Noctes Atticae

Gellius, Aulus

Gellius, Aulus. The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius. Rolfe, John C., translator. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, 1927 (printing).

On the names of the gods of the Roman people called Diovis and Vediovis.

IN ancient prayers we have observed that these names of deities appear: Diovis and Vediovis; furthermore, there is also a temple of Vediovis at Rome, between the Citadel and the Capitolium. [*](The two summits of the Capitoline Hill.) The explanation of these names I have found to be this: the ancient Latins derived Iovis from iuvare (help), and called that same god

father,
thus adding a second word. For Iovispater is the full and complete form, which becomes Iupiter [*](The correct spelling in Latin is Iuppiter.) by the syncope or change of some of the letters. So also Neptunuspater is used as a compound, and Saturnus— pater and Ianuspater and Marspater—for that is the original form of Marspiter—and Jove also was called Diespiter, that is, the father of day and of light. And therefore by a name of similar origin Jove is called Diovis and also Lucetius, because he blesses and helps us by means of the day and the light, which are equivalent to life itself. And Lucetius is applied to Jove by Gnaeus Naevius in his poem On the Punic war. [*](Fr. 55, Bährens.)

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Accordingly, when they had given the names Iovis and Diovis from iuvare (help), they applied a lame of the contrary meaning to that god who had, not the power to help, but the force to do harm—for some gods they worshipped in order to gain their favour, others they propitiated in order to avert their hostility; and they called him Vediovis, thus taking away and denying his power to give help. For the particle ve which appears in different forms in different words, now being spelled with these two letters and now with an a inserted between the two, has two meanings which also differ from each other. For ve, like very many other particles, has the effect either of weakening or of strengthening the force of a word; and it therefore happens that some words to which that particle is prefixed are ambiguous [*](That is, it is uncertain what force ve- has in these words; but see the next note.) and may be used with either force, such as vescus (small), vemens (mighty), and vegrandis (very small), [*](Gellius is wrong in supposing that ve- strengthened the force of a word; it means without, apart from. Nonius cites Lucilias for vegrandis in the sense of very great, but wrongly; see Marx on Lucil. 631. Vescus means small, or, in an active sense, make small (Lucr. i. 326); Walde derives it from rescor in the sense of eating away, corroding (Lucr. i. 326) and from ve-escus in the sense of small Vemens, for vehemens, is probably a participle (vehemenos) from veho.) a point which I have discussed elsewhere [*](xvi. 5. 6.) in greater detail. But vesanus and vecordes are used with only one of the meanings of ve, namely, the privative or negative force, which the Greeks call kata\ ste/rhsin.

It is for this reason that the statue of the god Vediovis, which is in the temple of which I spoke above, holds arrows, which, as everyone knows, are devised to inflict harm. For that reason it has often been said that that god is Apollo; and a shegoat is sacrificed to him in the customary fashion, [*](Vediovis, or Veiovis, was the opposite of Jupiter, ve- having its negative force. He was a god of the nether world and of death; hence the arrows and the she-goat, which was an animal connected with the lower world (see Gell. x. 15. 12, and Wissowa Religion und Kultus,p. 237). Some regarded the god as a youthful (little) Jupiter and the she-goat as the one which suckled him in his infancy; others as Apollo, because of the arrows, but the she-goat has no connection with Apollo.)

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and a representation of that animal stands near his statue.

It was for this reason, they say, that Virgil, a man deeply versed in antiquarian lore, but never making a display of his knowledge, prays to the unpropitious gods in the Georgics, thus intimating that in gods of that kind there is a power capable of injuring rather than aiding. The verses of Vergil are these: [*](Georg. iv. 6.)

  1. A task of narrow span, but no small praise,
  2. If unpropitious powers bar not my way
And favouring Phoebus grant a poet's prayer. And among those gods which ought to be placated in order to avert evil influences from ourselves or our harvests are reckoned Auruncus [*](Commonly called Averruncus, although the glosses give also the form Auruncus. From averrunco, to avert.) and Robigus. [*](Also called Robigo (f.), the god or goddess who averted mildew from the grain.)

On the rank and order of obligations established by the usage of the Roman people.

THERE was once a discussion, in my presence and hearing, of the rank and order of obligations, carried on by a company of men of advanced age and high position at Rome, who were also eminent for their knowledge and command of ancient usage and conduct. And when the question was asked to whom we ought first and foremost to discharge those obligations, in case it should be necessary to prefer some to others in giving assistance or showing attention, there was a difference of opinion. But it

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was readily agreed and accepted, that in accordance with the usage of the Roman people the place next after parents should be held by wards entrusted to our honour and protection; that second to them came clients, who also had committed themselves to our honour and guardianship; that then in the third place were guests; and finally relations by blood and by marriage.

Of this custom and practice there are numerous proofs and illustrations in the ancient records, of which, because it is now at hand, I will cite only this one at present, relating to clients and kindred. Marcus Cato in the speech which he delivered before the censors Against Lentulus wrote thus: [*](xli. 1, Jordan.)

Our forefathers regarded it as a more sacred obligation to defend their wards than not to deceive a client. One testifies in a client's behalf against one's relatives; testimony against a client is given by no one. A father held the first position of honour; next after him a patron.

Masurius Sabinus, however, in the third book of his Civil Law assigns a higher place to a guest than to a client. The passage from that book is this: [*](Fr. 6, Huschke; 2 Bremer.)

In the matter of obligations our forefathers observed the following order: first to a ward, then to a guest, then to a client, next to a blood relation, finally to a relation by marriage. Other things being equal, women were given preference to men, but a ward who was under age took precedence of one who was a grown woman. Also those who were appointed by will to be guardians of the sons of a man against whom they had appeared in court, appeared for the ward in the same case.

Very clear and strong testimony on this subject

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is furnished by the authority of Gaius Caesar, when he was high priest; for in the speech which he delivered In Defence of the Bithynians he made use of this preamble: [*](ii. p. 123, Dinter; O. R. F.2 p. 419.)
In consideration either of my guest-friendship with king Nicomedes or my relationship to those whose case is on trial, O Marcus Iuncus, I could not refuse this duty. For the remembrance of men ought not to be so obliterated by their death as not to be retained by those nearest to them, and without the height of disgrace we cannot forsake clients to whom we are bound to render aid even against our kinsfolk.

