Noctes Atticae

Gellius, Aulus

Gellius, Aulus. The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius. Rolfe, John C., translator. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, 1927 (printing).

Of the lineage and names of the Porcian family.

WHEN Sulpicius Apollinaris and I, with some others who were friends of his or mine, were sitting in the library of the Palace of Tiberius, it chanced that a book was brought to us bearing the name of Marcus Cato Nepos. We at once began to inquire who this Marcus Cato Nepos was. And thereupon a young man, not unacquainted with letters, so far as I could judge from his language, said:

This Marcus Cato is called Nepos, not as a surname, but because he was the grandson of Marcus Cato Censorius through his son, and father of Marcus Cato the ex-praetor, who slew himself with his own sword at Utica during the civil war. There is a book of Marcus Cicero's about the life of the last-named, entitled Laus Catonis, or A Eulogy of Cato, in which Cicero says [*](Fr. 1, p. 987, Orelli2.) that he was the great-grandson of Marcus Cato Censorius. Therefore the father of the man whom Cicero eulogized was this Marcus Cato, whose orations are circulated under the name of Marcus Cato Nepos.

Then Apollinaris. very quietly and mildly, as was his custom when passing criticism, said:

I congratulate you, my son, that at your age you have been able to favour us with a little lecture on the family of Cato, even though you do not know who this Marcus Cato was, about whom we are now inquiring. For the famous Marcus Cato Censorius had not one, but several grandsons, although not all were sprung from the same father. For the famous Marcus Cato, who was both an orator and
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a censor, had two sons, born of different mothers and of very different ages; since, when one of them was a young man, his mother died and his father, who was already well on in years, married the maiden daughter of his client Salonius, from whom was born to him Marcus Cato Salonianus, a surname which he derived from Salonius, his mother's father. But from Cato's elder son, who died when praetorelect, while his father was still living, and left some admirable works on The Science of Law, there was born the man about whom we are inquiring, Marcus Cato, son of Marcus, and grandson of Marcus. He was an orator of some power and left many speeches written in the manner of his grandfather; he was consul with Quintus Marcius Rex, and during his consulship went to Africa and died in that province. But he was not, as you said he was, the father of Marcus Cato the ex-praetor, who killed himself at Utica and whom Cicero eulogized; nor because he was the grandson of Cato the censor and Cato of Utica was the censor's great-grandson does it necessarily follow that the former was the father of the latter. For this grandson whose speech was just brought to us did, it is true, have a son called Marcus Cato, but he was not the Cato who died at Utica, but the one who, after being curule aedile and praetor, went to Gallia Narbonensis and there ended his life. But by that other son of Censorius, a far younger man, who, as I said, was surnamed Salonianus, two sons were begotten: Lucius and Marcus Cato. That Marcus Cato was tribune of the commons and died when a candidate for the praetorship; he begot Marcus Cato the ex-praetor, who committed suicide at Utica during the civil war, and when Marcus
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Tullius wrote the latter's life and panegyric he said that he was the great-grandson of Cato the censor. You see therefore that the branch of the family which is descended from Cato's younger son differs not only in its pedigree, but in its dates as well; for because that Salonianus was born near the end of his father's life, as I said, his descendants also were considerably later than those of his elder brother. This difference in dates you will readily perceive from that speech itself, when you read it.

Thus spoke Sulpicius Apollinaris in my hearing. Later we found that what he had said was so, when we read the Funeral Eulogies and the Genealogy of the Porcian Family.

That the most elegant writers pay more attention to the pleasing sound of words and phrases (what the Greeks call eu)fwni/a, or

euphony
) than to the rules and precepts devised by the grammarians.

VALERIUS PROBUS was once asked, as I learned from one of his friends, whether one ought to say has urbis or has urbes and hanc turrem. or hanc turrim.

If,
he replied,
you are either composing verse or writing prose and have to use those words, pay no attention to the musty, fusty rules of the grammarians, but consult your own ear as to what is to be said in any given place. What it favours will surely be the best.
Then the one who had asked the question said:
What do you mean by 'consult my ear'?
and he told me that Probus answered:
Just as Vergil did his, when in different passages
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he has used urbis and urbes, following the taste and judgment of his ear. For in the first Georgic, which,
said he,
I have read in a copy corrected by the poet's own hand, he wrote urbis with an i. These are the words of the verses: [*](Georg. i. 25.)
  1. O'er cities (urbis) if you choose to watch, and rule
  2. Our lands, O Caesar great.
But turn and change it so as to read urbes, and somehow you will make it duller and heavier. On the other hand, in the third Aeneid he wrote urbes with an e: [*](Aen. iii. 106.)
  1. An hundred mighty cities (urbes) they inhabit.
Change this too so as to read urbis and the word will be too slender and colourless, so great indeed is the different effect of combination in the harmony of neighbouring sounds. Moreover, Vergil also said turrim, not turrem, and securim, not securem:
  1. A turret (turrim) on sheer edge standing, [*](Aen. ii. 460.)
and
  1. Has shaken from his neck the ill-aimed axe (securim). [*](Aen. ii. 224.)
These words have, I think, a more agreeable lightness than if you should use the form in e in both places.
But the one who had asked the question, a boorish fellow surely and with untrained ear, said:
I don't just understand why you say that one form is better and more correct in one place and the other in the other.
Then Probus, now somewhat impatient, retorted:
Don't trouble then to inquire whether you ought to say urbis or urbes. For since
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you are the kind of man that I see you are and err without detriment to yourself, you will lose nothing whichever you say.

With these words then and this conclusion Probus dismissed the man, somewhat rudely, as was his way with stupid folk. But I afterwards found another similar instance of double spelling by Vergil. For he has used tres and tris in the same passage with such fineness of taste, that if you should read differently and change one for the other, and have any ear at all, you would perceive that the sweetness of the sound is spoiled. These are the lines, from the tenth book of the Aeneid: [*](Aen. x. 350.)

  1. Three (tres) Thracians too from Boreas' distant race,
  2. And three (iris) whom Idas sent from Ismarus' land.
In one place he has tres, in the other tris; weigh and ponder both, and you will find that each sounds most suitable in its own place. But also in this line of Vergil, [*](Aen. ii. 554.)
  1. This end (haec finis) to Priam's fortunes then,
if you change haec and say hic finis, it will be hard and unrhythmical and your ears will shrink from the change. Just as, on the contrary, you would make the following verse of Vergil less sweet, if you were to change it: [*](Aen. i. 241.)
  1. What end (quem finem) of labours, great king, dost thou grant?
For if you should say quam das finem, you would somehow make the sound of the words harsh and somewhat weak.

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Ennius too spoke of rectos cupressos, or

straight cypresses,
contrary to the accepted gender of that word, in the following verse:
  1. On cliffs the nodding pine and cypress straight. [*](Ann. 490, Vahlen.2 Ennius also has longi cupressi in Ann. 262.)
The sound of the word, I think, seemed to him stronger and more vigorous, if he said rectos cupressos rather than rectas. But, on the other hand, this same Ennius in the eighteenth book of his Annals [*](Ann. 454, Vahlen2, cf. ii. 26. 4.) said aere fulva instead of fulvo, not merely because Homer said h)e/ra baqei=a, [*](Iliad xx. 446; xxi. 6.) but because this sound, I think, seemed more sonorous and agreeable.

In the same way Marcus Cicero also thought it smoother and more polished to write, in his fifth Oration against Verres, [*](ii. 5. 169.) fretiu rather than freto. He says

divided by a narrow strait (fretu)
; for it would have been heavier and more archaic to say perangusto freto. Also in his second Oration against Verres, making use of a like rhythm, he said [*](ii. 2. 191.)
by an evident sin,
using peccatu instead of peccato; for I find this written in one or two of Tiro's copies, of very trustworthy antiquity. These are Cicero's words:
No one lived in such a way that no part of his life was free from extreme disgrace, no one was detected in such manifest sin (peccatu) that while he had been shameless in committing it, he would seem even more shameless if he denied it.

Not only is the sound of this word more elegant in this passage, but the reason for using the word is definite and sound. For hic peccatus, equivalent to peccatio, is correct and good Latin, just as many of the early writers used incestus (criminal), not of the one who committed the crime, but of the crime

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itself, and tributus, where we say tributum (tribute). Adlegatus (instigation) too and arbitratus (judgment) are used for adlegatio and arbitratio, and preserving these forms we say arbitratu and adlegatu meo. So then Cicero said in manifesto peccatu, as the early writers said in manifesto incestu, not that it was not good Latin to say peccato, but because in that context the use of peccatu was finer and smoother to the ear.

With equal regard for our ears Lucretius made funis feminine in these verses: [*](ii. 1153.)

  1. No golden rope (aurea funis), methinks, let down from heaven
  2. The race of mortals to this earth of ours,
although with equally good rhythm he might have used the more common aureus funis and written:
  1. Aureus e caelo demisit funis in arva.

Marcus Cicero calls [*](In Verr. iv. 99.) even priests by a feminine term, antistitae, instead of antislites, which is demanded by the grammarians' rule. For while he usually avoided the obsolete words used by the earlier writers, yet in this passage, pleased with the sound of the word, he said:

The priests of Ceres and the guardians (antistitae) of her shrine.
To such a degree have writers in some cases followed neither reason nor usage in choosing a word, but only the ear, which weighs words according to its own standards. [*](cf. Hor. Epist. i. 7. 98.)
And as for those who do not feel this,
says Marcus Cicero himself, [*](Orat. 168.) when speaking about appropriate and rhythmical language,
I know not what ears they have, or what there is in them resembling a man.

