie commissions extenuating the power and authoritie of magistrats or officers to be odious, or at leastwise lesse gratious, if they bee not for the reforming and amending of the abuses and corruption of the officers. As they do in Venice, from five yeares to five yeares: And euerie yeare in Genes, where the Sindies are afterwards Commissioners, to heare the abuses committed by the magistrats & officers (which in auntient time in Athens was giuen to certaine ordinarie magistrats) as also at Rome by the law Bebia▪ when as before Quaestors or judges were by commission appointed by the people. That extraordinarie hearing of causes of the judges by commission, was also gratious; which Vespasian the emperour appointed for the hearing and determining of suits and controuersies, which in the time of the civill warres were growne infinitly, and for the deciding whereof the whole lives of all the magistrats would haue scarce sufficed. Commissions may also bee graunted for things concerning the greater part of officers, or a whole corporation or colledge, in which and like cases commissions are necessarie. And I remember that king Charles the ninth, hauing directed his letters patents, in the yeare 1570, for the generall reformation of the waters and forrests of Normandie, which drew after it question of the fairest of his demaine; from the hearing whereof the precedent and councellors of the parliament of Roan were forbidden: Which interiection although they left nothing vnattempted to have letted, yet so it was, that in fine they agreed thereunto, after that I had againe and againe presented unto them the kings commaunds, to that effect and purpose, and commenced suit not onely against the principall men of that prouinciall court, about matters concerning my commission, but also against the whole bodie and corporation of the citie of Roan, for the rights which they pretended against the king; and that, that was the cause for which I had obtained the interdiction.

But briefly, and yet more plainely and plentifully to make plaine all sorts of Commissioners, whether they be for the government of prouinces, or for the warres; or[*](Diuers sortes of commissioners, and from whom they have their commissions.) for the administration of iustice, or for the kings receits and treasure, or other things concerning the state. We say, that the commissions come still from the soueraigne

prince, or from the magistrats, or from commissioners deputed by the soueraigne prince; for a fourth there is not. Againe Commissioners deputed, are either taken out of the number of magistrats and officers, or out of other priuat men. And if the commission be directed vnto the magistrats or officers, it is either for matter belonging unto them by their office, or otherwise not belonging unto them. And in what sort soeuer it be that commission be directed, whether it be to an officer, or a particular person, it is directed with power and authoritie to heare and proceed in the cause; either without appeale, or else with appeale reserued unto the soueraigne prince, (if the commission came from him) or unto the magistrats named in the commission; or els a commissioner is appointed by him whome the soueraigne hath deputed: as sometime commission is giuen out for the instruction of the affaires, or proceedings unto the definitiue sentence exclusiuely ro inclusiuely, sauing the execution thereof, if appeale bee made. Sometime also Commissioners are appointed by the magistrars to examine a fact, or the right of a matter, or both the one and the other together; sometimes without any power or commaund, and sometime with both.

This diuision extendeth to all Commissioners, in what forme of Commonweale soeuer it be. As is to be seene in the state of the Romans, where the mannaging of the warres, and government of the countries and prouinces newly conquered, at the first belonged unto the ordinarie magistrats and officers, viz. the Consuls, Praetors, and Quaestors, yea euen a good way from the citie, whilest that the Roman empire was yet[*](The gouernour of the prouinces in the Romaine empire nothing but commissioners) contained within the bounds of Italie: But after that the bounds thereof were extended further, they then began to appoint Commissioners to gouerne their prouinces, in stead of their ordinarie magistrats, who although they were all by one name called Potestates, yet for all that they gouerned the prouinces in stead of Consuls, Praetors, and Quaestors: they were also called Proconsuls, Propraetors, Proquaestors, that is to say, Commissioners, or Lieutenant sent in stead of Consuls, Praetors, or Quaestors: As is in Liuie to be seene, who speaking of Philo the first Proconsull saith, Actum cum Tribunis Plebis est, ad populum ferrent vt cum Philo Consulatu abijsset, pro consule rem gereret, The tribunes of the people were dealt with, that they would moue it unto the people, that when Philo was out of his consulship he might rule as proconsul. But after that the empire was growne great, and also extended farre, such commissions were by the sufferance of the people graunted by the Senat, to such as were lately gone out of their offices in the citie, who agreed among themselves for the government of the prouinces; or if they could not so fall to agreement, cast lots for them, which they called C---mparare inter se, & sortiri: Except the charge and commission were of such consequence and importance (by reason of some great warre alreadie risen, or like to arise in the prouince) as deserued to have some valiant and great captaine without lot thereunto by the Senat appointed: Where if any partaking or factions chanced to arise about the matter, the people at the request of the Tribunes appointed one thereunto by commission. As it did Scipio Africanus, to whome the people gaue commission for the mannaging of the warres in Spaine and Affrike, and by that meanes drew Hannibal out of Italy, and discharged that country of a long and most dangerous war. The like commission was without lot extraordinarilie by the people also granted to Paulus Aemylius, to make warre against Perseus king of Macedon. And so also to the great captaine Pompey against the pirats, by the law Gabinia, and against king Mithridates, by the law Manilia: all they which the yeare before had borne office, beeing reiected, the people naming whome they pleased and best liked. Howbeit that this was no vsuall matter, but right seldome times done: For ordinarily the Consuls, Praetors, and Quaestors discharged, and so going our of their offices in the cities, cast lots for the

