The six books of a common-weale

A Popular estate is a forme of Commonweale, wherin all or most[*](What a popular estate is.) part of the people togeather commaundeth in soueraignetie over the rest altogether, and over euerie one in particular. The principall point of a popular estate is seene in this, that the greater part of the people hath the Soueraigne commaund and power not onely over euerie one in particular, but also over the lesser parte of all the people together. As for example in Rome, where there were but five and thirtie tribes or companies of the people: eighteene of these companies together, had soueraigne power over the other seauenteene: and authoritie to establish lawes, whereunto both they and euerie one of the Citise---s in particular were subiect and bound, wherfore Tiberius Gracchus the factious Tribune of the people requested Marcus Octauius his companion and fellow of himself to giue

up his office, before that the eighteene tribes had giuen their voices for the deposing of him: for withstanding of Tiberius propounding and vrging the lawes for the diuision of lands: and for opposing himselfe against the profit of the people. Also at such time as Lucius Rullus, the busie Tribune by request which hee presented unto the people, concerning the diuision of lands, desired that the commissioners which had that charge, might bee chosen by the greater part of the seauenteene tribes of the people onely: Cicero, then Consull tooke thereupon occasion amongst the other things to crosse the entertainement of his request, and publication of the law, saying: that the Tribune in so doing went about to deceiue the other eightteene Tribes, that is to say the greater part of the people of their voices, which the Consuls obiection was the lesse to have bene regarded, and the more easily to have by the Tribune bene answered, for that his request was, but if it pleased the people (that is to say: the greater part of the 35 Tribes) that the lesse part of the people (that is to say the seauenteene tribes) might appoint the commissioners▪ so that the maiestie of the people notwithstanding his request remained still whole and vntouched: considering that the lesser part of the people was thereunto to be deputed, but at the will and pleasure of the greater part: to the end that the greater part of the people should not still for euerie trifling matter be called together. So by the law Domitia it was prouided that if by the death of any of the Augures, Preests or Bishops any benefice fell voide, they should assemble but 17 tribes of the people for the nominating of him, whom they would haue chosen Bishop: so that he which was by nine of the tribes of the people nominated and allowed, was by the chapiter or Colledge of Augures or Bishopps to be admitted and receiued.

When I say the greater part of the people to have the soueraignitie in the popular[*](Great difference whether voyces▪ be taken by Poll o by Tribes & companies, in a popular Commonweale.) estate; that is so to be vnderstood, when the voices are to bee taken by Pole as in Venice, in Rhaguse, in Genua, in Luca, and almost al Aristocratique Commonweales: but if the voices be taken by tribes, parrishes, or companies sufficeth it, of them to have the greater part, also albeit that there be in them far the lesser part of citisens, as it hath commonly chanced in auncient popular Commonweales. In Athens the people was divided into ten principall tribes, whereunto in favour of Demetrius, and Antigonus they ioyned two others, of them called Antigonia and Demetria: and againe the people was divided into thirtie sixe classes or companies. But such diuisions according to the diuers encreasings of the people, and more easie and commodious giuing of voices are often time changed. So Romulus at first deuided all the people in Rome[*](The small number of the people of Rome, and how they were divided in the time of Romlus, and how they were againe divided in the time of King Seruius▪ with the manner of their giuing of voyces.) which then was about 3000 into three tribes or parts: and after that euerie part into ten companies, appointing over euerie one of them an head: how be it the voices (as Liuy saith) were then al giuen by poll. But by the ordinance of king Seruius the people was againe divided into sixe companies, according unto every mans wealth and reuenue: in such sort: as that the first companie wherein the richest were enrolled, had asmuch power as all the rest: if the centuries of this first companie were al of one accord and mind in giuing of their voices, that is to say fourescore centuries, which were but eight thousand persons; for in that case the voices of the other fiue companies were neuer asked. But if two or three centuries of the first companie were not of the same opinion with the rest: so many centuries of the second company were drawne out as might supply that defect, and that so often in euerie companie, vntill the number of fourescore companies were filled up. So that in taking voices they seldom came unto the third & fourth company: but most seldom unto the first, and vnto the sixt neuer: in which sixt companie was the refuse of the people, and poorest citisens, which according to the view then taken, were in number aboue threescore thousand: beside the bourgesses and citisens of the five first companies in number sixteene thousand▪