The account of Apion, a learned man who was surnamed Plistonices, of the mutual recognition, due to old acquaintance, that he had seen at Rome between a man and a lion.

APION, who was called Plistonices, was a man widely versed in letters, and possessing an extensive and varied knowledge of things Greek. In his works, which are recognized as of no little repute, is contained an account of almost all the remarkable things which are to be seen and heard in Egypt. Now, in his account of what he professes either to have heard or read he is perhaps too verbose through a reprehensible love of display—for he is a great self-advertiser in parading his learning; but this incident, which he describes in the fifth book of his Wonders of Egypt, [*](F. H. G. iii. 510.) he declares that he neither heard nor read, but saw himself with his own eyes in the city of Rome.

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In the Great Circus,
he says,
a battle with wild beasts on a grand scale was being exhibited to the people. Of that spectacle, since I chanced to be in Rome, I was,
he says,
an eye-witness. There were there many savage wild beasts, brutes remarkable for their huge size, and all of uncommon appearance or unusual ferocity. But beyond all others,
says he,
did the vast size of the lions excite wonder, and one of these in particular surpassed all the rest. This one lion had drawn to himself the attention and eyes of all because of the activity and huge size of his body, his terrific and deep roar, the development of his muscles, and the mane streaming over his shoulders. There was brought in, among many others who had been condemned to fight with the wild beasts, the slave of an ex-consul; the slave's name was Androclus. When that lion saw him from a distance,
says Apion,
he stopped short as if in amazement, and then approached the man slowly and quietly, as if he recognized him. Then, wagging his tail in a mild and caressing way, after the manner and fashion of fawning dogs, he came close to the man, who was now half dead from fright, and gently licked his feet and hands. The man Androclus, while submitting to the caresses of so fierce a beast, regained his lost courage and gradually turned his eyes to look at the lion. Then,
says Apion,
you might have seen man and lion exchange joyful greetings, as if they had recognized each other.

He says that at this sight, so truly astonishing, the people broke out into mighty shouts; and Gaius Caesar called Androclus to him and inquired the reason why that fiercest of lions had spared him alone. Then Androclus related a strange and

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surprising story.
My master,
said he,
was governing Africa with proconsular authority. While there, I was forced by his undeserved and daily floggings to run away, and that my hiding-places might be safer from my master, the ruler of that country, I took refuge in lonely plains and deserts, intending, if food should fail me, to seek death in some form. Then,
said he,
when the midday sun was fierce and scorching, finding a remote and secluded cavern, I entered it, and hid myself. Not long afterwards this lion came to the same cave with one paw lame and bleeding, making known by groans and moans the torturing pain of his wound.
And then, at the first sight of the approaching lion, Androclus said that his mind was overwhelmed with fear and dread.
But when the lion,
said he,
had entered what was evidently his own lair, and saw me cowering at a distance, he approached me mildly and gently, and lifting up his foot, was evidently showing it to me and holding it out as if to ask for help. Then,
said he,
I drew out a huge splinter that was embedded in the sole of the foot, squeezed out the pus that had formed in the interior of the wound, wiped away the blood, and dried it thoroughly, being now free from any great feeling of fear. Then, relieved by that attention and treatment of mine, the lion, putting his paw in my hand, lay down and went to sleep, and for three whole years from that day the lion and I lived in the same cave, and on the same food as well. For he used to bring for me to the cave the choicest parts of the game which he took in hunting, which I, having no means of making a fire, dried in the noonday sun and ate. But,
said he,
after I had finally grown tired of that wild
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life, I left the cave when the lion had gone off to hunt, and after travelling nearly three days, I was seen and caught by some soldiers and taken from Africa to Rome to my master. He at once had me condemned to death by being thrown to the wild beasts. But,
said he,
I perceive that this lion was also captured, after I left him, and that he is now requiting me for my kindness and my cure of him.

Apion records that Androclus told this story, and that when it had been made known to the people by being written out in full on a tablet and carried about the Circus, at the request of all Androclus was freed, acquitted and presented with the lion by vote of the people.

Afterwards,
said he,
we used to see Androclus with the lion, attached to a slender leash, making the rounds of the shops throughout the city; Androclus was given money, the lion was sprinkled with flowers, and everyone who met them anywhere exclaimed: 'This is the lion that was a man's friend, this is the man who was physician to a lion.'

That it is a disputed question among philosophers whether voice is corporeal or incorporeal.

A QUESTION that has been argued long and continuously by the most famous philosophers is whether voice has body or is incorporeal; for the word incorporeus has been coined by some of them, corresponding exactly to the Greek a)sw/matos. Now a body is that which is either active or passive: this in Greek is defined as to\ h)/toi poiou=n h)\ pa/sxon, or

that which either acts or is acted upon.
Wishing
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to reproduce this definition the poet Lucretius wrote: [*](i. 304.)
  1. Naught save a body can be touched or touch.
The Greeks also define body in another way, as to\ trixh= dia/staton, or
that which has three dimensions.
But the Stoics maintain [*](II. 141, Arn.) that voice is a body, and say that it is air which has been struck; Plato, however, thinks that voice is not corporeal:
for,
says he, [*](Timaeus, p. 67, B.)
not the air which is struck, but the stroke and the blow themselves are voice.
Democritus, and following him Epicurus, declare that voice consists of individual particles, and they call it, to use their own words, r(eu=ma a)to/mwn, [*](p. 353, Usener.) or
a stream of atoms.
When I heard of these and other sophistries, the result of a self-satisfied cleverness combined with lack of employment, and saw in these subtleties no real advantage affecting the conduct of life, and no end to the inquiry, I agreed with Ennius' Neoptolemus, who rightly says: [*](340, Ribbeck3.)
  1. Philosophizing there must be, but by the few;
  2. Since for all men it's not to be desired.

On the function of the eye and the process of vision.

