The six books of a common-weale

THe proprietie of the word Tyrant, being not well knowne, hath deceiued[*](Who is properly a Tyrant and that hee may lawfully be of any man slaine.) many, and armed the subiects unto the destruction of their princes. We haue before said him properly to be called a Tyrant, who of his owne authoritie taketh upon him the soueraigntie, against the will of the people, without election, or right of succession, neither by lot, by will, nor iust warre, nor speciall calling of God: and this is he, whome poth the lawes and the writings of auntient fathers commaund to bee slaine; propounding also most ample rewards unto such as should kill him: viz. the honourable titles of nobilitie and prowesse, armes, statues, crownes, and in briefe the goods of the Tyrant also; as vnto the true deliverer of his countrey, or as the Cretensians vse to say of his mother. Neither in this case make they any difference betwixt a good and a vertuous prince; or a wicked man and a villaine. For it is not lawfull for any man liuing, of himselfe to inuade the soueraigntie, and to make himselfe maister

of his fellowes, what colour of vertue or iustice soeuer they pretend: and that more is, in law he is guiltie of death, that wrongfully taketh uppon him any the markes proper unto soueraigne maiestie. If then the subiect will inuade or take uppon him the state of his king by any meanes whatsoeuer; or in a popular or Aristocraticall state, doth of a companion make himselfe a soueraigne, hee deserueth death: So that our question in this respect hath in it no difficultie, but that such aspirers may of all the people, or any of them, be lawfully slaine. Yet true it is, that the Greekes have in this point differed from the Latins; as whether a man in this case ought by way of fact to preuent[*](Whether a Tyrant may be lawfully slayne before he be lawfully tried and conuicted▪) the course of iustice? For why, the law Valeria published at the request of Pub. Valerius Publicola giueth leaue to every man to kill a Tyrant, and afterward to trie the cause of him so slaine. Which law seemeth also not to want good ground of reason: for that to proceed by way of iustice, the Commonweale should bee consumed with the firebrands of tyranny, before the fire once kindled could bee quenched: Besides that, who should cal into question of iustice the Tyrant, armed with his guard and garrisons? who should take him being possessed of the castles and strong holds? were it not better by times to oppresse him by force, than by too religious standing upon the proceeding of the law, to loose the law together with the state? Howbeit the law of Solon is quite contrarie unto this, expresly forbidding to proceed by way of fact, or to kil him that seeketh to possesse himselfe of the soueraigntie, but first to bring him unto his triall; which seemeth more reasonable than the law Valeria: For that otherwise good & innocent men might oftentimes be taken out of the way and slaine by their enemies, under the color of aspiring, before the truth could be tried: who so once dead, are in that regard alwayes accounted as men iustly slaine. But these two lawes so repugnant and contrarie, may in mine opinion thus be well reconciled; if the meaning of Solons law be referred unto him, who suspected of aspiring, hath not as yet possessed the castles or strong places, seduced the people, nor armed himselfe with strong garrison: and the law Valeria unto him who hath openly declared himselfe a Tyrant, seised uppon the castles and citadels, and strengthned himselfe with garrisons. In the first case wee find that Furius Camillus the dictator, by way of iustice proceeded against Marcus Manlius Torquatus: and in the second case Brutus and Cassius euen in the Senat and most open assembly of the people, slew Caesar, thinking of nothing lesse. But Solon, when as he too religiously (should I say) or superstitiously, had ordained that Tyrants should be lawfully tryed before they were put to death, whilest he yet lived saw Pisistratus of a subiect to aspire unto the soueraigntie of the Athenian state, against whome for all that they which slew the Tyrants at Athens proceeded not by way of iustice; whose children neuerthelesse Harmodius and Aristogiton slew, contrarie unto the law, by the priuat authoritie of Solon onely.

