Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

Therefore we must not expect any speech to be ornate that is not, in the first place,

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acceptable. An acceptable style is defined by Cicero [*](Part. Or., vi. 19. ) as one which is not over-elegant: not that our style does not require elegance and polish, which are essential parts of ornament, but that excess is always a vice.

He desires, therefore, that our words should have a certain weight about them, and that our thoughts should be of a serious cast or, at any rate, adapted to the opinions and character of mankind. These points once secured, we may proceed to employ those expressions which he regards as conferring distinction on style, that is to say, specially selected words and phrases, metaphor, hyperbole, appropriate epithets, repetitions, synonyms and all such language as may suit our case and provide an adequate representation of the facts.

But since my first task is to point out the faults to be avoided, I will begin by calling attention to the fault known as κακέμφατον, a term applied to the employment of language to which perverted usage has given an obscene meaning: take, for example, phrases such as ductare exercitus and patrare bellum, [*](ductare might mean ad libidinem abducere. patrare bellum might mean paedicare formosum. ) which were employed by Sallust in their old and irreproachable sense, but, I regret to say, cause amusement in certain quarters to-day. This, however, is not, in my opinion, the fault of the writer, but of his readers;

still it is one to be avoided, for we have perverted the purity of language by our own corruption, and there is no course left to us but to give ground before the victorious advance of vice. The same term is also applied in the cases where an unfortunate collocation of words produces an obscene suggestion. For example, in the phrase cum hominibus notis loqui, unless hominibus is placed between cum and notis, we shall commit ourselves to a phrase

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which will require some apology, since the final letter of the first syllable, which cannot be pronounced without closing the lips, will force us either to pause in a most unbecoming manner, or by assimilation to the n which follows [*](i.e. pronouncing cunnotis. ) will produce a most objectionable suggestion.

I might quote other collocations of words which are liable to the same objection, but to discuss them in detail would be to fall into that very fault which I have just said should be avoided. A similar offence against modesty may be caused by the division of words, as, for example, by the use of the nominative of intercapedinis. [*](interccapedo, of which the last two syllables might give rise to unseemly laughter; pedo = break wind. )

And it is not merely in writing that this may occur, but you will find, unless you exercise the greatest care, that there are a number of persons who take pleasure in putting an indecent interpretation on words, thinking, as Ovid [*](Met. i. 502. ) says:

  1. that whatsoe'er is hid is best of all.
Nay, an obscene meaning may be extracted even from words which are as far removed from indecency as possible. Celsus, for example, detects an instance of κακέμφατον in the Virgilian [*](Georg. i. 357. ) phrase:
  1. incipiunt agitata tumescere;
but if this point of view be accepted, it will be risky to say anything at all.

Next to indecency of expression comes meanness, styled ταπείνωσις, when the grandeur or dignity of anything is diminished by the words used, as in the line:

  1. There is a rocky wart upon the mountain's brow.
    [*](From an unknown tragedian.)
The opposite fault, which is no less serious, consists
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in calling small things by extravagant names, though such a practice is permissible when deliberately designed to raise a laugh. Consequently we must not call a parricide a scamp, nor a man who keeps a harlot a villain, since the first epithet is too weak and the second too strong.

This fault will result in making our language dull, or coarse, jejune, heavy, unpleasing or slovenly, all of which faults are best realised by reference to the virtues which are their opposites, that is, point, polish, richness, liveliness, charm, and finish.

We must also avoid μείωσις a term applied to meagreness and inadequacy of expression, although it is a fault which characterises an obscure style rather than one which lacks ornament. But meiosis may be deliberately employed, and is then called a figure, as also is tautology, which means the repetition of a word or phrase.

The latter, though not avoided with special care even by the best authors, may sometimes be regarded as a fault: it is, in fact, a blemish into which Cicero not infrequently falls through indifference to such minor details: take, for example, the following passage, [*](Pro Cluent. xxxv. 96. To bring out the effect criticised by Cicero, iudicium must he translated judgment. But trial is required to give the correct sense. ἐπανάληψις = repetition. )

Judges, this judgment was not merely unlike a judgment.
It is sometimes given another name, ἐπανάληψις, under which appellation it is ranked among figures, of which I shall give examples when I come to the discussion of stylistic virtues. [*](IX. ii.)