And had this ordinance of king Seruius still remained in force after kings were driuen [*](How the people of Rome wrested unto it selfe the soueraigntie, and how that state of an Aristocratie became a Democatie, or a meere popular state.) out, it had not bene a popular state but an Aristocraticall, for that the lesser part of the people had then therein the soueraignetie. But shortly after the expulsion of the kings the common people seeing themselves oppressed by the wealth & power of the greater, reuolted thrice from the nobilitie, and held their state apart: to the intent they might every one of them, as wel the poore as the rich, the base as the noble, have their voices alike; neither could they be before quieted, vntill they had obtained power out of the bodie of themselves to chuse their Tribunes, the maintainers of their liberties: wherof their Tribunitial assemblies began first to be holden. But for asmuch as the nobility & richer sort dispersed among the tribes, caused the poorer & meaner sort (for the most part their followers▪) to giue their voices at their appointment & pleasure; there was a decree made, That from thenceforth the nobilitie should no more be present at the assemblies of the common people: which was then divided into eighteene tribes, which by little and little in continuance of time tooke such increase, that they grew to the number of five and thirtie tribes: who at length by meanes of their factious Tribunes got unto themselves the soueraigntie of the Commonweal, with power to make all the lawes, and chuse all the magistrates, except the Consuls, the Praetor, and Censors, which for that they were the greatest magistrates, they were still chosen by the greatest assemblies, that is to say of the nobilitie and people together, the whole bodie of the people beeing (as wee said before) divided into tribes or companies. But forasmuch as the enfranchised men, and such as by desert had obtained the libertie of the cittie, mingled through all the tribes of the people of Rome, in number far exceeded the naturall and antient citisens, and so by multitude of voices, carried all things away from them: which (as we haue before said) was by Appius the Censor done, thereby to gratifie the vulgar people, and by that meanes to obtaine[*](How Fabius by great wisedome ouerthrew the popular deuise of Appius, and so obtained the name of Maximus. ) of them what so he would: Fabius Maximus the Censor by great wisdom ouerthrew all the grace that Appius had by cunning got, by thrusting all the enfranchised men, and such as were of them discended, into foure tribes by themselves: so to preserue the antient and freeborn citisens in the right of their voices. For which onely fact by him brought to passe without tumult or sedition, hee obtained the name of Maximus, or as we say, the Greatest. Which his order still continued, vntill that about 300 yeares after, Seruius Sulpitius Tribune of the people, would needes have the enfranchised men againe enrolled into the Tribes of their maisters by whome they were before manumised or set at libertie: but before this his motion was brought to effect, he was himselfe slaine: which for all that in the time of the civill warres betwixt Marius [*](Marius popular.) and Silla, was by Marius (hauing ceised upon the citie) effected: so to make the estate of the Commonweale more popular, and to weaken the authoritie of the nobilitie and richer sort. Demosthenes after the victorie of Philip king of Macedon at Chaeronea attempted the like at Athens; by presenting a request unto the people, That the enfranchised, and other the inhabitants of Athens, might be enrolled in the number of citisens: which his request was then euen openly reiected, albeit that there then were not aboue 20000 citisens: which was seuen thousand moe than was in the time of Pericles, when as were found but thirteene thousand citisens enroled, out of whom[*](No Commonweal so popular as that all the people gaue therein voice, it being sufficient that the greater part of the tribes still caried aw ay the matter.) also 5000 strangers, who had s---yly crept in for citisens, were sold for slaues: and yet the multitude of the slaues was than ten times more than the number of the citisens.

This which I have said, may well serue to aunswere that which might bee alleaged, That there is not, neither haply euer was any so popular a Commonweale, as wherein the subiects had all voyces alike; or if they had, that they could all meet together to make lawes, create magistrats, and vse the other markes of soueraigntie: a good part of