prouinces, if they could not otherwise agree for the government of them among themselves: [*](The cause of the ciuil war betwixt illa and Marius.) and for that the charge of the warre against Mithridates by lot fell unto Cor. Sylla, Marius by the working of Pub. Sulpitius, one of the Tribunes by him suborned, caused it to be by the people taken from him; and by extraordinarie commission giuen unto himselfe: which was the cause of the most cruell and bloodie civill warre that euer was in Rome. So also was the prouince extraordinarily appointed unto Cato Vticensis, against Ptolomee king of Cyprus; which by him vndertaken, Clodius boasted, That he had pluckt out Catoes tongue, which had alwaies before beene at libertie to speake against extraordinarie powers and commissions. Sometime also if the horriblenesse of some enormious fact required a more seuere triall, the matter was propounded unto the people, who put it over by commission vnto the Senat; which out of the bodie of it selfe appointed some one or moe, not onely for instructions, but euen to heare and end the matter. As when Lucius Tubullus the Pretor, had with grieuous extortion most filthily polluted the Tribunall seat, and peruerted iustice; so that the people leauing the ordinarie course, and the magistrats to whom the hearing of the matter belonged, referred it wholly vnto the Senat by extraordinarie commission: the Senat forthwith deputed Cn. Scipio to iudge and end the cause. So also when Tiberius the emperor by cōmission appointed the Senat to enquire of the murthers committed betwixt the Nucerians & Neapolitans: the Senat deputed the Consuls to enquire therof. Yea sometime the senat without commission from the people, but as it were by meere soueraignty appointed commissioners, if the case in question were committed in Italy, out of the territorie of the citie of Rome, as a thing belonging to the Senat, apart from all others; as saith Polybius: as it happened in a straunge robberie and murther, wherof Cicero speaketh in his booke De Claris Oratoribus; to the hearing whereof (hee saith) the Senat deputed the Consuls. By which examples here before produced, it appeareth[*](Whether cōmissioners appointed by the prince, or people hauing the soueraigntie, may appoint their Deputies and so commit the matter to others.) that Commissioners appointed by the prince, or people hauing the soueraigntie, whether they be magistrats or priuat men, may appoint their deputies, and so commit the matter to others, if it be not expresly forbidden them by their commission so to doe; or that question be of the estate it selfe in the commission: as the ambassadours or Commissioners which are to entreat of peace, or alliance, or other such like things cannot commit the same to others. As is also to be said if question be of the life, ---ame, or state of any man: wherein the manner and examination for better instructions may be deputed to others, but not the iudgement it selfe, except the judge before appointed by commission excuse his absence by sicknesse or some other lawfull cause. But Iustinian the emperour afterwards ordained better by forme of a perpetuall edict, That Commissioners appointed by the prince, should depute nothing of their commission to others more than the instructions of the suit: neither thought he that sufficient, but decreed also, that the Commissioners appointed by the prince should themselves heare the appeale, and instructions of the suit. But to meet with all that is to be met with, the most sure rule is to have al that is commited, particularly in the commission, expressed, and so the commissioners to be ruled by the commission, as is the manner in all well established Commonweals.