I HAVE observed that the philosophers have varying opinions about the method of seeing and the nature of vision. The Stoics say [*](II. 871, Arn.) that the causes of sight are the emission of rays from the eyes to those objects which can be seen, and the simultaneous

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expansion of the air. Epicurus believes [*](319, Usener.) that there is a constant flow from all bodies of images of those bodies themselves, and that these impinge upon the eyes and hence the sensation of seeing arises. Plato is of the opinion [*](Timaeus, p. 45, B.) that a kind of fire or light issues from the eyes, and that this, being united and joined either with the light of the sun or with that of some other fire, by means of its own and the external force makes us see whatever it has struck and illumined. But here too we must not dally longer, but follow the advice of that Neoptolemus in Ennius, of whom I have just written, [*](xv. 9.) who advises having a
taste
of philosophy, but not
gorging oneself with it.

Why the first days after the Kalends, Nones and Ides are considered unlucky; and why many avoid also the fourth day before the Kalends, Nones or Ides, on the ground that it is ill-omened.

VERRIUS FLACCUS, in the fourth book of his work On the Meaning of Words, writes [*](p. xiv. Müller.) that the days immediately following the Kalends, Nones and Ides, which the common people ignorantly call

holidays,
are properly called, and considered,
ill-omened,
for this reason:—
When the city,
he says,
had been recovered from the Senonian Gauls, Lucius Atilius stated in the senate that Quintus Sulpicius, tribune of the soldiers, when on the eve of fighting against the Gauls at the Allia, [*](In 390 B. C.) offered sacrifice in anticipation of that battle on the day after the Ides; that the army of the Roman people was thereupon cut to pieces, and three days later the whole
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city, except the Capitol, was taken. Also many other senators said that they remembered that whenever with a view to waging war a magistrate of the Roman people had sacrificed on the day after the Kalends, Nones or Ides, in the very next battle of that war the State had suffered disaster. Then the senate referred the matter to the pontiffs, that they might take what action they saw fit. The pontiffs decreed that no offering would properly be made on those days.

Many also avoid the fourth day before the Kalends, Nones and Ides, as ill-omened. It is often inquired whether any religious reason for that observance is recorded. I myself have found nothing in literature pertaining to that matter, except that Quintus Claudius Quadrigarius, in the fifth book of his Annals, says that the prodigious slaughter of the battle of Cannae occurred on the fourth day before the Nones of August. [*](August 2, 216 B. C.)

In what respect, and how far, history differs from annals; and a quotation on that subject from the first book of the Histories of Sempronius Asellio.

SOME think that history differs from annals in this particular, that while each is a narrative of events, yet history is properly an account of events in which the narrator took part; and that this is the opinion of some men is stated by Verrius Flaccus in the fourth book of his treatise On the Meaning of Words.[*](p. xiv. Müller.) He adds that he for his part has doubts about the matter, but he thinks that the view may have some appearance of reason, since i(stori/a in Greek means a

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knowledge of current events. But we often hear it said that annals are exactly the same as histories, but that histories are not exactly the same as annals; just as a man is necessarily an animal, but an animal is not necessarily a man.

Thus they say that history is the setting forth of events or their description, or whatever term may be used; but that annals set down the events of many years successively, with observance of the chronological order. When, however, events are recorded, not year by year, but day by day, such a history is called in Greek e)fhmeri/s, or

a diary,
a term of which the Latin interpretation is found in the first book of Sempronius Asellio. I have quoted a passage of some length from that book, in order at the same time to show what his opinion is of the difference between history and chronicle.

But between those,
he says, [*](Fr. 1, Peter.)
who have desired to leave us annals, and those who have tried to write the history of the Roman people, there was this essential difference. The books of annals merely made known what happened and in what year it happened, which is like writing a diary, which the Greeks call e)fhmeri/s. For my part, I realize that it is not enough to make known what has been done, but that one should also show with what purpose and for what reason things were done.
A little later in the same book Asellio writes: [*](Fr. 2, Peter.)
For annals cannot in any way make men more eager to defend their country, or more reluctant to do wrong. Further-more, to write over and over again in whose consulship a war was begun and ended, and who in consequence entered the city in a triumph, and in that
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book not to state what happened in the course of the war, what decrees the senate made during that time, or what law or bill was passed, and with what motives these things were done—that is to tell stories to children, not to write history.

The meaning of adoptatio and also of adrogatio, and how they differ; and the formula used by the official who, when children are adopted, brings the business before the people.

WHEN outsiders are taken into another's family and given the relationship of children, it is done either through a praetor or through the people. If done by a praetor, the process is called adoptatio; if through the people, arrogatio. Now, we have adoptatio, when those who are adopted are surrendered in court through a thrice repeated sale [*](This was a symbolic sale, made by thrice touching a balance with a penny, in the presence of a praetor; see Suet., Aug. lxiv.) by the father under whose control they are, and are claimed by the one who adopts them in the presence of the official before whom the legal action takes place. The process is called adrogatio, when persons who are their own masters deliver themselves into the control of another, and are themselves responsible for the act. But arrogations are not made without due consideration and investigation; for the so-called comitia curiata [*](The assembly of the curiae, the thirty divisions into which the Roman citizens were divided, ten for each of the original three tribes. It was superseded at an early period by the comitia centuriata, and its action was confined to formalities. See xv. 27. 5.) are summoned under the authority of the pontiffs, and it is inquired whether the age of the one who wishes to adopt is not rather suited to begetting children of his own; precaution is taken that the property of the one who is being adopted is not being sought under false pretences; and an oath is administered which is said

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to have been formulated for use in that ceremony by Quintus Mucius, [*](Fr. 13, Huschke; I. p. 58 and p. 80, Bremer.) when he was pontifex maxinus. But no one may be adopted by adrogatio who is not yet ready to assume the gown of manhood. The name adrogatio is due to the fact that this kind of transfer to another's family is accomplished through a rogatio or
request,
put to the people.

The language of this request is as follows:

Express your desire and ordain that Lucius Valerius be the son of Lucius Titius as justly and lawfully as if he had been born of that father and the mother of his family, and that Titius have that power of life and death over Valerius which a father has over a son. This, just as I have stated it, I thus ask of you, fellow Romans.

