Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

This form of trope is not only a rhetorical ornament, but is frequently employed in everyday speech. Some also apply the term synecdoche when something is assumed which has not actually been expressed, since one word is then discovered from other words, as in the sentence,

  1. The Arcadians to the gates began to rush;
Aen. xi. 142. A false explanation of the historic infinitive as involving the omission of some such word as coeperunt.
when such omission creates a blemish, it is called an ellipse.

For my own part, I prefer to regard this as a figure, and shall therefore discuss it under that head. Again, one thing may be suggested by another, as in the line,

  1. Behold, the steers
  2. Bring back the plough suspended from the yoke,
Ed. ii. 61
from which we infer the approach of night. I am not sure whether this is permissible to an orator except in arguments, when it serves as an indication of some fact. However, this has nothing to do with the question of style.

It is but a short step from synecdocheè to metonymy, which consists in the substitution of one name for another, and, as Cicero [*](Orat. xxvii. 93. ) tells us, is called hypallage by the rhetoricians. These devices are employed to indicate an invention by substituting the name of

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the inventor, or a possession by substituting the name of the possessor. Virgil, for example, writes: [*](Aen. i. 177. )
  1. Ceres by water spoiled,
and Horace:
  1. Neptune admitted to the land
  2. Protects the fleets from blasts of Aquilo.
A. P. 63.
If, however, the process is reversed, the effect is harsh.

But it is important to enquire to what extent tropes of this kind should be employed by the orator. For though we often hear

Vulcan
used for fire and to say vario Marte pugnatum est for
they fought with varying success
is elegant and idiomatic, while Venus is a more decent expression than coitus, it would be too bold for the severe style demanded in the courts to speak of Liber and Ceres when we mean bread and wine. Again, while usage permits us to substitute that which contains for that which is contained, as in phrases such as
civilised cities,
or
a cup was drunk to the lees,
or
a happy age,

the converse procedure would rarely be ventured on by any save a poet: take, for example, the phrase:

  1. Ucalegon burns next.
Aen. ii. 311.
It is, however, perhaps more permissible to describe what is possessed by reference to its possessor, as, for example, to say of a man whose estate is being squandered,
the man is being eaten up.
Of this form there are innumerable species.

For example, we say

sixty thousand men were slain by Hannibal at Cannae,
and speak of
Virgil
when we mean
Virgil's poems
; again, we say that supplies have
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come,
when they have been
brought,
that a
sacrilege,
and not a
sacrilegious man
has been detected, and that a man possesses a knowledge of
arms,
not of
the art of arms.

The type which indicates cause by effect is common both in poets and orators. As examples from poetry I may quote:

  1. Pale death with equal foot knocks at the poor man's door
Hor. Od. I. iv. 13.
and
  1. There pale diseases dwell and sad old age;
Aen. vi. 275
  1. while the orator will speak of
    headlong anger
    ,
  2. cheerful youth
    or
    slothful ease
    .

The following type of trope has also some kinship with synecdochè. For when I speak of a man's

looks
instead of his
look,
I use the plural for the singular, but my aim is not to enable one thing to be inferred from many (for the sense is clear enough), but I merely vary the form of the word. Again, when I call a
gilded roof
a
golden roof,
I diverge a little from the truth, because gilding forms only a part of the roof. But to follow out these points is a task involving too much minute detail even for a work whose aim is not the training of an orator.

Antonomasia, which substitutes something else for a proper name, is very common in poets: it may be done in two ways: by the substitution of an epithet as equivalent to the name which it replaces, such as

Tydides,
Pelides,
[*](The son of Tydeus=Diomede, the son of Peleus = Achilles.) or by indicating the most striking characteristics of an individual, as in the phrase
  1. Father of gods and king of men,
Aen. i. 65.
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or from acts clearly indicating the individual, as in the phrase,
  1. The arms which he, the traitor, left
  2. Fixed on the chamber wall.
Aen. iv. 495. This third example does not correspond with the twofold division given by utroque and may be spurious.
This form of trope is rare in oratory,

but is occasionally employed, For although an orator would not say

Tydides
or
Pelides,
he will speak of certain definite persons as
the impious parricides,
while I should have no hesitation in speaking of Scipio as
the destroyer of Carthage and Numantia,
or of Cicero as
the prince of Roman orators.
Cicero himself, at any rate, availed himself of this licence, as, for example, in the following case:
Your faults are not many, said the old praeceptor to the hero,
[*](Pro Muren. xxix. 60. The passage continues (a quotation from some old play) But you have faults and I can correct them. Phoenix is addressing his pupil Achilles. ) where neither name is given, though both are clearly understood.

