Noctes Atticae

Gellius, Aulus

Gellius, Aulus. The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius. Rolfe, John C., translator. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press; William Heinemann, 1927 (printing).

The derivation of soror, according to Antistins Labeo, and that of frater, according to Publius Nigidius.

ANTISTIUS LABEO cultivated the study of civil law with special interest, and gave advice publicly to those who consulted him on legal questions; he was also not unacquainted with the other liberal arts, and he had delved deep into grammar and dialectics, as well as into the earlier and more recondite literature. He had also become versed in the origin and formation of Latin words, and applied that knowledge in particular to solving many knotty points of law. In fact, after his death works of his were published,

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which are entitled Posteriores, of which three successive books, the thirty-eighth, thirty-ninth and fortieth, are full of information of that kind, tending to explain and illustrate the Latin language. Moreover, in the books which he wrote On the Praetor's Edict he has included many observations, some of which are graceful and clever. Of such a kind is this, which we find written in the fourth book On the Edict: [*](Fr. 26, Huschke; 2, Bremer (ii, p. 85).)
A soror, or 'sister,'
he says,
is so called because she is, as it were, born seorsum, or ' outside,' and is separated from that home in which she was born, and transferred to another family.
[*](That is to say, by marriage.)

Moreover, Publius Nigidius, a man of prodigious learning, explains the word frater, or

brother,
by a no less clever and ingenious derivation: [*](Fr. 50, Swoboda.)
A frater,
he says,
is so called because he is, as it were, fere alter, that is, 'almost another self.'
[*](These derivations are, of course, purely fanciful; soror and frater are cognate with sister and brother, and are not of Latin derivation.)

Marcus Varro's opinion of the just and proper number of banqueters; his views about the dessert and about sweetmeats.

THAT is a very charming book of Marcus Varro's, one of his Menippean Satires, entitled You know not what the Late Evening may Bring, [*](Apparently a proverbial expression; cf. Virg. Georg. i. 461, Denique, quid vesper serus vehat . .. sol tibi signa dabit.) in which he descants upon the proper number of guests at a dinner, and about the order and arrangement of the entertainment itself. Now he says [*](Fr. 333, Bücheler.) that the number of the guests ought to begin with that of the Graces and end with that of the Muses; that is,

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it should begin with three and stop at nine, so that when the guests are fewest, they should not be less than three, when they are most numerous, not more than nine.
For it is disagreeable to have a great number, since a crowd is generally disorderly, [*](There is a word-play on turba and turbulenta, which it seems difficult to reproduce. Cf. Ausonius, p. 12, 146, Peiper; i., p. 22, L. C. L.: Quinque advocavi; sex enim conviviumCum rege iustum; si super, convicium est.) and at Rome it stands, [*](Referring to turba as the throng of citizens in public assembly.) at Athens it sits, but nowhere does it recline. Now, the banquet itself,
he continues,
has four features, and then only is it complete in all its parts: if a nice little group has been got together, if the place is well chosen, the time fit, and due preparation not neglected. Moreover, one should not,
he says,
invite either too talkative or too silent guests, since eloquence is appropriate to the Forum and the courts, but silence to the bed-chamber and not to a dinner.
He thinks, then, that the conversation at such a time ought not to be about anxious and perplexing affairs, but diverting and cheerful, combining profit with a certain interest and pleasure, such conversation as tends to make our character more refined and agreeable.
This will surely follow,
he says,
if we talk about matters which relate to the common experience of life, which we have no leisure to discuss in the Forum and amid the press of business. Furthermore, the host,
he says,
ought rather to be free from meanness than over-elegant,
and, he adds:
At a banquet not everything should be read, [*](Readings or music were common forms of entertainment at a Roman dinner (cf. e.g. Pliny, Epist. iii. 1. 9). Legi, however, may have the meaning of legere in § 3 (end), in which case the reference would be to the viands and biwfelh= would mean wholesome.) but such things as are at once edifying and enjoyable.

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And he does not omit to tell what the nature of the dessert ought to be. For he uses these words:

Those sweetmeats (bellaria) are sweetest which are not sweet; [*](An example of Varro's fondness for word-plays; sweetest is used in the double sense of sweetest to the taste and pleasantest in their after-effects.) for harmony between delicacies and digestion is not to be counted upon.