And albeit that a man might make many questions concerning commissions graunted, as well by the soueraigne prince, as by the magistrates, in time both of peace and warre: yet will I thereof touch but two or three, and those most necessarie to bee vnderstood of them which have the managing of the affaires of state, whether it be in peace or warre. Wherefore leauing the rest, and to bee briefe: wee say that the[*](Diuers wai whereby commissioners cease.) commission ceaseth by the death of him that graunted the same, or by his reuoking of the commission: or in case that the commissioner during the time of the commission,

obtaine some office or preferment equall to him that graunted the commission: for then one of them cannot commaund the other. But as for the expresse reuocation[*](Whether the acts of a commissioner done after his commission reuoked, and yet before he had knowledg of the reuocation thereof, be good or not?) declared by the princes letters or edicts, concerneth as well them which are ignorant of such reuocation of their authoritie and commission, as them which know it. And albeit that the acts of a commissioner so reuoked, done after the reuocation of the commission, and yet before the knowledge of such a reuocation to him giuen, hold for good but in regard of particular men, towards whom the commissioner hath executed his commission; and especially, if they haue voluntarily yeelded unto the commissioner, knowing the commission to be alreadie reuoked: and that towards others the acts of the commission after the reuocation of the commission, are of none effect by the rigour of the law, yet equitie and reason bindeth them thereunto, vntill that the commissioners or appointed iudges doe know that their commission is reuoked. For as a commissioner hath no power vntill he haue receiued his commission: so likewise the commission dureth, vntill the reuocation thereof be signified; or at leastwise vntill the commissioner know that it is reuoked. And therefore Celsus sayth, that the acts of the gouernour of a prouince are good and auaileable, if the commissioner know not that his commission is called in. And although Pope Innocent were of opinion, that it was otherwise to be iudged, if question were of life or honour, and was therein of many followed, yet he continued not in that opinion. And albeit that he was a pope[*](A good decree of Pope Innocent the fourth.) & soueraigne prince, and a man most skilfull in both the lawes, yet willed he no greater authoritie to be giuen unto his writings than to other mens, neither to rest thereon further than there were good and strong reason therefore. But to take away these antient difficulties, the secretaries to the state have used to ioyne vnto commissions, and almost to all mandats and letters pattents this clause, A die qua rescriptum Significabitur, From the day that the rescript shall be notified: which clause if it be omitted, yet is it alwayes necessarily to be vnderstood. And thus much concerning the expresse reuocation of a commission.

So also a Commission taketh end by the death of him that graunted it, bee hee[*](Whether a commission alwaies taketh end by the death of him that graunted it?) prince or magistrat; prouided alwaies, that the thing committed bee yet whole and entire: for otherwise the commissioner may continue that which hee hath begun, so that it be done without fraud. But it is fraud in law, when a Commissioner not aduertised by a purseuant or expresse rescript (but by some other certaine meanes) of the death of the prince, the matter being yet whole, neuerthelesse proceedeth therein. Now the matter is not whole and entire, which cannot by the Commissioner bee left off without proiudice to the publike state, or to the right of priuat men: as in matter of iustice, if the parties haue contested, the thing is no more entire, but the Commissioners may and ought to go through with that they have begun, whether it bee the prince or the magistrat that hath giuen them commission. And so in warre the matter is said not to be entire, if the battell stand ranged before the enemie, and that the retreat cannot without euident perill be made: in which case the generall is not to forbeare the giuing of battaile, although he be certainly enformed of the death of the prince; or that it be forbid him to ioyne battaile. So if rebellion arise, which cannot otherwise be appeased but by the execution of the authors thereof; that is first to bee done, and afterward knowledge thereof to be giuen, (as saith the lawyer) although the death or countermaund of the prince happen or come in the meane time. Yet the commissions comming from the prince, or letters mandatorie, are in that different from the other letters royall, which they call letters of iustice: for that these coutinue in their force and vertue, whereas the letters of commaund expire after the death of the prince. Yet neuerthelesse the new prince oftentimes ratifieth that which was done by the commaundement

of his predecessour, although he died, the matter yet whole and entire, and the rather if it be well and for his profit done; which the magistrats cannot do to the commissioners by them appointed, for that their ratifications in tearmes of iustice are neuer to be receiued. And thus much concerning all the sorts of Commissioners.