But here might many questions be made, as, Whether a Tyrant who by force or[*](Whether a Tyrant hauing aspired unto the soueraigntie, and afterwards confirmed therin by the consent of the people in general, may yet lawfully be slay▪) fraud hauing oppressed the libertie of the people, and so aspired unto the soueraigntie, may be iustly slaine; hauing after his aspiring caused himselfe to be so chosen or confirmed by the voyces of the people in generall? For why, it seemeth that such a solemn act of election, is a true ratification of him in his tyrannie, the people consenting thereunto. Yet am I neuerthelesse of opinion, that he may lawfully be slaine, and that without any lawfull processe or triall, except he shall first renounce his authoritie, quit his forces, and so put himselfe into the power of the people: for why, that cannot bee thought to be done by the free consent of the people, which they do by constraint, being by the Tyrants dispoyled of their authoritie and power. As when Sylla caused himselfe to be confirmed dictator for fourescore yeares, by the law Valeria, which hee caused to be published, hauing at the same time a strong and puissant armie of his own

within the citie: [*](Lib. de▪ legibus.) Cicero said, That it was no law at all. And in like case Caesar, who about thirtie sixe yeares after, caused himselfe by the law Seruia, to bee made dictatour perpetuall. And also Cosmus Medices, who after the death of his kinsman Alexander hauing an armie in the citie of Florens, caused the Senators to chuse him duke of that citie for euer: about which election whilest they made some doubt, hee so thundered with his artillerie before the pallace, as that the Senat doubting otherwise of the safetie of themselves, and of the rest of the citisens, hasted the rather to make choyce of him. Howbeit if the children or posteritie of a tyrant, shall for long time, as by the space of an hundrd yeares, in continual possession hold the soueraigntie, possessed by their great grandfathers or auncestours, and so by their iust commaunds, gouern the Commonweale; such a government ought not now to be called a tyrannie, for that in this case, [*](Long prescription serueth in staed of a iust title.) as in all other things, a prescription of so many yeares serueth in stead of a iust title. And whereas it is said, that the rights of soueraigntie cannot be prescribed: that is to say, in lesse then an hundred yeares, and concerneth priuat men, who the Commonweale yet standing upright, seeke to vsurpe the soueraigntie, but concerneth not the generall conuersion or chaunge of the whole state of a Commonweale. Wee said that the possession of the posteritie of a tyrant ought to be of long continued without interuption or interpellation: that is to say, that the subiects have not with any conspiracie rebellion, or intercession, troubled the government of the tyrant, or of his posteritie: for thereby it is in a sort euident, and to bee gathered, the subiects of their owne accord to have yeelded unto his commaunds, and to have taken him for their iust prince. But interpellation or gain▪ saying, and resistance, may aswell be showed & declared by deeds as by words: of which sort was that which Aquila the Tribune of the people did, who in sight of all the people tooke off the crowne that was set upon the head of Caesars statue, Caesar himselfe in vaine fretting thereat; who afterwards unto such grants of honours and preferments as he gaue unto his friends, would still adde that, If by Aquil--- his leaue we may do it. And thus much concerning a Tyrant, whether hee bee a good man or an euill, who without all right hath aspired unto the soueraigntie of the Commonweale wherein he liveth.

But the chiefe question of this our discourse, is to know, whether a soueraigne prince[*](Whether a lawful soueraign prince tiranizing may of his subiects be lawfully ayne or not.) come unto that high estate by election, or by lot, by rightfull succession, or by iust warre, or by the especiall vocation of all-mightie God; forgetting his dutie, and become without measure cruell, couetous, and wicked, so peruerting the lawes of God and man, and such an one as we commonly call a Tirant, may be lawfully slaine or not. And true it is that many interpretours, both of Gods and mans lawes, have said it to be lawfull: many of them without distinction ioyning these two incompatible words together, a King a Tyrant: which so daungerous a doctrine hath bene the cause of the vtter ruine and ouerthrow of many most mightie empires, and kingdomes. But to discide this question wel, it behoueth vs to distinguish an absolute soueraigne prince, from him which is not so: and also subiects from straungers, according as wee have before declared. For it is great difference to say that a Tirant may lawfully be slaine by a prince a straunger; or by his owne subiect. For as of all noble acts, none is more[*](That a prince tyanizing may by an other straung prince be lawfully slaine.) honorable or glorious then by way of fact, to defend the honour, goods, and lives of such as are vniustly oppressed by the power of the more mightie, especially the gate of iustice being shut against them: as did Moyses seeing his brother the Israelite beaten and wronged by the Aegyptian, and no meanes to have redresse of his wronges; so is it a most faire and magnificall thing for a prince to take up armes to relieue a whole nation and people, vniustly oppressed by the crueltie of a tirant: As did the great Hercules, who traueling over a great part of the world with wonderfull prowes and valour

