The six books of a common-weale

AN Aristocratie is a forme of Commonweale, wherein the lesse[*](What an Aristocratie is.) part of the citisens with soueraigne power commaundeth over all the rest; and euerie citisen in particular. And in that it is contrarie unto the estate Popular, for that in the Aristocraticall state the lesser part of the citisens command, and in the Popular state the greater: and yet in that they both agree, that they which have the soueraignty, have power to commaund over every one in particular, but not over all in generall. Wherefore a Monarchie is in that better and more honourable than the other two; for that in it the power of one extendeth it selfe over all in generall, and in particular also: a thing in mine opinion well worthy the noting. And like as a Monarchie is either Royall, Lordlike, or Tyrannicall: so also an[*](Three sorts of Aristocraties.) Aristocratie may be Lordly, lawfull, or factious; which in auntient time the called an Oligarchie; that is to say, a Seignorie of a verie small number of Lords. As were the thirtie lords of Athens, ouerthrowne by Thrasibulus, whom they called the thirtie Tyrants. Or the ten commissioners, commonly called the Decemuiri, appointed to reforme the lawes and customes of Rome: and long after the Triumuiri, who by force oppressing the libertie of the people, inuaded the soueraigntie. And that is it for which the auntients have alwaies taken this word Oligarchie, in the euill part, and Aristocratie[*](Impossible to establish an Aristocratie only of good men.) in the good; defining it to be A government of good men. But we have before declared, that in matters of state (to vnderstand of what forme euerie Commonweale is) we must not haue regard whether the gouernours thereof bee vertuous, or otherwise; but to the government thereof. It is also a difficult matter, and almost impossible, to establish an Aristocratie composed onely of good men; for that cannot bee done by lot, neither by election, the two vsuall meanes: whereunto we may ioyne the third, by lot and election together, as impossible as the other; vertue with fortune hauing no agreement. Neither is lot and fortune to be admitted unto the consultations of honest causes: and if the same should be committed unto the choyce of the promiscuous and vulgar people, they would not make choyce of men altogether vnlike themselus; that is of fools, of wicked and most impudent men, good and wise men (if there be any) euerie where being the least part of the people: and what more shamefull thing could there be, than the honour and reputation of wise men, to depend of the iudgement (should I say, or of the rashnesse) of the head strong people. Yet let vs grant some few good and wise men to bee in the citie, truely they will shun euen the verie sight of the

wicked and of the bedlem multitude: neither if they come unto their common assemblies, be so shamelesse and impudent, as to name and make their choice of themselves as of wise men. For so Lactantius Firmianus meerely iesteth at the seuen Sages of Greece: If they were but wise (saith he) in their owne iudgements, then were they not wise: but in the iudgement of others, much lesse, who were not wise in iudging no mo wise but seuen, and all the rest fooles.

But some may say it should do well herein to imitate the auncient Romans, and other Latins, in the choice that they by solemne oath made of the most valiant and warlike man of all other for their Generall: who so chosen, should make choice of a second for his Lieutenant most like himselfe: and he likewise of the third: and the third of the fourth; and so in order one valiant man of an other, vntill the number of their Legions were filled. This truely might seeme a good way for the forming of a Commonweal of good and worthie men, at the first beginning thereof: But who should prefine the measure and number of those good men? and who should be suertie unto the Commonweal, that every one of those good men, should still make choice of an other good man like himselfe; rather then of his sonne, his brother, his kinsman, or his friend? and admit it were so done, sith every where there are so few good men, who should defend them from the multitude, and violence of them that were left, as fools and wicked men? But admit that a Commonweal may at the first be made of such a select number of good men; how long shall we think it can so stand? And that is it for which there neither is, nor euer was any pure Aristocratie; wherein the most vertuous onely had the soueraigntie. For albeit that the Pythagorians hauing drawne unto their line the most noble and honorable princes of Italie: in the time of king Seruius Tullius had chaunged certeine Tyrants, into iust Regalities, and were in hope also by little and little to have brought the Oligarchies, and Democraties, into Aristocraties, as in some places they had alreadie done: yet neuerthelesse it so fell out, that the popular men, and ringleaders of the people, seeing all power and authoritie, under the coulour of vertue, to be taken out of their hands, entered into great conspiracies, and so arming the people against the Pythagoreans, and the desperate rout, against the better sort: (as easie it was for the stronger to oppresse the weaker) burnt them in their diet, and massacred almost all the rest that escaped from the daunger of the fire: which shamefull murther of the Pythagorians raised great sturres in Italie.[*](Whersoeuer the lesser part of the people hath the soueraignties there is one kind or other of an Aristocratie.)

Wherefore whether they be of the better sort, or of the worse; of the richer sort, or of the poorer; of the nobler, or of the baser; of the more warlike, or otherwise which hold the soueraigntie, so that it be the lesser part of the citizens or people, we call it by the name of an Aristocratie. This lesser part of citizens or people we need not to define by any certein number: for that the varietie of numbers is infinite, and can by no man be comprehended. As admit there be ten thousand citizens, of whom an hundred have the soueraigntie; if in their common assemblie three score of them shall be of one[*](The lesser part of the people in an Aristocratie not to be defined by any certaine number.) opinion for the making of a law: that law shall in generall bind the other fortie which have part also in the soueraigntie, but are the fewer in number, together with the other nine thousand nine hundred excluded from the government, and the same three score being of one mind together, shall rule the whole ten thousand in particular: Neither yet for all that is the soueraigne right drawne unto those three score; But as in every lawfull Colledge and Corporation, the greater part is every where the better: so it followeth that three score being of one accord, shall over rule the other fortie both altogether and a part: except by law concerning soueraigntie it be prouided, that two thirds of the citizens agreeing among themselves, should preuaile against the rest; as we see it set downe in almost all the lawes and statutes of Colledges: by which