them to the contrarie being ordinarily still absent, and so the lesse part making the law▪ But it sufficeth, that the greater part of the tribes carried away the matter, albeit that haply in some one tribe a thousand citisens were in voyces equall unto another, wherein there were ten thousand; considering that the prerogative of euerie mans voyce was in this tribe re---etued unto him. Yet hereby it came to passe, that the more ambitious fort of men oftentimes by bribes or favour corrupted the chiefe men, and as it were the ringleaders of the tribes, especially at such time as the lesser part of the people was present at the assemblies: Which to meet withall, it was therefore oftentimes prouided, that when any law of importance was made, it should in no wise bee againe repealed, except there were six thousand citisens at the least present at the assemblie, who gaue their consent to the reuoking thereof; as is oftentimes to bee seene in Demosthenes. And the Ostracisme (as Plutarch writeth) tooke no place upon any man, except six thousand citisens at the least agreed in one therein: which yet was the lesser part of the people. T---e like whereof is also obserued in the lawes of the Venetians, being of any great weight or importance; and namely in laws concerning the execution of iustice, whereunto this clause is adioyned, That the great Councel shal not in any thing derogat from the law established, except there be at the least a thousand Venetian gentlemen there present; and that of them, eight hundred all agree in one and the same opinion, for the repealing of the law. Whereunto the Roman lawes, concerning corporations and colleges, seeme also to have had regard; where two third parts of the Collegiats, and of them also the most voyces must agree, to giue any law or order unto the rest. And in all the assemblies of the Venetians, which have bene called together for the government of the seignorie in our daies, there have scarcely at once met together fifteene hundred gentlemen: so that when the law willeth a thousand of them at the least to be present, the meaning of the law is, that there should two third parts of those which have voyces in the state be still present, and of them eight hundred to be all of one opinion for the passing of any matter: which I thinke to bee therefore done, for that eight hundred of them make the greater part of fiftene hundred: a thing requisit, where voices are taken by the Poll, as in Venice, and not by tribes or companies, as they did in Rome and other popular estates, by reason of the infinit multitude of them which had part in the seignorie. And in Rome, vntill the law Fusia, (made 693 yeares after the building of the citie) they confounded the voices of the tribes, to the intent it might lesse be vnderstood which way every tribe had gone, so to auoid the displeasure of the citisens among themselves, about the giuing of their voices. So at Strasbourg the most popular of the German cities, and at Mets, although it came into the power of the French, yet they giue their voices by tribes; as the three popular Commonweals also of the Grisons, call the tribes and companies unto their assemblies, for the creating of their magistrats, and making of lawes: yet so, as that the greater tribes have the greeter part of the suffrages or voyces. True it is, that the cantons of Vri, Schwits, Vnderuald, Zug, Glaris, and Apenzel, which are true Democraties, and hold the more popular libertie, for that they are mountainers, make their assemblies for most part in open places, and there euerie one of them (being fourteene yeares old) giue their voices for the chusing of the Senat, the Aman, and their other magistrats, which they doe by lifting up their hand, after the auntient forme of the Athenian --- and manner of other such popular Commonweales, sometimes constraining their neighbours with drie blowes to hold up their hand, as they did of old. In like manner the tribes of the Grisons, which are of others most popular, and most popularly gouerned of any Commonweale that is, make their common assemblies for the choice of their Aman: (which is the soueraigne magistrat in euerie one of their little cantons:) where he which hath bene Aman the three yeares before, standing upright, and excusing himselfe unto the people, craueth of them pardon for whatsoeuer hee hath done amisse in his office before: then after that hee appointeth out three citisens, out of whome the people chose one for their Aman or chiefe magistrat for the yeare following: after whome they chose also his lieutenant, who is as it were the chauncellour, and thirteene other councellors, of whom foure are of the councell for the more secret affaires of the state, and after them the Camarlign, or Chamberlaine treasurer for the common treasurie. But in this there is a notable difference, betwixt the government[*](The cantons of the Swissers much ruled by their great men, but the Grisons not so.) of the Grisons, and of the other Cantons of the Swissers: for that hee which can giue unto his side, two or three of the principal officers, of any one canton of the Swissers, who are ruled by certaine great men bearing sway amongst them, may assure himselfe to have gained the whole canton: whereas the people of the Grisons hold themselves in nothing subiect or pliant vnto their officers, if the good liking of the whole commons be not gained; as I have seene by the letters of the bishop of Bayonne, ambassadour for the French king: and afterward by Maister Bellieure ambassadour also, and a man of good understanding in matters of state, hauing the same charge, gaue the king to vnderstand, in the moneth of May 1555, how that the ambassadour of Spaine had almost caused all the companies of the Grisons to reuolt, insomuch that in assemblie of the Cade, there were moe voyces for Spaine, than for Fraunce. And after that how that they of the Comminaltie of Linguedine, hauing not receiued the money promised them by the Spaniards, laid hand uppon the Spanish pentioners amongst them, and putting them to torture, afterward condemned them in a fine of ten thousand crownes to be by them paid into the common treasure. Wherein the French ambassadour so well bare himselfe, that notwithstanding the Spanish practise, they within two moneths after, together with the rest of the cantons of the Swissers sent 27 ambassadours into Fraunce, to renue and confirme their former alliances.