destroyed many most horrible monsters, that is to say Tirants: and so delivered people without number among the gods: his posteritie for many worlds of yeares after, holding most great kingdomes, and other the imitatours of his vertues: as Dio, Timoleon, Aratus, Harmodius, Aristogiton, with other such like honorable princes bearing the titles of chastisers and correctors of Tyrants. And for that onely cause Temir-Cutlu, whom our writers commonly call Tamerlan emperour of the Tartars, denounced warre vnto Baiazet king of the Turkes, who then besieged Constantinople; saying that he was come to chastice his tiranie, and to deliver the aflicted people; whom indeed he in a set battell vanquished in the plaines neare unto Mount Stella: and hauing slaine and put to ---light three hundred thousand Turkes, kept the tirant (taken prisoner) in chaines in an yron Cage vntill he dyed. Neither in this case is it materiall whether such a vertuous prince being a straunger proceed against a Tirant by open force, or finenes, or else by way of iustice. True it is that a valiant and worthy prince hauing the tirant in his power, shall gaine more honour by bringing him vnto his triall, to chastice him as a murtherer, a manqueller, and a robber: rather then to vse the law of armes against him. Wherefore let vs resolue upon that, that it is lawfull for any straunger to kill a Tirant; that is to say a man of all men infamed, and notorious for the oppression, murder, and slaughter of his subiects and people. But as for subiects to do the same, it is to be knowne whether the prince that beareth rule be an absolute soueraigne; or not: for if he be no absolute soueraigne, then must the Soueraigntie of necessitie be either in the people, or in the nobilitie: in which case there is no doubt, but that it is lawfull to proceed against a Tirant by way of iustice, if so men may preuaile against him: or else by way of fact, and open force, if they may not otherwise have reason. As the Senat did in the first case against Nero: and in the other against Maximinus: for that the Roman Emperours were at the first nothing else but princes of the Common weal, that is to say the chiefe and principall men, the soueraigntie neuerthelesse still resting in the People and the Senat: as I have before showed, that this Commonweal was then to haue bene called a principalitie: although that Seneca speaking in the person of Nero his scholler sayeth: I am the onely man amongst liuing men, elect and chosen to be the Lieutenant of God on earth: I am the Arbitratour of lyfe and death: I am able at my pleasure to dispose of the state and qualitie of every man. True it is that he tooke upon him this soueraigne authoritie by force wrested from the Senat and people of Rome: but in right he had it not, the state being but a verie principalitie, wherein the people had the soueraigntie. As is also that of the Venetians, who condemned to death their Duke Falier, and also executed many others, without forme or fashion of any lawfull processe: forasmuch as Venice is an Aristocraticall principalitie, wherein the Duke is but the first or chiefe man, soueraigntie still remayning in the state of the Venetian Gentlemen. As is likewise the Germain Empire, which is also nothing else but an Aristocraticall principalitie, wherein the the Emperour is head and chiefe, the power and majestie of the Empire belonging unto the States thereof: who thrust out of the government Adolphus the emperour in the yeare 1296: and also after him Wenceslaus in the yeare 1400, and that by way of justice, as hauing iurisdiction and power over them. So also might we say of the state of the Lacedemonians, which was a pure Aristocratie, wherein were two kings, without any soueraigntie at all, being indeed nothing but Captaines and Generals for the managing of their warres: and for that cause were by the other magistrats of the state, sometime for their faults condemned to pay their fine; as was king Agesilaus: and sometime to death also as were Agis and Pausanias. Which hath also in our time hapned unto the kings of Denmarke and Sweden, whereof some have beene banished, and the others died in prison: for that the nobilitie pretendeth them to be nothing but princes, and not Soueraignes, as we have before showed: so also are they subiects unto those states which have the right of their election. And such were in auntient times the kings of the cities of the Gauls, whom Caesar for this cause oftentimes calleth Regulos, that is to say little kings: being themselves subiects, and iusticiable unto the Nobilitie, who had all the soueraigntie: causing them euen to be put to death, if they had so deserued. And that is it for which Amphiorix the captaine generall, whom they called the king of the Liegeois said; Our commaundes (saith he) are such, as that the people hath no lesse power over vs, then we over the people: wherein he showed euidently that he was no soueraigne prince: howbeit that it was not possible for him to haue equall power with the people, as we have before showed. Wherefore these sorts of princes, hauing no soueraigntie, if they polluted with wickednes and villanie, cannot be chastised by the authoritie and seueritie of the magistrat, but shall abuse their wealth and power unto the hurt and destruction of good men; it alwayes hath and shall be lawfull not for strangers onely, but euen for the subiects themselves also, to take them out of the way.

But if the prince be an absolute Soueraigne, as are the true Monarques of Fraunce,[*](That it is not lawfull for the subiects either by the way of fact, or iustice to attempt any thing against the honour, life, or dignitie of their soueraigne prince, be he neuer so euill or wicked.) of Spain, of England; Scotland, Turkie, Moschouie, Tartarie, Persia, Aethiopia, India, and of almost all the kingdomes of Affricke, and Asia, where the kings themselves have the soueraigntie without all doubt or question; not divided with their subiects: in this case it is not lawfull for any one of the subiects in particular, or all of them in generall, to attempt any thing either by way of fact, or of iustice against the honour, life, or dignitie of the soueraigne: albeit that he had committed all the wickednes, impietie, and crueltie that could be spoken; For as to proceed against him by way of justice, the subiect hath no such iurisdiction over his Soueraigne prince: of whom dependeth all power and authoritie to commaund: and who may not onely reuoke all the power of his Magistrats; but euen in whose presence the power of all Magistrats, Corporations, Colleges, Estates, and Communities cease, as we have said, and shall yet more fully in due place say. Now if it be not lawfull for the subiect by way of justice to proceed against his prince; the vassall against his lord; nor the slaue against his master; and in briefe, if it be not lawfull, by way and course of iustice to proceed against a king, how should it then be lawfull to proceed against him by way of fact, or force. For question is not here, what men are able to doe by strength and force, but what they ought of right to do: as not whether the subiects have power and strength, but whether they have lawfull