Institutio Oratoria
Quintilian
Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.
This ambiguity crops up in many ways, and gives rise to disputes, mole especially in connexion with wills, when two men of the same name claim their freedom or, it may be, an inheritance, or again, when the enquiry turns on the precise nature of the bequest.
There is another form of ambiguity where a word has one meaning when entire and another when divided, as, for example, ingenua, armameniam or Corvinum. [*](Inyenua, a freeborn woman; in genua, on to the knees. Armamentum, equipment; arma mentum, arms, chin. Corvinum, ace. of name Corvinus; cor vimium, heart, wine. ) The disputes arising from such ambiguities are no more than childish quibbles, but nevertheless the Greeks are in the habit of making them the subject for controversial themes, as, for example, in the notorious case of the αὐλητρίς, when the question is whether it is a hall which has fallen down three times ( αὔλη τρίς ) or a flute-player who fell down that is to be sold.
A third form of ambiguity is caused by the use of compound words; for example, if a man orders his body to be buried in a cultivated spot, and should direct, as is often done, a considerable space of land surrounding his tomb to be taken from the land left to his heirs with a view to preserving his ashes from outrage, an occasion for dispute may be afforded by the question whether the words mean
in a cultivated place( in culto loco ) or
in an uncultivated place( inculto loco ).
Thus arises the Greek theme
Or it may arise from the arrangement of the words,
- I say that you, O prince of Aeacus' line,
- Rome can o'erthrow.
which makes it doubtful what the exact reference of some word or words may be, more especially when there is a word in the middle of the sentence which may be referred either to what precedes or what follows, as in the line of Virgil [*](Aen. i. 477. ) which describes Troilus as
where it may be disputed whether the poet means that he is still holding the reins, or that, although he holds the reins, he is still dragged along.
- lora tenens tamen,
The controversial theme,
A certain man in his will ordered his heirs to erect statuam auream hastam tenentem,'turns on a similar ambiguity; for it raises the question whether it is the statue holding the spear which is to be of gold, or whether the spear should be of gold and the statue of some other material. The same result is even more frequently produced by a mistaken inflexion of the voice, as in the line:
- quinquaginta uhi erant centum inde occidit Achilles. [*](Achilles slew fifty out of a hundred,ora hundred out of fifty. Translated from a Greek line in Arist. Soph. El. i. 4. ( πεντήκοντ᾽ ἀνδρῶν ἑκατὸν λίπε δῖος ). Quinquaginta is the object of occidit. Faulty reading might make it go with ubi erant, leaving centum as the object of occidit, and making nonsense of the line. )
It is also often doubtful to which of two antecedents a phrase is to be referred. Hence we get such
My heir shall be bound to give my wife a hundred pounds of silver according to choice,where it is left uncertain which of the two is to make the choice. But in these examples of ambiguity, the first may be remedied by a change of case, the second by separating 1 the words or altering their position, the third by some addition. [*](See § 11.)
Ambiguity resulting from the use of two accusatives may be removed by the substitution of the ablative: for example, Lachetem audivi percussisse Demeam (I heard that Demea struck Laches, or that L. struck D.) may be rendered clear by writing a Lachete percussum Demeam (that D. was struck by L.). There is, however, a natural ambiguity in the ablative case itself, as I pointed out in the first book. [*](I. vii. 3.) For example, caelo decurrit aperto [*]( Apparently a misquotation of Virg. Aen. v. 212, pelago decurrit aperto. ) leaves it doubtful whether the poet means he hastened down
through the open sky,or
when the sky was opened for him to pass.
