Institutio Oratoria

Thirdly, there are times when the question concerns things which are different in species, and we ask whether two different things are to be called by the same name, in spite of the fact that each has a special name of its own: for example, is tile same name applicable both to a love-potion and a poison? [*](cp. VIII. V. 31. ) But in all disputes of this kind the question is whether one thing is another thing as well, since the name in doubt does without question apply to something else. It is sacrilege to steal a sacred object from a temple; is it also sacrilege to steal private property from a temple? It is adultery to lie with another man's wile in one's own house; is it adultery to do so in a brothel? It is tyrannicide to slay a tyrant; is it tyrannicide to force him to slay himself?

Consequently the syllogism, to which I shall return later, is virtually a weaker form of definition, since while definition seeks to determine whether one thing has the same name as another, syllogism seeks to determine whether one thing is to be regarded as identical with another.

There is moreover great variety in definitions. For instance, persons will give different verbal expression to

Definition is sometimes required to explain rare or obscure words such as clarigatio [*](A formal demand for redress under threat of war.) or erctum citum, [*](An undivided inheritance.) or again to explain familiar words such as penus [*](Store of provisions.) or litus. [*]( Shore, see v. xiv. 34, where its derivation is explained as qua fiuctus eludit. ) This variety in definition has caused some writers to include it under conjecture, others under quality and others again under legal questions.