Now, that we have alreadie said of Commissioners, hath no place in officers, for[*](Whether the power of officers nd together with the death of the prince?) that their power endeth not together with the death of the prince, although it bee in some sort holden in sufferance, and as it were suspended vntill they have letters from the new prince, or confirmation from him for the continuance of their offices. And for this cause the parliament of Paris after the death of king Lewes the eleuenth, decreed that the officers should continue in their charge, as they had before done, vntil that they receiued commaund to the contrarie from the new king; following therein an auntient decree giuen in like case in the moneth of October, in the yeare 1380. Howbeit the court of Toulouse after the death of Charles the seuenth, otherwise decreed than had the parliament of Paris, viz. That all their iurisdiction should cease, vntill they had receiued new commaundement from the new king; and yet that if any occurrents should chance wherein the authoritie of the court should bee requisit, that then the court should proceed by letters and commissions, intituled The people holding the Parliament royall of Toulouse, firmed with the seale of the court, without any mention making of the king. But forasmuch as the king comming unto his kingdome by right of succession, vseth his maiestie before he be consecrated; as it was iudged by a decree of the parliament of Paris, the nineteenth of Aprill, in the yeare 1398 (contrarie to the opinion of many) it belongeth not unto any officers, parliament, or Senat, to doubt of the power or maiestie of the prince: which if it were not, neither were they to have any authoritie or power: neither are in any other sort to proceed, but as officers unto the king, and under his obeysance. But if it were lawfull for the people to make choice of their king, as it is in Polonia, Denmarke, and Hungarie; (where the kings beeing dead, the maiestie of the kingdome is to returne vnto the people) another thing were to bee said: For then the magistrats vse not the princes name in the vacancie of the kingdom (for that then there is no king) but every one of them do their lawfull acts and duties, as if they had such power from the Senat and the people) by force of the law, and power proper unto the magistrats: whereas Commissioners and judges extraordinarily appointed, can by no meanes (the prince being dead) hold their authoritie and power; for that they do nothing by the vertue of the law or of ordinarie power: and not for that commissions be odious, and offices gratious (as some have thought) for oftentimes a commission is more gratious, yea and more profitable also unto the Commonweal, than any officers ordinarie power. And as for the decree of the parliament of Paris (bearing date the sixteenth of October 1381) whereby it was ordained, that the kings edicts and commands should have like power the king being dead, that they had whilest he yet lived; that is so to be vnderstood, if the charge committed bee then begun to be put in execution. And therefore if the power of the magistrats be annuall, and the king die before the magistrats yeare be expired, yet may the magistrat neuerthelesse hold his office for his yeare: or if it be perpetuall, continue the same in such sort and so long as the law giueth him leaue, for that his office dependeth not of a simple commaund[*](Offices by lawe established, are not but by contrarie edicts or lawes to be put downe.) which may still be reuoked, or of a charge which cannot be recommaunded, but is grounded upon a law, receiued, published, verified, and registred: in such sort as that his office cannot be suppressed but by a contrarie edict or law. As when question was for the suppressing of the militarie Tribunes, (for the discord betwixt the Senat and the people, before created with the power of the Consuls) and in their steady to restore again the Consuls, it could not be done vntill that by the law Licinia, that power

of the Tribunes was againe taken away. And in our time when as the fift and sixt president of the parliament of Paris were to be suppressed, they were not yet therefore displaced (for that against their wils they could not, except that for some capital crime they had bene before condemned) but an expresse edict was made, that after their death none should be more placed in their roomes, but so their offices to bee suppressed. So by a generall edict made by Charles the ninth, at the request of the estates of Orleans, in the yeare 1560, all offices erected after the death of king Francis his grandfather, were againe suppressed. And oft times it happeneth, that one officer is by one law made; but more often, that many are made at once: as when threescore sergeants were at once created by one edict of king Francis the first; and the criminall judges at once erected throughout the realme by an edict in the yeare 1527▪ when as before the same man was judge both of criminall and civill causes. Which course was so straitly obserued and kept in the kingdome of Fraunce, as that the verie clarkes of the clarke of the parliament, were by expresse edict made an office, though afterwards by another edict againe suppressed, at the instance of the chiefe clarke, in the yeare 1544: as were other small charges, which the Roman Commonweale were by the magistrats themselves commonly giuen unto their seruants, without any law at all. Neither is it sufficient for the magistrats and other officers to be by the law created, but that their successours also have a particular declaration, to testifie that they have obtained their offices, and yet no need of any new edict or law. And for this cause the princes commissions directed unto the officers in the quality of officers, continue in force to their successors: for that the prince therein maketh choice of the magistrat or officer, and not of the person: but if choice be made of any mans person, whose name is expressed in the commission, he being dead, his successour in the same office cannot execute the commission, for that the prince made choyce not of the magistrat but of the person.

