Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

Again, another source of ambiguity arises from leaving it doubtful in a written document whether a syllable is long or short. Cato, for example, means one thing in the nominative when its second syllable is short, and another in the dative or ablative when the same syllable is long. [*](sc. of the adjective catus, shrewd. ) There are also a number of other forms of ambiguity which it is unnecessary for me to describe at length.

Further, it is quite unimportant how ambiguity arises or how it is remedied. For it is clear in all cases that two interpretations are possible, and as far as the written or spoken word is concerned, it is equally important for both parties. It is therefore a perfectly futile rule which directs us to endeavour, in connexion with this basis, to turn the word in question to suit our own purpose, since, if this is feasible, there is no ambiguity.

In cases of ambiguity the only questions which confront us will be, sometimes which of the two interpretations is most natural, and always which interpretation is most equitable, and what was the intention of the person who wrote or uttered the words. I have, however, given sufficient instructions in the course of my remarks on conjecture and quality, as to the method of treating such questions, whether by the prosecution or the defence.

v7-9 p.163

There is, however, a certain affinity between all these bases. [*](III. vi. 54.) For in definition we enquire into the meaning of a term, and in the syllogism, which is closely connected with definition, [*](See ch. viii. 1.) we consider what was the meaning of the writer, while it is obvious that in the case of contrary laws there are two bases, one concerned with the letter, and the other with the intention. Again, definition is in itself a kind of ambiguity, since it brings out two meanings in the same term.

The basis concerned with the letter and the intention of the law involves a legal question as regards the interpretation of the words, which is identical with the question arising out of contrary laws. Consequently some writers have asserted that all these bases may be resolved into those concerned with the letter and intention, while others hold that in all cases where the letter and the intention of a document have to be considered, it is ambiguity that gives rise to the question at issue. But all these bases are really distinct, for an obscure point of law is not the same as an ambiguous point of law. Definition, then,

involves a general question as to the actual nature of a term, a question which may conceivably have no connexion whatsoever with the content of the case in point. In investigations as to the letter and the intention, the dispute turns on the provisions contained in the law, whereas the syllogism deals with that which is not contained in the law. In disputes arising out of ambiguity we are led from the ambiguous phrase to its conflicting meanings, whereas in the case of contrary laws the fight starts from the conflict of their provisions.