These examples of popular cities we have set downe, that thereby the force and nature of popular states and Commonweales might the better be vnderstood: Wherefore let vs then conclude; That to be a popular State or Commonweale wherein the greater part of the people have the soueraigntie; whether their voices be giuen by[*](Aristotle his opinion concerning an Aristocratical or popular Commonweale.) poll, by tribes, companies, parishes, or communities. And yet Aristotle writeth vnto the contrarie: We must not saith he, according to the common opinion iudge the estate popular, where the greater part of the people have the soueraigntie: And afterward for example bringeth forth xiij. hundred citisens in a citie, of whom a thousand of the better & richer sort have the soueraigntie, excluding the rest: we ought not saith he to deeme this a popular state; no more than that to be an Aristocratie, wherin the lesser part of the citisens have the soueraigntie, being men of the poorer sort. And after that he concludeth thus: The popular estate is wherein the poorer sort of the citisens have the soueraigntie; and an Aristocratie where the richer sort beare the rule, whether they be moe or fewer in the one or in the other much concerneth not. And by this meanes Aristotle to establish his owne, reiecteth the common opinion of all people: yea euen of the Philosophers and law-giuers themselves: which common receiued opinion hath alwaies beene, is, and shall be mistris in matters of state. And yet he had neither true nor probable reason to depart from the common opinion: whereas thereof ensueth a thousand intollerable and ineuitable absurdities. For so we might say that the faction of the Decemuiri or ten commissioners, appointed for the correcting and amending of the euill lawes and customes of Rome, taking upon them the soueraigntie, was a popular estate; albeit that all histories call it an Oligarchie, although they in that barenes of the Commonwealth were not chosen for their wealth, but for

their wisedome onely. And to the contrarie, when the people for the maintenance of their popular estate had driuen them out, a man might say that the state was then chaunged into an Aristocratie. So should we also say, if twelue thousand of the richer sort had the soueraigntie, and but five hundred of the poorer sort were excluded, that that state were an Aristocratie. And againe to the contrarie, if there were but five hundred poore gentlemen, which had the government over the rest of the richer sort, one should call such a Commonweal a popular state. For so saith Aristotle, calling the Commonweales of Appollonia, Thera, and Colophon popular states, wherein a few auntient verie poore families had the soueraigntie over the rich. Yea he passeth on further and saith, that if the greater part of the people hauing the soueraigntie, giue[*](To iudge of an estate we are not to consider who haue the magistracies or offices but who they be in whom the soueraigntie resteth.) the great offices and honours of their state unto the fairest or tallest of their citisens, it shall no more be a popular, but an Aristocratique estate: which is an other foule errour in matter of state, considering that to iudge of an estate, the question is not to know who have the magistracies or offices: but onely who they bee which have the soueraigntie and power to place and displace the magistrats and officers, and to giue lawes unto every man.

And these absurdities, and others also much greater then they, ensue hereof, in that[*](That the state of a commonweale may be of one sort, and yet the government therof of another and that quite contrarie.) Aristotle hath mistaken the manner and forme of the government of a Commonweale, for the soueraigne state thereof. For as we haue before said, the state may be a pure royall Monarchie, and yet the government there of popular: as namely if the prince giue honours, offices, and preferments therein to the poore, aswell as to the rich: to the base aswell as to the noble, and so indifferently to all without respect or accepting of person. As also it may be that the state be royall, and yet the government aristocraticall: as if the prince giue the honours and offices to a few of the nobilitie, or to a few of the richer sort onelie, or some few of his fauorits. And to the contrarie, if the people hauing the soueraigntie, giue the most honorable offices, rewards, and preferments unto the nobilitie onely, as they did in Rome, vntill the law Canuleia, the estate should be in deed popular, and yet the gouerment Aristocratique. So if the nobilitie, or a few of the better sort should haue the soueraigntie, and yet bestow the most honorable charges and preferments upon the poorer and baser sort, aswell as upon the rich, without favour or respect of persons: the state should be Aristocratique, and yet popularly gouerned. But if all or the greatest part of the people hauing the soueraigntie, shall giue the honorable offices and preferments indifferently to all, without respect of person, or by lot bestow the same upon all the citisens: a man might wel iudge that estate not onely popular, but also to be most popularly gouerned. As was done at Athens at the request and motion of Aristides the just, whereby all the citisens were receiued into all the offices of the Commonweale, without respect of their wealth, contrarie to the law of Solon, whereby it was prouided, that in bestowing of honours and places of authoritie and commaund, regard also bee had unto mens abilitie and wealth. So likewise if the nobilitie onely, or some few of the richer sort should have the soueraigntie in the state, and so exclude all the rest of the people from the honorable places and preferments in the Commonweal, so to keepe them to themselves alone: one might say that estate not to be aristocratike only, but also aristocratically gouerned; as wee may see in the state of Venice. But here happily some man will say, that none but my selfe is of this opinion, and that not one of the auntient, and much lesse of the moderne writers which intreat of matters of state or Commonweales, have once touched this point. True it is that I cannot denie the same; yet this distinction neuerthelesse seemeth unto me more then necessarie, for the good understanding of the state of every commonweal; if a man will not cast himselfe head long into an infinite