Yet there are other differences also betwixt an officer and a commissioner: for that[*](The power of an officer or magistrat larger, than the power of a commission.) the power of an officer besides that it is ordinarie, it is also better authorised, and larger than is a commissioners, & that is it for which the Edicts and lawes leaue many things to the consciences and discretions of the Magistrats: who indifferently applie and interpret the lawes according to the occurrents & exigence of the causes presented: Whereas Commissioners are otherwise bound, and as it were tyed unto the verie words of their commission, and especially where question is of the affaires of state: as in the charges and commissions of Embassadours or Commissioners deputed to negotiate betwixt princes, where the Commissioners may not without danger of their lives passe one point beyond the lesson they have in writing, if this clause (which is oft times put unto the charges and instructions of Embassadours and Commissioners to treat with princes) be not thereunto annexed, viz. That if any thing else be to be done, the Embassadour shall at his wisedome and discretion, according to the chaunge of places, times, and persons, have care thereof: much like unto that clause whereof Aeschines the Orator speaketh in the oration which hee made for the defence of his legation; where he saith, that this clause put into the the commission of Embassadours, viz. That they should do whatsoeuer they saw to be for the common good; extended not unto that they had in their expresse and particular charge: so that the aforesaid clause extendeth not unto the principall obligations and resolutions of treaties, as to the making or breaking of peace, but onely unto the accessories and matters of lesse importance. As if question be of any thing to be graunted unto the enemies or friends, for the inlarging of their power to the hurt of the Commonweale, it is not lawfull for the Embassadours without speciall commaund to intreat thereof: For seeing that in the lesse affaires of priuat men, an Attourney or Proctor hauing a generall authoritie with