meanes threescore foure citizens, shall in the aforesaid number of an hundred, be superiou unto the other thirtie six. Wherefore in an Aristocratie we are not to have regard how little, or how great the number of the citizens is; prouided that they which have the soueraigntie over the rest, be fewer in number than the one half of the whole. For admit there be an hundred thousand citizens in a Commonweale, of whom ten thousand have the soueraigntie over the rest, it shall as well be called an Aristocratie; as if of ten thousand citizens, one thousand onely should hold the estate: considering that both in the one and other Commonweal, the tenth part hath the soueraigntie: so we may say where the hundred, or the thousand part of the citizens beare the sway; and the fewer that they be, the more assured and durable is the state; so that they be not at variance amongst themselves. As the estate of the Pharsalians was the most durable of [*](The Aristocratical estate of the Pharsalians.) Graece, and yet it had but twentie Gouernours. And the Lacedemonian Commonweal, which caried away the prize of honour from all the others of the East: albeit that it was most populous, yet for all that it had in it but thirtie Gouernours, chosen out of[*](The estate of the Lacedemonians.) the better sort, to continue in the government so long as they lived. The Epidaurians saith Plutarche had but an hundred and foure score of the noblest and welthiest of the citizens which had part in the soueraigntie: out of which number they chose the counsellours of the state. The auntient Commonweale of Marseilles in Prouence (which[*](The auntient estate of them of Marseilles.) in the iudgement of Cicero was the best ordered Commonweal that euer was in the world) had in it six hundred citizens which held the soueraigntie: out of which number of six hundred were taken the Senators, and fifteene magistrats, and of these fifteene magistrats were three Presidents set over them in maner of the Roman Praetors. The like we may deeme of the Rhodians and Theban Common-weales, after that their popular estates were chaunged into Aristocraties, the richer sort possessing themselves of the soueraigntie: than which nothing can bee more commodious for the Commonweal, especially if good citizens cannot be had. For which cause Titus Flaminius the Consul established the townes and cities of the Thessalians in forme of an Aristocratie, making Senatours and Iudges of the richer sort, and giuing to them the soueraigne power, whom it concerned most, that their Commonweal should continue in rest and peace. Which order Andrew Doria seemeth to have followed in[*](The Aristocraticall estate of Genua framed by Andrew Doria.) reforming the Commonweal of Genua, by him drawne from the obeysance of the French, in the yeare 1528, at which time he by the consent of the citizens there established an Aristocratie of eight and twentie families, chosen as well out of the base commonaltie, as out of the nobilitie, so that they had six houses within Genua, all whom by a law he made noble, & partakers of the soueraigntie of the state: leauing unto their discretion, every yere to chuse unto them ten other citizens, such as they should think fittest for their vertue, for their nobilitie or riches. Out of these eight and twentie families, he established a Counsell of fower hundred men, every yeare to be chosen for the government of the state: who also made choice of the Duke, and eight gouernours for two yeares to continue, whom together they call the Seignorie; for that unto them it belongeth to manage the waightie affaires of the Common wealth: except some such great matter happen, as may require the aduise of the Senate, which consisting of an hundred persons, is vsually every yeare chosen by the nobilitie, by secret voices, by lot giuen, as they do in Venice. And every one of these eight Gouernours after his office expired, continueth for two yeares Procurour of the Common wealth: and from that time forward, remayneth one of the priuie councell, together with them which are and have beene Dukes, who are Procurours of the Common weal so long as they live. Besides that there are fortie Captaines every yeare chosen, and an hundred men deputed to every one of those captaines, which is a legion of foure thousand men, appointed for the strength and defence of the citie: over which legion there is one Colonell, or chiefe Captaine, whom they call the Generall; who are all chosen by the voices of the nobilitie: As for their iurisdiction or administration of justice, they vse strangers, viz. a Praetor, who is alwaies a stranger; with two Lieutenants his assistants, the one for the receit, the other for criminall causes: and five other Ciuilians, judges for all priuat causes for two yeares, all strangers also; whom, they call the Rota. Yet besides them, there are seauen extraordinarie Iudges chosen out of the Citizens, for the extraordinarie deciding of causes. Besides whom were also five Syndicques to receiue informations against the Duke, and the eight Gouernours, after that their charge was expired, causing proclamation to be openly made, That if any man had any complaint against them, for any wrong or iniurie receiued from them, he should come in and be heard: at which time if none complained, they had letters testimoniall giuen them, in witnesse of their upright dealing in their office. The same yeare[*](The estate of Geneua) that Doria established an Aristocratie at Genua, they of Geneua also changed their Pontificall monarchie into a Popular state, gouerned in maner of an Aristocratie. And albeit that the Towne long time before pretended, it selfe not to bee subiect unto the laws either of the Duke of Sauoy or of the Pope, but to be free from them both; yet the citizens thought it not best for them to attempt any thing, vntill that discord about the Soueraigntie was risen not only betwixt the Duke & the bishop, but euen betwixt the bishop and the people also: at which time they tooke hold upon the occasion then presented unto their desires for the changing both of their Religion & state. Wherefore their Commonweale now set at libertie, they established a Counsell of two hundred citizens, with soueraigne and perpetuall power; but that the people still reserued unto themselves the confirmation of lawes, the election of their Syndicques and other the great magistrats, and the treaties of peace and warre; all which belong unto the right of Soueraigntie, as we have before declared. Now out of this great Counsell of two hundred, they made choice of a perpetuall Senat of threescore persons: and out of that Senat, they take five and twentie to be of the priuie Counsell for euer, chosen all by the great Counsell, and the foure Syndicques chosen every yeare for soueraigne Magistrats, beside the other Iudges and magistrats ordinarie. But the difference betwixt this Commonweal and that of Genua is notable, but especially in this, that the Genowaies vse every yeare to change their great Counsell of fower hundred, and Senat of three score, with other their Magistrats, except some few which continue for two yeares. Whereas the great Counsell of Geneua, the Senat, and priuie counsell are once chosen for euer: yet so, as that the censuring of every one of them every yere is still reserued unto the Citizens: which is most straitly looked vnto; whereby it commeth to passe, that the Commonweal of Geneua is more firme, and lesse subiect vnto alteration or seditious innouation than is that of Genua. Moreover the choice of the great Counsell, the Senat, and of the priuie Counsell at Geneua is not made all at once, as at Genes and Venice; but a roome being become void by the death or attainder of a councelour of the priuie Counsell of five and twentie, they proceed to the choice of an other out of the great counsell, to put in his place into the priuie Councell: and after that of a citizen, or at least wise of a Burgeois, to put into the great counsell, a man not any way sported or defamed: not hauing any regard in the choice of them, unto their wealth, or nobilitie, but in what they may vnto their vertue and integritie only: a thing (as we read) used amongst the Lacedemonians, who after the death of their Senators, made choice of others in respect of their honour and vertue onely.

