Institutio Oratoria

The syllogistic basis [*]( See III. vi. 43 sqq. ) has some resemblance to the basis concerned with the letter and intention of the law, since whenever it comes into play, one party rests his case on the letter: there is, however, this difference between the two bases, that in the latter we argue against the letter, in the present beyond the letter, while in the latter the party defending the letter aims at securing that in any case the letter may be carried into effect, whereas in the present his aim will be to prevent anything except the letter being carried into effect. The syllogism is sometimes employed in conjunction with definition: for often if the definition be weak it takes refuge in the syllogism. Assume a law to run as follows:

A woman who is a poisoner shall be liable to capital punishment. A wife gave her husband a love-potion to cure him of his habit of beating her. She also divorced him. On being asked by her relatives to return to him, she refused. The husband hung himself. The woman is accused of poisoning.

The syllogistic basis, then, deduces from the letter of the law that which is uncertain; and since this conclusion is arrived at by reason, the basis is called ratiocinative. [*](See in. vi. 43, 61. ) It may be subdivided into the following species of question. If it is right to do a thing once, is it right to do it often? Example:

A priestess found guilty of unchastity is thrown from the Tarpeian rock and survives. It is demanded that she shall be thrown down again.

A man kills two tyrants together and claims two rewards.

If a thing is legal before a certain occurrence, is it legal after it? Example:

The ravisher took refuge in flight. His victim married. The ravisher returned and the woman demands to be allowed her choice.

It is forbidden to accept a plough as security. He accepted a ploughshare.

It is forbidden to export wool from Tarentum: he exported sheep.

In all these cases the syllogism rests on the letter of the law as well: for the accuser urges that the provisions of the law are precise. He will say,

I demand that the priestess who has broken her vows be cast down: it is the law,

The ravished woman demands the exercise of the

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choice permitted her by law,

Wool grows on sheep,

But to this we may reply,

The law does not prescribe that the condemned woman should be thrown down twice, that the ravished woman should exercise her choice under all circumstances, that the tyrannicide should receive two rewards, while it makes no mention of ploughshares or of sheep.

The man who kills his father shall be sewn up in a sack. He killed his mother,

It is illegal to drag a man from his own house into the court. He dragged him from his tent.

Under this heading come questions such as the following: if there is not a special law applicable to the case, ought we to have recourse to an analogous law? is the point in question similar to what is contained in the letter of the law? Now it should be noted that what is similar may be greater, equal or less. In the first ease we enquire whether the provisions of the law are sufficient, or, if they are insufficient, whether we should have recourse to this other law. In both cases it is a question of the intention of the legislator. But the most effective form of treatment in such cases will be to appeal to equity.

I turn to tile discussion of ambiguity, which will be found to have countless species: indeed, in the opinion of certain philosophers, there is not a single word which has not a diversity of meanings. There are, however, very few genera, since ambiguity must occur either in a single word or in a group of words.

Single words give rise to error, when the same noun applies to a number of things or persons (the Greeks call this homonymy): for example, it is uncertain with regard to the word gallus whether it means a cock or a Gaul or a proper name or an emasculated priest of tybele; while Ajax may refer either to the son of Telamon or the son of Oileus. Again, verbs likewise may have different meanings, as, for example, cerno. [*]( See or decide or separate. )

This ambiguity crops up in many ways, and gives rise to disputes, mole especially in connexion with wills, when two men of the same name claim their freedom or, it may be, an inheritance, or again, when the enquiry turns on the precise nature of the bequest.

There is another form of ambiguity where a word has one meaning when entire and another when divided, as, for example, ingenua, armameniam or Corvinum. [*](Inyenua, a freeborn woman; in genua, on to the knees. Armamentum, equipment; arma mentum, arms, chin. Corvinum, ace. of name Corvinus; cor vimium, heart, wine. ) The disputes arising from such ambiguities are no more than childish quibbles, but nevertheless the Greeks are in the habit of making them the subject for controversial themes, as, for example, in the notorious case of the αὐλητρίς, when the question is whether it is a hall which has fallen down three times ( αὔλη τρίς ) or a flute-player who fell down that is to be sold.