full and entier power, may not yet for all that giue, acquite, or alienate any thing, or giue or take an oath of any person without a speciall charge; much lesse ought he so to doe in things touching the publique, and namely in things concerning the state: well may things done without commission, be confirmed, yet could they not of right without commission be so done. For albeit that in priuat matters he may say him[*](In matters of state e that goeth beyond his commission is worthely blamed, although that things fall out er so wel.) selfe to have well and duely executed his charge, which hath done it better than was to him inioyned, yet in publique affaires of the estate it is not alwaies so: for the Souldiour which hath assailed the enemie, or the Captaine which hath giuen battell contrarie to the Generals commaund, are both worthie of death, although they obtaine the victorie. For what could euer have more honorablie beene done, or more worthie eternall praise, than was that which was done by Fabius, collonell of the horsemen under Papyrius Cursor the Dictator? who with the losse but of an hundred men onely, slew twentie thousand of the enemies; and yet for that he contrarie to the Dictators commaund had ioyned battell with the enemie, he was brought in question of his head, neither had so escaped, had not the Dictator (ouercome by the earnest intreating of the people) so rested contented. And therefore Caesar in like case speaking of one of his captaines called Syllanus, said him to have done well and wisely in not giuing of battell, although he were sure to have caried away the victorie: for that said he it is not the dutie of a captaine, to do any thing that is by his Generall forbidden him. Yea so much it concerneth not to doe any thing that is forbidden in matters of warre, as that the Lieutenant generall to an other man, ought not to giue the enemie battell, except it be so expresly giuen him in charge: which was the cause that the Countie of Aiguemond was shrewdly shent of the Spaniards, for giuing battell unto the Mareshall de Termes (although he therein tooke him prisoner and discomfited the French armie) for that he had hasarded the whole state of the low Countries, if he had lost the bartell. But this latter point is to be vnderstood of such as be Lieutenants, or subiect to the commaund of others, who by vertue, of their office have not power to command. For an officer, as the Consull, or in his absence his Lieutenant; or with vs the Constable, the Marshall, or other Generall of the armie, placed as in title of office, to haue full and absolute commaund over the armie, and to mannage the warre, may by vertue of his office, and without attending any other speciall commaund, make warre upon the denounced enemies, pursue them and giue them battell, besiege them, and take their fortresses and strong holdes, and dispose of the armie according to his discretion, if he have not expresse commaundement to the contrarie from his soueraigne, and so his power suspended: yet hauing taken any strong places, or the enemies Generall, he may not without speciall commaund deliver them, or yet make peace with the enemie. True it is, that in popular estates these points are not, neither can bee so straitly[*](Large commission to be giuen to generals for the wars in popular commonweals than in Monarchies, and why?) kept, the generals thereof themselves doing almost all; which in a Monarchie depend of the will and pleasure of one onely prince: For why it is more easie to know the pleasure of the prince, than of the people; of one man, than of many thousands. As we may still see in Liuie large commissions by the people giuen unto the generals of their warres▪ as in the warres against the Hetrusceans, all power was giuen unto Fabius, Omnium rerum arbitrium & a Senatu, & a populo, & a collega, Fabio Consuli Commissum, The disposing of all things (saith he) was both of the Senat, and the people, and his fellow in office committed to Fabius. And in another place, Initio liberum pacis at belli arbitrium permissum▪ At the beginning the free disposing of peace and warre was committed unto him. And yet neuerthelesse they kept this difference betwixt them which had the mannaging of their warres by vertue of their office, and them which did the same by commission; as that the Consuls, Praetors, and others, hauing power to make warre by vertue of their office, might auow and iustifie their owne actions, without any other ratification, except they had taken upon them some thing that concerned the soueraigntie of the people; whereas the Commissioners, if they therein passed their cōmission, must of necessitie have their actions by the Senat or by the people ratified. As Pompey hauing had commission for the mannaging of the warre against king Mithridate, passing farther made warre also against diuers other nations and people, at his pleasure bestowing the kingdomes, estates, and towns by him conquered and wonne: and albeit that the people would infringe or reuoke nothing of that hee had done, yet neuerthelesse after his triumph, he oftentimes requested the Senat, that those his doings might by it be ratified: and finding the Senat to make thereof difficultie, and to vse therein long delayes; he to strengthen and backe himselfe against his enemies, and such as were about to looke into his doings, ioined himselfe in friendship and alliance with Caesar, so to make themselves both of them the stronger. For albeit that hee had a generall commission, and that in that case all was at his discretion: and therefore (as some thinke) needed no ratification: yet is it not so, the generall clauses of commissions being alwaies to be interpreted and ruled to the best good and profit of the Commonweale▪ not in any thing giuing power to doe that is hurtfull unto the publike state; which is not a thing lawful or permitted euen unto a priuat man to do, hauing a charge in generall tearmes committed unto him. Wherefore these words expressed in commissions, be they Gouernors, Captaines, Iudges, or ambassadors (for things to be done)[*](General clauses in commissions for things to be done according to the descriptiō of the commissioners how they are to be vnderstood?) At their discretion according to their wisedome; or at their will and pleasure: and others such like, are still to be so interpreted and vuderstood, as euerie good and wise man would interpret and vnderstand them, still respecting the good and profit of the Commonweale: wherein if any fault be committed, account thereof is to be giuen; the least fault that can be, being still in matters of state, and publike interest to be enquired after: no excuse of errour, or ignorance, being therein to be admitted or accepted. And much the lesse, if he which hath taken uppon him such publike charge had it not laid upon him, but was by him sought for: neither offered unto him, but by force by him extorted. For if priuat mens faults, when they have taken upon them the charge to do any thing one of them for another (although it bee of their owne accord) be not excusable; how should they then be excused in matters concerning the state and Commonweale.

But to the intent that the force of Commissions and offices may the better bee vnderstood, it shall not be amisse to produce the examples of the auntient Romans, and to compare their manner of speech in the making of them, with that of ours. As in[*](How the auntient Romaines gaue extraordinarie power unto their generals by commission.) that which Festus Pompeius saith, Cum imperio esse dicebatur apud antiquos, cui nomina▪ tim a populo dabatur imperium, He was said of the auntients to have power, to whome by name power was by the people giuen: which is asmuch as to say, by expresse commission, without appeale unto any other magistrat, unto whome so authorised the law gaue power to command: For that a magistracie or office cannot be wishout power to commaund. So we see in Liuie, at such time as Hannibal besieged Rome, Placuit▪ omnes qui Dictatores, Consules, Censoresue fuissent cum imperio esse, donec recessisset hostis a muris, that is to say, A decree was made (or commission giuen) that all such as had bene Dictators, Consuls, or Censors, should have power and authoritie to command, vntill the enemie were departed from the walles. So Cicero speaking of Augustus Caesar saith, Demus imperium Caesari, sine quo res militar is geri nō potest, Let vs giue (saith he) power and authoritie unto Caesar, without which militarie affaires cannot be mannaged. For why, Octauianus yet but yong, could by the law neither beare office, nor lead the armie, much lesse without power and authoritie take upon him a generals

charge: and therefore Cicero persuaded, That the charge for the mannaging of the warre should with power by commission be giuen vnto him: which place of Cicero hath much troubled both Sigonius and Gruchius. For had Octauianus bene either Consul or Praetor, Cicero would not have used these words, for that he should then by law have had the power and commaund of a magistrat.