The Swissers except the Grisons, and the other five little cantons, have almost the[*](The state of the) Swissers.) same forme of a Commonweale; as we see at Zurich the great Councell of two hundred,

the Senat, and the priuie Councell established after the maner of Geneua: or to say better, that of Geneua after the forme of Zurich; which is almost like unto that of Berne. Which neuerthelesse differ in this, that with these the great Councel & the Senat chaunge euerie yeare: which they do not at Geneua: for with these the fraternities, which they call Zunfft, euerie one of them composed of one, two or three occupations: which are eleuen at Schaffouse, twelue at Zurich, fifteene at Basil; and in other places more or lesse, chuse twelue persons of euerie fraternitie, for the great Councell: and for the Senat they chuse two, as at Zurich; or three, as at Basil; of whome one is the chiefe of the fraternitie. So that the great Councell at Zurich, consisteth of two hundreth, of 244 at Basil, of 86 at Schaffuse. And of Senators at Zurich the number is fiftie, at Schaffuse twentie sixe, and at Basil sixtie three. But they which are so chosen by the voyces of the fraternitie, are confirmed also by the great Councell, and by the Senators or magistrat, or by the old Senat, as at Basil. For the one halfe of the Senat is that which was before, which had the charge alreadie sixe monethes. And the other-moytie of the Senat, is of those which are but newly chosen, to the intent that the Senat should not be wholy chaunged all at once. True it is, that the auntient Senat of Basil, chose alwaies the Senat for the yeare following: and the Burgamasters who had for their companions three Tribunes at Zurich, and two at Basil, who with the Bourgamasters being foure, have nine other persons, as assistants ioyned unto them, and so together make the colledge of the thirteene men (as they call it) unto whome all the mannaging of the secret affaires of the Commonwealth are committed: and without whose authoritie nothing vsually is propounded vnto the Senat or great Councell to resolue of. There are also at Zurich eight men, which have charge of the common receit, over whome one Bourgomaster is gouernour. And at Zurich and Shaffuse the new Senators determine all causes criminall: whereas in all the other townes the Prouost of the empire, with three Senators in the name of the whole Senat decide the same: which prouost is also chosen of the Senat, and generally none may bee chosen into the Senat which is defamed or base borne. By all which it is manifest, that their estate is gouerned Aristocratically; and yet more at Berne, Lucerne, Friburg, and Sole---re, where the fraternities and companies have no voyces in the state, neither power o--- authoritie to meet together, more then for matters concerning their occupations and trades: but euerie yeare foure captaines or chiefe men of euerie citie, chose out sixteen other citisens, men of greatest integritie, and without all imputation: who three daies before Easter make choice of the great Councell, consisting of an hundred of the better sort of the citisens at Lucerne, and of more than two hundred at Berne: which great Councell afterwards chuseth the Auoyer, which they call Schuldthessen, and the other magistrats. And particularly the Auoyer, with the aforesaid sixteene, and the foure captaines chose the Senat, which is of xxvj at Berne, and xviij at Lucerne: who have the power of the state at Berne for a yeare. The foure captaines are also annuall chosen by the great Councell; by which captaines and the treasurors, all the judges are ---lected and confirmed by the Senat: which Senat hath also the deciding of the first appeales. The second appeales are decided by the same Senat of xxvj, and xxvj others whome the Senat shall make choice of. But the last appeale of all is unto the great Councell, the chiefe whereof is the Auoyer: where if question be of the life, fame, or fortune of any the citisens: it is by the decree there made decided, without further appeale. The same order almost is used in the state of Friburg, in making choyce of the great Councell, consisting of two hundred of the better sort of the citisens: by whome afterward is chosen the Senat of twentie foure persons, and the Auoyer with the foure captaines.

Whereby it is well to be vnderstood those estates of the Swissers to bee Aristocratique,[*](The estate of the Swissers Aristocraticall, et temperated with a certaine mixtu of popularitie.) yet popularly tempered: for that the way is open for all the citisens of what de gree soeuer unto all the officers and places of commaund, benefits and charge in the Commonweale, if they be not men infamed, distracted of their wits, or otherwise vtterly ignorant of government. That is also belonging unto popularitie, that almost all their magistrats are annuall: which temperature of the better or richer sort with the meaner or poorer, in being capable of the honours of the Commonweale, maketh the same much more firme and stable, than if the honours and preferments were communicated but unto the Senators or richer sort onely; with whome the vulgar people is most commonly at oddes: and that so much the more amongst the Swissers, where the nobilitie (except some few) long sithence destroyed and almost rooted ou---, the people tooke upon them the soueraigntie: which by little and little falling againe unto the nobil---itie (excepting in the five mountaine cities) have with a popular moderation tempered their states with better lawes and orders than the rest. For commonly the Aristocraticall state admitteth none but the Senators, the nobilitie, or richer sort, unto the honours and offices of the state, the rest being quite excluded. Howbeit there have bene moe Aristocraties, consisting of the more auntient and noble families, than of the richer or more vertuous. As the Commonweales of the Samians, the Corcyreans, the Rhodians, and Cnidians, and almost all the Commonweales of Greece, after the victorie of Lysander, were by him chaunged into Aristocraties of the most auntient families, in chusing out ten or twentie, or at the most thirtie, unto whome hee committed the soueraigntie for the government of their estates. Wee see also the state of Venice, to be as we have before shewed meere Aristocratike: And them also of Rhaguse, of Luca, of Ausbourg, of Nuremberg, to be composed in forme of Aristocraties, of the most auntient families, although they be but few in number. For as for the Rhagusians[*](The estate of the Rhagusians.) (in auntient time called Epidaurians) hauing new built the citie of Rhaguse, neere unto the auntient citie of Epidaurus, vtterly rased by the furie of the Gothes, and exempting themselus from the government of the Alhanois, established among themselves an Aristocratike forme of a Commonwealth, gouerned by the most noble and auntient families; following therein almost the example of the Venetians: yet still much more respectiue and carefull of their nobilitie, than are the Venetians. For a Venetian gentleman may marrie a base woman, or a common citisens daughter: whereas the Rhagusian gentleman may not marrie a common citisen, neither a straunger, how noble soeuer, if she be not a gentlewoman of Zarafi, or Catharo, and bee farther worth at the least a thousand ducats. There are also but twentie foure houses, which have part in the state: out of whom are drawne diuers families, out of which the great Councell of about three hundred gentlemen is drawne; prouided alwaies that they bee twentie yeares old, when they are so chosen. These make choyce of threescore gentlemen Senators, for the mannaging of the affaires of the state, and in cases of appeale, so that they be aboue the value of three hundred ducats: who have also the hearing of criminall causes of importance, as if question be of the life, honour, or state of any gentleman. Beside this Senat there is a priuie councell of twelue persons, with a yearely prince or gouernour of the citie; and five masters of requests (whome they call Prouisors) men appointed to receiue the requests of the people presented unto them in what court soeuer. There are also six Consuls to decide civill causes, and five other judges for criminall matters, and thirtie others for the deciding of such suits and controuersies as exceed not the summe of three hundred ducats. Many other meaner officers they have also, of whome we will in due place speake. Truely this Commonweale of Rhaguse hath of all others that we have heard, the purest Aristocratie, and farthest from all popular mixture. The citie of Luca also gouerned after the same fashion, admitteth [*](The estate of of Luca.) onely the auntient families to bee partakers of the soueraigntie of their government, who are but few, albeit that about the yeare 1555 there were numbred two and fiftie thousand citisens, besides women. Out of the nobilitie are created an hundred & twentie yearely Senators: out of whome are chosen the ten Councellors of the priuie Councell, with the prince whome they call the Gonfalonnier. And in these consisteth the soueraigne state of this Commonweale. Other officers there be also, as Censors, Pretors, and Receiuers, of whome we will in due place speake. Suffiseth it now for the present to have shewed diuers Aristocraticall estates, in respect of soueraigntie, to the end by diuers examples both of the auntient and new Commonweales, we may the better vnderstand the true nature of an Aristocratie.

