Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

The point on which judgment has to be delivered is whether the accused is guilty of causing his victim's death. The same type of case will also bring conjecture into play, when, for example, the question in dispute is whether the accused shall be punished with banishment for life or for five years. For the question then is whether he caused his death willingly or not.

Again, there are questions concerned with numerical quantity which turn on a point of law, such as the questions whether thirty

v7-9 p.133
rewards are due to Thrasybulus, [*](i.e. for his overthrow of the thirty tyrants; cp. II. vi. 26. ) or whether, when two thieves have stolen a sum of money, they are each to be required to refund fourfold or twofold. But in these cases, too, valuation of the act is necessary, and yet the point of law also turns on quality.

V. He who neither denies nor defends his act nor asserts that it was of a different nature from that alleged, must take his stand on some point of law that tells in his favour, a form of defence which generally turns on the legality of the action brought against him.

This question is not, however, as some have held, always raised before the commencement of the trial, like the elaborate deliberations of the praetor when there is a doubt as to whether the prosecutor has any legal standing, but frequently comes up during the course of the actual trial. Such discussions fall into two classes, according as the point in dispute arises from an argument advanced by the prosecution or from some prescription [*](cp. III. vi. 72. ) (or demurrer) put forward by the defence. There have indeed been some writers who have held that there is a special prescriptive basis; but prescription is covered by precisely the same questions that cover all other laws.

When the dispute turns on prescription, there is no need to enquire into the facts of the case itself. For example, a son puts forward a demurrer against his father on the ground that his father has forfeited his civil rights. The only point which has to be decided is whether the demurrer can stand. Still, wherever possible, we should attempt to create a favourable impression in the judge as to the facts of the case as well, since, if this be done, he will be all the more disposed to give an indulgent hearing

v7-9 p.135
to our point of law: for example, in actions taking the form of a wager and arising out of interdicts, [*](sponsio (= wager) was a form of suit in which the litigant promised to pay a sum of money if he lost his case. The interdict was an order issued by the praetor commanding or prohibiting certain action. It occurred chiefly in disputes about property. ) even though the question is concerned solely with actual possession, the question as to tile right to possession not being raised, it will be desirable to prove not merely that the property was actually in our possession, but that it was ours to possess.

On tile other hand, the question more frequently turns on intention. Take the law [*](i.e. an imaginary law of the schools of rhetoric. )

Let a hero choose what reward he will.
I deny that he is entitled to receive whatever he chooses. I cannot put forward any formal demurrer, but none the less I use the intention as against the letter of the law just as I should use a demurrer. In both cases the basis is the same.

Moreover every law either gives or takes away punishes or commands, forbids or permits, and involves a dispute either on its own account or on account of another law, while the question which it involves will turn either on the letter or the intention. The letter is either clear or obscure or ambiguous.

And what I say with reference to laws will apply equally to wills, agreements, contracts and every form of document; nay, it will apply even to verbal agreements. And since I have classified such cases under four questions or bases, I will deal with each in turn.

Lawyers frequently raise the question of the letter and the intention of the law, in fact a large proportion of legal disputes turn on these points. We need not therefore be surprised that such questions occur in the schools as well, where they are often invented with this special purpose. One form of this kind of question is found in cases where tile enquiry turns both on the letter and the spirit

v7-9 p.137
of a law.

Such questions arise when the law presents some obscurity. Under these circumstances both parties will seek to establish their own interpretation of the passage and to overthrow that advanced by their opponent. Take for example the following case.

A thief shall refund four times the amount of his theft. Two thieves have jointly stolen 10,000 sesterces. 40,000 are claimed from each. They claim that they are liable only to pay 20,000 each.
The accuser will urge that the sum which he claims is fourfold the amount stolen; the accused will urge that the sum which they offer to pay is fourfold. The intention of the law will be pleaded by both parties.