That no one may be puzzled by the word bellaria which Varro uses in this passage, let me say that it means all kinds of dessert. For what the Greeks called pe/mmata or tragh/mata, our forefathers called bellaria. [*](mensa secunda bellariorum occurs in the Transactions of the Arval Brethren for May 27, A.D. 218.) In the earlier comedies [*](p. 144, 65, Ribbeck 3.) one may find this term applied also to the sweeter wines, which are called Liberi bellaria, or

sweetmeats of Bacchus.

That the tribunes of the commons have the right to arrest, but not to summon.

IN one of the letters of Ateius Capito we read [*](Fr. 19, Huschke: ii. p. 287, Bremer.) that Antistius Labeo was exceedingly learned in the laws and customs of the Roman people and in the civil law.

But,
he adds,
an excessive and mad love of freedom possessed the man, to such a degree that, although the deified Augustus was then emperor and was ruling the State, Labeo looked upon nothing as lawful and accepted nothing, unless he had found it ordered and sanctioned by the old Roman law.
He then goes on to relate the reply of this same Labeo, when he was summoned by the messenger of a tribune of the commons. He says:
When the tribunes of the commons had been appealed to by a woman against Labeo and had sent to him at
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the Gallianum [*](Probably Labeo's country place. He spent half the year in retirement (Dig. i. 2. 2.47), and praedia Galliana are mentioned in C.I.L. iii. 536, and ix. 1455, col. iii, lines 62—64.) bidding him come and answer the woman's charge, he ordered the messenger to return and say to the tribunes that they had the right to summon neither him nor anyone else, since according to the usage of our forefathers the tribunes of the commons had the power of arrest, but not of summons; that they might therefore come and order his arrest, but they did not have the right to summon him when absent.

Having read this in that letter of Capito's, I later found the same statement made more fully in the twenty-first book of Varro's Human Antiquities, and I have added Varro's own words on the subject: [*](Fr. 2, Mirsch.)

In a magistracy
says he,
some have the power of summons, others of arrest, others neither; summoning, for example, belongs to the consuls and others possessing the imperium [*](The right of commanding an army conferred by the Lex Curiata de imperio on the dictator, consuls, magister equitum and praetors.) ; arrest, to the tribunes of the commons and the rest who are attended by a messenger; neither summoning nor arrest to the quaestors and others who have neither a lictor nor a messenger. Those who have the power of summons may also arrest, detail, and lead off to prison, all this whether those whom they summon are present or are sent for by their order. The tribunes of the commons have no power of summons, nevertheless many of them in ignorance have used that power, as if they were entitled to it; for some of them have ordered, not only private persons, but even a consul to be summoned before the rostra. I myself, when a triumvir, [*](That is, one of the triumviri capitales, a minor office.) on being summoned by Porcius, tribune of the commons, did not appear, following the authority of our leading men, but I held to the old law. Similarly, when I was a tribune, I ordered
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no one to be summoned, and required no one who was summoned by one of my colleagues to obey, unless he wished.

I think that Labeo, being a private citizen at the time, [*](That is, he had not yet held a magisterial office.) showed unjustified confidence in that law of which Marcus Varro has written, in not appearing when summoned by the tribunes. For how the mischief was it reasonable to refuse to obey those whom you admit to have the power of arrest? For one who can lawfully be arrested may also be taken to prison. But since we are inquiring why the tribunes, who had full power of coercion, did not have the right to summon ... [*](There seems to be a lacuna in the text. Supply we may assume that it was, or something similar.) because the tribunes of the commons seem to have been elected in early times, not for administering justice, nor for taking cognizance of suits and complaints when the parties were absent, but for using their veto-power when there was immediate need, in order to prevent injustice from being done before their eyes; and for that reason the right of leaving the city at night was denied them, since their constant presence and personal oversight were needed to prevent acts of violence.

That it is stated in Marcus Varro's books on Human Antiquities that the aediles and quaestors of the Roman people might be cited before a praetor by a private citizen.

WHEN from the secluded retreat of books and masters I had come forth among men and into the light of the forum, I remember that it was the

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subject of inquiry in many of the quarters frequented by those who gave public instruction in law, or offered counsel, whether a quaestor of the Roman people could be cited by a praetor. Moreover, this was not discussed merely as an academic question, but an actual instance of the kind had chanced to arise, in which a quaestor was to be called into court. Now, not a few men thought that the praetor did not have the right to summon him, since he was beyond question a magistrate of the Roman people and could neither be summoned, nor if he refused to appear could he be taken and arrested without impairing the dignity of the office itself which he held. But since at that time I was immersed in the books of Marcus Varro, as soon as I found that this matter was the subject of doubt and inquiry, I took down [*](From his bookcase.) the twenty-first book of his Human Antiquities, in which the following is written: [*](Fr. 3, Mirsch.)
It is lawful for those magistrates who have the power neither of summoning the people as individuals nor of arrest, even to be called into court by a private citizen. Marcus Laevinus, a curule aedile, was cited before a praetor by a private citizen; to-day, surrounded as they are by public servants, aediles not only may not be arrested, but even presume to disperse the people.