And forasmuch as diuers men beleeue, and some of them of greatest knowledge of[*](Whether the Germaine empire be a Monarchie, or a eere Aristocratie.) the Germans have by writing also published, the German empire to be a true Monarchie: we will also speake of that estate, whereof although we have in briefe somewhat spoken before, yet here we will more at large thereof discourse, and show the same to be an Aristocraticall estate. True it is, that from the time of Charlemaigne unto the raigne of Henrie surnamed the Falconer, it was a pure Monarchie by right of succession, continued in the royall blood of the said Charlemaigne. But the descent of Charlemaigne, taking end in this Henrie the Falconer, the Monarchie by the voyces of the princes being translated from this Henrie, hath of long time continued by the right of election: insomuch that the seuen princes Electours, hauing by little and lirtle withdrawne the soueraigntie, have left nothing vnto the emperour, but the ba---e marks therof in show; the soueraigntie it selfe in effect remaining unto the state of the seuen electors, of three hundred German princes or thereabouts, and the ambassadours deputed for the imperial cities. Which when it first happened, I see no man to have yet written▪ For that such things as by little and little and little creepe into a Commonweale, are scarcely at all perceiued, neither well felt, vntill the change bee quite made. Now wee have before shewed that it is an Aristocratike state, wheresoeuer the lesser part of the citisens or people commaund over the rest together, and over euerie one in particular. And so it is, that the estates of the empire, composed of three or foure hundred men (a--- [*](In whom the soueraigntie of the Germaine empire consistteth.) I have said) have the soueraigne power priuatly over the emperour himselfe, and over all the other princes, and townes of the empire in particular: as also to giue lawes to all the subiects of the empire, to determine of peace and warre, to lay taxes and impositions upon the people, to appoint judges both ordinarie and extraordinarie, to iudge of the goods, honour, and lives of the emperour, the princes and imperiall townes: which all are the true markes of soueraigntie. Which if it be so, as most certaine it is, who can denie but that the state of the German empire is a true Aristocratie? And that to bee true which I haue said, is most euident; sith it is so, that the power of soueraigne commaund dependeth of the acts and decrees of the estates. But the decrees are made by the seuen princes electors, accounted for one third part of the voyces: and by the other princes of the empire, in number not aboue three hundred, who have also another third part of the voyces: and by the deputies of the free cities or imperiall townes, in number seuentie, or thereabouts, which have the other third part of the deliberatiue voyces: by whome all the lawes and decrees of the empire, or whatsoeuer els is propounded, have used to be made, established, disanulled, or confirmed. And hath nothing particular in respect of the state, different from other Aristocraties, but that the seuen princes electors have (as we said) one third part of the voyces; the princes another, and the imperiall townes the rest: in such sort, as that if the seuen electors and the deputies, or the deputies and the princes, or the electors and the other princes,