Neither a ward nor a woman who is not under the control of her father may be adopted by adrogatio; since women have no part in the comitia, and it is not right that guardians should have so much authority and power over their wards as to be able to subject to the control of another a free person who has been committed to their protection. Freedmen, however, may legally be adopted in that way by freeborn citizens, according to Masurius Sabinus. [*](Fr. 27, Huschke; Jus. Civ. 60, Bremer.) But he adds that it is not allowed, and he thinks it never ought to be allowed, that men of the condition of freedmen should by process of adoption usurp the privileges of the freeborn.

Furthermore,
says he,
if that ancient law be maintained, even a slave may be surrendered by his master for adoption through the agency of a praetor.
And he declares that several authorities [*](Cato, Fr. 4a, I. p. 21, Bremer.) on ancient law have written that this can be done.

I have observed in a speech of Publius Scipio On

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Morals, which he made to the people in his censorship, that among the things that he criticized, on the ground that they were done contrary to the usage of our forefathers, he also found fault with this, that an adopted son was of profit to his adoptive father in gaining the rewards for paternity. [*](That is, the privileges and exemptions conferred upon the fathers of children, later comprised under the ius trium liberorum; see ii. 15. 3 ff.) The passage in that speech is as follows: [*](O.R.F.2 p. 180.)
A father votes in one tribe, the son in another, [*](The meaning is that a man who had been adopted would vote in the tribe of his adoptive father, which might be different from that of his own father.) an adopted son is of as much advantage as if one had a son of his own; orders are given to take the census of absentees, and hence it is not necessary for anyone to appear in person at the census.

The Latin word coined by Sinnius Capito for

solecism,
and what the early writers of Latin called that same fault: and also Sinnius Capito's definition of a solecism.

A solecism, which by Sinnius Capito and other lien of his time was called in Latin inparilitas, or

inequality,
the earlier Latin writers termed stribiligo, [*](This word, which seems to occur only here and in Arnobius i. 36, apparently means twisted, awry.) evidently meaning the improper use of an inverted form of expression, a sort of twist as it were. This kind of fault is thus defined by Sinnius Capito, in a letter which lie wrote to Clodius Tuscus:
A solecism,
he says, [*](Fr. 2, Huschke.)
is an irregular and incongruous joining together of the parts of speech.

Since

soloecismus
is a Greek word, the question is often asked, whether it was used by the men of
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Attica who spoke most elegantly. But I have as yet found neither soloecismus nor barbarismus [*](These words were applied to any impropriety in the use of language.) in good Greek writers; for just as they used ba/rbaros, so they used so/loikos. [*](Both words have the general meaning of foreign ; according to some, so/loikos was derived from Soloi, a town of Cilicia, whose inhabitants spoke a perverted Attic dialect. This derivation seems to be accepted to-day. Barbarus is regarded as an onomatopoeic word, representing stammering; cf. balbus.) So too our earlier writers used soloecus regularly, soloecismus never, I think. But if that be so, soloecismus is proper usage neither in Greek nor in Latin.

One who says pluria, compluria and compluriens speaks good Latin, and not incorrectly.

AN extremely learned man, a friend of mine, chanced in the course of conversation to use the word pluria, not at all with a desire to show off, or because he thought that plura ought not to be used. For he is a man of serious scholarship and devoted to the duties of life, and not at all meticulous in the use of words. But, I think, from constant perusal of the early writers a word which he had often met in books had become second nature to his tongue.

There was present when he said this a very audacious critic of language, who had read very little and that of the most ordinary sort; this fellow had some trifling instruction in the art of grammar, which was partly ill-digested and confused and partly false, and this he used to cast like dust into the eyes of any with whom he had entered into discussion. Thus on that occasion he said to my friend:

You were incorrect in saying pluria; for that form has
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neither justification nor authorities.
Thereupon that friend of mine rejoined with a smile:
My: good sir, since I now have leisure from more serious affairs, I wish you would please explain to me why pluria and compluria—for they do not differ-are used barbarously and incorrectly by Marcus Cato, [*](Fr. 24, Peter.) Quintus Claudius, [*](Fr. 90, Peter.) Valerius Antias, [*](Fr. 65, Peter.) Lucius Aelius, [*](Fr. 48, Fun.) Publius Nigidius, [*](Frag. 64, Swoboda.) and Marcus Varro, whom we have as endorsers and sanctioners of this form, to say nothing of a great number of the early poets and orators.
And the fellow answered with excessive arrogance:
You are welcome to those authorities of yours, dug up from the age of the Fauns and Aborigines, but what is your answer to this rule? No neuter comparative in the nominative plural has an i before its final a; for example, meliora, maiora, graviora. Accordingly, then, it is proper to say plura, not pluria, in order that there be no i before final a in a comparative, contrary to the invariable rule.

Then that friend of mine, thinking that the self-confident fellow deserved few words, said:

There are numerous letters of Sinnius Capito, a very learned man, collected in a single volume and deposited, I think, in the Temple of Peace. The first letter is addressed to Pacuvius Labeo, and it is prefixed by the title, 'Pluria, not plura, should be used.' [*](Fr. 1, Huschke.) In that letter he has collected the grammatical rules to show that pluria, and not plura, is good Latin. Therefore I refer you to Capito. From him you will learn at the same time, provided you can comprehend what is written in that letter, that pluria, or plura, is the positive and simple form, not, as it seems to you, a comparative.

It also confirms that view of Sinnius, that when

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we say complures or
several,
we are not using a comparative. Moreover, from the word compluria is derived the adverb compluriens,
often.
Since this is not a common word, I have added a verse of Plautus, from the comedy entitled The Persian: [*](v. 534.)
  1. What do you fear?—By Heaven! I am afraid;
  2. I've had the feeling many a time and oft (compluriens).
Marcus Cato too, in the fourth book of his Origins, has used this word three times in the same passage: [*](Fr. 79, Peter.)
Often (compluriens) did their mercenary soldiers kill one another in large numbers in the camp; often (compluriens) did many together desert to the enemy; often (compluriens) did they attack their general.

v2.p.3

Some remarkable stories about the elder Publius Africanus, drawn from the annals.