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But the early grammarians have noted this feature in Homer above all, that when he had said in one place [*](Iliad xvi. 583.) koloiou/s te yhra/s te,

both crows and starlings,
in another place [*](Iliad xvii. 755.) he did not use yhrw=n te, but yarw=n:
  1. As lights a cloud of starlings (yarw=n) or of daws,
not conforming to general usage, but seeking the pleasing effect peculiar to the word in each of the two positions; for if you change one of these for the other, you will give both a harsh sound.

The words of Titus Castricius to his young pupils on unbecoming clothes and shoes.

TITUS CASTRICIUS, a teacher of the art of rhetoric, who held the first rank at Rome as a declaimer and an instructor, a man of the greatest influence and dignity, was highly regarded also by the deified Hadrian for his character and his learning. Once when 1 happened to be with him (for I attended him as my master) and he had seen some pupils of his who were senators wearing tunics and cloaks on a holiday, and with sandals on their feet, [*](Instead of the senatorial shoe; this was red or black and was fastened on by four black thongs which passed crosswise around the ankle and the calf of the leg; of Hor. Sat. i. 6. 27.) he said:

For my part, I should have preferred to see you in your togas, or if that was too much trouble, at least with girdles and mantles. But if this present attire of yours is now pardonable from long custom, yet it is not at all seemly for you, who are senators of the Roman people, to go through the streets of the city
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in sandals, nor by Jove! is this less criminal in you than it was in one whom Marcus Tullius once reproved for such attire.

This, and some other things to the same purport, Castricius said in my hearing with true Roman austerity. But several of those who had heard him asked why he had said soleatos, or

in sandals,
of those who wore gallicae, or
Gallic slippers,
and not soleae. But Castricius certainly spoke purely and properly; for in general all kinds of foot-gear which cover only the bottom of the soles, leaving the rest almost bare, and are bound on by slender thongs, are called soleae, or sometimes by the Greek word crepidulae. But gallicae, I think, is a new word, which came into use not long before the time of Marcus Cicero. In fact, he himself uses it in his second Oration against Antony: [*](Phil. ii. 76.)
You ran about,
says lie,
in slippers (gallicis) and cloak.
Nor do I find this word with that meaning in any other writer—a writer of high authority, that is; but, as I have said, they called that kind of shoe crepidae and crepidulae, shortening the first syllable of the Greek word krhpi=des, and the makers of such shoes they termed crepidarii. Sempronius Asellio in the fourteenth book of his Histories says: [*](Fr. 11, Peter2.)
He asked for a cobbler's knife from a maker of slippers (crepidarius sutor).

Of the Nerio of Mars in ancient prayers.

PRAYERS to the immortal gods, which are offered according to the Roman ritual, are set forth in the

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books of the priests of the Roman people, as well as in many early books of prayers. In these we find:
Lua, [*](These names apparently represented characteristics of the deities with which they are coupled, which in some cases later became separate goddesses; see Fowler, Roman Festivals, pp. 60 ff. Gellius is apparently right in his explanation of Nerio in §§ 7–10, while later myths made her the wife of Mars. Lua (cf. luo, purify), according to Livy xlv. 33. 2, was a goddess to whom, in company with Mars and Minerva, the captured arms of an enemy were devoted when they were burned by the victors. Salacia (cf. sal, salt one) was a sea-goddess. Hora, according to Nonius, p. 120, was a goddess of youth. Ovid, Met. xiv. 830- 851, says that it was the name given to Hersilia, the wife of Romulus, after her deification. For the other names see the Index.) of Saturn; Salacia, of Neptune; Hora, of Quirinus; the Virites of Quirinus; Maia of Vulcan; Heries of Juno; Moles of Mars, and Nerio of Mars.
Of these I hear most people pronounce the one which I have put last with a long initial syllable, as the Greeks pronounce Nhrei/+des (
Nereids
). But those who have spoken correctly made the first syllable short and lengthened the third. For the nominative case of the word, as it is written in the books of early writers, is Nerio, although Marcus Varro, in his Menippean Satire entitled Skiomaxi/a, or
Battle of the Shadows,
uses in the vocative Nericnes, not Nerio, in the following verses: [*](Frag. 506, Bücheler.)
  1. Thee, Anna and Peranna, Panda Cela, Pales,
  2. Nerienes and Minerva, Fortune and likewise Ceres.
From which it necessarily follows that the nominative case is the same. But Nerio was declined by our forefathers like Atnio; for, as they said Aniēnem with the third syllable long, so they did Neriēnem. Furthermore, that word, whether it be Nerio or Nerienes, is Sabine and signifies valour and courage. Hence among the Claudii, who we are told sprang from the Sabines, whoever was of eminent and surpassing courage was called Nero. [*](See Suet. Tib. i. 2.) But the Sabines
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seem to have derived this word from the Greeks, who call the sinews and ligaments of the limbs neu=ra, whence we also in Latin call them nervi. Therefore Nerio designates the strength and power of Mars and a certain majesty of the War-god.

Plautus, however, in the Truculentus says [*](515.) that Nerio is the wife of Mars, and puts the statement into the mouth of a soldier, in the following line:

  1. Mars, coming home, greets his wife Nerio.

About this line I once heard a man of some repute say that Plautus, with too great an eye to comic effect, attributed this strange and false idea, of thinking that Nerio was the wife of Mars, to an ignorant and rude soldier. But whoever will read the third book of the Annals of Gnaeus Gellius will find that this passage shows learning, rather than a comic spirit; for there it is written that Hersilia, when she pleaded before Titus Tatius and begged for peace, prayed in these words: [*](Fr. 15, Peter2.)

Neria of Mars, I beseech thee, give us peace; I beseech thee that it be permitted us to enjoy lasting and happy marriages, since it was by thy lord's advice that in like manner they carried off us maidens, [*](Referring to the rape of the Sabine women. Itidem shows that Cn. Gellius had in mind the later myth (see note 1, p. 480) that Mars finally carried off Nerio as his bride.) that from us they might raise up children for themselves and their people, and descendants for their country.
She says
by thy lord's advice,
of course meaning her husband, Mars; and from this it is plain that Plautus made use of no poetic fiction, but that there was also a tradition according to which Nerio was said by some to be the wife of Mars. But it must be noticed besides that Gellius writes Neria with an a, not Nerio nor Nerienes. In addition to Plautus too, and Gellius, Licinius
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Imbrex, an early writer of comedies, in the play entitled Neaera, wrote as follows: [*](p. 39, Ribbeck3.)
  1. Neaera I'd not wish to have thee called;
  2. Neriene rather, since thou art wife to Mars.
Moreover, the metre of this verse is such that the third syllable in that name must be made short, [*](That is, Nērĭĕnem, instead of Nērĭēnem.) contrary to what was said above. But how greatly the quantity of this syllable varied among the early writers is so well known that I need not waste many words on the subject. Ennius also, in this verse from the first book of his Annals, [*](Ann. 104, Vahlen2.)
  1. Neriene of Mars and Here,
  2. [*](See Paul. Fest., p. 89, 4, Lindsay: Herem Marteam antiqui accepta hereditate colebant, quae a nomine appellabatur heredum, et esse una ex Martis comitibus putabatur.)
if, as is not always the case, he has preserved the metre, has lengthened the first syllable and shortened the third.

And I do not think that I ought to pass by this either, whatever it amounts to, which I find written in the Commentary of Servius Claudius, [*](Fr. 4, Fun.) that Nerio is equivalent to Neirio, meaning without anger (ne ira) and with calmness, so that in using that name we pray that Mars may become mild and calm; for the particle ne, as it is among the Greeks, is frequently privative in the Latin language also.

Remarks of Marcus Cato, who declared that he lacked many things, yet desired nothing.

MARCUS CATO, ex-consul and ex-censor, says that when the State and private individuals were abounding in wealth, his country-seats were plain and

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unadorned, and not even whitewashed, up to the seventieth year of his age. And later he uses these words on the subject: [*](O.R.F., p. 146, Meyer2.)
I have no building, utensil or garment bought with a great price, no costly slave or maidservant. If I have anything to use,
he says,
I use it; if not, I do without. So far as I am concerned, everyone may use and enjoy what he has.
Then he goes on to say:
They find fault with me, because I lack many things; but I with them, because they cannot do without them.
This simple frankness of the man of Tusculum, who says that he lacks many things, yet desires nothing, truly has more effect in inducing thrift and contentment with small means than the Greek sophistries of those who profess to be philosophers and invent vain shadows of words, declaring that they have nothing and yet lack nothing and desire nothing, while all the time they are fevered with having, with lacking, and with desiring.

The meaning of manubiae is asked and discussed; with some observations as to the propriety of using several words of the same meaning.