be of accord and agree in one, the decree whatsoeuer passeth. And for that the ecclesiastical princes are the greater number, they oftentimes carrie away the matter against the lay princes: which was the cause that the same lay princes, who had before renounced the Romish religion, tooke in euill part the diet which Charles the fift held at Ratisbon; neither being thither sent for, would come. And like as the gentlemen of Venice, Luca, and Rhaguse, vntil they be twentie yeares old enter not into the great councell, neither have any part in the soueraigntie: euen so likewise the children or neere kinsmen of the German princes, be they young, or be they old, have no voyces in the diet, if they be not qualified princes of the empire: which are a certaine number of Dukes, Marquesses, Counties, Lantgraues, Burgraues, Margraues, Barons, Archbishops, Bishops, and Abbats. And albeit that the duke of Loraine be a prince of the empire, and hath a voyce with the rest of the princes, yet so it is, that his vncle the countie Vaudemont, of the same stocke and house with him, as other like princes of the same ranke and order, have neither voyces nor places in the assembly of the states and princes of the empire, but are reckoned amongst the children of those princes. Howbeit yet many are of opinion, the princes and imperial cities to have their soueraigne states apart, neither to be bound unto any other mens commaunds or lawes, otherwise than as friends and confederats; in such sort and manner, as the Swissers have their cities and iurisdictions among themselves, one divided from another. But the difference is to him that looketh neerer thereinto, right great, euerie Canton being soueraigne in it self, and not subiect unto the lawes and commaundements of others; neither otherwise bound among themseues, than in aliance offensiue or defensiue, as we have in due place declared: whereas the German empire is vnited by the estates generall in soueraigntie, who not onely have power to bridle the princes and cities, with fines, exile, proscription, and other seuere punishments, but also to depose and thrust out of the empire euen the emperours themselves, as they did the emperours Adolphus and Venes---aus, with many others. Beside that, the estates make ordinatie decrees and lawes, which bind all the subiects of the empire, as well in generall, as in particular. And that more is, the ten circles or circuits of the empire, hold their particular estates, and yet bring their requests, complaints, and grieuances, unto the estates generall, to receiue their commandements and resolutions, as lawes. Moreover the princes electours, the day after the [*](The princes Electors hold their states of the empire and not of the emperour.) coronation of the emperour, protest themselves to hold their states of the empire, and not of the emperour, albeit that they doe their homage betwixt the emperours hands. In briefe, all iurisdiction and soueraigntie of all appeales in civill causes, aboue twentie crownes by the auntient lawes, and fortie by the new, appertaine unto the imperiall chamber, as to all the appeales of the subiects of the empire: which chamber is composed of twentie foure judges, and one prince of the empire, chosen euerie yeare, according to the order of the ten prouinces or circuits. And if so be that any controuersie arise betwixt any of the princes, or the imperiall cities themselves; whether it bee for their bounds, their lives, their honour or states, the deciding thereof belongeth unto the judges of the imperial court: except it please the whole states of the empire to take unto themselves the hearing and determining of the matter, in such their generall assemblies as we have before spoken of. As in the yeare 1555, it is set downe in a decree of the empire, That if from that time forward any prouince, prince, towne, or subiect of the empire should beare armes against the German nation, hee should bee iudged by the states of the empire; who to that end were appointed to hold a diet at Wormes. And in the same diet holden at Ausburg, it was forbidden all the princes of the empire, to raise any armie, or to take up armes in the aid of any straunge prince, and that uppon a great penaltie. And that more is, it is expresly and most straitly forbidden by the laws [*](Lib. 2. cap. 28.) of the empire, any prince, towne, or corporation, to be so hardie, as to prohibit or let the appeales of the subiects unto the imperiall chamber, and that upon great paine also. And in fine, the emperour himselfe, as head of the assemblie of the states, more straitly bindeth them as it were into one bodie and Commonweale, than if they were but of[*](The maiestie of the empire not to rest in the emperour but in the whole assemblie of the estates of the empire.) themselves onely: and yet in him resteth not the maiestie of the empire, but in the whole assemblie of the states. For other which hold the soueraigne power in Commonweales, doe themselves creat princes, dukes, and earles, whereas the emperour is himselfe by the other dukes and princes of the empire created. How therefore can hee being the selfe same man be both the soueraigne and subiect of the empire, lord, and vassall, maister, and yet constrained to be obedient unto the estates? And not unto the estates onely, but euen unto the deputies and lieutenants of the empire? Which unto some may seeme right straunge, and yet is indeed most true. I truely my selfe haue read the letters of a great lord, pentionarie unto the king, directed unto Mommorancie the Connestable, bearing date the twelft of May, in the yeare 1552: whereby hee aduertiseth, that Henrie the second (then the French king) had iust cause to complaine unto the duke of Saxonie, and the countie Palatine, lieutenant for the empire, to have iustice against the emperour Charles the fift and his brother Ferdinand king of the Romans, according to the golden bull, and decrees of the states: for that they contrarie unto the lawes of the empire and customes of their auncestors, hauing intercepted the kings letters directed unto the estates of the empire, had not suffered the same to bee unto them delivered, but also forbidden the archbishop of Mets, chauncelour of the empire to receiue or present the same unto the states, as his office was. And by the assemblie of the imperiall diet holden at Heidelberg, in the yere 1553, it was decreed, that none of the emperours court should mannage any the affaires of the empire; as I have seene by letters from the French ambassadour. And as for monies extraordinarily raysed by the decree of the estates, for the affaires of the empire, they are not brought into the emperours coffers, but are laid safely up in store in certaine cities therefore appointed: viz. Strausbourg, Lubec, and Ausbourg: Neither is it lawfull for the emperour to take so much as one peny out of the common treasure, without the consent of the state. Al which most plainly show them to be in an errour, and much deceiued, which call the German emperour a Monarch; or which deeme that Aristocraticall estate to bee a right Monarchie. Whereas all to the contrarie the emperour Maximilian the first, great grandfather to him which now raigneth (albeit that hee was ambitious enough) yet in a discourse which hee had with the states of the empire concerning such matter, told them, That hee thought it not needfull to take the imperiall crowne at the hands of the Bishop of Rome, neither to stand upon such ceremonies, seeing that the soueraigne power, as they knew, rested in the states themselves. Neither is it lawfull for the emperour of himselfe, or at his pleasure to call together a diet of the empire, without some especiall and extraordinarie vrgent cause, neither to dissolue the same: but at the breaking up of euerie diet, order is there taken for the diet to bee holden the yeare next following. So that it is not lawfull for the emperour to rall an assemblie of the states, which it was lawfull for the Roman magistrats to do, as also for other magistrats in euerie popular and Aristocraticall Commonweale, so that it were done by commaunding of euerie one, as in particular, but not of altogether, as in common: After the auntient manner of the Romans, whereby the Consull might by his edict call together all the Senators, one by one into the Senat, upon paine of proceeding against them, by seising upō their bodies or goods, by way of imprisonment, taking of pledges or rasing of their houses. And yet for all that the German princes are not bound to come unto the diet of the empire, if they be by none commaunded, but by the emperour, as they gaue Charles the fift the emperour well to vnderstand, in the yeare 1554: and also Maximilian the second, refusing in the yeare 1566, to have any diet then according to his request holden. And if it fortune the emperour, or king of the Romans, to come unto the frontiers of their territories, the princes euerie one of them in their degree goe to meet them, but yet in such sort, as if it were but to meet a straunge prince.