This is what Varro says in the part of his work which concerns the aediles, but in an earlier part of the same book he says [*](See xiii. 12. 6, above.) that quaestors have the right neither to summon nor to arrest. Accordingly, when both parts of the book had been read, all came over to Varro's opinion, and the quaestor was summoned before the praetor.

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The meaning of pomerium.

THE augurs of the Roman people who wrote books On the Auspices have defined the meaning of pomerium in the following terms:

The pomerium is the space within the rural district designated by the augurs along the whole circuit of the city without the walls, marked off by fixed bounds and forming the limit of the city auspices.
[*](That is to say, the pomerium separated the ager Romanus, or country district, from the city. The auspices could be taken only within the pomerium. When a furrow was drawn and the earth turned inward to mark the line of the city walls, the furrow represented the pomerium. On the derivation of the word see T.A.P.A. xliv. 19 ff.) Now, the most ancient pomerium, which was established by Romulus, was bounded by the foot of the Palatine hill. But that pomerium, as the republic grew, was extended several times and included many lofty hills. Moreover, whoever had increased the domain of the Roman people by land taken from an enemy had the right to enlarge the pomerium.

Therefore it has been, and even now continues to be, inquired why it is that when the other six of the seven hills of the city are within the pomerium, the Aventine alone, which is neither a remote nor an unfrequented district, should be outside the pomerium; and why neither king Servius Tullius nor Sulla, who demanded the honour of extending the pomerium, nor later the deified Julius, when he enlarged the pomerium, included this within the designated limits of the city.

Messala wrote [*](Fr. 3, Huschke; id., Bremer (ii, p. 265).) that there seemed to be several reasons for this, but above them all he himself approved one, namely, because on that hill Remus took the auspices with regard to founding the city, but found the birds unpropitious and was less

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successful in his augury than Romulus.
Therefore,
says he,
all those who extended the pomerium excluded that hill, on the ground that it was made ill-omened by inauspicious birds.

But speaking of the Aventine hill, I thought I ought not to omit something which I ran across recently in the Commentary of Elys, [*](The name is obviously corrupt; see critical note.) an early grammarian. In this it was written that in earlier times the Aventine was, as we have said, excluded from the pomerium, but afterwards by the authority of the deified Claudius it was admitted and honoured with a place within the limits of the pomerium.

A passage from the book of the augur Messala, in which he shows who the minor magistrates are and that the consul and the praetor are colleagues; and certain observations besides on the auspices.

IN the edict of the consuls by which they appoint the day for the centuriate assembly it is written in accordance with an old established form:

Let no minor magistrate presume to watch the skies.
[*](That is, for omens.) Accordingly, the question is often asked who the minor magistrates are. On this subject there is [*](This and the following verbs seem to be in epistolary past tenses; that is, Gellius uses the tenses which would represent the time from the standpoint of his future readers.) no need for words of mine, since by good fortune the first book of the augur Messala On Auspices is at hand, when I am writing this. Therefore I quote from that book Messala's own words: [*](Fr. 1, Huschke; 1a, Bremer (i, p. 263).)
The auspices of the patricians are divided into two classes. The
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greatest are those of the consuls, praetors and censors. Yet the auspices of all these are not the same or of equal rank, for the reason that the censors are not colleagues of the consuls or praetors, [*](Explained in § 6, below.) while the praetors are colleagues of the consuls. Therefore neither do the consuls or the praetors interrupt or hinder the auspices of the censors, nor the censors those of the praetors and consuls; but the censors may vitiate and hinder each other's auspices and again the praetors and consuls those of one another. The praetor, although he is a colleague of the consul, cannot lawfully elect either a praetor or a consul, as indeed we have learned from our forefathers, or from what has been observed in the past, and as is shown in the thirteenth book of the Commentaries of Gaius Tuditanus; [*](Fr. 8, Peter2; 2, Huschke; id., Bremer (i, p. 35).) for the praetor has inferior authority and the consul superior, and a higher authority cannot be elected by a lower, or a superior colleague by an inferior. At the present time, when a praetor elects the praetors, I have followed the authority of the men of old and have not taken part in the auspices at such elections. Also the censors are not chosen under the same auspices as the consuls and praetors. The lesser auspices belong to the other magistrates. Therefore these are called 'lesser' and the others 'greater' magistrates. When the lesser magistrates are elected, their office is conferred upon them by the assembly of the tribes, but full powers by a law of the assembly of the curiae; the higher magistrates are chosen by the assembly of the centuries.
[*](On these comitia see xv. 27, below.)