labyrinth of errours, where into we see Aristotle himselfe to have fallen: mistaking the popular Commonweal for the Aristocratique: and so contrarie wise, contrarie to the common receiued opinion, yea and contrarie to common sence also: For these principles euill grounded, nothing that is firme and sure can possiblie be thereon built. From this errour likewise is sprung the opinion of them which have forged a forme of a Commonweale mingled of all three, which we have for good reasons before reiected.

Wherefore let vs firmely set downe and resolue that there are but three formes of[*](That the state of a Commonweal may be of one sort and the government of an other, withour confusion of the states.) Commonweales, and no moe, and those simple also, and without any confused mixture one of them with an other; albeit that the government be sometimes contrarie to the state: As a Monarchie is contrarie to a Democratie or popular estate; and yet neuerthelesse the soueraigntie may be in one onely prince, who may popularly gouerne his estate, as I have before said: and yet it shall not be for that a confusion of the popular estate with a Monarchie, which are states of themselves incompatible, but is well (as it were) a combyning of a Monarchie with a popular government, the most assured Monarchie that is. The like we may deeme of the Aristocratique estate, and of the popular government: which is by farre more firme and sure, then if the estate and government were both Aristocratique: the state standing almost inuiolable, when as the subiects by such a moderat kind of gouerment are amongst themselves combyned, as also unto the Commonweale. And albeit that the government of a Commonweale may be more or lesse popular, aristocratique, or royall, (as of tyrannies, some may be more cruell than others,) yet so it is that the state in it selfe receiueth no comparison of more or lesse. For the soueraigntie is alwaies indiuisible and incommunicable in one[*](Soueraigntie allwaies by nature of itselfe indiuisible.) alone, or in the lesse part of all the people, or in the greater part thereof; which are the three sorts of Commonweales by vs set downe. And as for that which we have said, that the government may be more or lesse popular, may be deemed so to be, by the Commonweales of the Swissers, where the mountaine Cantons of Vri, Schwits, Vnderuald, Zug, Glaris, and Apensel are so popular, as that the soueraigntie of the Commonweal[*](The popularitie of the mountain .) resteth onely in them all, so that they be fourteene yeares old, in somuch that their chiefe magistracies & places of greatest commaund are sometime giuen euen to verie Sadlers, and such other mechanicall men: neither of the aforesaid Cantons is any one of them walled except Zug. The other new Cantons and Geneua, are lesse popular, gouerning thrmselues by certein lords, which they call the Councell, as I have learned by Master Basse-fountaine Bishop of Limoges, who long and discreetly without blame, as any one embassadour, hath to his great honour mannaged this charge. And albeit that the Bernoies and they of Zurich compose their Senat of diuers handy crafts men, yet they vse commonly to creat their Auoyers (or chiefe magistrats) of their most noble and auntient families: whereby they are lesse subiect vnto seditions and tumults: whereas the lords of the three Cantons of the Grisons being more popular, are also more subiect unto seditions and sturres, the people in their assemblies being hard to be gouerned; and once moued, hard to be pleased; as the ambassadours of princes have alwaies by experience found. For the true nature of the[*](The true nature of the people.) people is, to desire libertie without restraint of bit or bridle whatsoeuer: and to have all men equall in wealth, in honour, in paines, and rewards; without regard of nobilitie, wisedome, or vertue: and as Plutarch saith wisely to have all cast into lot, and euen ballance, without respect or favour of any man, then if any valiant or honourable minded of the nobilitie or richer sort shall by any meanes attempt to restraine the people so intemperatly abusing their libertie; them straight waies they do what they can to kill or to banish, and confiscating their goods, divided the same among the poorer sort, and