Now if one should say that the Emperour beareth himselfe as a Iudge, and determiner[*](How the emperour determineth the quarels and controuersies betwixt the princes, or the imperial town of the empire.) of all quarrels and controuersies betwixt the Princes, or the imperiall Townes; True it is at the first motion, and when the parties are content to accept thereof, and that also but as Lieutenant for the Empire: as in like case the Duke of Saxonie, and the Countie Palantine might also iudge as the Imperiall Lieutenants: and yet for all this, appeal made unto the Estates of the Empire suspendeth the power of the Emperour, aswell as of the imperiall Lieutenants. Yet might some say, that the Princes of the Empire by their letters, and in the assemblies of the States, vse these magnificall titles towards the Emperour, Your sacred Maiestie, and such like, which cannot be applied but unto him which is himselfe a Soueraigne: such as slaues would scarce vse towards[*](Glorious flattering itles giuen to princes neuer awhit encrease their souerign ti.) the greatest kings on earth: titles for fashion sake, foolishly or wickedly (should I say) giuen by flatterers unto men, which are onely fitting the most mightie and immortall God. And yet do in deed no more increase the power of the Germaine Emperour, then of the King of the Romains: whom by such like prodigall pompe and words, a man might also think to have the power of soueraigne Maiestie; so that in that Empire there should be two Soueraignes: and yet for all that one of them subiect unto the other. For so George Helfustein Baron of Gondelphfingen, pronouncing the speach of Ferdinand king of the Romans in the generall assemblie of the States of the Empire in the yeare 1556, calleth him their Soueraigne Lord.

But the greatest argument of Soueraigntie is, that the Emperour giueth the fees of[*](How the emperour bestowe the fees of the empire.) the Empire being void, unto whom he pleaseth, and inuesteth in them whom he seeth good: and that without the consent of the States. Whereunto I againe answere, that the expresse consent of the Estates is not necessarie, and yet is it not altogether done without their good liking, who neuerthelesse permit the same; when as they might aswell cut of this point, as they have done the other marks of Soueraigntie. And howbeit that the embasadour Marillac was of opinion, that the Emperour had not this power: and therefore aduertised king Henry, how that the Emperour Charles the fift had at Bruxels in the yeare 1551, inuested Philip of Spaine in the Duchie of Millan without the consent of the States of the empire: yet can he not find so much as any one inuestiture of any Imperiall fee, in the conferring whereof the expresse consent of the Estates was had. But certein it is, that the Emperour bestoweth not these fees or inuestitures, but as in qualitie of the Lieutenant of the empire: in such sort as he receiueth the fealtie and homage of the princes, for, and in the name of the empire. As in like case Ferdinand the emperour without the consent of the estates of the empire, receiued Granuellan sent unto him with speciall charge and deputation from Philip king of Spayne in the yeare 1565, to do for him the fealtie and homage due unto the Empire, for the Duchie of Millan, and the perpetuall Lieutenancie of the principalitie of Sienna: granting unto him as a vassall of the Empire charters of his fealtie done: and for the confirmation of his possession therein. The same is to be thought concerning the confirmations of benefices, and other royall rights, which giuen by the princes or cities of the empire, or by the Chapters and Colleges of priests themselves, are yet neuerthelesse to be confirmed by the Imperial authoritie: according to the agreement made betwixt the Bishop of Rome, and the estates of the Empire. As for letters of

safe conduct which he giueth vnto embassadors, heralts at armes, and other strangers, [*](The maiestie of the Germaine emperour by this French author still empaired) whereunto the ordinarie clause is adioyned in these words, Forasmuch as wee for our Imperiall power may do all things: they show right well that the Emperour was in auncient time a soueraigne Monarchie; which he now is not: For why then should the Electors and other princes of the Empire refuse to grant unto the emperour, the diet which he requested of them in the yeare 1566? or why then should both hee and his officers be by them forbidden so much as to touch the monies by them raised for the maintenance of the warres. And to cut it short, we need not but to look into the articles of the oath made by the Emperours (by vs before declared) to know yet more euidently, that the soueraigntie of the Empire is not any wise in the emperour, albeit that he carrie the crowne, the scepter, and weare the other most precious and imperial habits, and in all solemnities and ceremonies hath the precedence before other the Christian kings, yea and that men attribute unto him the title of Most sacred Maiestie, all in deed hauing the show of soueraigne and royall maiestie, but yet not the thing it selfe. And yet to say the trueth, a man knoweth not how to do him so great honour as the maiestie of the sacred empire, whereof he is the head, deserueth. But the maner[*](A great pollicy in Aristocratical estates to giue unto him least power to whom they giue most honour.) of well gouerned Aristocratike states, is to graunt unto him the least power to whom they giue the greatest honour: and sometimes also least honour unto them that be of most power: as of all others the Venetians in the ordering and government of their Commonweal best know how to vse that matter. Seeing therefore wee have thus showed the Empire to bee but an Aristocraticall estate, we may well conclude, That there is neither prince nor imperiall citie which hath therein the soueraigntie, being nothing else but members of the empire, every one of them gouerning their estate under the power, and without any thing derogating from the lawes and ordinances of the empire. Wherein many are deceiued, which make so many Commonweals as there are princes and imperiall townes; the contrarie wherof we have before showed. But as in this realme every citie and feigniorie have their Iudges, Consuls, Sheriffes, and other their particular officers which gouerne their estate; so is it in the Imperiall townes and cities: but that here are moe roiall judges; whereas in the empire there is none but the Imperiall chamber onely which receiueth the Appeales from the other judges and lieutenants of the empire. And yet neuerthelesse when it chanceth the empire to be divided into factions, and part takings; or that the princes bandie them selues one of them against an other (which hath beene too often seene) then every towne and prince for the most part beare them selues as diuers Aristocraticall estates, and particular Monarchies; making of every member a particular bodie of a soueraigne Commonweale.

Now as the state of the Empire it selfe is entirely Aristocratique, so also the great imperiall townes and cities hold their estates in Aristocraticall forme: as Ausburg, Nuremberg, Wormes, and others, which are almost all Aristocraties; albeit that in trueth some of them are more popular than others, as is the citie of Strasbourg. But for breuitie sake I will for example onely set downe the state of the citie of Nuremberg,[*](The estate of Nuremberg Aristocraticall.) the greatest, most famous, and best ordered of all the imperial cities, established in forme of an Aristocratie; wherein of an infinite number of citisens there are but xxviij. auntient families which have power over all the rest of the subiects, which are within the iurisdiction of Nuremberg. Out of these xxviij. families, they every yeare first make choice of two Censors, men without any imputation; which done, all the rest of the magistrats are every one of them displaced: then these Censors according to their owne discretion make choice of xxvj. Senators: who out of themselves chuse xiij. persons, for the managing of the secret affaires of that Commonweal: and out of

