Res Gestae

This trade of forensic oratory the great Plato defined as πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον (that is, the shadow of a small part of the science of government[*](Plato, Gorgias, 463 b. For amplitudo Platonis, cf. xxii. 16, 22, sermonum amplitudine lovis aemulus Platon. ) ) or as the fourth part of flattery;[*](I.e., the lowest of the four parts.) but Epicurus counts it among evil arts, calling it κακοτεχνία.[*](The art of deceiving; cf. Quintilian, ii. 15, 2; 20, 2. Epicurus denied that it was an art.) Tisias[*](One of the earliest rhetoricians, a teacher of Gorgias; see Cic., Brut. 12, 46.) says that it is the artist of persuasion, and Gorgias of Leontini agrees with him.

This art, thus defined by the men of old, the cunning of certain Orientals raised to a degree hateful to good men, for which reason it is even confined by the restraints of a time fixed beforehand.[*](So, at Athens, to a space of time marked by the emptying of the clepsydra, or water-clock.) Therefore after having described in a very few words its unworthiness, with which I became acquainted while I was living in those parts, I shall return to the course of the narrative with which I began.

Formerly judgement-seats gained glory through the support of old-time refinement, when orators of fiery eloquence,[*](Cf. concitatus orator, xiv. 7, 18.) devoted to learned studies, were eminent for talent and justice, and for the fluency and many adornments of their diction; for example Demosthenes, to hear whom, when he was going to speak, as the Attic records testify, the people were wont to flock together from all Greece[*](Cf. Cic., Brutus, 84, 289.) ; and

Not less eminent among the Romans were men like Rutilius, Galba, and Scaurus, conspicuous for their life, their character, and their uprightness; and later in the various epochs of subsequent times many former censors and consuls, and men who had been honoured with triumphs, such as Crassus, Antonius, Philippus, Scaevola,[*](All these men are mentioned in Cicero’s Brutus; see Index.) and many others, after successful campaigns, after victories and trophies, distinguished themselves by civic services to the State, and winning laurels in the glorious contests of the Forum, enjoyed Fame’s highest honours.

After these Cicero, the most eminent of them all, by the floods of his all-conquering oratory often saved the oppressed from the fiery ordeal of the courts, and declared: It might perhaps be pardonable to refuse to defend some men, but to defend them negligently could be nothing but criminal.[*](Preserved only here; cf. In Caec. 18, 60.)

But now it is possible to see in all the regions of the Orient powerful and rapacious classes of men flitting from one forum to another, besieging the home

Among these the first class consists of those who, by sowing the seeds of all sorts of quarrels, busy themselves with thousands of recognisances, wearing out the doors of widows and the thresholds of childless men; and if they have found even slight retreats[*](For receptacula, cf. xxviii. 1, 48.) of secret enmity, they rouse deadly hatred among discordant friends, kinsfolk, or relatives. And in these men their vices do not cool down in course of time, as do those of others, but grow stronger and stronger. Poor amid insatiable robbery, they draw the dagger[*](Called by Wagner insipida translatio. ) of their talent to lead astray by crafty speeches the good faith of the judges, whose title is derived from justice.

By their persistence rashness tries to pass itself off as freedom of speech; and reckless audacity as firmness of purpose; a kind of empty flow of words as eloquence. By the perversity of these arts, as Cicero insists, it is a sin for the conscientiousness of a judge[*](Cf. Quint. iv. 1, 9, iudex religiosus. ) to be deceived. For he says: And since nothing in a state ought to be so free from corruption as the suffrage and judicial decisions, I do not understand why one who corrupts them by money deserves punishment, while one who corrupts them by his eloquence is even praised. For my part, I think that he does more evil who corrupts a judge by a speech than one who does so by money; for no one can corrupt a sensible man by money, but he can do so by words.[*](De Re Pub. v. 11, preserved by Ammianus.)