Institutio Oratoria

For the purpose of the exordium and the slatement of facts is merely to prepare the judge for these points, while it would be a work of supererogation to know the bases [*](See III. vi.) of cases or to consider the other

of the five parts [*](I. ix. 1; IV. iii. 15.) into which we divided judicial cases, any single one other than the proof may on occasion be dispensed with. But there can be no suit in which the proof is not absolutely necessary. With regard to the rules to be observed in this connexion, we shall, I think, be wisest to follow our previous method of classification and show first what is common to all cases and then proceed to point out those which are peculiar to the several kinds of cases.

1. To begin with it may be noted that the division laid down by Aristotle [*](Rhet. i. ii. 2. ) has met with almost universal approval. It is to the effect that there are some proofs adopted by the orator which lie outside the art of speaking, and others which he himself deduces or, if I may use the term, begets out of his case. The former therefore have been styled ἄτεχνοι or inartificial proofs, the latter ἔντεχνοι or artificial.

To the first class belong decisions of previous courts, rumours, evidence extracted by torture, documents, oaths, and witnesses, for it is with these that the majority of forensic arguments are concerned. But though in themselves they involve no art, all the powers of eloquence are as a rule required to disparage or refute them. Consequently in my opinion those who would eliminate the whole of this class of proof from their rules of oratory, deserve the strongest condemnation.

It is not, however, my intention to embrace all that can be said for or against these views. I do not for instance propose to lay down rules for commonplaces, a task requiring infinite detail, but merely to sketch out the general lines and method