A worse fault is ὁμοείδεια, or sameness, a term applied to a style which has no variety to relieve its tedium, and which presents a uniform monotony of hue. This is one of the surest signs of lack of art, and produces a uniquely unpleasing effect, not merely on the mind, but on the ear, on account of its

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sameness of thought, the uniformity of its figures, and the monotony of its structure.

We must also avoid macrology, that is, the employment of more words than are necessary, as, for instance, in the sentence of Livy,

The ambassadors, having failed to obtain peace, went back home, whence they had come.
[*](Fr. 62, Hertz. ) On the other hand, periphrasis, which is akin to this blemish, is regarded as a virtue. Another fault is pleonasm, when we overload our style with a superfluity of words, as in the phrase,
I saw it with my eyes,
where
I saw it
would have been sufficient.

Cicero passed a witty comment on a fault of this kind in a declamation of Hirtius when he said that a child had been carried for ten months in his mother's womb.

Oh,
he said,
I suppose other women carry them in their bags.
[*](perulra means a small wallet. But it is noteworthy that in Apul. Met. V. xiv. it is used = uterus, and the doubleentendre was probably current in Cicero's time. ) Sometimes, however, the form of pleonasm, of which I have just given an example, may have a pleasing effect when employed for the sake of emphasis, as in the Virgilian phrase [*](Aen. iv- 359. ) :
  1. With mine own ears his voice I heard.
But whenever the addition is not deliberate,

but merely tame and redundant, it must be regarded as a fault. There is also a fault entitled περιεργία, which I may perhaps translate by superfluous elaboration, which differs from its corresponding virtue much as fussiness differs from industry, and superstition from religion. Finally, every word which neither helps the sense nor the style may be regarded as faulty.

Cacozelia, or perverse affectation, is a fault in every kind of style: for it includes all that is turgid, trivial, luscious, redundant, far-fetched or extravagant, while the same name is also applied to virtues

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carried to excess, when the mind loses its critical sense and is misled by the false appearance of beauty, the worst of all offences against style, since other faults are due to carelessness, but this is deliberate.

This form of affectation, however, affects style alone. For the employment of arguments which might equally well be advanced by the other side, or are foolish, inconsistent or superfluous, are all faults of matter, whereas corruption of style is revealed in the employment of improper or redundant words, in obscurity of meaning, effeminacy of rhythm, or in the childish search for similar or ambiguous expressions.

Further, it always involves insincerity, even though all insincerity does not imply affectation. For it consists in saying something in an unnatural or unbecoming or superfluous manner. Style may, however, be corrupted in precisely the same number of ways that it may be adorned. But I have discussed this subject at greater length in another work, [*]( The lost De causis corruptae eloquentiae. ) and have frequently called attention to it in this, while I shall have occasion to mention it continually in the remaining books. For in dealing with ornament, I shall occasionally speak of faults which have to be avoided, but which are hard to distinguish from virtues.

To these blemishes may be added faulty arrangement or ἀνοικονόμητον, the faulty use of figures or ἀσχημάτιστον, and the faulty collocation of words or κακοσύνθετον. But, as I have already discussed arrangement, I will confine myself to the consideration of figures and structure. There is also a fault known as Σαρδισμὸς, which consists in the indiscriminate use of several different dialects, as, for instance, would result from mixing Doric, Ionic, and

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even Aeolic words with Attic.

A similar fault is found amongst ourselves, consisting in the indiscriminate mixture of grand words with mean, old with new, and poetic with colloquial, the result being a monstrous medley like that described by Horace in the opening portion of his Ars poetica, [*](A. P. I.)

  1. If a painter choose
  2. To place a man's head on a horse's neck,
and, be proceeds to say, should add other limbs from different animals.

The ornate is something that goes beyond what is merely lucid and acceptable. It consists firstly in forming a clear conception of what we wish to say, secondly in giving this adequate expression, and thirdly in lending it additional brilliance, a process which may correctly be termed embellishment. Consequently we must place among ornaments that ἐνάργεια which I mentioned in the rules which I laid down for the statement of facts, [*]( ii. 63. ) because vivid illustration, or, as some prefer to call it, representation, is something more than mere clearness, since the latter merely lets itself be seen, whereas the former thrusts itself upon our notice.