Res Gestae

Ammianus Marcellinus

Ammianus Marcellinus. Ammianus Marcellinus, with an English translation, Vols. I-III. Rolfe, John C., translator. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press; W. Heinemann, 1935-1940 (printing).

Nor did he at so critical a time disregard the interests of private persons, but he gave ear to their suits and disputes, especially those of the senators of the free towns, whom he was much inclined to favour, and unjustly invested many of them with high public office.

There[*](At Naessus.) it was that he found Symmachus[*](Father of the Symmachus from whom we have eleven books of letters, a pillar of the pagan religion. The son was later prefect of the city of Rome; cf. xxvii. 3, 3.) and Maximus, two distinguished senators, who had been sent by the nobles as envoys to Constantius. On their return he received them with honour, and passing over the better man,[*](Symmachus.) in place of Tertullus made Maximus prefect of the eternal city, to please Rufinus Vulcatius,[*](Cf. xxvii. 7, 2.) whose nephew he knew him to be. Under this man’s administration, however, there were supplies in abun- dance, and the complaints of the populace, which were often wont to arise, ceased altogether.

Then, to bring about a feeling of security in the crisis and to encourage those who were submissive, he promoted Mamertinus, the pretorian prefect in Illyricum, to the consulship, as well as Nevitta; and that too although he had lately beyond measure blamed Constantine as the first to raise the rank of base foreigners.[*](See xxi. 10, 8.)

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While by these and similar means Julian, wavering between hope and fear, was planning new measures, Constantius at Edessa, troubled by the varying reports of his scouts, was hesitating between two different courses, now preparing his soldiers for battle in the field, now, if opportunity should offer, planning a second siege of Bezabde, with the prudent design of not leaving the flank of Mesopotamia unprotected when he was presently about to march to the north.

But in this state of indecision he was kept back by many delays, since the Persian king was waiting on the other side of the Tigris until the signs from heaven should warrant a move; for if Sapor had crossed the river and found no one to oppose him, he could easily have penetrated to the Euphrates; besides this, since he was keeping his soldiers in condition for civil war, he feared to expose them to the dangers of an attack upon a walled city, knowing by experience the strength of its fortifications and the energy of its defenders.

However, in order not to be wholly inactive, nor be criticised for slackness, he ordered Arbitio and Agilo, commanders of the cavalry and of the infantry, to sally forth promptly with strong forces, not with a view of provoking the Persians to battle, but to draw a cordon on our bank of the Tigris and be on the watch to see where the impetuous king might break through. Moreover, he often warned

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them by word of mouth and in writing that if the enemy’s horde should begin to cross, they were to retreat quickly.