Words may be separated by a breathing space or pause. We may, for instance, say statuam, and then, after a slight pause, add auream hastam, or the pause may come between statuam auream and haslam. The addition referred to above would take the form quod elegerit ipse, where ipse will show that the reference to the heir, or quod elegerit ipsa, making the reference to the wife. In cases where ambiguity is caused by the addition of a word, the difficulty may be eliminated by the removal of a word, as in the sentence nos flentes illos deprehendimus. [*]( Does this mean we found them weeping, or we found them weeping for us? The ambiguity is eliminated by the removal of nos. )
Where it is doubtful to what a word or phrase refers, and the word or phrase itself is ambiguous, we shall have to alter several words, as, for example, in the sentence,
My heir shall be bound to give him all his ownwherev7-9 p.161property,
his ownis ambiguous. Cicero commits the same fault when he says of Gaius Fannius, [*](Brut. xxvi. 101. The sentence continues, (an act of which Laelius said by way of excuse that he had given the augurship not to his younger son-in-law, but to his elder daughter), Fannius, I say, despite his lack of affection for Laelius, in obedience to his instructions attended the lectures of Panaetius. )
He following the instructions of his father-in-law, for whom, because he had not been elected to the college of augurs, he had no great affection, especially as he had given Quintus Scaevola, the younger of his sons-in-law, the preference over himself. .For over himself may refer either to his father-in-law or to Fannius.
Again, another source of ambiguity arises from leaving it doubtful in a written document whether a syllable is long or short. Cato, for example, means one thing in the nominative when its second syllable is short, and another in the dative or ablative when the same syllable is long. [*](sc. of the adjective catus, shrewd. ) There are also a number of other forms of ambiguity which it is unnecessary for me to describe at length.
Further, it is quite unimportant how ambiguity arises or how it is remedied. For it is clear in all cases that two interpretations are possible, and as far as the written or spoken word is concerned, it is equally important for both parties. It is therefore a perfectly futile rule which directs us to endeavour, in connexion with this basis, to turn the word in question to suit our own purpose, since, if this is feasible, there is no ambiguity.
In cases of ambiguity the only questions which confront us will be, sometimes which of the two interpretations is most natural, and always which interpretation is most equitable, and what was the intention of the person who wrote or uttered the words. I have, however, given sufficient instructions in the course of my remarks on conjecture and quality, as to the method of treating such questions, whether by the prosecution or the defence.
There is, however, a certain affinity between all these bases. [*](III. vi. 54.) For in definition we enquire into the meaning of a term, and in the syllogism, which is closely connected with definition, [*](See ch. viii. 1.) we consider what was the meaning of the writer, while it is obvious that in the case of contrary laws there are two bases, one concerned with the letter, and the other with the intention. Again, definition is in itself a kind of ambiguity, since it brings out two meanings in the same term.
The basis concerned with the letter and the intention of the law involves a legal question as regards the interpretation of the words, which is identical with the question arising out of contrary laws. Consequently some writers have asserted that all these bases may be resolved into those concerned with the letter and intention, while others hold that in all cases where the letter and the intention of a document have to be considered, it is ambiguity that gives rise to the question at issue. But all these bases are really distinct, for an obscure point of law is not the same as an ambiguous point of law. Definition, then,
involves a general question as to the actual nature of a term, a question which may conceivably have no connexion whatsoever with the content of the case in point. In investigations as to the letter and the intention, the dispute turns on the provisions contained in the law, whereas the syllogism deals with that which is not contained in the law. In disputes arising out of ambiguity we are led from the ambiguous phrase to its conflicting meanings, whereas in the case of contrary laws the fight starts from the conflict of their provisions.
The distinction between these bases has therefore been rightly accepted by the most learned of
There are other details concerning which I can give no instructions without a statement of the particular case on which the orator has to speak. For not only must the whole case be analysed into its component topics and questions, but these subdivisions themselves require to be arranged in the order which is appropriate to them. For example, in the exordium each part has its own special place, first, second and third, etc., while each question and topic requires to be suitably arranged, and the same is true even of isolated general questions. [*](cp. II. iv. 24; III. v. 8. )
For it will not, I imagine, be represented that sufficient skill in division is possessed by the man who, after resolving a controversial theme into questions such as the following, whether a hero is to be granted any reward that he may claim, whether he is allowed to claim private property, whether he may demand any woman in marriage, whether he may claim to marry a woman who already possesses a husband, or this particular woman, then, although it is his duty to deal with the first question first, proceeds to deal with them indiscriminately as each may happen to occur to him, and ignores the fact that the first point which should be discussed is whether we should stand by the letter or the intention of the law, and fails to follow the natural order,
which demands that after beginning with this question he should then proceed to introduce the subsidiary questions, thereby making the structure of his speech