Beside this, there was also a notable difference betwixt the manner of propounding[*](The manner of propounding of requests unto the people for the creating of magistrates and commissioners in auntient time diuers.) the request for the creating of a magistrat, and of a Commissioner: For the magistrat was vsually created by vertue of the lawes before made; the magistrat thus asking the people, Quos vellent Consules fieri, Whome they would to be made Consuls? and so of the other magistracies and offices being vacant. But for commissions of command, they used these words, Vellent iuberent vt huic vel illi imperium esset in hac vel illa prouincia, If they willed and commaunded that this or that man should have the government in this or that prouince. As is reported of Scipio Africanus, who had commission with power to commaund, although he were not yet of age to beare office, or to be a magistrat. And Cicero speaking of all sorts of commissions saith, Omnes Potestates, Imperia, curationes, ab vniuerso populo proficisci conuenit, It beseemeth al potestats, commaunds, and commissions, to come from the bodie of the whole people. Where by the word Potestates, he vnderstandeth the gouernours of princes, who were properly so called. And by the word Imperia, Captains, who had particular commission to mannage the warres (howbeit that the word Imperia, is vnderstood also of the civill magistrats) with power to commaund. By the word Curationes, is meant all other charges, without power to commaund. The word Imperator, signifieth properly a generall or chiefe captaine, as Plinie speaking of Pompey, Toties Imperator antequam miles, So often a generall before he was a souldior. But generally the word Curatio, importeth all sorts of commissions; as is easily to be gathered by this place of Cicero, Idem transfero in magistratus, Curationes, Sacerdotia: The same I transferre into magistracies, Commissions, and Priesthoods; which are the three sorts of publike charges. Vlpian the lawyer allo well distinguisheth a magistrat from him whome he calleth Curator republicae, of whome he hath made an expresse booke: whome the law calleth by a Greeke word ---; who had no power to condemne, nor to appoint any fine, which was lawfull for all magistrats to do, as we have before showed.

But it is to be noted, that al commissions passe into the nature of offices, as oft as that[*](How commissions passe into the nature of offices.) is by law made an ordinarie charge, which was before done by commission, as we have by the examples of our owne Commonweale before declared. And that which was before giuen at the pleasure of the magistrats, becommeth also an office, if he that hath the soueraigntie doth by law establish the same. As in auntient time the Consuls, as it were by commission made choice of the six Colonels, whome they called Tribunos militum, vntill that about 642 yeares after the foundation of the citie of Rome, it was by an expresse law (made at the request of the Tribunes of the people) set downe and decreed, That from that time forward it should bee an ordinarie office, and the people to have the choice of them: which was euer after obserued, except some such great warre were in hand, as that it was thought needfull, that extraordinarie choice should be made of those Colonels by commission: As in the Macedonian warre against king Perseus, Licinius and Cassius the Consuls, made a motion unto the people, That the Tribunes, or Collonels of the souldiors, might for that yeare bee chosen by the Consuls, as indeed they were. So likewise in auntient time also, the Consuls, Praetors, and other great magistrats made choice of their slaues and seruants for their vshers, secretaries, sargeants, Trumpetors, and such like; as they did also in this realme, vntill the time of Philip the Faire, who was the first that tooke this power from the bailiefs and seneschals,

and yet leauing unto the lords justices, power to establish sergeants and notaries in the prouinces of their iurisdiction and territorie. And in like case the kings atturney generall, in the time of our fathers, made choice of such aduocats as hee thought best for the pleading of the kings causes; who are now as ordinarie officers created by the prince himselfe, the particular commission before giuen unto the atturney generall, being conuerted into the forme of a most honourable office. And thus much in generall concerning Commissioners and officers: it followeth now that wee should also speake of Magistrats, and of such other things as are unto euerie one of them properly belonging.