ALL along the roof of the colonnades of Trajan's forum [*](The largest and grandest of the imperial fora, including the basilica Ulpia, the column of Trajan, and the library.) there are placed gilded statues of horses and representations of military standards, and underneath is written Ex manubiis. Favorinus inquired, when he was walking in the court of the forum, waiting for

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his friend the consul, who was hearing cases from the tribunal—and I at the time was in attendance on him—he asked, I say, what that inscription manubiae seemed to us really to mean. Then one of those who were with him, a man of a great and wide-spread reputation for his devotion to learned pursuits, said:
Ex manubiis is the same as ex praeda; for manubiae is the term for booty which is taken mann, that is 'by hand.'
Then Favorinus rejoined:
Although my principal and almost my entire attention has been given to the literature and arts of Greece, I am nevertheless not so inattentive to the Latin language, to which I devote occasional or desultory study, as to be unaware of this common interpretation of manubiae, which makes it a synonym of praeda. But I raise the question, whether Marcus Tullius, a man most careful in his diction, in the speech which he delivered against Rullus on the first of January On the Agrarian Law, joined manubiae and praeda by an idle and inelegant repetition, if it be true that these two words have the same meaning and do not differ in any respect at all.
And then, such was Favorinus' marvellous and almost miraculous memory, he at once added Cicero's own words. These I have appended: [*](De Leg. Agr. i., p. 601, Orelli2.)
The decemvirs will sell the booty (praedam), the proceeds of the spoils (manubias), the goods reserved for public auction, in fact Gnaeus Pompeius' camp, while the general sits looking on
; and just below he again used these two words in conjunction: [*](Id. ii. 59.)
From the booty (ex praeda), from the proceeds of the spoils (ex manubiis), from the crown-money.
[*](It was customary for cities in the provinces to send golden crowns to a victorious general, which were carried before him in his triumph. By the time of Cicero the presents took the form of money, called aurum coronarium. Later, it was a present to the emperor on stated occasions.) Then, turning to the man who had said that manubiae was the same as praeda, Favorinus said, "Does it seem to you that in both
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these passages Marcus Cicero weakly and frigidly used two words which, as you think, mean the same thing, thus showing himself deserving of the ridicule with which in Aristophanes, the wittiest of comic writers, Euripides assailed Aeschylus, saying: [*](Frogs 1154, 1156 ff. )
  1. Wise Aeschylus has said the same thing twice;
  2. 'I come into the land,' says he, 'and enter it.'
  3. But 'enter' and ' come into' are the same.
  4. By Heaven, yes! It's just as if one said
  5. To a neighbour: 'Use the pot, or else the pan'?

But by no means,
said he,
do Cicero's words seem like such repetitions as ma/ktra, pot, and ka/rdopos, pan, which are used either by our own poets or orators and those of the Greeks, for the purpose of giving weight or adornment to their subject by the use of two or more words of the same meaning.

Pray,
said Favorinus, "what force has this repetition and recapitulation of the same thing under another name in manubiae and praeda? It does not adorn the sentence, does it, as is sometimes the case? It does not make it more exact or more melodious, does it? Does it make an effective cumulation of words designed to strengthen the accusation or brand the crime? As, for example, in the speech of the same Marcus Tullius On the Appointment of an Accuser one and the same thing is expressed in several words with force and severity: [*](Div. in Caec. 19.) ' All Sicily, if it could speak with one voice, would say this:
Whatever gold, whatever silver, whatever jewels I had in my cities, abodes and shrines.'
For having once mentioned the cities as a whole, he added 'abodes' and 'shrines,' which are themselves a
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part of the cities. Also in the same oration he says in a similar manner: [*](§ 11.) 'During three years Gaius Verres is said to have plundered the province of Sicily, devastated the cities of the Sicilians, emptied their homes, pillaged their shrines.' Does he not seem to you, when he had mentioned the province of Sicily and had besides added the cities as well, to have included the houses also and the shrines, which he later mentioned? So too do not those many and varied words, 'plundered, devastated, emptied, pillaged,' have one and the same force? They surely do. But since the mention of them all adds to the dignity of the speech and the impressive copiousness of its diction, although they are nearly the same and spring from a single idea, yet they appear to contain more meaning because they strike the ears and mind more frequently.

"This kind of adornment, by heaping up in a single charge a great number of severe terms, was frequently used even in early days by our most ancient orator, the famous Marcus Cato, in his speeches; for example in the one entitled On the Ten, when he accused Thermus because he had put to death ten freeborn men at the same time, he used the following words of the same meaning, which, as they are brilliant flashes of Latin eloquence, which was just then coming into being, I have thought fit to call to mind: [*](p. 39, 127, Jordan.) 'You seek to cover up your abominable crime with a still worse crime, you slaughter men like swine, you commit frightful bloodshed, you cause ten deaths, slay ten freemen, take life from ten men, untried, unjudged, uncondemned.' So too Marcus Cato, at the beginning of the speech which he delivered in the senate, In Defence

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of the Rhodians, wishing to describe too great prosperity, used three words which mean the same thing. [*](Orig. v. 1, p. 21, 8, Jordan.) His language is as follows: I know that most men in favourable, happy and prosperous circumstances are wont to be puffed up in spirit and to increase in arrogance and haughtiness.' In the seventh book of his Origins too, [*](Frag. 108, Peter2.) in the speech which he spoke Against Servius Galba, Cato used several words to express the same thing: [*](O.R.F., p. 123, Meyer2.) ' Many things have dissuaded me from appearing here, my years, my time of life, my voice, my strength, my old age; but nevertheless, when I reflected that so important a matter was being discussed..."

"But above all in Homer there is a brilliant heaping up of the same idea and thought, in these lines: [*](Iliad xi. 163.)

  1. Zeus from the weapons, from the dust and blood,
  2. From carnage, from the tumult Hector bore.
Also in another verse: [*](Odyss. xi. 612.)
  1. Engagements, battles, carnage, deaths of men.
For although all those numerous synonymous terms mean nothing more than 'battle,' yet the varied aspects of this concept are elegantly and charmingly depicted by the use of several different words. And in the same poet this one thought is repeated with admirable effect by the use of two words; for Idaeus, when he interrupted the armed contest of Hector and Ajax, addressed them thus: [*](Iliad vii. 279.)
  1. No longer fight, dear youths, nor still contend,
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and in this verse it ought not to be supposed that the second word, meaning the same as the first, was added and lugged in without reason, merely to fill out the metre; for that is utterly silly and false. But while he gently and calmly chided the obstinate fierceness and love of battle in two youths burning with a desire for glory, he emphasized and impressed upon them the atrocity of the act and the sin of their insistence by adding one word to another; and that double form of address made his admonition more impressive. Nor ought the following repetition of the same thought to seem any more weak and cold: [*](Odyss. xx. 241.)
  1. With death the suitors threatened, and with fate, Telemachus,
because he said the same thing twice in qa/naton (death) and mo/ron (fate); for the heinousness of attempting so cruel and unjust a murder is deplored by the admirable repetition of the word meaning 'death.' Who too is of so dull a mind as not to understand that in [*](Iliad ii. 8.)
  1. Away, begone, dire dream,
and [*](Iliad viii. 399.)
  1. Away, begone, swift Iris,
two words of the same meaning are not used to no purpose, e)k parallh/lwn, 'as the repetition of two similar words,' as some think, but are a vigorous exhortation to the swiftness which is enjoined?"

Also those thrice repeated words in the speech of Marcus Cicero Against Lucius Piso, although displeasing to men of less sensitive ears, did not merely aim at elegance, but buffeted Piso's assumed expression
v2.p.499
of countenance by the rhythmical accumulation of several words. Cicero says: [*](In Pis. 1.) Finally, your whole countenance, which is, so to speak, the silent voice of the mind, this it was that incited men to crime, this deceived, tricked, cheated those to whom it was not familiar.' Well then,
continued Favorinus, "is the use of praeda and manubiae in the same writer similar to this? Truly, not at all! For by the addition of manubiae the sentence does not become more ornate, more forcible, or more euphonius; but manubiae means one thing, as we learn from the books on antiquities and on the early Latin, praeda quite another. For praeda is used of the actual objects making up the booty, but manubiae designates the money collected by the quaestor from the sale of the booty. Therefore Marcus Tullius, in order to rouse greater hatred of the decemvirs, said that they would carry off and appropriate the two: both the booty which had not yet been sold and the money which had been received from the sale of the booty."

Therefore this inscription which you see, ex manubiis, does not designate the objects and the mass of booty itself, for none of these was taken from the enemy by Trajan, but it declares that these statues were made and procured 'from the manubiae,' that is, with the money derived from the sale of the booty. For manubiae means, as I have already said, not booty, but money collected from the sale of the booty by a quaestor of the Roman people. But when I said 'by the quaestor,' one ought now to understand that the praefect of the treasury is meant. For the charge of the treasury has been transferred from the quaestors to praefects. [*](See Suet. Claud. xxiv.) However, it is possible to find instances in which
v2.p.501
writers of no little fame have written in such a way as to use praeda for manubiae or manubiae for praeda, either from carelessness or indifference; or by some metaphorical figure they have interchanged the words, which is allowable when done with judgment and skill. But those who have spoken properly and accurately, as did Marcus Tullius in that passage, have used manubiae of money.

A passage of Publius Nigidius in which he says that in Valeri, the vocative case of the name Valerius, the first syllable should have an acute accent; with other remarks of the same writer on correct writing.

THESE are the words of Publius Nigidius, a man pre-eminent for his knowledge of all the sciences, from the twenty-fourth book of his Grammatical Notes:[*](Fr. 35, Swoboda.)

How then can the accent be correctly used, if in names like Valeri we do not know whether they are genitive [*](On casus interrogandi for the genitive see Fay, A.J.P. xxxvi (1916), p. 78.) or vocative? For the second syllable of the genitive has a higher pitch than the first, and on the last syllable the pitch falls again; but in the vocative case the first syllable has the highest pitch, and then there is a gradual descent.
[*](See note 2, p. 426. Many believe this to be true also of the Latin sermo urbanus; see Class. Phil. ii. 444 ff.) Thus indeed Nigidius bids us speak. But if anyone nowadays, calling to a Valerius, accents the first syllable of the vocative according to the direction of Nigidius, he will not escape being laughed at. Furthermore, Nigidius calls the acute accent
the highest pitch,
and what we call accentus, or
accent,
he calls voculatio, or
tone,
and the case which we now call genetivus, or
genitive,
he calls casus interrogandi,
the case of asking.

v2.p.503

This too I notice in the same book of Nigidius: [*](36 Swoboda.)

