Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

On the other hand there are indications which may be made to serve either party, such as livid spots, swellings which may be regarded as symptoms either of poisoning or of bad health, or a wound in the breast which may be treated as a proof of murder or of suicide. The force of such indications depends on the amount of extraneous support which they receive.

Hermagoras would include among such indications as do not involve a necessary conclusion, an

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argument such as the following,
Atalanta cannot be a virgin, as she has been roaming the woods in the company of young men.
If we accept this view, I fear that we shall come to treat all inferences from a fact as indications. None the less such arguments are in practice treated exactly as if they were indications.

Nor do the Areopagites, when they condemned a boy for plucking out the eyes of quails, seem to have had anything else in their mind than the consideration that such conduct was an indication of a perverted character which might prove hurtful to many, if he had been allowed to grow up. So, too, the popularity of Spurius Maelius and Marcus Manlius was regarded as an indication that they were aiming at supreme power.

However, I fear that this line of reasoning will carry us too far. For if it is an indication of adultery that a woman bathes with men, the fact that she revels with young men or even an intimate friendship will also be indications of the same offence. Again depilation, a voluptuous gait, or womanish attire may be regarded as indications of effeminacy and unmanliness by anyone who thinks that such symptoms are the result of an immoral character, just as blood is the result of a wound: for anything, that springs from the matter under investigation and comes to our notice, may properly be called an indication.

Similarly it is also usual to give the names of signs to frequently observed phenomena, such as prognostics of the weather which we may illustrate by the Vergilian

  1. For wind turns Phoebe's face to ruddy gold
Verg. G. i. 431.
and
  1. The crow
  2. With full voice, good-for-naught, invites the rain.
ib. i. 388.
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If these phenomena are caused by the state of the atmosphere, such an appellation is correct enough.

For if tile moon turns red owing to the wind, her hue is certainly a sign of wind. And if, as the same poet infers, [*]( Verg. G. i. 422. ) the condensation and rarification of the atmosphere causes that

concert of bird-voices
of which he speaks, we may agree in regarding it as a sign. We may further note that great things are sometimes indicated by trivial signs, witness the Vergilian crow; that trivial events should be indicated by signs of greater importance is of course no matter for wonder.

I now turn to arguments, the name under which we comprise the ἐνθυμήματα, ἐπιχειρήματα, and ἀποδείξεις of the Greeks, terms which, in spite of their difference, have much the same meaning. For the enthymeme (which we translate by commentun or commentatio, there being no alternative, though we should be wiser to use the Greek name) has three meanings: firstly it means anything conceived in the mind (this is not however the sense of which I am now speaking);

secondly it signifies a proposition with a reason, and thirdly a conclusion of an argument drawn either from denial of consequents or from incompatibles [*](v. viii. 5; xiv. 2. n.) ; although there is some controversy on this point. For there are some who style a conclusion from consequents an epicheireme, while it will be found that the majority hold the view that an epicheireme is a conclusion from incompatibles: [*](See v. xiv. 2, VIII. v. 9.) wherefore Cornificius styles it a contrarium or argument from contraries. Some again call it a rhetorical

syllogism, others an incomplete syllogism, because its parts are not so clearly defined or of the same number as those of the regular syllogism, since such

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precision is not specially required by the orator. Valgius [*](See III. i. 18. A rhetorician of the reign of Augustus.) translates ἐπιχείρημα by aggressio,

that is an attempt. It would however, in my opinion, be truer to say that it is not our handling of the subject, but the thing itself which we attempt which should be called an ἐπιχείρημα, that is to say the argument by which we try to prove something and which, even if it has not yet been stated in so many words, has been clearly conceived by the mind.

Others regard it not as an attempted or imperfect proof, but a complete proof, falling under the most special [*]( The last or lowest species. p. § 56 and VII. i. 23. ) species of proof; consequently, according to its proper and most generally received appellation it must be understood in the sense of a definite conception of some thought consisting of at least three parts. [*](i.e. the major and minor premisses and the conclusion. See v. xiv. 6 sqq. ) Some call an ἐπιχείρημα a reason,

but Cicero [*](de Inv. . xxxi. 34. ) is more correct in calling it a reasoning, although he too seems to derive this name from the syllogism rather than anything else; for he calls the syllogistic basis [*](See III. vi. 43, 46, 51.) a ratiocinative basis and quotes philosophers to support him. And since there is a certain kinship between a syllogism and an epicheireme, it may be thought that he was justified in his use of the latter term.

An ἀπόδεξις is a clear proof; hence the use of the term γραμμικαὶ ἀποδείξεις,

linear demonstrations
[*](See I. x. 38.) by the geometricians. Caecilius holds that it differs from the epicheireme solely in the kind of conclusion arrived at and that an apodeixis is simply an incomplete epicheireme for the same reason that we said an enthymeme differed from a syllogism. For an epicheireme is also part of a syllogism. Some think that an apodeixis is portion of an epicheireme,
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namely the part containing the proof.

But all authorities, however much they may differ on other points, define both in the same way, in so far as they call both a method of proving what is not certain by means of what is certain. Indeed this is the nature of all arguments, for what is certain cannot be proved by what is uncertain. To all these forms of argument the Greeks give the name of πίστεις , a term which, though the literal translation is fides

a warrant of credibility,
is best translated by probatio
proof.
But argument has several other meanings.

For the plots of plays composed for acting in the theatre are called arguments, while Pedianus, when explaining the themes of the speeches of Cicero, says The argument is as follows. Cicero [*](In some letter now lost.) himself in writing to Brutus says, Fearing that I might transfer something from that source to my Cato, although the argument is quite different. It is thus clear that all subjects for writing are so called.

Nor is this to be wondered at, since the term is also in common use among artists; hence the Vergilian phrase A mighty argument. [*](Aen. vii. 791, with Reference to the design on the shield of Turnus. ) Again a work which deals with a number of different themes is called

rich in argument.
But the sense with which we are now concerned is that which provides proof Celsus indeed treats the terms, proof, indication, credibility, attempt, simply as different names for the same things, in which, to my thinking, he betrays a certain confusion of thought.

For proof and credibility are not merely the result of logical processes, but may equally be secured by inartificial arguments. Now I have already [*](v. ix. 2.) distinguished signs or, as he prefers to call them, indications from arguments. Consequently, since an argument is a process of reasoning

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which provides proof and enables one thing to be inferred from another and confirms facts which are uncertain by reference to facts which are certain, there must needs be something in every case which requires no proof.