From this whole passage of Messala it becomes clear both who the lesser magistrates are and why they are so called. But he also shows that the praetor

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is a colleague of the consul, because they are chosen under the same auspices. Moreover, they are said to possess the greater auspices, because their auspices are esteemed more highly than those of the others.

Another passage from the same Messala, in which he argues that to address the people and to treat with the people are two different things; and what magistrates may call away the people when in assembly, and from whom.

THE same Messala in the same book has written as follows about the lesser magistrates [*](Fr. 2, Huschke: id., Bremer (i, p. 263).)

A consul may call away the people from all magistrates, when they are assembled for the elections or for another purpose. A praetor may at any time call away the people when assembled for the elections or for another purpose, except from a consul. Lesser magistrates may never call away the people when assembled for the elections or another purpose. Hence, whoever of them first summons the people to an election has the law on his side, because it is unlawful to take the same action twice with the people (bifariam cum populo agi), nor can one minor magistrate call away an assembly from another. But if they wish to address the people (contionem habere) without laying any measure before them, it is lawful for any number of magistrates to hold a meeting (contionem habere) at the same time.
From these words of Messala it is clear that cum populo agere,
to treat with the people,
differs from contionem habere,
to address the people.
For the former means to ask something of the people
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which they by their votes are to order or forbid; the latter, to speak to the people without laying any measure before them.

That humanitas does not mean what the common people think, but those who have spoken pure Latin have given the word a more restricted meaning.

THOSE who have spoken Latin and have used the language correctly do not give to the word humanitas the meaning which it is commonly thought to have, namely, what the Greeks call filanqrwpi/a, signifying a kind of friendly spirit and good-feeling towards all men without distinction; but they gave to humanitas about the force of the Greek paidei/a; that is, what we call eruditionem institutionemque in bonas artes, or

education and training in the liberal arts.
Those who earnestly desire and seek after these are most highly humanized. For the pursuit of that kind of knowledge, and the training given by it, have been granted to man alone of all the animals, and for that reason it is termed humanitas, or
humanity.

That it is in this sense that our earlier writers have used the word, and in particular Marcus Varro and Marcus Tullius, [*](De Orat. i. 71; ii. 72, etc.) almost all the literature shows. Therefore I have thought it sufficient for the present to give one single example. I have accordingly quoted the words of Varro from the first book of his Human Antiquities, beginning as follows: [*](Fr. 1, Mirsch.)

Praxiteles, who, because of his surpassing art, is unknown to no one of any liberal culture (humaniori).
He does not use humanior in its usual sense of
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good-natured, amiable, and kindly,
although without knowledge of letters, for this meaning does not at all suit his thought; but in that of a man of
some cultivation and education,
who knew about Praxiteles both from books and from story.

The meaning of Marcus Cato's phrase

betwixt mouth and morsel.

THERE is a speech by Marcus Cato Censorius On the Improper Election of Aediles. In that oration is this passage: [*](lxv. 1, Jordan.)

Nowadays they say that the standing-grain, still in the blade, is a good harvest. Do not count too much upon it. I have often heard that many things may come inter os atque offam, or 'between the mouth and the morsel'; but there certainly is a long distance between a morsel and the blade.
Erucius Clarus, who was prefect of the city and twice consul, a man deeply interested in the customs and literature of early days, wrote to Sulpicius Apollinaris, the most learned man within my memory, begging and entreating that he would write him the meaning of those words. Then, in my presence, for at that time I was a young man in Rome and was in attendance upon him for purposes of instruction, Apollinaris replied to Clarus very briefly, as was natural when writing to a man of learning, that
between mouth and morsel
was an old proverb, meaning the same as the poetic Greek adage:
  1. 'Twixt cup and lip there's many a slip.

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That Plato attributes a line of Sophocles to Euripides; and some other matters of the same kind.

