Res Gestae

Having held council with his most distinguished generals about the siege of Ctesiphon, the opinion of some was adopted, who felt sure that the undertaking was rash and untimely, since the city, impregnable by its situation alone, was well defended; and, besides, it was believed that the king would soon appear with a formidable force.

So the better opinion prevailed, and the most careful of emperors, recognizing its advantage, sent Arintheus with a band of light-armed infantry, to lay waste the surrounding country, which was rich in herds and crops; Arintheus was also bidden, with equal energy to pursue the enemy, who had been lately scattered and concealed by impenetrable by-paths and their familiar hiding-places.[*](Here there seems to be an extensive lacuna, since the sending of envoys to Julian by Sapor (Socrat. iii. 19) and other important events are missing; see crit. note.)

But Julian, ever driven on by his eager ambitions, made light of words of warning, and upbraiding his generals for urging him through cowardice and love of ease to loose his hold on the Persian kingdom, which he had already all but won;

And it seemed as if Bellona herself lighted the fire with fatal torch, when he gave orders that all the ships should be burned, with the exception of twelve of the smaller ones, which he decided to transport on wagons as helpful for making bridges. And he thought that this plan had the advantage that the fleet, if abandoned, could not be used by the enemy, or at any rate, that nearly 20,000 soldiers would not be employed in transporting and guiding the ships, as had been the case since the beginning of the campaign.[*](Gregory Nazianzen says that a Persian, who played the part of Zopyrus (see xviii. 5, 3, note), advised Julian to take this step; cf. Aug. De Civ. Dei, iv. 29; v. 21.)

Then, as every man murmured, in fear for his life, and manifest truth made clear, that if the dryness of the country or high mountains made it necessary to retreat, they could not return to the waters; and as the deserters, on being put to the torture, openly confessed that they had used deceit, orders were given to use the greatest efforts of the army to put out the flames. But the frightful spread of the fire had already consumed the greater number of the ships, and only the twelve could be saved unharmed which had been set aside to be kept.[*](See § 4, above.)

By this disaster the fleet was needlessly lost, but Julian, trusting to his united army, since none of the soldiers was distracted by other duties, and now stronger in numbers, advanced into the interior, where the fruitful country furnished an abundance of supplies.

On learning this the enemy, in order to torment us with hunger, set fire to the plants and the ripe grain; and we, being prevented from advancing by the conflagration, were forced to stay in a permanent

Yet the emperor and the soldiers were troubled for this reason—that since the ships had been rashly destroyed, there was no means of making a bridge; and the movements of the advancing enemy could not be halted, whose approach was shown by the bright gleam of their armour, which skilfully fitted every limb. And there was also another great evil, in that the reinforcements that were awaited under Arsaces and our other generals did not appear, being hindered by the reasons already mentioned.[*](In the lacuna at the end of § 2; cf. xxiii. 2 and 3. The Roman troops that had remained behind on the other bank of the Tigris made no move, partly from fear and partly because of discord among their generals.)