The tale which in Grecian history is told of Olympias, wife of king Philip and mother of Alexander, is also recorded of the mother of that Publius Scipio who was the first to be called Africanus. For both Gaius Oppius [*](Fr. 2, Peter2.) and Julius Hyginus, [*](Fr. 4, Peter2; p. 37, Bunte.) as well as others who have written of the life and deeds of Africanus, declare that his mother was for a long time thought to be barren, and that Publius Scipio, her husband, had also given up hope of offspring; that afterwards, in her own room and bed, when she was lying alone in the absence of her husband and had fallen asleep, of a sudden a huge serpent was seen lying by her side; and that when those who had seen it were frightened and cried out, the snake glided away and could not be found. It is said that Publius Scipio himself consulted soothsayers about the occurrence; that they, after offering sacrifice, declared that he would have children, and not many days after that serpent had been seen in her bed, the woman began to

v2.p.5
experience the indications and sensation of conception. [*](A similar story is told of Augustus (Suet. Aug. xciv. 4) as well as of Alexander the Great (§ 1 and Livy, xxvi. 19. 7).) Afterwards, in the tenth month, she gave birth to that Publius Scipio who conquered Hannibal and the Carthaginians in Africa in the second Punic war. [*](At Zama, 202 B.C.) But it was far more because of his exploits than because of that prodigy that he too [*](As well as Alexander and Augustus; see note 1.) was believed to be a man of godlike excellence.

This too I venture to relate, which the same writers that I mentioned before have put on record: This Scipio Africanus used often to go to the Capitolium in the latter part of the night, before the break of day, give orders that the shrine of Jupiter be opened, [*](The name Capitolium was applied to the southern summit of the Capitoline Hill, and also to the temple of Juppiter Optimus Maximus. The temple contained three shrines, to Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva.) and remain there a long time alone, apparently consulting Jupiter about matters of state; and the guardians of the temple were often amazed that on his coming to the Capitolium alone at such an hour the dogs, [*](The temple was guarded at night by dogs, as were doubtless other similar places, and as it is said that the ruins of Pompeii are to-day. Geese were also used for the purpose; see Cic. pro Sex. Rose. 56, anseribus cibaria publice locantur et canes aluntur in Capitolio, ut significent, si fures venerint.) that flew at all other intruders, neither barked at him nor molested him.

These popular beliefs about Scipio seemed to be confirmed and attested by many remarkable actions and sayings of his. Of these the following is a single example: He was engaged in the siege of a town [*](According to Valerius Maximus, iii. 7. 1, the town was Badia.) in Spain, which was strongly fortified and defended, protected by its position, and also well provisioned; and there was no prospect of taking it. One day he sat holding court in his camp, at a point from which there was a distant view of the town.

v2.p.7
Then one of the soldiers who were on trial before him asked in the usual way on what day and in what place he bade them give bail for their appearance. Then Scipio, stretching forth his hand towards the very citadel of the town which he was besieging, said:
Appear the day after to-morrow in yonder place.
And so it happened; on the third day, the day on which he had ordered them to appear, the town was captured, and on that same day he held court in the citadel of the place.

Of a disgraceful blunder of Caesellius Vindex, which we find in his work entitled Archaic Terms.

IN those highly celebrated notes of Caesellius Vindex On Archaic Terms we find a shameful oversight, although in fact the man is seldom caught napping. This error has escaped the notice of many, in spite of their diligent search for opportunities to find fault with Caesellius, even through misrepresentation. Now, Caesellius wrote that Quintus Ennius, in the thirteenth book of his Annals, used cor in the masculine gender.

I add Caesellius' own words:

Ennius used cor, like many other words, in the masculine gender; for in Annals xiii. he wrote quem cor.
He then quoted two verses of Ennius [*](381 ff., Vahlen2.) :
  1. While Hannibal, of bold breast, did me exhort
  2. Not to make war, what heart thought he was mine?
v2.p.9
The speaker is Antiochus, king of Asia. He is surprised and indignant that Hannibal, the Carthaginian, discourages his desire to make war on the people of Rome. [*](Antiochus did not follow Hannibal's advice and suffered a crushing defeat at Thermopylae in 191 B.C.) Now, Caesellius understands the lines to mean that Antiochus says:
Hannibal dissuades me from making war. In so doing, what kind of heart does he think I have, and how foolish does he believe me to be, when he gives me such advice?

So Caesellius; but Ennius' meaning was quite different. For there are three verses, not two, which belong to this utterance of the poet's, and Caesellius overlooked the third verse:

  1. Through valour war's great advocate and friend.
The meaning and arrangement of these three verses I believe to be this:
Hannibal, that boldest and most valiant of men, who I believed (for that is the meaning of cor meum credidit, exactly as if he had said
who l, foolish man, believed
) would strongly advise war, discourages and dissuades me from making war.
Caesellius, however, somewhat carelessly misled as to the connection of the words, assumed that Ennius said quem cor, reading quem with an acute accent, [*](The interrogative quem would be stressed (have an acute accent), while the relative quem would not (i.e., would have a grave accent).) as if it belonged with cor and not with Hannibal. But I am well aware that one might, if anyone should have so little understanding, defend Caesellius' masculine cor by maintaining that the third verse should be read apart from the others, as if Antiochus had exclaimed in broken and abrupt language
a mighty adviser!
But those who would argue thus do not deserve a reply.

v2.p.11

What Tullius Tiro, Cicero's freedman, criticized in the speech which Marcus Cato delivered in the senate in defence of the Rhodians; and our answer to his strictures.

