Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

I am not sure, however, whether it is so much a figure of thought as of speech. For the only difference lies in the fact that universals are not contrasted with universals, but particulars with particulars. Celsus, however, and that careful writer Visellius regard it as a figure of thought, while Rutilius Lupus regards it as belonging to both, and calls it antithesis.

To the figures placed by Cicero among the ornaments of thought Rutilius (following the views of Gorgias, a contemporary, whose four books he transferred to his own work, and who is not to be confused with Georgias of Leontini) and Celsus (who follows Rutilius) would add a number of others, such as:

concentration, which the Greek calls διαλλαγή [*](διαλλαγή is corrupt, but the correct term has not yet been discovered. MSS. ΔΙΑΜΑΤΗΝ, ΔΙΑΜΑΠΗΝ, etc. ) a term employed when a number of different arguments are used to establish one point: consequence, which Gorgias calls ἐπακολούθησις and which I have already discussed under the head of argument [*](See v. xiv. 1.) : inference, which Gorgias terms συλλογισμός threats, that is, κατάπληξις exhortation, or παραινετικόν But all of these are perfectly straightforward methods of speaking, unless combined with some one of the figures which I have discussed above.

Besides these, Celsus considers the following to be figures: exclusion, asseveration, refusal, [*]( The meaning of detrectare is uncertain It may mean refuse to deal with some topic, or simply detract. ) excitement of the judge, the use of proverbs, the employment of quotations from poetry, jests, invidious remarks or invocation to intensify a charge (which is identical with δείνωσις ) flattery,

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pardon, disdain, admonition, apology, entreaty and rebuke.

He even includes partition, proposition, division and affinity between two separate things, by which latter he means that two things apparently different signify the same: for example, not only the man who murders another by administering a deadly draught is to be regarded as a poisoner, but also the man who deprives another of his wits by giving him some drug, a point which depends on definition.

To these Rutilius or Gorgias add ἀναγκαῖον that is, the representation of the necessity of a thing, ἀνάμνησις or reminding, ἀνθυποφορά that is, replying to anticipated objections, ἀντίῤῥησις or refutation, παραύξησις or amplification, προέκθεσις which means pointing out what ought to have been done, and then what actually has been done, ἐναντιότης, or arguments from opposites [*]( See IX. iii. 90. For enthymemes κατ᾽ ἐνατίωσιν, see v. xiv. 2. and note on ex pugnantibus, Vol. II. p. 524. ) (whence we get enthymemes styled κατ᾽ ἐναντίωσιν ), and even μετάληψις, which Hermagoras considers a basis. [*]( See III. vi. 46. The term is not used here in the same sense as in VIII. vi. 37, but rather = translatio, see III. vi. 23. Lit. translatio means transference of the charge : the sense is virtually the same as that of exceptio (a plea made by defendant in bar of plaintiffs action). Competence is perhaps the least unsatisfactory rendering. ) Visellius, although he makes the number of figures but small, includes among them the enthymeme, which he calls commentum, and the epicheireme, which he calls ratio. [*](See note on v. xiv. 5, Vol. II. p. 524.) This view is also partially accepted by Celsus, who is in doubt whether consequence is not to be identified with the epicheireme.

Visellius also adds general reflexions to the list. I find others who would add to these διασκευή [*](Apparently some form of exaggeration.) or enhancement, ἀπαγόρευσις or prohibition, and παραδιήγησις or incidental narrative. But though these are not figures, there may be others which have slipped my notice, or are yet to be invented: still, they will be of the same nature as those of which I have spoken above.

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