power to condemne their soueraigne prince. Now the subiect is not only guiltie of treason in the highest degree, who hath slaine his soueraigne prince, but euen he also which hath attempted the same; who hath giuen councell or consent thereunto; yea if he haue conccaled the same, or but so much as thought it: which fact the lawes have in such detestation, as that when a man guiltie of any offence or crime, dieth before he be thereof condemned, he is deemed to have died in whole and perfect state, except he have conspired against the life and dignitie of his soueraigne prince: this onely thing they have thought to bee such, as that for which hee may worthily seeme to have bene now alreadie iudged and condemned; yea euen before he was therof accused. And albeit that the lawes inflict no punishment upon the euill thoughts of men; but on those onely which by word or deed breake out into some enormitie: yet if any man shall so much as conceit a thought for the violating of the person of his soueraigne prince, although he have attempted nothing, they have yet iudged this same thought worthie of death, notwithstanding what repentance soeuer he have had[*](Treason but thought of punished with death.) thereof. As in proofe it fell out with a gentleman of Normandie, who confessed himselfe unto a Franciscan Frier, to have had a purpose in himself to haue slaine Francis the

first, the French king: of which euill purpose and intent he repenting himselfe, receiued of the frier absolution, who yet afterward told the king thereof; who sending for the gentleman, and he confessing the fact, turned him over to the parliament of Paris for his triall, where he was by the decree of that high court condemned to death, and so afterwards executed. Which wee cannot say, that the judges did for feare, seeing that they had oftentimes refused to ratifie the edicts and letters patents by that gratious king granted, notwithstanding whatsoeuer commaundement hee did giue for them to confirme the same. And so in Paris, although a foolish man and altogether out of his wit, called Caboche, drew his sword upon Henrie the second, Francis his son, as with a purpose to have slaine him; but without effect or hurt done, yet was he neuerthelesse condemned, and so put to death, without any regard had unto his lunesie or frensie; although the lawes euerie where excuse the madde and lunitike man, from all punishment, what murther or villanie soeuer he doe; seeing that hee is more than enough[*](That soueraigne princes whatsoeuer ught to bee unto their subiects sacred and inuiolat.) tormented with the frantike furious passion it selfe. And least any man should thinke themselves to have bene the authors of these lawes and decrees, so the more straitly to prouide for their owne safetie and honour, let vs see the lawes and examples of holy Scripture. Nabugodonozor king of Assyria, with fire and sword destroyed all the countrey of Palestine, besieged the citie of Hierusalem, tooke it, robbed and rased it downe to the ground, burnt the temple, and defiled the sauctuarie of God, slew the king, with the greatest part of the people, carrying away the rest that remained into captiuitie into Babilon; and yet not so contented, caused * the image of himselfe made in gold, to be [*](Dan. cap..) set up in publike place, commaunding all men without exception to adore and worship the same, upon paine of being burnt alive: and caused them that refused so to doe, to be cast into a burning furnace: and yet for all that the holy * Prophets directing their[*](Bare. 1. Hier. 29) letters unto their brethren the Iewes, then in captiuitie at Babilon, will them to pray unto God, for the good and happie life of Nabuchodonosor and his children, and that they might so long rule and raigne over them as the heauens should endure. Yea euen God himselfe doubted not to call Nabuchodonosor his seruant; saying, That he would[*](Hier. 2. Ezec. 9) make him the most mightie prince of the world. And yet was there euer a more detestable tyrant than he? who not contented to be himselfe worshipped, but caused his image to be also adored, and that upon paine of being burnt quick. And yet for all that we see the prophet Ezechiel, enspired with the spirit of God, angrie with Sedechia king of Hierusalem, greatly to detest his perfidious dealing, disloyaltie, and rebellion against king Nabuchodonosor, whose vas---all hee was, and as it were reioyceth him to have bene most iustly slaine. We have also another more rare example of Saul, who possessed with an euill spirit, caused the priests of the lord to be without iust cause slain, for that one of them had receiued Dauid flying from him, and did ofttimes what in his power was, to kill, or cause to have bene killed the same Dauid, a most innocent prince, by whome he had got so manie victories over his enemies: at which time he fell twice himselfe into Dauid his hands; who blamed of his most valiant souldiers (over whom he then commaunded) for that he would not suffer his so mortal an enemie then in his power, to be slaine, being in most assured hope to have enioyed the kingdome after his death, he detested their counsel, saying, God forbid that I should suffer the person of a king, the Lords annointed to be violated. Yea moreover hee himselfe defended the same king persecuting of him, when as hee commaunded the souldiers of his guard ouercome by wine and sleepe to be wakened. And at such time as Saul was slaine, and that a souldiour thinking to do Dauid a pleasure, presented him with Saul his head: Dauid forthwith caused the same souldier to be slain, which had brought him the head, saiing, Go thou wicked, how durst thou lay thine impure hands upon the Lords annointed? thou shalt surely die therefore: and afterwards without all dissimulation mourned himselfe for the dead king. All which is worth our good consideration. For Dauid was by Saul persecuted to death, and yet wanted not power to have revenged himselfe, being become stronger than the king by the aid of his enemies, unto whome hee fled euen against his will: besides that he was the chosen of God, and annointed by the hands of Samuel, to be king of the people, and had also married the kings daughter: and yet for all that he abhorred to take upon him the title of a king, and much more to attempt any thing against the life or honour of Saul, or to rebell against him, but chose rather to banish himselfe out of the realme, than in any sort to seeke the kings destruction. So we also read, that the most holy and best learned men that euer were amongst the Iewes▪ whome they called the Essei (that is to say, the true executors of the law of God) held, that soueraigne princes whatsoeuer they were, ought to bee unto their subiects inuiolable, as persons sacred, and sent vnto them from God. And wee doubt not, but that Dauid a king and prophet, led by the spirit of God, had alwaies before his eies the law of God, which saith, Thou shalt not speake euill of thy prince, nor detract the Magistrat. [*](* Exod. 23. 