If you write the genitive case of amicus,
he says,
or of magnus, end the word with a single i; but if you write the nominative plural, you must write magnei and amicei, with an e followed by i, and so with similar words. Also [*](Id. 37.) if you write terra in the genitive, let it end with the letter i, as terrai; [*](Really terrái.) but in the dative with e, as terrae. Also [*](Id. 38.) one who writes mei in the genitive case, as when we say mei studiosus, or ' devoted to me,' let him write it with i only (mei), not with e (meei); [*](Gellius refers only to the ending, which is i alone, and not i preceded by e.) but when he writes mehei, it must be written with e and i, since it is the dative case.
Led by the authority of a most learned man, I thought that I ought not to pass by these statements, for the sake of those who desire a knowledge of such matters.

Of verses of Homer and Parthenius, which Virgil seems to have followed.

THERE is a verse of the poet Parthenius: [*](Anal. Alex., p. 285, fr. 33, Meineke.)

  1. To Glaucus, Nereus and sea-dwelling Melicertes.
This verse Virgil has emulated, and has made it equal to the original by a graceful change of two words: [*](Georg. i. 437.)
  1. To Glaucus, Panopea, and Ino's son Melicertes.

v2.p.505

But the following verse of Homer he has not indeed equalled, nor approached. For that of Homer [*](Iliad xi. 728.) seems to be simpler and more natural, that of Virgil [*](Aen. iii. 119.) more modern and daubed over with a kind of stucco, [*](Referring to the otiose epithet pulcher, which is gilding the lily.) as it were:

  1. A bull to Alpheus, to Poseidon one.
  1. A bull to Neptune, and to you, Apollo fair.

Of an opinion of the philosopher Panaetius, which he expressed in his second book On Duties, where he urges men to be alert and prepared to guard against injuries on all occasions.

THE second book of the philosopher Panaetius On Duties was being read to us, being one of those three celebrated books which Marcus Tullius emulated with great care and very great labour. In it there was written, in addition to many other incentives to virtue, one especially which ought to be kept fixed in the mind. And it is to this general purport: [*](Fr. 8, Fowler.)

The life of men,
he says,
who pass their time in the midst of affairs, and who wish to be helpful to themselves and to others, is exposed to constant and almost daily troubles and sudden dangers. To guard against and avoid these one needs a mind that is always ready and alert, such as the athletes have who are called 'pancratists.' For just as they, when called to the contest, stand with their arms raised and stretched out, and protect their head and face by opposing their hands as a rampart; and as all their limbs, before the battle
v2.p.507
has begun, are ready to avoid or to deal blows—so the spirit and mind of the wise man, on the watch everywhere and at all times against violence and wanton injuries, ought to be alert, ready, strongly protected, prepared in time of trouble, never flagging in attention, never relaxing its watchfulness, opposing judgment and forethought like arms and hands to the strokes of fortune and the snares of the wicked, lest in any way a hostile and sudden onslaught be made upon us when we are unprepared and unprotected.

That Quadrigarius used the expression cum multis mortalibus; whether it would have made any difference if he had said cum multis hominibus, and how great a difference.

THE following is a passage of Claudius Quadrigarius from the thirteenth book of his Annals:[*](Fr. 76, Peter.2)

When the assembly had been dismissed, Metellus came to the Capitol with many mortals (cum mortalibus mulltis); from there he went home attended by the entire city.
When this book and this passage were read to Marcus Fronto, as I was sitting with him in company with some others, it seemed to one of those present, a man not without learning, that the use of mortalibus multis for hominibus multis in a work of history was foolish and frigid, and savoured too much of poetry. Then Fronto said to the man who expressed this opinion:
Do you, a man of most refined taste in other matters, say that mortalibus multis seems to you foolish and frigid, and do you think there is no reason why a man whose language is chaste, pure and almost conversational,
v2.p.509
preferred to say mortalibus rather than hominibus? And do you think that he would have described a multitude in the same way if he said cum multis hominibus and not cum multis mortalibus? For my part,
continued Fronto,
unless my regard and veneration for this writer, and for all early Latin, blinds my judgment, I think that it is far, far fuller, richer and more comprehensive in describing almost the whole population of the city to have said mortales rather than homines. For the expression ' many men' may be confined and limited to even a moderate number, but 'many mortals' somehow in some indefinable manner includes almost all the people in the city, of every rank, age and sex; so you see Quadrigarius, wishing to describe the crowd as vast and mixed, as in fact it was, said that Metellus came into the Capitol ' with many mortals, speaking with more force than if he had said 'with many men.'

When we, as was fitting, had expressed, not only approval, but admiration of all this that we had heard from Fronto, he said:

Take care, however, not to think that mortales multi is to be used always and everywhere in place of multi homines, lest that Greek proverb, to\ e)pi\ th=| fakh=| mu/ron, or 'myrrh on lentils, [*](That is, to use a costly perfumed oil to dress a dish of lentils; proverbial for a showy entertainment with little to eat ) which is found in one of Varro's Satires, [*](p. 219, Bücheler.) be applied to you.
This judgment of Fronto's, though relating to trifling and unimportant words, I thought I ought not to pass by, lest the somewhat subtle distinction between words of this kind should escape and elude us.

v2.p.511

That fades has a wider application than is commonly supposed.

WE may observe that many Latin words have departed from their original signification and passed into one that is either far different or near akin, and that such a departure is due to the usage of those ignorant people who carelessly use words of which they have not learned the meaning. As, for example, some think that facies, applied to a man, means only the face, eyes and cheeks, that which the Greeks call pro/swpon; whereas facies really designates the whole form, dimensions and, as it were, the make-up of the entire body, being formed from facio as species is from aspects and figura from fingere. Accordingly Pacuvius, in the tragedy entitled Niptra, used faces for the height of a man's body in these lines: [*](253, Ribbeck3.)

  1. A man in prime of life, of spirit bold,
  2. Of stature (facie) tall.

But facies is applied, not only to the bodies of men, but also to the appearance of other things of every kind. For facies may be said properly, if the application be seasonable, of a mountain, the heavens and the sea. [*](Just so we speak of the face of nature, the face of the waters, and the like.) The words of Sallust in the second book of his Histories are [*](ii. 2, Maur.)

Sardinia, in the African Sea, having the appearance (facies) of a human foot, [*](That is, the sole of the foot.) projects farther on the eastern than on the western side.
And, by the way, it has also occurred to me that Plautus too, in the Poenulus, said facies,
v2.p.513
meaning the appearance of the whole body and complexion. These are his words: [*](1111.)
  1. But tell me, pray, how looks (qua sit facie) that nurse of yours?—
  2. Not very tall, complexion dark.—'Tis she!—
  3. A comely wench, with pretty mouth, black eyes—
  4. By Jove! a picture of her limned in words!
Besides, I remember that Quadrigarius in his nineteenth book used facies for stature and the form of the whole body.

The meaning of caninum prandium in Marcus Varro's satire.

LATELY a foolish, boastful fellow, sitting in a bookseller's shop, was praising and advertising himself, asserting that he was the only one under all heaven who could interpret the Satires of Marcus Varro, which by some are called Cynical, by others Menippean. And then he displayed some passages of no great difficulty, which he said no one could presume to explain. At the time I chanced to have with me a book of those Satires, entitled (Udroku/wn, or The Water Dog. [*](This, with the (Ippoku/wn, or Dog-Knight, and the Kunorh/twr, or Dog-Rhetorician, justifies the term Cynicae as applied to Varro's Saturae.) I therefore went up to him and said:

Master, of course you know that old Greek saying, that music, if it be hidden, is of no account. [*](The same proverb is put into the mouth of Nero by Suetonius (Nero, xx. 1), where the meaning is, that it is of no use for one to know how to sing, unless he proves that he knows how by singing in public.) I beg you therefore to read these few lines and tell me the meaning of the proverb
v2.p.515
contained in them.
Do you rather,
he replied,
read me what you do not understand, in order that I may interpret it for you.
How on earth can I read,
I replied,
what I cannot understand? Surely my reading will be indistinct and confused, and will even distract your attention.

Then, as many others who were there present agreed with me and made the same request, I handed him an ancient copy of the satire, of tested correctness and clearly written. But he took it with a most disturbed and worried expression. But what shall I say followed? I really do not dare to ask you to believe me. Ignorant schoolboys, if they had taken up that book, could not have read more laughably, so wretchedly did he pronounce the words and murder the thought. Then, since many were beginning to laugh, he returned the book to me, saying,

You see that my eyes are weak and almost ruined by constant night work; I could barely make out even the forms [*](Apices here seems to refer to the strokes of which the letters were made up; cf. Cassiodorus vii. 184. 6 K., digamma nominatur quia duos apices ex gamma littera habere videtur, and Gell. xvii. 9. 12.) of the letters. When my eyes have recovered, come to me and I will read the whole of that book to you.
Master,
said I,
I hope your eyes may improve; but I pray you, tell me this, for which you will have no need of your eyes; what does caninum prandium mean in the passage which you read?
And that egregious blockhead, as if alarmed by the difficulty of the question, at once got up and made off, saying:
You ask no small matter; I do not give such instruction for nothing.

