Res Gestae

Ammianus Marcellinus

Ammianus Marcellinus. Ammianus Marcellinus, with an English translation, Vols. I-III. Rolfe, John C., translator. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press; W. Heinemann, 1935-1940 (printing).

While these vain attempts were being made, King Sapor, both when far away and when he had come near, learned from the true accounts of scouts and deserters of the brave deeds of our men and the shameful defeats of his army, accompanied by a

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greater loss of elephants than he had ever known in his reign; also that the Roman army, inured to constant hardship after the loss of their glorious leader, were looking out (as they said), not for their safety, but for revenge, and would end the difficulties of their situation by either a decisive victory or a glorious death.

This news filled his mind with fear for many reasons: for he knew by experience that the troops scattered in great numbers through the provinces could easily be assembled by one little ticket,[*](The watchword, and orders of various kinds, were written on small square tablets, called tesserae; cf. xiv. 2, 15; Suet., Galba, 6, 2; etc.) and he was aware that his own subjects, after the loss of so many men were in a state of extreme panic, and, besides, that in Mesopotamia a Roman army had been left which was not much smaller.[*](I.e. than the one which had invaded Persia.)

More than all, it dulled his anxious mind that five hundred men together in one swim had crossed unharmed the swollen river, had slain his guards, and had roused their comrades who had remained behind to similar boldness.

Meanwhile our men, since the raging waters prevented bridges from being made, and everything edible had been used up, passed two days in wretchedness, deprived of everything useful; excited by hunger and wrath, they were in a state of frenzy and eager to lose their lives by the sword rather then by starvation, the most shameful kind of death.

However, the eternal power of God in heaven was on our side, and the Persians, beyond our hopes, took the first step and sent as envoys for

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securing peace the Surena and another magnate, being themselves also low in their minds, which the fact that the Roman side was superior in almost every battle shook more and more every day.

Nevertheless, they offered conditions which were difficult and involved, for they pretended that from feelings of humanity the most merciful of kings would allow the remnants of the army to return, if the emperor and his most distinguished generals would comply with his demands.

In reply to this Arintheus[*](Cf. xxiv. 1, 2.) was sent to him with the prefect Salutius, but, while a deliberate discussion was going on as to what ought to be determined, four days passed by, full of torments from hunger and worse than any death.

If the emperor, before letting these envoys go, had used this space of time to withdraw gradually from the enemy’s territories, he could surely have reached the protection of Corduena,[*](Cf. xviii. 6, 20; the distance was fourteen geographic, or nautical, miles.) a rich region belonging to us, and distant only a hundred miles from the spot where all this took place.

Now the king obstinately demanded the lands which (as he said) were his and had been taken from him long ago by Maximianus; but, in fact, as the negotiations showed, he required as our ransom five provinces on the far side of the Tigris: Arzanena,[*](In Armenia.) Moxoëna,[*](In Armenia.) and Zabdicena,[*](In Mesopotamia.) as well as Rehimena[*](Unknown.) and Corduena with fifteen fortresses, besides Nisibis,[*](A strong city thrice vainly besieged by the Persians.) Singara[*](Cf. xviii. 5, 7; xx. 6.) and Castra Maurorum,[*](xviii. 6, 9.) a very important stronghold.

And whereas it would have been better to fight ten battles than give up any one of these, the band of flatterers pressed upon the timid

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emperor, harping upon the dreaded name of Procopius,[*](Julian had named Procopius as his successor; see xxiii. 3, 2.) and declaring that if he returned[*](He was in hiding, probably at Chalcedon; cf. xxvi. 6, 3-5.) on learning of the death of Julian, he would with the fresh troops under his command easily and without opposition make himself emperor.

Jovian, inflamed by these dangerous hints too continually repeated, without delay surrendered all that was asked, except that with difficulty he succeeded in bringing it about that Nisibis and Singara should pass into control of the Persians without their inhabitants, and that the Romans in the fortresses that were to be taken from us should be allowed to return to our protection.

To these conditions there was added another which was destructive and impious, namely, that after the completion of these agreements, Arsaces, our steadfast and faithful friend[*](Cf. note to xxiv. 7, 8.) should never, if he asked it, be given help against the Persians. This was contrived with a double purpose, that a man who at the emperor’s order[*](Cf. xxiii. 3, 6.) had devastated Chiliocomum might be punished, and that the opportunity might be left of presently invading Armenia without opposition. The result was that later this same Arsaces was taken alive,[*](Cf. xxvii. 12, 3.) and that the Parthians amid various dissensions and disturbances seized a great tract of Armenia bordering on Media, along with Artaxata.

When this shameful treaty was concluded, lest anything contrary to the agreements should be done during the truce, distinguished men were given on both sides as hostages: from our side Nemota, Victor, and Bellovaedius,[*](The names are evidently corrupted and there should be four Roman hostages; see crit. note.) tribunes of famous corps,

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and from the opposite party Bineses, one of the distinguished magnates, and three satraps besides of no obscure name.

And so a peace of thirty years was made and consecrated by the sanctity of oaths; but we returned by other routes, and since the places near the river were avoided as rough and uneven, we suffered from lack of water and food.