28.) Neither is there any thing more common in all the holy Scripture, than the forbidding not onely to kill or attempt the life or honour of a prince, but euen for the verie magistrats also, although (saith the Scripture) they be wicked and naught. If therfore he be guiltie of treason against God and man, which doth but detract the magistracie; what punishment then can be sufficient for him that shall attempt his life? For the law of God is in this case yet more precise than are the lawes of men: For the law Iulia holdeth but him guiltie of treason, which shall giue councell to kill the magistrat, whereas the law of God expresly forbiddeth in any sort to speake of the magistrat euil, or in any wise to detract him. Wherefore to aunswere unto the vaine and friuolous obiections & arguments of them which maintain the contrarie, were but idly to abuse both our time and learning. But as he which doubteth whether there bee a God or nor, is not with arguments to be refuted, but with seuere punishments to bee chastifed: so are they also which call into question a thing so cleere, and that by bookes publikely imprinted; that the subiects may take up armes against their prince beeing a Tyrant, and take him out of the way howsoever: howbeit that the most learned diuines, and of best understanding, are cleere of opinion, that it is not lawfull for a man not only to kill his soueraigne prince, but euen to rebell against him, without an especiall and vndoubtfull commaundement from God; as we read of Iehu, who was chosen of God, and by the prophet annointed king of Israel, with expresse commandement vtterly to root out all the house of king Achab. He before as a subiect had right patiently borne all his wickednesse and outrages. Yea the most cruell murthers and torturing of the most holy prophets, and religious men, the vnworthy murthers, banishments, and proscriptions of the subiects; as also the most detestable witchcraft of queene Iesabel: yet for all that durst he attempt nothing against his soueraigne prince, vntill he had expresse commaundement from God, by the mouth of his prophet, whome God indeed so assisted, as that with a small power he slew two kings, caused seuentie of king Achab his children to be put to death, with many other princes of the kings of Israel and of Iuda, and all the idolatrous priests of Bahal, that is to say of the Sunne, after thas hee had caused Iesabel the queene, to be cast headlong downe from an high tower, and left her bodie to be torne in peeces and eaten up of dogges. But we are not to apply this especiall commaundement of God, unto the conspiracies and rebellions of mutinous subiects against their soueraigne princes. And as for that which Caluin saith, if there were at this time magistrats appointed for the defence of the people, and to restraine the insolencie of kings, as were the Ephori in Lacedemonia, the Tribunes in Rome, and the Demarches in Athens, that they ought to resist and impeach their licentiousnesse and crueltie: he sheweth sufficiently, that it was neuer lawfull in a right Monarchie, to assault the prince, neither to attempt the life or honour of their soueraigne king: for he speaketh not but of the popular and Aristocratique states of Commonweales. And we have before shewed, that the kings of Lacedemonia were no more but plaine Senators and captaines: and when he speaketh of states, he saith, Possibly, not daring to[*](The warrs of the Germaine princes against Charies the fit in Germanie in Luthers iudgment not lawful. Sledan. lib. 4.) assure any thing. Howbeit that there is a notable difference betwixt the attempting of the honour of his prince, and the withstanding of his tyranny; betwizt killing his king, and the opposing of ones selfe against his crueltie. We read also, that the Protestant princes of Germanie, before they entred into armes against Charles the emperor, demaunded of Martin Luther if it were lawfull for them so to doe or not; who frankly told them, That it was not lawfull, whatsoeuer tyrannie or impietie were pretended; yet was he not therein of them beleeued: so thereof ensued a deadly and most lamentable warre, the end whereof was most miserable, drawing with it the ruine and destruction of many great and noble houses of Germanie, with exceeding slaughter of the subiects: whereas No cause (as saith Cicero) can be thought iust or sufficient for vs to take up armes against our countrey. And yet it is most certaine, that the soueraigntie of the empire resteth not in the person of the emperour, (as we will in due place declare) but being chiefe of the state, they could not lawfully take up armes against him, but by a generall consent of the state, or of the greater part of them, which was not done: then much lesse is it lawfull to take up atmes against a soueraigne prince. I cannot vse a better example, than of the dutie of a sonne towards his father: the law of God saith, That he which speaketh euill of his father or mother, shall be put to death. Now if the father shall be a theefe, a murtherer, a traytor to his countrey, as an incestuous person, a manqueller, a blasphemer, an atheist, or what so you will else; I confesse that all the punishments that can bee deuised are not sufficient to punish him: yet I say, it is not for the sonne to put his hand thereunto, Quia nulla tanta impiet as, nullum tantum scelus est, quod sit parricidio vindicandum. For that (as saith an auntient Orator) no impietie can be so great, no offence so hainous, as to be revenged with the killing of ones father. And yet Cicero reasoning upon the same question, saith, our country to bee deerer unto vs than our parents. Wherefore the prince whom you may iustly call the father of the country ought to be unto every man dearer & more reuerend than any father, as