The words of the passage in which that proverb is found are as follows: [*](Fr. 575, Bücheler.)

Do you not know that Mnesitheus [*](A celebrated Athenian physician of the fourth century before our era.) writes that there are three kinds of wine, dark, light and medium, which the Greeks call
v2.p.517
kirro/s or 'tawny'; and new, old and medium? And that the dark gives virility, the light increases the urine, and the medium helps digestion? That the new cools, the old heats, and the medium is a dinner for a dog (caninum prandium)?
The meaning of
a dinner for a dog,
though a slight matter, I have investigated long and anxiously. Now an abstemious meal, at which there is no drinking, is called
a dog's meal,
since the dog has no need of wine. Therefore when Mnesitheus named a medium wine, which was neither new nor old—and many men speak as if all wine was either new or old—he meant that the medium wine had the power neither of the old nor of the new, and was therefore not to be considered wine at all, because it neither cooled nor heated. By refrigerare (to cool), he means the same as the Greek yu/xein.

v3.p.3

A discourse of the philosopher Favorinus directed against those who are called Chaldaeans, and who profess to tell men's fortunes from the conjunction and movements of the stars and constellations.

AGAINST those who call themselves

Chaldaeans
or
astrologers,
[*](Literally, calculators of nativities; see also note on i. 9. 6.) and profess from the movements and position of the stars to be able to read the future, I once at Rome heard the philosopher Favorinus discourse in Greek in admirable and brilliant language. But whether it was for the purpose of exercising, not vaunting, his talent, or because he seriously and sincerely believed what he said, I am unable to tell; but I promptly jotted down the heads of the topics and of the arguments which he used, so far as I could recall them immediately after leaving the meeting, and they were about to this effect: [*](p. 44, Marres.) That this science of the Chaldaeans was not of so great antiquity as they would have it appear; that the founders and authors of it were not those whom they themselves name, but that tricks and delusions of that kind were devised by jugglers and men who made a living and profit from
v3.p.5
their lies. And since they saw that some terrestrial phenomena known to men were caused by the influence and control of the heavenly bodies, as for example the ocean, as though a companion of the moon, grows old and resumes its youth along with her—from this, forsooth, they derived an argument for persuading us to believe that all human affairs, both the greatest and the least, as though bound to the stars and constellations, are influenced and governed by them. But Favorinus said that it was utterly foolish and absurd to suppose, because the tide of the ocean corresponds with the course of the moon, that a suit at law which one happens to have about an aqueduct with his neighbours, or with the man next door about a party wall, is also bound to heaven as if by a kind of chain and is decided by the stars. But even if by some divine power and purpose this could happen, yet he thought that it could by no means be grasped and understood in such a brief and scant span of life as ours by any human intellect, but he believed that some few things were conjectured paxumere/steron, (to use his own term), that is,
somewhat roughly,
[*](In a rough and ready, superficial manner.) with no sure foundation of knowledge, but in a loose, random and arbitrary manner, just as when we look at objects far away with eyes blinded by their remoteness from us. For the greatest difference between men and gods was removed, if man also had the power of foreknowing all future events. Furthermore, he thought that even the observation of the stars and constellations, which they declared to be the foundation of their knowledge, was by no means a matter of certainty.
For if the original Chaldaeans,
said he,
who dwelt in the open plains, watched the movements and orbits of the stars their
v3.p.7
separations and conjunctions, and observed their effects, let this art continue to be practised, but let it be only under the same inclination of the heavens as that under which the Chaldaeans then were. For the system of observation of the Chaldaeans cannot remain valid, if anyone should wish to apply it to different regions of the sky. For who does not see,
said he,
how great is the diversity of the zones and circles of the heavens caused by the inclination and convexity of the earth? Why then should not those same stars, by which they maintain that all human and divine affairs are affected, just as they do not everywhere arouse cold and heat, but change and vary the weather, at the same time causing calm in one place and storm in another—why should they not, I say, produce one series of affairs and events in the land of the Chaldaeans, another among the Gaetulians, another on the Danube, and still another on the Nile? But,
said he,
it is utterly inconsistent to suppose that the mass and the condition of this vast height of air does not remain the same under one or another region of the heavens, but that in human affairs those stars always indicate the same thing from whatever part of the earth you may observe them.
Besides, he expressed his surprise that anyone considered it a certainty that those stars which they say were observed by the Chaldaeans and Babylonians, or by the Egyptians, which many call erraticae, or
wandering,
but Nigidius called errones, or
the wanderers,
[*](Fr. 87, Swoboda; the reference is to the planets.) are not more numerous than is commonly assumed; for he thought it might possibly be the case that there were some other planets of equal power, without which a correct and
v3.p.9
final observation could not be completed, but that men could not see them because of their remarkable brilliance or altitude. ' For,' said he,
some stars are visible from certain lands and are known to the men of those lands; but those same stars are not visible from every other land and are wholly unknown to other men. And granting,
said he,
both that only these stars ought to be observed, and that too from one part of the earth, what possible end was there to such observation, and what periods of time seemed sufficient for understanding what the conjunction or the orbits or the transits of the stars foretold? For if an observation was made in the beginning in such a manner that it was calculated under what aspect, arrangement and position of the stars anyone was born, and if thereafter his fortune from the beginning of his life, his character, his disposition, the circumstances of his affairs and activities, and finally also the end of his life were noted, and all these things as they had actually happened were committed to writing, and long afterwards, when the same stars were in the same aspect and position, it was supposed that those same things would happen to others who had been born at that same time; [*](That is, the time when the stars were again in the same position. The point is, that observations made for one man, even though they came out right, were of no value, because of the long time that it took for the stars to reach the same positions that they had at the time of the earlier observations.) if the first observations were made in that way,
said he,
and from such observations a kind of science was formed, it can by no means be a success. For let them tell me in how many years, pray, or rather in how many ages, the cycle of the observations could be completed.
For he said that it was agreed among astrologers that those stars which they call
wandering,
which are supposed
v3.p.11
to determine the fate of all things, beginning their course together, return to the same place from which they set out only after an innumerable and almost infinite number of years, so that there could be no continuity of observation, and no literary record could endure for so long an epoch. And he thought that this point also ought to be taken into consideration, that one constellation presided at the time when a man was first conceived in his mother's womb, and another one ten months later when he came into the world, and he asked how it was consistent for a different indication to be made about the same person, if, as they themselves thought, a different position and order of the same stars gave different fortunes. But also at the time of marriage, from which children were expected, and at the very union of the husband and wife, he said that it ought to be indicated by a fixed and inevitable position of the stars, with what character and fortune men would be born; and, indeed, long before that, when the father and mother were themselves born, it ought to be foretold even then from their horoscope what offspring they would produce; and far, far back of that, even to infinity, so that, if that science rested on any foundation of truth, a hundred years ago, or rather at the beginning of heaven and earth, and then on in an unbroken series of predictions as long as generation followed generation, those stars ought to have foretold what character and fortune anyone would have who is born to-day.
But how,
said he,
can it be believed that the fate and fortune foretold by the form and position of any one of the stars are
v3.p.13
fixed and attached to one particular individual, and that the same position of the stars is restored only after a long series of years, if the indications of the same man's life and fortunes in such short intervals, through the single degrees of his forefathers and through an infinite order of successions, are so often and so frequently pointed out as the same, although the position of the stars is not the same? But if this can happen, and if this contradiction and variation be admitted through all the epochs of antiquity in foretelling the origin of those men who are to be born afterwards, this inequality confounds the observation and the whole theory of the science falls to the ground.
Moreover, he thought that the most intolerable thing was their belief that not only occurrences and events of an external nature, but even men's very deliberations, their purposes, their various pleasures, their likes and dislikes, the chance and sudden attractions and aversions of their feelings on trifling matters, were excited and influenced from heaven above; for example, if you happened to wish to go to the baths, and then should change your mind, and again should decide to go, that all this happens, not from some shifting and variable state of mind, but from a fateful ebb and flow of the planets. Thus men would clearly be seen to be, not logika\ zw=a or
reasoning beings,
as they are called, but a species of ludicrous and ridiculous puppets, if it be true that they do nothing of their own volition or their own will, but are led and driven by the stars.
And if,
said he,
they affirm that it could have been foretold whether king Pyrrhus or Manius Curius was to be victorious in the battle, why, pray, do they not dare also to predict which of the
v3.p.15
players with dice or counters on a board will win? Or, forsooth, do they know important things, but not those which are unimportant; and are unimportant things more difficult to understand than the important? But if they claim knowledge of great matters and say that they are plainer and easier to be understood, I should like,
said he,
to have them tell me, in this observation of the whole world, in comparison with such mighty works of nature, what they regard as great in the trifling and brief fortunes and affairs of men. And I should like to have them answer this question also,
said he:
if the instant in which man at birth is allotted his destiny is so brief and fleeting, that at that same moment not more than one can be born with the same conjunction under the same circle of the heavens, and if therefore even twins have different lots in life, since they are not born at the same instant—I ask them to tell me,
said he,
how and by what plan they are able to overtake the course of that fleeting moment, which can scarcely be grasped by one's thoughts, or to detain and examine it, when in the swift revolution of days and nights even the briefest moments, as they say, cause great changes?
Then, finally, he asked what answer could be made to this argument, that human beings of both sexes, of all ages, born into the world under different positions of the stars and in regions widely separated, nevertheless sometimes all perished together by the same kind of death and at the same moment, either from an earthquake, or a falling building, or the sack of a town, or the wreck of the same ship.
This,
said he,
of course would never happen, if the natal influence assigned to the birth
v3.p.17
of each of them had its own peculiar conditions. But if,
he said,
they answer that even in the life and death of men who are born at different times certain events may happen which are alike and similar, through some similar conjunction of the stars at a later time, why may not sometimes everything become equal, so that through such agreement and similarity of the stars many a Socrates and Antisthenes and Plato may appear, equal in birth, in person, in talent, in character, in their whole life and in their death? But this,
said he,
can by no means whatever happen. Therefore they cannot properly use this argument against the inequality of men's births and the similarity of their death.
He added that he excused them from this further inquiry: namely, if the time, the manner and the cause of men's life and death, and of all human affairs, were in heaven and with the stars, what would they say of flies, worms, sea urchins, and many other minute animals of land and sea? Were they too born and destroyed under the same laws as men? so that to frogs also and gnats either the same fates are assigned at birth by the movements of the constellations, or, if they do not believe that, there seemed to be no reason why that power of the stars should be effective with men and ineffectual with the other animals.