the same Senat also make choice of other xiij. Sheriffes also: beside the vij. Bourgmasters, which are an other particular counsell, whose authoritie aud power is much like unto that of the Decemuiri in Venice. And these Magistrats which we have spoke of, are they which mannage all the greatest affaires of that Commonwealth. I speak not of the five criminall judges: nor of the twelue appointed for the deciding of civill causes; neither of the Prouiditor for victuals, the two treasurers: nor of the three maisters of the wards: almost of like authoritie with the procurators of Saint Marke at Venice, to the imitation of whome they of Nuremberg seeme in some sort to have bene desirous to fashion their Commonweale. And albeit that of the imperiall townes some of them be freer than other; as are those which be neither in subiection nor protection of other princes, namely Nuremberg, Strasbourg, Lubec, Hambourg, Breme, Wormes, and Spires. Yet so it is, that they all as subiects have a reuerent regard unto the maiestie of the German empire. True it is, that there are many which have exempted themselves from the power of their princes, to maintaine themselves in libertie: and now of late to hold of the empire, as the towne of Brunswich, which hath withdrawne it selfe from the obeysance of the princes of Brunswich, Wormes and others, which[*](Most of the Iperiall cities of Germanie gouerned in form o Aristocraties.) have exempted themselves from the power of their auntient lords. As in like case the Swissers and Grisons, now divided Commonweals, but sometimes subiects of the empire. And namely, the lords of the Canton of Fribourg, in the treatie of Combourgeoisie, betwixt them and the lords of Berne, call the towne of Fribourg a member of the empire, albeit that they have their state therefrom divided unto themselves in full soueraigntie. Some others acknowledge and confesse themselves to hold their liberties and priuileges, for the government of their estate from the emperour; as they of Vri, vnderuald, and Schwits, hauing their letters patents therefore from Lewes of Bauaria the emperour, bearing date the yeare 1316. They also of Tietmarsh for the confidence they had reposed in the strength and situation of their countrey, (placed in the frontiers of the kingdome of Denmarke) withdrew themselves from the German empire, and established their Commonweale in forme of an Aristocrati---, of eight and fortie of the better sort of them, who so long as they live have the soueraigntie, and when one of them is dead, still chusing another in his place. True it is, that in the yeare 1559, Adolph duke of Holst did what he could to haue subdued them, pretending that Christiern his great grandfather had of the emperour Frederike the third obtained the soueraigntie over them of Tietmarsh, for hauing dismembred themselves from the empire; as I have seene by the letters of Maister Danzai, ambassadour for the king into Denmarke.

Wherefore it is manifest not onely the whole estate of the Germaine empire, but euen the imperiall citties, themselves also to be gouerned in manner and forme of pure Aristocraties. But heere we must have regarde in considering of the Aristocratique estate that wee confound not the princes and chiefe magistrates of a Commonweale with kings: nor a counsell of the nobilitie with a Senate: wherein Historiographers often times erre and goe astray, and that specially when as in a Commonweale there are so few of the nobilitie or better sort to mannage the state, as that they are both Senatours and magistr ats: which government of few, the Greekes call an Oligarchie. So the Pharsalian estate was gouerned by twentie of the nobilitie: the Lacdemonians by thirtie, neither were there moe in all the cities of the Greeks after the victorie of Lysander. They of Thetmarsh were gouerned by eight and fortie; and had no other Senatours then the Seignorie it selfe: the Cnidians by threestore (whome of their integritie of life they called Amymones) but these were but annuall magistrates: whereas the other were perpetuall. And all be it that the Cnidians neuer gaue any account

of that they had done in time of their government, yet were they not therefore soueraigne lords, but soueraigne magistrats; who their magistracie once expired, were again to restore unto the nobilitie, the soueraigne governments by them committed to their charge. In like case they of Zurich chose euerie yeare thirtie six magistrats, of whom twelue by course gouerned foure moneths: which forme of government continued unto the yeare 1330, that the common people enraged and rising up in mutinie cast them out, creating in their stead a Senat of two hundred of the nobility, with a Consull chiefe amongst them: and all those estates had the counsell of their nobilitie and Senat all one. Yet doe they better and much more surely, which in an Aristocratie (how little soeuer) be it deuide the counsell of the nobilitie from the Senat: as amongst the Rhagusians, where although the number be but small of them that gouerne that Commonweale, being it selfe shut up into a small roome: yet of them is made a Senat of threescore men, out of whom are selected twelue to mannage the secret affaires of their state. Heretofore also the Commonweale of Chio established in forme of an Aristocratie by certaine Genua gentlemen of the house Austinian, hauing won it from the emperours of Constantinople; every yeare made choice of twelue counsellors of estate for the Senat: out of whome they chose foure, who with one soueraigne prince or magistrat gouerned all the affaires of state: the authoritie of which foure for all that, was but for six months, the soueraign magistrat yet stil holding his place for two yeres: in which manner of government they honorably maintained their estate, vntill that of late yeares it was by the Grand Signior taken from the Genowayes, and so vnited unto the Turkish empire.

And thus much concerning the definition of an Aristocratie. Now as concerning the profits and dangers incident unto an Aristocratique estate: & the manner of the government thereof, we will in due place declare. It resteth now to answere unto that[*](Four sortes of Aristocraties by Aristotle set downe.) which Aristotle saith concerning an Aristocratie, being altogether contrarie unto that which is by vs before set downe. There are ([*](Plit lib. 4. Cap. .) saith hee) foure sorts of Aristocraties: The first, where none but the richer sort, and that to a certaine reuenue, haue pan in the government of the Seignorie: The second, where the estates and offices are giuen by lot unto them which hold most wealth: The third, where the children succeed their fathers, in the government of the Seignory: And the fourth, when they which take upon them the state, vse a lordlike power and commaund without lawe. And yet neuertheles in the same booke, and a little after, hee maketh five sorts of Commonweales, viz. the Regall, the Popular, the gouerment of a few, the government of the nobilitie▪ and after these a fift kind, composed of the other foure: which (as hee saith[*](* Lib. 4. Cap. 7.) afterwards) is no where to be found. But such a medley of Commonweales wee haue before not onely by probable but euen by necessarie reasons also, prooued to bee impossible, and by nature altogether imcompatible: wherefore letting that passe, let vs now also show the diuers formes of Aristocraties by Aristotle set downe, to bee no way considerable. First hee no where defineth what an Aristocratie is: the verie cause of his errour. For what can bee more vaine, than to say it to be an Aristocratie where the ritcher or the better sort have onely part in the government?[*](Aristot. by the author impugned.) For it may bee that of ten thousand citisens, six thousand of them hauing two hundred crownes of yerely reuenue, have all part in the Seignorie; and yet neuerthelesse the state shall be a popular state, considering that the greater part of the citisens have the soueraignitie: for otherwise there shall be no popular Commonweale at all. The like might be said for the government of the better sort also, who might chaunce to be the greater number of the citisens, which should have part in the Seignorie: and yet according to the opinion of Aristotle, it should also be an Aristocraticall estate, albe---