THE State of Rhodes is famed for the happy situation of the island, its celebrated works of art, its skill in seamanship and its naval victories. Although a friend and ally of the Roman people, that State was on cordial terms with Perses, son of Philip and king of Macedon, with whom the Romans were at war; [*](The second Macedonian war, 171–168 B.C. The Rhodians sided with the Romans until 169 B.C., when they sent envoys to the Roman head-quarters and to the senate, declaring that they would no longer tolerate a war which injured their traffic with Macedonia and diminished their revenues; that they were disposed to declare war against the party which should refuse to make peace, and that they had already formed an alliance with Crete and with the Asiatic cities. The Romans, who had in the past treated the Rhodians with special favour, were indignant and glad of the opportunity to humble the presumptuous State. When it was proposed in the senate to declare war upon Rhodes, the Rhodians resorted to every means of placating the Romans. Cato pleaded their cause, pointing out that they had committed no offence, unless the Romans wished to punish mere wishes and thoughts. His words, however, were in vain. The senate deprived the Rhodians of their possessions on the mainland and humiliated them in other ways. Alliance with Rhodes was not renewed until 164 B.C., and then only after many entreaties.) accordingly, the Rhodians often sent envoys to Rome and tried to reconcile the contending parties. But when their attempts at peace-making failed, many of the Rhodians harangued the people in their assemblies, urging that if peace were not made, the Rhodians should aid the king in his contest with the people of Rome; but as to that question no official action was taken. When, however, Perses was defeated and taken prisoner, the Rhodians were in great fear because of what had been said and done on many occasions in the popular assemblies; and they sent envoys to Rome, to apologize for the hastiness of some of their fellow-citizens and vindicate their loyalty as a community. When the envoys reached Rome and were admitted to the

v2.p.13
senate, after having humbly pleaded their cause they left the House, and the senators were called upon for their opinions. When some of the members complained of the Rhodians, declaring that they had been disloyal, and recommended that war be declared upon them, then Marcus Cato arose. He endeavoured to defend and save our very good and faithful allies, to whom many of the most distinguished senators were hostile through a desire to plunder and possess their wealth; and he delivered that famous speech entitled For the Rhodians, which is included in the fifth book of his Origins and is also in circulation as a separate publication.

Now Tullius Tiro, Marcus Cicero's freedman, was unquestionably a man of refined taste and by no means unacquainted with our early history and literature. He had been liberally educated from his earliest years, and Cicero found in him an assistant, and in a sense a partner, in his literary work. But surely Tiro showed more presumption than can be tolerated or excused. For he wrote a letter [*](p. 9, Lion.) to Quintus Axius, a friend of his patron, with excessive assurance and warmth, in which, as he imagined, he criticized that speech For the Rhodians with keen and fine judgment. It chanced to take my fancy to touch upon certain of the animadversions which he makes in that letter, and I shall doubtless be the more readily pardoned for finding fault with Tiro, because he took Cato to task.

His first charge was that Cato,

ignorantly and absurdly,
to use Tiro's own language, made use of a preamble which was excessively arrogant and excessively severe and fault-finding, in which he declared that he feared lest the fathers, having their
v2.p.15
minds upset by joy and exultation at their success, might act unwisely and be in no state of mind for understanding and deliberating aright. Tiro says:
Advocates who are pleading for clients ought in their opening remarks to win over and propitiate the jurors with complimentary and respectful language; they ought, while their minds, as they wait to hear the case, are still in suspense and cool, to render them complacent, and not to arouse contradiction by insults and arrogant threats.
Then he has given us Cato's own preamble, which runs as follows: [*](Origines, v. 1, Jordan.)
I am aware that in happy, successful and prosperous times the minds of most men are wont to be puffed up, and their arrogance and self-confidence to wax and swell. Therefore I am now gravely concerned, since this enterprise has gone on so successfully, lest something adverse may happen in our deliberations, to bring to naught our good fortune, and lest this joy of ours may become too extravagant. Adversity subdues and shows what ought to be done; prosperity, since it inspires joy, commonly turns men aside from wise counsel and right understanding. Therefore it is with the greater emphasis that I advise and urge that this matter be put off for a few days, until we regain our self-command after so great rejoicing.

Then what Cato says next,
continues Tiro,
amounts to a confession rather than a defence; for it does not contain a refutation or shifting of the charge, but the sharing of it with many others, which of course amounts to nothing in the way of excuse. Moreover,
says Tiro,
he also acknowledges that the Rhodians, who were accused of favouring the king's cause against the Roman people
v2.p.17
and wishing him success, did so from motives of self-interest, for fear that the Romans, already proud and self-confident, with the addition of a victory over king Perses might become immoderately insolent.
And he gives Cato's own words, as follows: [*](Origines, v. 2, Jordan.)
And I really think that the Rhodians did not wish us to end the war as we did, with a victory over king Perses. But it was not the Rhodians alone who had that feeling, but I believe that many peoples and many nations agreed with them. And I am inclined to think that some of them did not wish us success, not in order that we might be disgraced, but because they feared that if there were no one of whom we stood in dread, we would do whatsoever we chose. I think, then, that it was with an eye to their own freedom that they held that opinion, in order not to be under our sole dominion and enslaved to us. But for all that, the Rhodians never publicly aided Perses. Reflect how much more cautiously we deal with one another as individuals. For each one of us, if he thinks that anything is being done contrary to his interests, strives with might and main to prevent it; but they in spite of all permitted this very thing to happen.

Now as to his criticism of Cato's introduction, Tiro ought to have known that although Cato defended the Rhodians, he did so as a senator who had been consul and censor and was recommending what he thought was best for the public welfare, not as an advocate pleading the cause of the accused. For one kind of introduction is appropriate for a man who is defending clients before jurors and striving in every way to excite pity and compassion; quite another for a man of eminent authority, when the

v2.p.19
senate is asked for its opinion on a matter of State, and when, indignant at the highly unjust opinions of some of the members, he gives plain and emphatic expression at once to his indignation and his sorrow, speaking in behalf of the public welfare and the safety of our allies. Indeed, it is a proper and salutary rule of the schools of rhetoric, that jurors who are to pass judgment on the person of a stranger and on a case which does not personally concern them (so that apart from the duty of acting as jurors no danger or emolument will come to them) ought to be conciliated and induced by mild and soothing language to have regard for the reputation and safety of the prisoner at the bar. But when the common prestige, honour and advantage of all are involved, and therefore one must advise what is to be done, or what must be put off that has already been begun, then one who busies oneself with an introduction designed to make his hearers friendly and kindly disposed towards himself wastes his efforts in needless talk. For the common interests and dangers have themselves already disposed the jurors to listen to advice, and it is rather they themselves that demand good-will [*](That is, towards the welfare of the State. Tiro seems to be making a word-play, using benivolos and benivolentiam in the same sense, but with a different application.) on the part of their counsellor. But when Tiro says that Cato admitted that the Rhodians did not wish the Romans to fight as successfully as they did, and king Perses to be conquered by the Roman people, and when he asserts that he declared that not the Rhodians alone, but many other nations too, had the same feeling, but that this availed nothing in excuse or extenuation of their fault—in this very first point Tiro is guilty of a shameless lie. He quotes Cato's words, yet misrepresents him by giving them a false interpretation.
v2.p.21
For Cato does not admit that the Rhodians did not wish the Roman people to be victorious, but said that he thought they did not; and this was unquestionably an expression of his own opinion, not an concession of the guilt of the Rhodians. On this point, in my judgment at least, Cato is not only free from reproach, but is even deserving of praise and admiration. For he apparently expressed a frank and conscientious opinion adverse to the Rhodians; but then, having established confidence in his candour, [*](Cf. i. 6. 6.) he so changed and shifted that very statement which seemed to militate against them, that on that account alone it seemed right that they should be more highly esteemed and beloved by the people of Rome; inasmuch as they took no steps to aid the king, although they wished him to succeed and although his success would have been to their advantage.