one ordained & sent unto vs by God. I say therfore that the subiect is neuer to be suffered to attempt any thing against his soueraign prince, how naughty & cruel soeuer he be lawful it is, not to obey him in things contrarie unto the laws of God & nature: to flie and hide our selues from him; but yet to suffer stripes, yea and death also rather than to attempt any thing against his life or honour. O how many Tirants should there be; if[*](What great inconueniecies should ensue if it were lawful for subiects under the colour of tyrants to kil their soueraign princes) it should be lawfull for subiects to kill Tirants? how many good and innocent princes should as Tirants perish, by the conspiracie of their subiects against them? He that should of his subiects exact subsidies, should be then (as the vulgar people accompt him) a Tirant: he that should rule and commaund contrarie to the good liking of the people, should be a Tirant: (as Aristotle in his Politiques sayeth him to be) he that should keepe strong gardes and garrisons for the safetie of his person, should be a Tirant: he that should put to death traitors and conspirators against his state should be also counted a Tirant. And in deed how should good princes be assured of their lives, if under the colour of tirannie they might bee slaine of their subiects, by whom they ought to be defended? Not for that I would say it not to be lawfull for other Princes by force of armes to prosecute tiranie (as I have before said) but for that it is not lawful for subiects so to doe. Howbeit that I am rather of Diogenes the Cinique his opinion, who one day meeting with Dionysius the yonger, then liuing in exile at Corinth, and seeing him merily sporting himselfe in the streats with iesters and minstrels; verie soberlie said unto him, Truely thou art now in an estate vnworthie of thee. I hartilie thank thee (said Dionysius) for hauing compassion on me. And thinkest thou said Diogenes that I thus say for any compassion I have of thee? mistake me not, for I speake it rather in dispite of the life thou now leadest, to see such a vile slaue as thee, worthy to grow old, and die in the accursed state of tirannie, as did thy father, thus to sport thy selfe in securitie, and quietly to passe thy time among vs. For can any hangman more cruelly torment a man condemned to torture, than feare? Feare I say of death, of infamie,[*](The miserable state and condition of a Tyrant whilst he liveth.) and of torture: these bee the reuenging furies which continually vex Tirants, and with eternall terrours torment them both night and day: Then enuie, suspition, feare, desire of revenge, with a thousand contrarie passions at variance among themselves, do so disquiet their minds, and more cruelly tiranize over them, than they themselves can over their slaues, with all the torments they can deuise. And what greater wretchednesse can happen unto a man, than that which presseth and forceth the tirant? to have a desire to make his subiects beasts and fooles, by cutting from them all the waies to vertue and learning? To bee a slaue and subiect unto a thousand spyes and pryers into other mens lives? to heare, see, and vnderstand, what is done, saied, o--- thought of all and every man? and in stead of ioyning and vniting of his subiects in loue and amitie together; to sow amongst them a thousand quarrels and dissentions: to the end they should alwaies be at defiance among themselves, and in distrust one of an other? And who can doubt but that a Tirant still languishing in such torment, is of all men most miserable, and more afflicted and tormented, than if he should die a thousand deaths? Death (as sayeth Theophrastus) is the end of all miseries; and the repose of the vnfortunate, as sayeth Caesar: neither the one nor the other being in that point superstitious, as not persuaded of the immortalitie of the soule, or that it longer lived than the bodie, or that there remayned any farther paines for the wicked after this life: so that to wish a Tirant slaine as a punishment for his deserts, is but to wish his good and rest.

But most Tirants have ordinarilie neare unto their owne persons certeine Mynnions,[*](The policie of some Tyrants to auert from themselves the peoples rage.) of whom they make great account and reckning: whom they vse as spunges to suck up their subiects blood, upon whom when occasion serueth, they discharge themselves; to the end that the people entering into furie, should seise upon them, and spare themselves: So had Tiberius, Seian; Nero, Tigillin; Dionyse the younger, Phyliste; and of late Henry king of Sweden, George Preschon, whom we read to have beene giuen as a prey unto the furious people, and by them to have beene rent and torne in peeces. So the Emperour Anthonius Caracalla to please the people, put to death all the flatterers who had before induced him to kill his brother. Neither did Caligula in better sort intreat his claw-backs. And by these sleights have Tyrants oftentimes wel escaped the rage and furie of the people. But if the conspiratours began their furie at the person of the Tyrant himselfe, then were not onely his friends and favourites, but euen his wiues, children, and neerest kinsmen, most cruelly slaine. Which they did not onely all Greece ouer, but in Sicilie also: as after the death of Hiero the Tyrant, ensued the slaughter of all his friends and kinsfolks, the rage of the people with vnspeakable crueltie bursting out, euen to the dismembring of his sisters and cosens: his statues were cast downe, all his edicts reuoked, not only those which were vniust and vnreasonable, but euen those also which were right commendable and necessarie; to the intent that no memoriall of Tyrants might remaine: yet true it is, that oftentimes their good decrees were still kept. And that is it for which Cicero said, That there was nothing