it that the greater part of the people beare therein the sway. As for the government of good men, if we shall measure them according to the highest degree and perfection of vertue, we shall not finde one such: but if after the common manner, and opinion of the people, so euerie man will call himselfe a good man. But to iudge of an other[*](Hard to iudge who is a good man.) mans integritie and vertue, as it is an hard matter for any man to do, so hath it it also unto wisemen alwaies seemed a thing most dangerous: Insomuch that the wise and graue Cato being chosen out for the purpose, durst not giue sentence whether Q. Luctacius was a good man or not. But admit that in euerie Commonweale the good are in number fewer than the bad; & yet have the government of the common state: why for the same reason hath not Aristotle made one sort of Aristocraty, wherin the nobilitie hold the soueraignitie? seeing that they are euer fewer in nūber then the base & vulgar sort: why also maketh he not an other sort of Aristocratie, wherein the most antitient families although but of base degree bore rule? As it chanced in Florence after that the nobilitie were driuen out. For it is right certain that there are many base families, who although they be not famous or much spoken of for any great thing by them or their auncestours done, are yet more auncient and honest then a number of upstart gentlemen, who happily scarce knowe their owne fathers. He might also make an other sort of Aristocratie, wherein the tallest and greatest should have the soueraignitie as he himselfe[*](Poli. lib. 3. Cap. 5.) saith they do in Ethiopia: and so consequently also an Aristocratie of the fairest, of the strongest, of the valiantest, of the wisest, of the learnedst, and of others with such like qualities of the bodie, or of the minde: as wee see to bee incident but into the fewer sort: whereof should ensue an infinite multitude and varietie of Aristocratique Commonweales. But that seemeth also unto mee most strange that hee should say the second sort of an Aristocraty, to be where the richer sort by lot have the government and mannaging of the state, whereas alwaies, elsewhere, hee had said lots properly to appertaine unto the popular state. Thus the Athenian Commonweale was of all other most popular, he with Xenophon agreeth: and yet for all that the greatest honours, offices, and preferments were not their giuen, but unto the richest before the time of Pericles. And in Rome which was also a popular state, before the law Canuleia the greatest honours, priesthood, and preferments, were not bestowed upon any of the common vulgar sort of people, but upon the most auntient gentlemen whome they called Patricii: a most certain argument that the Commweale may be--- in state popular, and yet gouerned Aristocratically: and that there is a notable difference betwixt the state of a Commweale; and the government of the same, as we have before said. As for the fourth sort of Aristocraties, wherin (as Aristotle saith) some few which take upon them the mannaging of the state, vse a Lordlike power and commaund over all without law, in manner of a tiranie: we have before showed the difference betwixt a Monarchie royall, Lordlike, and tirannical: the like difference whereof is also in the Aristocraticall government: wherein the Lords may gouerne their subiects as slaues, and dispose of their goods, as may the Lordly Monarke, without law and yet without tiranising also: not vnlike the good maister of the familie, who is alwaies more carful of his slaues, than of his hired Seruants: and so also loueth them better. For why it is not the law which maketh the iust and rightfull government, but the true administration of iustice, and equall distribution thereof. And the fairest thing in the world that can be desired in matter of state, (in the iudgement of Aristotle himselfe)[*](A wise and vetuous king the greatest ornament and stay of a Commonwe ) is to have a wise and vertuous king, knowing how to gouerne his people without lawe: considering that the lawe oftentimes serueth many but as a snare to deceiue and snarle men in: and is also of it selfe dumb and inexorable: as the nobilitie of Rome complained at such time as the people would needes haue lawes, and be gouerned by them, after that the kings were driuen out, who gouerned without law & gaue iudgement according to the diuersitie of the facts or causes presented before them: which manner of iustice the consulls and nobilitie, who in some measure held the Commonweale in an Aristocratique state continued, vntil that the people desirous to bring it unto a popularitie, requested to bee gouerned by the equalitie of lawes, and not to have their lives, fame, and fortune, to depend of the iudgement of the nobilitie & choice magistrats only: which their request after that it had bin, with much a do 6 yeres debaited, against the Lordlike Aristocraticall government of the nobilitie: they at length at the instance of their Tribune Terentius Arsa caused it to passe in force of a law, that from that time forward the nobilitie, consulls, and magistrates, should themselves as well as the people, be bound to all such lawes, as the Decemviri to that purpose appointed by the people should set downe and make. It is not therfore the law which maketh good Princes, or magistrats in a Commonweale, be it a Monarchie or Aristocratie; but upright reason and iustice, engrauen in the mindes and soules of iust princes and Magistrats; and that much better then in tables of stone. Neither euer were there more cruell tirants then were they, which bound their subiects with greatest multitude of edicts[*](Neuer worse government then where the greatest multitude of lawes w.) and lawes, which ---he tyrant Caligula of purpose, and to no purpose, caused to bee set downe in so small letter, as that they could hardly be of any man red, but with Linceus eyes, to the intent thereby to entangle the moe through ignorance transgressing the same: whose successour and vncle Claudius in one day made twentie edicts: and yet for all that there was neuer greater tiranie then then: neither worse or more vilanous men. But as an Aristocratie well ordered is of it selfe a maruelous faire and goodly state: so can there be none worse if it be once corrupted: when as for one tirant there[*](No forme of a commonweale worse then a corrupt Aristocratie) shal be many: and that especially when the nobilitie shal bandie it selfe against the people: as it often times chaunceth; and as we reade it to have in auncient time fallen out, when as in many Aristocratique estates none was by the nobilitie admitted into their number for the government of the state; but that they must first sweare, to be for euer enemies unto the people, and all popular men: a course not so much tending to the destruction of the cominaltie and people, as of the nobilitie and mightie men themselves: and so to the vtter subuersion of all Aristocraties, as we shall in due place declare And thus concerning the Aristocraticall estate: now let vs likewise see what a popular estate is.