Later on, Tiro quotes the following words from the same speech: [*](v 3, Jordan.)

Shall we, then, of a sudden abandon these great services given and received and this strong friendship? Shall we be the first to do what we say they merely wished to do?
This,
says Tiro,
is a worthless and faulty argument. [*](An enthymeme in logic was an argument consisting of two propositions, the antecedent and its consequence.) For it might be replied: 'Certainly we shall anticipate them, for if we do not, we shall be caught unawares and must fall into the snares against which we failed to guard in advance.' Lucilius,
he says,
justly criticizes [*](1169, Marx.) the poet Euripides for this reason, that when king Polyphontes declared that he had killed his brother, because his brother had
v2.p.23
previously planned to slay him, Meropa, his brother's wife, confuted the king with these words [*](Fr. 451, Nauck2.) :
  1. If, as you say, my husband planned your death,
  2. You too should only plan, till that time came.
But that,
says Tiro,
is altogether full of absurdity, to wish to do something, and yet have the design and purpose of never doing what you wish to do.
But, as a matter of fact, Tiro failed to observe that the reason for taking precautions is not the same in all cases, and that the occupations and actions of human life, and the obligations of anticipation or postponement or even of taking vengeance or precautions, are not like a combat of gladiators. For to a gladiator ready to fight the fortune of battle offers the alternative, either to kill, if he should conquer, or to die, if he should yield. But the life of men in general is not restricted by such unfair or inevitable necessities that one must be first to commit an injury in order to avoid suffering injury. In fact, such conduct was so alien to the humanity of the Roman people that they often forbore to avenge the wrongs inflicted upon them.

Then Tiro says that later in that same speech Cato used arguments that were disingenuous and excessively audacious, not suited to the character which Cato showed at other times, but cunning and deceitful, resembling the subtleties of the Greek sophists.

For although,
says he,
he charged the Rhodians with having wished to make war on the Roman people, he declared that they did not deserve punishment, because they had not made war in spite of their strong desire to do so.
He says that Cato introduced what the logicians call an
v2.p.25
e)pagwgh/, [*](Defined by Cicero, Topica, 42 f., as inductio, or an inductive argument, with examples; see also §§ 45–47, below.) a most treacherous and sophistical device. designed not so much for the truth as for cavil, since by deceptive examples he tried to establish and prove that no one who wished to do wrong deserved to be punished, unless he actually accomplished his desire. Now Cato's words in that speech are as follows: [*](v. 4, Jordan.)
He who uses the strongest language against them says that they wished to be our enemies. Pray is there any one of you who, so far as he is concerned, would think it fair to suffer punishment because he is accused of having wished to do wrong? No one, I think; for so far as I am concerned, I should not.
Then a little farther on he says: [*](v. 5, Jordan.)
What? Is there any law so severe as to provide that if anyone wish to do so and so, he be fined a thousand sesterces, provided that be less than half his property; [*](The law provided that a man should not be fined in a sum greater than half his property.) if anyone shall desire to have more than five hundred acres, [*](This was forbidden by a Licinian Law, passed in 367 B.C.; the iuger was really about two-thirds of an acre. Another Licinian Law provided that no one should pasture more than 100 head of cattle, or 500 of smaller animals, on the public lands. The number, and the amount of the fine, are here expressed indefinitely.) let the fine be so much; if anyone shall wish to have a greater number of cattle, let the fine be thus and so. In fact, we all wish to have more, and we do so with impunity.
Later he continues: [*](v. 6, Jordan.)
But if it is not right for honour to be conferred because anyone says that he wished to do well, but yet did not do so, shall the Rhodians suffer, not because they did wrong, but because they are said to have wished to do wrong?
With such arguments Tullius Tiro says that Marcus Cato strove to show that the Rhodians also ought not to be punished, because although they had wished to be enemies of the Roman people,
v2.p.27
they had actually not been such. Furthermore, he says that it cannot be denied that to wish to have more than five hundred acres, which was forbidden by Stolo's [*](That is, the Licinian Law of C. Licinius Stolo.) bill, is not exactly the same thing as to wish to make an unjust and unrighteous war upon the Roman people; also that it could not be denied that rewards and punishments belong to different categories.
For services,
he says,
that are promised should be awaited, and not rewarded until they are performed; but in the case of threatening injuries, it is fair to guard against them rather than wait for them. For it is an admission of the greatest folly,
he declares,
not to go to meet wickedness that is planned, but to await and expect it, and then, when it has been committed and accomplished, at last to inflict punishment, when what is done cannot be undone.