more common, than to approue the acts of a Tyrant, and yet to place in heauen them that had slaine them. And yet he in another saith it be a doubt, not yet resolued upon, viz. Whether a good man ought to come unto the counsell of a Tyrant consulting euen of good and profitable matters? And yet this question dependeth of the other: for if a man make conscience to be assistant unto a Tyrant, consulting of good things, for feare least in so doing he should seeme to approue his tyrannie: wherefore should he then approue the good lawes and decrees by him made? for that is also no lesse to ratifie his tyranny, and to giue example to others, aswell as to giue councell unto a Tyrant, in good and commendable things. Except one should say, that tyrannie which yet is in the force and strength of it selfe, is shored and countenanced by the[*](That not only the good acts and decrees of Tyrants, but eue their euill acts and decrees also are oftentimes of necessitie after their death▪ to be rtained in a commonweal.) councell of good and honest men, under the couert of some one or other good and commendable act, which would otherwise of it selfe fall, by the onely euill opinion conceiued of tyrannie; whereas he which is alreadie dead, cannot be againe reuiued to ratifie his other euill acts. Yea it oftentimes falleth out, that not onely the good & profitable acts of Tyrants, but euen their euill and vniust acts and orders are of necessitie to be retained also, if we will have the Commonwealth in safetie to stand. Wherefore Thrasibulus after he had put to flight the thirtie Tyrants of Athens: and Aratus hauing slaine Nicholas the Tyrant of Sicyone: and to the imitation of them Cicero after the death of Caesar the dictator, perswaded the publication of the lawes of forgetfulnesse, to extinguish the desire of revenge: yet for the most part ratifying the acts of those Tyrants, which they could not vtterly disanull, without the ruine of the whole Commonweale. As for that we read the acts of Nero and Demetrian, to haue beene reuoked, and disanulled by the Senat, that concerneth certaine perpetuall edicts of theirs, which for that they had a perpetuall inconuenience annexed unto them, would if they had not bene abrogated, have in time vtterly ruinated all that was now againe set in order: as for their good & cōmendable lawes, they were not at all altred. For what time was more glorious than Nero his first five yeares raigne? what more fit or better for the well ordering of a Commonweale? Insomuch that Traian himselfe a most excellent prince, deemed no man to have bene like unto Nero, for the well gouerning of a Commonweale. unto this the opinions of the lawyers agree, who hold the successours[*](The successours of Tyrants how farre they are bound to that which the Tyrants their predecessoures have promised.) of Tyrants to be bound unto all such things as the Tyrants their predecessours have iustly promised or done, but not unto the rest. So the emperour Constantine the Great, by a law abrogated such things, as Licinius the Tyrant had before vniustly decreed, but confirmed the rest. The like we read to have bene done by Theodosius the younger, and Arcadius the emperours, after the death of the Tyrant Maximus, by this law, Quae Tyrannus contra ius rescripsit non valere praecipimus: legitimis eius rescriptis non impugnandis, What the Tyrant hath against right decreed, we commaund to be of none effect; not impugning his lawfull decrees. And albeit that these two yong emperours, to be revenged of the Tyrant Maximus, had by a generall edict reuoked all the prodigall gifts and preferments, which he lauishly had bestowed uppon wicked men, and of no desert in the Commonweale: and also disanulled his iudgements and decrees: yet would they not repeale any thing that had bene by him decreed or graunted, without fraud and deceit, and the hurt of the Commonweale. Those last wordes without fraud and deceit, which we read in Theodosius, his law, are added against Tyrants Agents, & Brokers, who are especially to be laid hold upon, to the end that others take not example by them, to build their houses, or enrich themselves by the ruine or hurt of others, during the time that tyranie beareth sway; or that the Commonwealth is with civill warres divided. As it happened in the state of Milan, rent in sunder by the Venetians, the French, the Swissers, and the Spaniards, euerie one of them taking unto themselves so much thereof, as they could by force and strength, as if it had bene by good right, and the Sforces the rest: where amongst others it fortuned Iason the famous lawyer, a favourit of the Spaniards, by fraudulent meanes to obtaine the goods of Triuultius, a worthie captaine of the French part: but the Spaniards afterwards driuen out, and the French returned, Iason was right well beaten with his owne lawes and decisions, being by the captaine Triuultius againe thrust out of his vniust possession, and that by his owne doctrine. In which case yet the force of lawes and decrees ought[*](Naturall equitie in all cases cannot in any lawe be comprised, but is oft times to be left unto the religious arbitremēt of men expert in matters of state.) not to be of so great force and power, as naturall and upright equitie it selfe, which cannot be fully comprised in any lawes, but is to be left unto the religious arbitrement of them who know how to mannage the affaires of state, and wisely to ballance the particular profit, with the counterpoise of the publique, according to the infinit varietie of times, places, and persons; alwaies remembring the profit of euerie man in particular, and of all together in generall, not to be one and the same: and that the publike is alwaies to be preferred before the priuat, except the priuat be grounded upon the greatest equitie and reason. As if the Receiuers in the heat of the civill warres, or in the raigne of a Tyrant, or in such time as lawfull enemies make inuasion, shall be enforced to pay the publike money: it is good reason it should be allowed them, as paid unto the Commonwealth. For so it was iudged by decree of the parliament of Naples, for them that had paid unto the receiuers of Charles the eight, when as after the returne of the Spaniards, they would have enforced the receiuers to have paid the money twice, naturall reason (in this case) preferring the priuat profit before the publike. For the receiuers could not otherwise doe, the Frenchmen then fully possessed of the kingdom of Naples. But if the Receiuers or debtors of the Commonweale, shall without any summons or constraint, or for some colourable suit, pay unto the enemie, or a Tyrant, part of that which is due, to accept in stead of the whole, they shall yet still remaine not onely debtors for the whole, but be in daunger also of treason. Wherefore to conclude this question, It is not meet that the good decrees or laws of a slaine tyrant should be repealed or disanulled.