These remarks I have touched upon in a dry, unadorned, and almost jejune style. But Favorinus, such was the man's talent, and such is at once the copiousness and the charm of Greek eloquence, delivered them at greater length and with more charm, brilliance and readiness, and from time to

v3.p.19
time he warned us to take care lest in any way those sycophants should worm their way into our confidence by sometimes seeming to stumble upon, and give utterance to, something true.
For they do not,
said he,
say anything that is tangible, definite or comprehensible, but depending upon slippery and roundabout conjecture, groping with cautious steps between truth and falsehood, as if walking in the dark, they go their way. And after making many attempts they either happen suddenly on the truth without knowing it, or led by the great credulity of those who consult them, they get hold by cunning of something true, and therefore obviously find it easier to come somewhere near the truth in past events than in those to come. Yet all the true things which they say through accident or cunning,
said he,
are not a thousandth part of the falsehoods which they utter.

But besides these remarks which I heard Favorinus make, I recall many testimonies of the ancient poets, by which delusive fallacies of this kind are refuted. Among these is the following saying of Pacuvius: [*](v. 407, Ribbeck3.)

  1. Could men divine the future, they'd match Jove.
Also this from Accius, who writes: [*](v. 169, Ribbeck3.)

  1. I trust the augurs not, who with mere words
  2. Enrich men's ears, to load themselves with gold.

Favorinus too, wishing to deter and turn away young men from such calculators of nativities and from certain others of that kind, who profess to reveal all the future by means of magic arts, concluded with arguments of this sort, to show that they ought by no means to be resorted to and consulted.

v3.p.21
They predict,
said he,
either adverse or prosperous events. If they foretell prosperity and deceive you, you will be made wretched by vain expectations; if they foretell adversity and lie, you will be made wretched by useless fears. But if they predict truly and the events are unhappy, you will thereby be made wretched by anticipation, before you are fated to be so; if on the contrary they promise prosperity and it conies to pass, then there will clearly be two disadvantages: the anticipation of your hopes will wear you out with suspense, and hope will in advance have reaped the fruit of your approaching happiness. Therefore there is every reason why you should not resort to men of that kind, who profess knowledge of the future.

How Favorinus discoursed when I consulted hint about the duty of a judge.

AT the time when I was first chosen by the praetors to be one of the judges in charge of the suits which are called

private,
[*](See note on xii. 13. 1.) I hunted up books written in both languages on the duty of a judge, in order that, being a young man, called from poets' tales and orators' perorations to preside in court, I might from lack of the
living voice,
as they say, gain legal lore from so-called
mute counsellors.
And with regard to postponements and delays and some other legal principles I was advised and helped by the Julian Law itself [*](A law of Julius Caesar and Augustus regulating criminal processes.) and by the commentaries of Masurius Sabinus [*](Jur. Civ. iii. 3, Bremer.) and some other jurists. [*](ii. 2, p. 567, Bremer.) But in
v3.p.23
those complicated cases which often come up, and in the perplexity arising from conflicting opinions, such books gave me no aid at all. For although the opinions of judges ought to be formed from the conditions of the cases before them, yet there are certain general principles and precepts by which, before hearing a case, the judge ought to guard and prepare himself against the uncertain event of future difficulties; as, for example, an inexplicable perplexity in coming to an opinion once befell me.

A sum of money was claimed before me, which was said to have been paid and counted out; [*](i.e. advanced or loaned by the claimant.) but the claimant did not show this by documents or witnesses, but relied upon very slender arguments. It was clear, however, that he was a thoroughly good man, of well-known and tested integrity and of blameless life, and many striking instances of his probity and honesty were presented. On the other hand, the man upon whom the claim was made was shown to be of no substance, of base and evil life, often convicted of lying, and full of treachery and fraud. Yet lie, along with his numerous advocates, noisily protested that the payment of the money ought to be shown in the usual way, by a

receipt for payment,
by a
book of accounts,
by
producing a signature,
by
a sealed deed,
or by the
testimony of witnesses
; and if it could be shown in none of these ways, that he ought surely to be dismissed at once and his accuser found guilty of blackmail. He maintained that the testimony relating to the life and conduct of the two parties was irrelevant; for this was a case of claiming money before a private judge, not a question of morals inquired into by the censors.

v3.p.25

Thereupon some friends of mine, whom I had asked to aid me with their advice, experienced men with a reputation gained in acting as advocates and in the business of the forum, who were always inclined to act in haste because of the suits everywhere demanding attention, declared there was no need of sitting longer and that there was no doubt that the defendant ought to be acquitted, since it could not be shown in any of the usual ways that he had received the money. But when I contemplated the men, one abounding in honesty, the other in baseness and of a most shameful and degraded life, I could not by any means be argued into an acquittal. I therefore ordered a postponement and from the bench I proceeded to go to the philosopher Favorinus, with whom I associated a great deal at Rome at that time. I told him the whole story of the suit and of the men, as it had been related to me, begging that with regard both to the matter about which I was then in doubt, as well as to others which I should have to consider in my position as judge, he should make me a man of greater wisdom in such affairs.

Then Favorinus, after commending my scrupulous hesitation and my conscientiousness said:

The question which you are now considering may seem to be of a trifling and insignificant character. But if you wish me to instruct you as to the full duties of a judge, this is by no means a fit place or time; for such a discussion involves many intricate questions and requires long and anxious attention and consideration. For-to touch at once upon a few leading questions for your benefit-the first query relating to the duty of a judge is this. If a judge
v3.p.27
chance to have knowledge of a matter which is brought to trial before him, and the matter is clearly known and demonstrated to him alone from some external circumstance or event, before it has begun to be argued or brought into court, but nevertheless the same thing is not proved in the course of the trial, ought he to decide in accordance with what he knew beforehand, or according to the evidence in the case? This question also,
said he, "is often raised, whether it is fitting and proper for a judge, after a case has been heard, if there seems to be an opportunity for compromising the dispute, to postpone the duty of a judge for a time and take the part of a common friend and peace-maker, as it were. And I know that this further is a matter of doubt and inquiry, whether a judge, when hearing a suit, ought to mention and ask about the things which it is for the interest of one of the parties to the suit to mention and inquire, even if the party in question neither mentions nor calls for them. For they say that this is in fact to play the part of an advocate, not of a judge.

"Besides these questions, there is disagreement also on this point, whether it is consistent with the Practice and office of a judge by his occasional remarks so to explain and set forth the matter and he case which is being tried, that before the time of his decision, as the result of statements which at he time are made before him in a confused and doubtful form, he gives signs and indications of the motions and feelings by which he is affected on each occasion and at every time. For those judges who give the impression of being keen and quick hink that the matter in dispute cannot be examined

v3.p.29
and understood, unless the judge by frequent questions and necessary interruptions makes his own opinion clear and grasps that of the litigants. But, on the other hand, those who have a reputation for calmness and dignity maintain that the judge ought not, before giving his decision and while the case is being pleaded by both parties, to indicate his opinion whenever he is influenced by some argument that is brought forward. For they say that the result will be, since one emotion of the mind after another must be excited by the variety of points and arguments, that such judges will seem to feel and speak differently about the same case and almost at the same time. [*](Tempore evidently refers to the whole period of the trial; Favorinus seems to use the word in a double sense to emphasize his point.)

But,
said he, "about these and other similar discussions as to the duty of a judge I shall attempt to give you my views later, when we have leisure, and I will repeat the precepts of Aelius Tubero on the subject, which I have read very recently. But so far as concerns the money which you said was claimed before your tribunal, I advise you, by Heaven! to follow the counsel of that shrewdest of men, Marcus Cato; for he, in the speech which he delivered For Lucius Turius against Gnaeus Gellius, [*](li., Jordan.) said that this custom had been handed down and observed by our forefathers, that if a question at issue between two men could not be proved either by documents or witnesses, then the question should be raised before the judge who was trying the case which of the two was the better man, and if they were either equally good or equally bad, that then the one upon whom the claim was made should be believed and the verdict should be given in his favour. But in this case about which you are in
v3.p.31
doubt the claimant is a person of the highest character and the one on whom the claim is made is the worst of men, and there are no witnesses to the transaction between the two. So then go and give credit to the claimant and condemn the one on whom the claim is made, since, as you say, the two are not equal and the claimant is the better man."