These are the criticisms which Tiro passed upon Cato, not altogether pointless or wholly unreasonable; but as a matter of fact, Cato did not leave this e)pagwgh/ bare, isolated and unsupported, but he propped it up in various ways and clothed it with many other arguments. Furthermore, since lie had an eye as much to the interests of the State as to those of the Rhodians, he regarded nothing that he said or did in that matter as discreditable, provided he strove by every kind of argument to save our allies. And first of all, he very cleverly sought to find actions which are prohibited, not by natural or by international law, but by statutes passed to remedy some evil or meet an emergency; such for example as the one which limited the number of cattle or the amount of land. In such cases that which is forbidden cannot lawfully be done; but to

v2.p.29
wish to do it, if it should be allowed, is not dishonourable. And then he gradually compared and connected such actions as these with that which in itself it is neither lawful to do nor to wish to do. Then finally, in order that the impropriety of the comparison may not become evident, he defends it by numerous bulwarks, not laying great stress on those trivial and ideal censures of unlawful desires, such as form the arguments of philosophers in their leisure moments, but striving with might and main for one single end, namely, that the cause of the Rhodians, whose friendship it was to the interests of the commonwealth to retain, should be shown either to be just, or in any event, at least pardonable. Accordingly, he now affirms that the Rhodians did not make war and did not desire to do so; but again he declares that only acts should be considered and judged, and that mere empty wishes are liable neither to laws nor punishment; sometimes, however, as if admitting their guilt, he asks that they be pardoned and shows that forgiveness is expedient in human relations, arousing fear of popular outbreaks, if pardon is not granted, and on the other hand showing that if they forgive, the greatness of the Roman people will be maintained.

The charge of arrogance too, which in particular was brought against the Rhodians in the senate at that time, he evaded and eluded by a brilliant and all but inspired mode of reply. I shall give Cato's very words, [*](v. 7, Jordan.) since Tiro has passed them by:

They say that the Rhodians are arrogant, bringing a charge against them which I should on no account wish to have brought against me and my children. Suppose they are arrogant. What is that to us?
v2.p.31
Are you to be angry merely because someone is more arrogant than we are?
Absolutely nothing could be said with greater force or weight than this apostrophe against men proud of their deeds, loving pride in themselves, but condemning it in others.

It is further to be observed that throughout that speech of Cato's recourse is had to every weapon and device of the art rhetorical; but we are not conscious of their use, as we are in mock combats or in battles feigned for the sake of entertainment. For the case was not pleaded, I say, with an excess of refinement, elegance and observance of rule, but just as in a doubtful battle, when the troops are scattered, the contest rages in many parts of the field with uncertain outcome, so in that case at that time, when the notorious arrogance of the Rhodians had aroused the hatred and hostility of many men, Cato used every method of protection and defence without discrimination, at one time commending the Rhodians as of the highest merit, again exculpating them and declaring them blameless, yet again demanding that their property and riches should not be coveted, now asking for their pardon as if they were in the wrong, now pointing out their friendship to the commonwealth, appealing now to clemency, now to the mercy shown by our forefathers, now to the public interest. All this might perhaps have been said in a more orderly and euphonic style, yet I do not believe that it could have been said with greater vigour and vividness. It was therefore unfair of Tullius Tiro to single out from all the qualities of so rich a speech, apt in their connection with one another, a small and bare part to criticize, by asserting that it was not worthy

v2.p.33
of Marcus Cato to maintain that the mere desire for delinquencies that were not actually committed did not merit punishment.

But one will form a juster and more candid opinion of these words of mine, spoken in reply to Tullius Tiro, and judge accordingly, if one will take in hand Cato's own speech in its entirety, and will also take the trouble to look up and read the letter of Tiro to Axius. For then he will be able either to correct or confirm what I have said more truthfully and after fuller examination.

What sort of slaves Caelius Sabinus, the writer on civil law, said were commonly sold with caps on their heads, and why; and what chattels were sold under a crown in the days of our forefathers; and the meaning of that same expression

under a crown.

CAELIUS SABINUS, the jurist, has written [*](Fr. 2, Huschke; De Manc. fr. 19, Bremer.) that it was usual, when selling slaves, to put caps on those for whom the seller assumed no responsibility. He says that the reason for that custom was, that the law required that slaves of that kind be marked when offered for sale, in order that buyers might not err and be deceived; that it might not be necessary to wait for the bill of sale, but might be obvious at once what kind of slaves they were.

Just so,
he says,
in ancient times slaves taken by right of conquest were sold wearing garlands, and hence were said to be sold 'under a crown.' For as the crown was a sign that those who were being sold were captives, so a cap upon the head indicated that slaves were being sold for whom the seller gave the buyer no guarantee.

v2.p.35

There is, however, another explanation of the reason for the common saying that captives were sold

under a crown
namely, because a guard of soldiers stood around the bands of prisoners that were offered for sale, and such a ring of soldiers was called corona. But that the reason which I first gave is the more probable one is made clear by Marcus Cato in the book which he wrote On Military Science.

Cato's words are as follows [*](Fr. 2, Jordan, p. 80.)

That the people may rather crown themselves and go to offer thanks for success gained through their own efforts than be crowned and sold because of ill-success.

A noteworthy story about the actor Polus. [*](On this famous tragic actor see O'Connor, Chapters in the History of Actors and Acting in Ancient Greece (Princeton dissertation, 1908), pp. 128 ff. He flourished toward the end of the fourth century B.C.)

THERE was in the land of Greece an actor of wide reputation, who excelled all others in his clear delivery and graceful action. They say that his name was Polus, and he often acted the tragedies of famous poets with intelligence and dignity. This Polus lost by death a son whom he dearly loved. After he felt that he had indulged his grief sufficiently, he returned to the practice of his profession.

At that time he was to act the Electra of Sophocles at Athens, and it was his part to carry an urn which was supposed to contain the ashes of Orestes. The plot of the play requires that Electra, who is

v2.p.37
represented as carrying her brother's remains, should lament and bewail the fate that she believed had overtaken him. Accordingly Polus, clad in the mourning garb of Electra, took from the tomb the ashes and urn of his son, embraced them as if they were those of Orestes, and filled the whole place, not with the appearance and imitation of sorrow, but with genuine grief and unfeigned lamentation. Therefore, while it seemed that a play was being acted, it was in fact real grief that was enacted.

What Aristotle wrote of the congenital absence of some of the senses.

NATURE has given five senses to living beings; sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell, called by the Greeks ai)sqh/seis. Of these some animals lack one and some another, being born into the world blind, or without the sense of smell or hearing. But Aristotle asserts that no animal is born without the sense of taste or of touch.

His own words, from the book which he wrote On Memory, are as follows: [*](Peri\ (/Upnou or On Sleep, 2. Gellius is mistaken in his title.)

Except for some imperfect animals, all have taste or touch.

v2.p.39