THERE is an iambic trimeter verse of notorious antiquity:

  1. By converse with the wise wax tyrants wise.
This verse Plato in his Theaetetus [*](Really Theages 6, p. 125 B.) attributes to Euripides. I am very much surprised at this; for I have met it in the tragedy of Sophocles entitled Ajax the Locrian [*](Fr. 13, Nauck2.) and Sophocles was born before Euripides.

But the following line is equally well known:

  1. I who am old shall lead you, also old.
And this is found both in a tragedy of Sophocles, of which the title is Phthiotides, [*](Id. 633.) and in the Bacchae of Euripides. [*](193.)

I have further observed that in the Fire-bringing Prometheus of Aeschylus and in the tragedy of Euripides entitled Ino an identical verse occurs, except for a few syllables. In Aeschylus it runs thus: [*](Fr. 208, Nauck2 (Coeph. 576).)

  1. When proper, keeping silent, and saying what is fit.
In Euripides thus: [*](Id. 413.)
  1. When proper, keeping silent, speaking when 'tis safe.
But Aeschylus was considerably the earlier writer. [*](According to tradition Euripides was born on the day of the battle of Salamis (480 B.C.), Aeschylus took part in the fight, and Sophocles, then about sixteen years old, figured in the celebration of the victory. Christ, Griech. Lit., assigns Euripides' birth to 484.)

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Of the lineage and names of the Porcian family.

WHEN Sulpicius Apollinaris and I, with some others who were friends of his or mine, were sitting in the library of the Palace of Tiberius, it chanced that a book was brought to us bearing the name of Marcus Cato Nepos. We at once began to inquire who this Marcus Cato Nepos was. And thereupon a young man, not unacquainted with letters, so far as I could judge from his language, said:

This Marcus Cato is called Nepos, not as a surname, but because he was the grandson of Marcus Cato Censorius through his son, and father of Marcus Cato the ex-praetor, who slew himself with his own sword at Utica during the civil war. There is a book of Marcus Cicero's about the life of the last-named, entitled Laus Catonis, or A Eulogy of Cato, in which Cicero says [*](Fr. 1, p. 987, Orelli2.) that he was the great-grandson of Marcus Cato Censorius. Therefore the father of the man whom Cicero eulogized was this Marcus Cato, whose orations are circulated under the name of Marcus Cato Nepos.

Then Apollinaris. very quietly and mildly, as was his custom when passing criticism, said:

I congratulate you, my son, that at your age you have been able to favour us with a little lecture on the family of Cato, even though you do not know who this Marcus Cato was, about whom we are now inquiring. For the famous Marcus Cato Censorius had not one, but several grandsons, although not all were sprung from the same father. For the famous Marcus Cato, who was both an orator and
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a censor, had two sons, born of different mothers and of very different ages; since, when one of them was a young man, his mother died and his father, who was already well on in years, married the maiden daughter of his client Salonius, from whom was born to him Marcus Cato Salonianus, a surname which he derived from Salonius, his mother's father. But from Cato's elder son, who died when praetorelect, while his father was still living, and left some admirable works on The Science of Law, there was born the man about whom we are inquiring, Marcus Cato, son of Marcus, and grandson of Marcus. He was an orator of some power and left many speeches written in the manner of his grandfather; he was consul with Quintus Marcius Rex, and during his consulship went to Africa and died in that province. But he was not, as you said he was, the father of Marcus Cato the ex-praetor, who killed himself at Utica and whom Cicero eulogized; nor because he was the grandson of Cato the censor and Cato of Utica was the censor's great-grandson does it necessarily follow that the former was the father of the latter. For this grandson whose speech was just brought to us did, it is true, have a son called Marcus Cato, but he was not the Cato who died at Utica, but the one who, after being curule aedile and praetor, went to Gallia Narbonensis and there ended his life. But by that other son of Censorius, a far younger man, who, as I said, was surnamed Salonianus, two sons were begotten: Lucius and Marcus Cato. That Marcus Cato was tribune of the commons and died when a candidate for the praetorship; he begot Marcus Cato the ex-praetor, who committed suicide at Utica during the civil war, and when Marcus
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Tullius wrote the latter's life and panegyric he said that he was the great-grandson of Cato the censor. You see therefore that the branch of the family which is descended from Cato's younger son differs not only in its pedigree, but in its dates as well; for because that Salonianus was born near the end of his father's life, as I said, his descendants also were considerably later than those of his elder brother. This difference in dates you will readily perceive from that speech itself, when you read it.

Thus spoke Sulpicius Apollinaris in my hearing. Later we found that what he had said was so, when we read the Funeral Eulogies and the Genealogy of the Porcian Family.