This was the advice which Favorinus gave me at that time, as became a philosopher. But I thought that I should show more importance and presumption than became my youth and humble merit, if I appeared to sit in judgment on and condemn a man from the characters of the disputants rather than from the evidence in the case; yet I could not make up my mind to acquit the defendant, and accordingly I took oath that the matter was not clear to me and in that way I was relieved from rendering a decision. The words of the speech of Marcus Cato which

Favorinus mentioned are these:

And I have learnt this from the tradition of our ancestors: if anyone claim anything from another, and both are equally either good or bad, provided there are no witnesses to the transaction between the two, the one from whom the claim is made ought rather to be credited. Now, if Gellius had made a wager [*](See note on vi. 11. 9.) with Turio on the issue, ' Provided Gellius were not a better man than Turio,' no one, I think, would be so mad as to decide that Gellius is better than Turio; if Gellius is not better than Turio, the one from whom the claim is made ought preferably to be credited.

v3.p.33

Whether Plato and Xenophon were rivals and not on good terms with each other.

THOSE who have written most carefully and thoroughly about the life and character of Xenophon and Plato have expressed the belief that they were not free from certain secret and concealed feelings of enmity and rivalry of each other, and they have set forth some conjectural evidence of this, drawn from their writings. These are in fact of this sort: that Plato in his great number of works nowhere makes mention of Xenophon, nor, on the other hand, does Xenophon mention Plato in his writings, although both men, and in particular Plato in the dialogues which he wrote, mention many followers of Socrates. This too they thought was an indication of no sincerely friendly feeling: that Xenophon in opposition to that celebrated work of Plato, which he wrote on the best form of constitution and of governing a city-state, having barely read the two books of Plato's work which were first made public, proposed a different mode of government (to wit, a monarchy) in the work entitled Paidei/as Ku/rou, or The Education of Cyrus. They say that Plato was so disturbed by that conduct and book of his, that having made mention of king Cyrus in one of his own books, in order to criticize and belittle Xenophon's work he said [*](De Legg. 12, p. 694, c.) that Cyrus was indeed a strong and active man, but

had by no means had a fitting education
; for these are Plato's words about Cyrus.

Moreover, they think that this also is added to

v3.p.35
what I have already said: that Xenophon, in the book which he wrote as records of the sayings and doings of Socrates, [*](Memorabilia, i. l. ll.) asserts that Socrates never discussed the causes and laws of the heavens and of nature, and that he never touched upon or approved the other sciences, called by the Greeks maqh/mata which did not contribute to a good and happy life; accordingly, he says that those who have attributed discourses of that kind to Socrates are guilty of a base falsehood.

But when Xenophon wrote this,
they say,
The of course refers to Plato, in whose works Socrates discourses on physics, music and geometry.
But if anything of this kind was to be believed, or even suspected, in noble and dignified men, I do not believe that the motive was hostility or envy, or a contest for gaining greater glory; for such considerations are wholly alien to the character of philosophers, among whom those two were in all men's judgment pre-eminent. What then is the reason for that opinion? Undoubtedly this: the mere equality and likeness of kindred talents, even though the desire and inclination of contention be absent, nevertheless create an appearance of rivalry. For when two or more men of great intellectual gifts, who have gained distinction in the same pursuit, are of equal or nearly equal fame, then there arises among their various partisans emulation in expressing an estimate of their efforts and merit. Then later, from the contention of others, the contagion of rivalry spreads to the men themselves, and while they are pressing on to the same goal of honour, the race is so even, or almost even, [*](For ambiguus in this sense see Virg. Aen. v. 326.) that it comes imperceptibly under a
v3.p.37
suspicion of rivalry, not from any purpose of their own, but from the zeal of their partisans. [*](They were not rivals, but both equally eager to attain virtue. Thus they seen like competitors in a race, and as they run so that you can hardly tell which leads, their partisans insist on regarding them as rivals.) So then Xenophon and Plato, two stars of Socrates' charming philosophy, were believed to contend with and rival each other, because others strove to show that one or the other was the superior, and because two eminent characters, when they are labouring side by side for a lofty aim, beget a kind of appearance of rivalry and competition.

That Chrysippus skilfully and vividly represented the likeness of Justice in melodious and picturesque language.

MOST worthily, by Heaven! and most elegantly did Chrysippus, in the first book of his work entitled On Beauty and Pleasure, depict the face and eyes of Justice, and her aspect, with austere and noble word-painting. For he represents the figure of Justice, and says that it was usually represented by the painters and orators of old in about the following manner:

Of maidenly form and bearing, with a stern and fearsome countenance, a keen glance of the eye, and a dignity and solemnity which was neither mean nor cruel, but awe-inspiring.
From the spirit of this representation he wished it to be understood that the judge, who is the priest of Justice, ought to be dignified, holy, austere, incorruptible, not susceptible to flattery, pitiless and inexorable towards the wicked and guilty, vigorous, lofty, and powerful, terrible by reason of the force and majesty of equity and truth. Chrysippus' own words about Justice
v3.p.39
are as follows:
She has the title of virgin as a symbol of her purity and an indication that she has never given way to evil-doers, that she has never yielded to soothing words, to prayers and entreaties, to flattery, nor to anything of that kind. Therefore she is properly represented too as stern and dignified, with a serious expression and a keen, steadfast glance, in order that she may inspire fear in the wicked and courage in the good; to the latter, as her friends, she presents a friendly aspect, to the former a stern face.

I thought it the more necessary to quote these words of Chrysippus, in order that they might be before us for consideration and judgment, since, on hearing me read them, some philosophers who are more sentimental in their views called that a representation of Cruelty rather than of Justice.

The strife and contention of two eminent grammarians at Rome as to the vocative case of egregius.

ONCE upon a time, wearied with constant writing, I was walking in the park of Agrippa [*](The campus Agrippae, laid out by the famous minister of Augustus, was finished and dedicated by the emperor in 7 B.C. It extended from the line of the aqua Virgo on the south at least as far as the modern via S. Claudio on the north, and from the via Lata to the slope of the Quirinal hill, although its eastern boundary is quite uncertain; see Platner, Topog.,2 p. 477.) for the purpose of relieving and resting my mind. And there, as it chanced, I saw two grammarians of no small repute in the city of Rome, and was a witness of a violent dispute between them, one maintaining

v3.p.41
that vir egregi was the proper form of the vocative case, the other vir egregie.

The argument of the one who thought that we should say egregi was of this sort:

Whatever nouns or words,
said he,
end in the nominative singular in the syllable us preceded by i, in the vocative case terminate in the letter i, as Caelius Caeli, modius modi, tertius terti, Accius Acci, Titius Titi, and the like; so then egregious, since it ends in the syllable us in the nominative and the letter i precedes that syllable, must in the vocative singular have i for the final letter, and therefore it is correct to say egregi, not egregie. For divus and rivus and clivus do not end in the syllable us, but in that which ought to be written with two us, and in order to indicate that sound a new letter was devised, which was called the digamma.
[*](The Greek digamma had practically the form of Latin F and the pronunciation of Latin V (the semi-vowel). The Romans used the character to represent the sound of f, at first with the addition of the aspirate h (as in heehawed, C.I.L. i2. 3 and xiv. 4123) and afterwards alone. Since V was used both for the vowel u and the semi-vowel v, the emperor Claudius introduced an inverted digamma (v), to represent the latter sound; see Suet. Claud. xii. 3 and (e.g.) C.I.L. vi. 919. The writing of F for V, to which Gellius seems to refer, was apparently confined to a few grammarians; see Cassiodorus, vii. 148. 8 K and Priscian, ii, 11. 5 K.) When the other heard this, he said: "O egreie grammatice, or if you prefer, egregissime, tell me, I pray you, what is the vocative case of, inscius, impius, sobrius, ebrius, proprius, propitious, anxius, and contrarius, which end in the syllable us and have the letter i before the final syllable? For shame and modesty prevent me from pronouncing them according to your rule." Now the other, overcome by the accumulation of so many words against him, remained silent for a time; but then he nevertheless rallied, and upheld and defended that same rule which he
v3.p.43
had laid down, maintaining that proprius, propitius, anxius and contrarius ought to have the same form in the vocative case as adversarius and extrarius; that inscius also and impius and ebrius and sobrius were somewhat less commonly, nevertheless more correctly, made to end in that same case in the letter i rather than e. But as this contest of theirs was likely to be continued for some time, I did not think it worth while to listen to those same arguments any longer, and I left them shouting and wrangling.

Of what kind are the things which have the appearance of learning, but are neither entertaining nor useful; and also of changes in the names of several cities and regions.