On the other hand, onomatopoea, that is to say, the creation of a word, although regarded with the highest approbation by the Greeks, is scarcely permissible to a Roman. It is true that many words were created in this way by the original founders of the language, who adapted them to suit the sensation which they expressed. For instance, mugitus, lowing, sibilus, a hiss, and murmur owe their origin to this practice.

But to-day we consider that all has been done that can be done in this line, and do not venture on fresh creations, in spite of the fact that many of the words thus formed in antiquity are daily becoming obsolete. Indeed, we scarcely permit ourselves to use new derivatives, so they are called, which are formed in various ways from words in common use, such as Sullaturit, [*]( Cic. ad Att. IX. x. 6. )

he wishes to be a second Sulla,
or proscripturit,
he wishes to have
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a proscription,
while laureati posies,
laurelled door-posts,
for lauru coronati,
crowned with laurel,
are similar formations.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * [*]( This passage is too corrupt to admit of emendation or translation. There seem to be references to vio for eo and to arqtitollens. for which cp. arquitenens. Septemntriones can hardly be selected for censure, as it is not uncommon. )

These facts make catachresis (of which abuse is a correct translation) all the more necessary. By this term is meant the practice of adapting the nearest available term to describe something for which no actual term exists, as in the line

  1. A horse they build by Pallas' art divine,
Aen. II. xv. It is an abuse to say aedficant, which means literally "they make a house.
or as in the expression found in tragedy,
  1. To Aigialeus
  2. His sire bears funeral offerings,
[*]( Perhaps from the Medus of Pacuvius It is an abuse to use parental of funeral offerings made by father to son. )
The following examples are of a similar character.

Flasks are called acetabula, [*](Lit. vinegar flasks.) whatever they contain, and caskets pyxides, [*](i.e. made of boxwood. ) of whatever material they are made, while parricide includes the murder of a mother or a brother. We must be careful to distinguish between abuse and metaphor, since the former is employed where there is no proper term available, and the latter when there is another term available. As for poets, they indulge in the abuse of words even in cases where proper terms do exist, and substitute words of somewhat similar meaning. But this is rare in prose.

Some, indeed, would give the name of catachresis even to cases such as where we call temerity valour or prodigality liberality. I, however, cannot agree with them; for in these

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instances word is not substituted for word, but thing for thing, since no one regards prodigality and liberality as meaning the same, but one man calls certain actions liberal and another prodigal, although neither for a moment doubts the difference between the two qualities.

There is but one of the tropes involving change of meaning which remains to be discussed, namely, metalepsis or transumption, which provides a transition from one trope to another. It is (if we except comedy) but rarely used in Latin, and is by no means to be commended, though it is not infrequently employed by the Greeks, who, for example, call Χείρων the centaur Ἥσσων [*](Χείρων and ἥσσων both mean inferior. ) and substitute the epithet θοαί (swift) for ὄξειαι [*](cp. Od. xv. 298. Θοός is used elsewhere to express sharpness. ) in referring to sharp-pointed islands. But who would endure a Roman if he called Verres sus [*](Verres =boar; Catus=wise.) or changed the name of Aelius Catus to Aelius doctus?

It is the nature of metalepsis to form a kind of intermediate step between the term transferred and the thing to which it is transferred, having no meaning in itself, but merely providing a transition. It is a trope with which to claim acquaintance, rather than one which we are ever likely to require to use. The commonest example is the following: cano is a synonym for canto and canto [*](In the sense of to repeat.) for dico, therefore cano is a synonym for dico, the intermediate step being provided by canto.

We need not waste any more time over it. I can see no use in it except, as I have already said, in comedy.

The remaining tropes are employed solely to adorn and enhance our style without any reference to the meaning. For the epithet, of which the correct translation is appositum, though some call it sequens,

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is clearly an ornament. Poets employ it with special frequency and freedom, since for them it is sufficient that the epithet should suit the word to which it is applied: consequently we shall not blame them when they speak of
white teeth
or
liquid wine.
[*](Georg. III. 364. ) But in oratory an epithet is redundant unless it has some point. Now it will only have point when it adds something to the meaning, as for instance in the following:
O abominable crime, O hideous lust!