that the rather, if they be rich, or seeme to aspire: Yea oft times it happeneth, that the common people puft up with the punishment or slaughter of some one mightie man, violently breaketh out upon the rest, and that especially if it be once come to armes,[*](The beginning▪ of the popular estate of the Swissars.) and that the nobilitie be by the force of the people ouerthrowne. As it happened at the establishing of the popular estate of the Swissars, after the battell of Sempach, where almost all the nobilitie was slaine, and the rest which were left constrained to renounce their nobilitie; and yet neuerthelesse were excluded from all honours and offices of charge in the Commonweale, except at Zurich and Berne (which is in them the lesse to be maruelled at, for that the nobilitie there, with great safetie and without force of armes, made their peace with the victorious common people, now before quite spent[*](The auntient Gretians and Italians in their popular libertie more insolent than were the Swissars.) with civill warres.) Yet for all this insolencie, did the Swissers more moderatly vse their popular libertie, than did in antient time the Grecians or Italians, who oftentimes would needs have all bonds and obligations burnt or canceled: yea sometime the common people set on by such as were farre endebted, ranne uppon the creditours and rich men, robbed their houses, and enforced them to make an equall diuision of their possessions and lands, forbidding them the hauing or possessing of cattell or lands, aboue a certaine number or rate by them set downe: from which kind of dealing the Swissers have alwaies abhorred. And albeit that the publike pensions of princes, and gifts of straungers, in some of the Swissers cities, are not laid up in the common treasure, but divided among the people in particular; in the diuision whereof hee that hath most male children hath also a greater part than the rest: yet for all that, when as they of the canton of Glaris requested of Morlet, the French kings ambassadour, in the yere 1550, That the priuat and extraordinarie pensions, which the greater men yearely receiued of the king, might together with the publike pension bee equally divided amongst them all: King Henrie denied so to doe, and said, He would rather restraine his bountie, than suffer his priuat liberalitie to be so at their pleasure confounded with the common. Yea that worse is, the insolent libertie of the auntient Greeke popular Commonweales, proceeded to that libertie (should I say) or rather lewd madnesse, as to banish them that were more wise and discreet than the rest for the mannaging of their affaires, as they did Damon, maister to Pericles: and not onely wise and discreet, but euen the most iust and vertuous also; as was Aristides in Athens, & Hermodorus at Ephesus: which what thing is it else, than to go about to pluck up vertue it selfe by the root? But they were afraid least so great brightnesse of vertue in one great citisen or[*](Why in popular commonweales they oftentimes bannished the most wise and vertuous men.) subiect▪ should so dazle the eyes and minds of the rest of the common people, that forgetting their libertie, they should chuse rather to live in subiection unto so wise and vertuous a man, than to rule thēselues. Which thing they the more feared, if unto his vertues and good parts were ioyned nobilitie, or power, or experience in great matters; who with force ioyned thereunto, might from the citisens either with their will, or against their will, extort their libertie. Whereas the nobilitie and better sort, to the contrarie make no account or reckoning of the popular state: but thinke it good reason, that he which hath the most nobilitie, wealth, vertue, or knowledge, should be also the more esteemed, respected and honoured; and that the honourable charges in the Commonweale, should of right be due unto such men: and therefore alwaies desire and seeke to have themselves alwaies divided and seperated from the dregges and rascal[*](The inequalitie of the nobilitie and of the vulgar or commonpeople, not possible to be brought to any good conformity in one and the same state.) sort of the common people. Sith therefore the princes and nobilitie so much differ from the common and base people, it is a thing impossible by any meanes to make them together equall: or being made in honors and commaund, euen to reconcile thē among themselves, together with the Commonweale: and so (as they say) with one and the same brewing to moderat two so contrarie humors. Albeit that Solon vaunted, that if he had power to make lawes, he would make them such as should be most indifferent, both for the rich and the poore, the nobilitie and the base: which the nobilitie thought Solon to meane of the equalitie in Geometricall proportion; and the people of the proportion Arithmeticall: whereby it came to passe, that both the states yeelding unto him, gaue him power for the making of them lawes, and establishing of their Commonweale. But these things, as also what commodities or inconueniences attempted upon euerie Commonweale, shall in their due places bee more at large declared: sufficeth it now with what breuitie well might be, to have set downe the descriptions and kinds of all Commonweales, as also what is to euerie one of them proper, straunge, or common with others: and also who in euerie Commonweale hath the power of Soueraigne maiestie. Now let vs prosecute euerie part and limme, as it were, of a Commonweale, which are tied unto the soueraigntie of the state, as members unto the head; viz. the Senat, the magistrats, the officers, colleges, and corporation▪ and that in such order as wee have here rehearsed them.