A FRIEND of mine, a man not without fame as a student of literature, who had passed a great part of his life among books, said to me:

I should like to aid and adorn your Nights,
at the same time presenting me with a book of great bulk, overflowing, as he himself put it, with learning of every kind. He said that he had compiled it as the result of wide, varied and abstruse reading, and he invited me to take from it as much as I liked and thought worthy of record. I took the book eagerly and gladly, as if I had got possession of the horn of plenty, and shut myself up in order to read it without interruption. But what was written there was, by Jove! merely a list of curiosities: the name of the man who was first called a
grammarian
; the number of famous men named Pythagoras and Hippocrates; Homer's
v3.p.45
description [*](Odyss. xxii. 128, 137.) of the laurh/, or
narrow passage,
in the house of Ulysses; why Telemachus did not touch Pisistratus, who was lying beside him, with his hand, but awakened him by a kick; [*](Odyss. xv. 44.) with what kind of bolt Euryclia shut in Telemachus; [*](Odyss. i. 441.) and why the same poet did not know the rose, but did know oil made from roses. [*](Iliad xxiii. 186.) It also contained the names of the companions of Ulysses who were seized and torn to pieces by Scylla; [*](Odyss. xii. 245.) whether the wanderings of Ulysses were in the inner sea, as Aristarchus believed, [*](p. 244, Lehrs.) or in the outer sea, according to Crates. There was also a list of the isopsephic verses in Homer; [*](That is, those whose letters, treated as figures, amounted to the same sum, thus Iliad vii. 264 and 265 = 3498. See Suet. Nero xxxix. 2 and note a (L.C.L.).) what names in the same writer are given in the form of an acrostic; what verse it is in which each word is a syllable longer than the preceding word; [*](An example is Iliad iii. 182, w)= ma/kar )Atrei/dh moirhgene\s o)libiodai/mwn.) by what rule each head of cattle produces three offspring each year; [*](Odyss. iv. 86.) of the five layers with which the shield of Achilles was strengthened, whether the one made of gold was on top or in the middle; [*](Iliad xx. 269.) and besides what regions and cities had had a change of name, as Boeotia was formerly called Aonia, Egypt Aeria, Crete by the same name Aeria, Attica Acte, Corinth Ephyre, Macedonia Emathia, Thessaly Haemonia, Tyre Sarra, Thrace Sithonia, Paestum Poseidonia. [*](The original name was Poseidwni/a; Poseidw/nion was in Pallene. Gellius seems to have made a slip. Poseidw/ni/on means a temple of Poseidon.) These things and many others of the same kind were included in that book. Hastening to return it to him at once, I said:
I
v3.p.47
congratulate you, most learned sir, on this display of encyclopaedic erudition; but take back this precious volume, which does not have the slightest connection with my humble writings. For my Nights, which you wish to assist and adorn, base their inquiries especially on that one verse of Homer which Socrates said was above all other things always dear to him [*](Odyss. iv. 392.) Whate'er of good and ill has come to you at home.
[*](The emphasis is on the last two words. Socrates thought that the chief value of the study of philosophy was its effect on the student's own life and character. Gellius apparently means that he is collecting materials for home consumption; see Praef. i, ut liberis meis partae istiusmodi remissiones essent.)

That Marcus Varro presented Gnaeus Pompeius, when he was consul elect for the first time, with a commentary, which Varro himself called Ei)sagwgiko/s, [*](The word means Introductory. It was what we should call a Handbook of Parliamentary Practice.) on the method of conducting meetings of the senate.

GNAEUS POMP/EIUS was elected consul for the first time with Marcus Crassus. When he was on the point of entering upon the office, because of his long military service he was unacquainted with the method of convening and consulting the senate, and of city affairs in general. He therefore asked his friend Marcus Varro to make him a book of instructions (Ei)sagwgiko/s, as Varro himself termed it), from which he might learn what he ought to say and do when he brought a measure before the House. Varro in letters which he wrote to Op

v3.p.49
pianus, contained in the fourth book of his Investigations in Epistolary Form, says [*](i, p. 195, Bipont.) that this notebook which he made for Pompey on that subject was lost; and since what he had previously written was no longer in existence, he repeats in those letters a good deal bearing upon the same subject. [*](i, p. 125, Bremer.)

First of all, he tells us there by what magistrates the senate was commonly convened according to the usage of our forefathers, naming these:

the dictator, consuls, praetors, tribunes of the commons, interrex, and prefect of the city.
No other except these, he said, had the right to pass a decree of the senate, and whenever it happened that all those magistrates were in Rome at the same time, then he says that the first in the order of the list which I have just quoted had the prior right of bringing a matter before the senate; next, by an exceptional privilege, the military tribunes also who had acted as consuls, [*](From 444 to 384 B.C. military tribunes with consular authority took the place of the consuls.) and likewise the decemvirs, [*](The decemviri legibus scribundis, who drew up the Twelve Tables in 450 B.C.) who in their day had consular authority, and the triumvirs [*](The second triumvirate of Antony, Octavian and Lepidus; cf. iii. 9. 4 and the note.) appointed to reorganize the State, had the privilege of bringing measures before the House. Afterwards he wrote about vetoes, and said that the right to veto a decree of the senate belonged only to those who had the same authority [*](Potestate is used in the technical sense. The par potestas conferred on the colleague of the presiding officer the right to interpose his veto (Abbott, Roman Political Institutions, § 274).) as those who wished to pass the decree, or greater power. He then added a list of the places in which a decree of the senate might lawfully be made, and he showed and maintained that this was regular only
v3.p.51
in a place which had been appointed by an augur, and called a
temple.
[*](A templum (from temno) was originally a sacred precinct.) Therefore in the Hostilian Senate House [*](The curia Hostilia, on the Comitium (see iv. 5. 1 and note 3), was the earliest senate house, ascribed to Tullus Hostilius, the third king of Rome. It was restored by Sulla in 80 B.C., rebuilt by Faustus Sulla after its destruction by fire in 52 B.C. The curia Julia was begun by Caesar in 45 B. c. The curia Pompei, in which Caesar was murdered, was built by Pompey in 55 B.C., near his theatre. Whether it was an exedra of his colonnade, or a separate building, is uncertain.) and the Pompeian, and later in the Julian, since those were unconsecrated places,
temples
were established by the augurs, in order that in those places lawful decrees of the senate might be made according to the usage of our forefathers. In connection with which he also wrote this, that not all sacred edifices are temples, and that not even the shrine of Vesta was a temple. [*](The shrine or temple of Vesta, in spite of its sacred character, was not a consecrated temnplum. It was said to) After this he goes on to say that a decree of the senate made before sunrise or after sunset was not valid, and that those through whom a decree of the senate was made at that time were thought to have committed an act deserving censure. Then he gives much instruction on the same lines: on what days it was not lawful to hold a meeting of the senate; that one who was about to hold a meeting of the senate should first offer up a victim and take the auspices; that questions relating to the gods ought to be presented to the senate before those affecting men; then further that resolutions should be presented indefinitely, [*](That is, in general terms, as in Livy xxii. 1. 5, cum (consul) de re public rettuliset, i.e. had proposed a general discussion of the interests of the State.) as affecting the general welfare, or definitely on specific cases; that a decree of the senate was made in two ways: either by division if there was general agreement, or if the matter was disputed, by calling for the opinion of each senator; furthermore the senators ought to have been built by Numa, and was certainly very ancient. It was burned and rebuilt several times, the last restoration being in A.D. 196 by Julia Domna, wife of Septimius Severus.
v3.p.53
be asked their opinions in order, beginning with the grade of consul. And in that grade in former times the one to be called upon first was always the one who had first been enrolled in the senate; but at the time when he was writing he said that a new custom had become current, through partiality and a desire to curry favour, of asking first for the opinion of the one whom the presiding officer wished to call upon, provided however that he was of consular rank. [*](Cf. Suet. Jul. xxi.) Besides this he discoursed about seizure of goods [*](In consequence of the issue of a writ of execution; see Mommsen, Statsr. i. 160, and cf. Suet. Jul. xvii. 2.) and the imposing of a fine upon a senator who was not present when it was his duty to attend a meeting. These and certain other matters of that kind, first published in the book of which I spoke above, Marcus Varro treated in a letter written to Oppianus.

But when he says that a decree of the senate is commonly made in two ways, either by calling for opinions or by division, that does not seem to agree with what Ateius Capito has written in his Miscellanies. For in Book VIIII Capito says [*](Frag. 3, Huschke; 5, Bremer.) that Tubero asserts [*](Frag. 1, Huschke; De Off. Sen. 1, Bremer.) that no decree of the senate could be made without a division, since in all decrees of the senate, even in those which are made by calling for opinions, a division was necessary, and Capito himself declares that this is true. But I recall writing on this whole matter more fully and exactly in another place. [*](iii. 18.)

v3.p.55

Inquiry and difference of opinion as to whether the praefect appointed for the Latin Festival has the right of convening and consulting the senate.

JUNIUS declares [*](Frag. 10, Huschke; id., Bremer.) that the praefect left in charge of the city because of the Latin Festival [*](The feriae Latinae were held on the Alban Mount in April at a date set by the consuls. Since the consuls must be present at the celebration, they appointed a prafectus urbi to take their place in Rome. Under the empire he was called praefectus urbi fcriarum Latinarum, to distinguish him from the praefectus urbi instituted by Augustus (Suet. Aug. xxxvii). Since a praefectus had the powers of the officer or officers in whose place he was appointed, Varro and Capito are right in theory; but since very young men were often appointed to the office (Suet. Nero, vii. 2; S.H.A. vita Marci, iv, etc.), Junius may have been right as to the actual practice.) may not hold a meeting of the senate, since he is neither a senator nor has he the right of expressing his opinion, because he is made praefect at an age when he is not eligible to the senate. But Marcus Varro in the fourth book of his Investigations in Epistolary Form [*](p. 196, Bipont.) and Ateius Capito in the ninth of his Miscellanies [*](Frag. 4, Huschke; id., Bremer.) assert that the praefect has the right to convene the senate, and Capito declares that Varro agrees on this point with Tubero, contrary to the view of Junius:

For the tribunes of the commons also,
says Capito, [*](De Off. Sen. 2, Bremer.)
had the right of convening the senate although before the bill of Atinius [*](The date of this bill is not known.) they were not senators.