And in this, the princes much deceiue themselves, which ouerthrow and make void[*](Murthers euen of euill and tyrannicall princes, not to be rewarded, but seuerely punished.) all the acts of Tyrants, their predecessours; and namely they which giue reward to them that have slaine Tyrants, to make them a way unto the soueraigntie. For they shall neuer assure themselves of their owne lives, if they seuerely punish not the conspiratours against their owne prince and murtherers of him, although hee were neuer so great a Tyrant. As most wisely did Seuerus the emperour, who put to death all them which had any part in the murther of the emperour Pertinax: which was the cause (as saith Herodian) that there was no man which durst attempt his life. So also Vitelliu--- the emperour put to death all the murtherers and conspirators against Galba, who had presented requests signed with their owne hands unto the emperour Otho, to have had of him reward for their distoialtie. And Theophilus emperour of Constantinople caused them all to be called together, who had made his father emperour, after they had slaine Leo the Armenian, as if he would have well recompensed them for so great a good turne: who being come together with many other, who though not partakers of the murther, were yet desirous to be partakers of the reward; hee caused them altogether to be slaine. And that more is, the emperour Domitian put to death Epaphroditus, Nero his manumised seruant, and secretarie to the state, for hauing holpen Nero to kill himselfe, who most instantly requested him so to doe, being thereby delivered from the executioners hands, and crueil exemplarie death. And these things wee read not onely Tyrants, but euen good kings also to have done, not so much in regard of their owne safetie, as of the dignitie of them that were slaine. As Dauid did unto him

who in hope of reward brought him his father in lawes head cut off, but slaine by his enemies. And Alexander the Great caused cruelly to bee put to death him that had murthered king Darius, abhorring the subiect which durst to lay hand upon his king: although Alexander himselfe by lawfull warre sought after his life and state, as beeing his lawfull enemie. And yet in mine opinion the thing that hath most preserued the kings of Fraunce and their persons inuiolated, is for that they have not used crueltie towards[*](Lenitie of soueraign princes towards them of their owne blood offending them; and so in their daunger, or otherwise their honorable prisoners: unto themselves both commendable and profitable) them which were neere unto them in blood, albeit that they were attainted; conuicted, yea and condemned as enemies to their prince, and guiltie of treason. As Iohn the second, duke of Alencon, although he was twice for the same cause condemned, as for that he had with the enemies conspired against king Charles the seuenth and the Commonweale, and the sentence of death pronounced against him by the Chancelour, yet for all that would not the king, that he should bee executed. Many have blamed this the kings too much clemeneie, as daungerous: but they see not, that kings in so doing, do not so much deliver their kinsmen from punishment, as themselves; neither so much to prouide for other mens safetie, as for their own; nor that in forbidding the blood of their kinsmen to be shed, they spare their owne; nor that hee which putteth a prince of his owne blood into the executioners hands, or causeth him to be murthered, forgeth a knife to cut his owne throat. For wee have seene the emperours of Constantinople both of auntient and latter time, and many kings of Spaine and England, who fouling their hands in the blood of their princes, suffered themselves afterward in their persons that which they had done to others. For not to speake of those things which are reported to have of late bene done in the house of Castile: one king in that nation cruelly murthered six of his brethren: and in lesse than thirtie six yeares fourescore princes of royall blood, were (as Philip Comines in his Commentaries reporteth) in England either slaine or executed by the bloudie executioners hands. Now the greatest safetie of a soueraigne prince, is to haue their subiects persuaded, that they ought to be holy and inuiolat; although it much concerne the Commonweale also, the kings stocke to be most sacred, least the princes of the blood being taken out of the way, the Commonweale fall also; or else troubled with endlesse sedition, bee rent in peeces, as we shall in due place declare. I know well that some have blamed Seleucus, for not hauing put to death Demetrius, surnamed the Besieger, one of the most valiant princes that euer was; but hauing onely kept him in prison: And Hugh Capet, for hauing kept in prison in the castle at Orleans, Charles the last of the blood of king Charlemaigne: And Henrie the first, king of England, for hauing kept in prison vntill his death, his elder brother Robert, hauing before caused his eyes to bee put out: As also Christiern father to Frederike king of Denmarke, for hauing kept his cosen the king of Denmarke thrust out of his kingdome, five and twentie yeares prisoner, who as a priuat man there died in prison, in the castle of Calembourg, being 77 yeares old: And Iohn king of Sweden, who keepeth his elder brother Henrie (reiected by the people) prisoner euer since the yeare 1567, least he should trouble both him and the Commonweale. But they have bene, and yet are by this meanes more reuerenced and honoured of their subiects, than if they had put these their so honourable prisoners to death.

But here some men wil obiect, The keeping of such princes prisones, to be a thing[*](The keeping of great princes prisoners, daungerous.) full of perill and daunger: which I confesse, and was the onely reason that moued the pope to counsell Charles of Fraunce, to put to death Conradin his prisoner, the sonne of Manfroy king of Naples. As with like crueltie had Ptolomie, last king of Aegypt caused Pompey the Great, after his flight unto him from the battaile of Pharsalia, to be slaine; his councellors saying unto him, That dead men bit not. And yet neuerthelesse

neither could this Ptolomee escape destruction: neither wanted there heires enow of the house of Aragon, who ceased not to driue out them of the house of Aniou, and to recover againe the kingdome: and albeit that he which put him to death, beeing himselfe afterward also condemned to die, escaped: yet so it was, that the infamie of so detestable a murther, without cause committed uppon the person of a young innocent prince, hath yet tested upon them which did the execution to their owne destruction. And truely our auncestours seeing Iohn duke of Burgundie, rashly in the verie time of iudgement, confessing the murther of Lewes his kinsman, duke of Orleans; and yet to have easily escaped the daunger, said, That surely from thence foreward a man might have the blood of princes good cheape, and in so saying said well. For the same Iohn comming afterward under safe conduct, was himself likewise serued, and in cold blood slaine, they that were the authors of his death escaping vnpunished.