Institutio Oratoria

There is another form of conclusion which is not actually identical with the major premise, but has the same force

Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved into its elements is devoid of' feeling, and that which is devoid of feeling is nothing to us.

All animate things are better than inanimate, but there is nothing better than the universe, wherefore the universe is animate.

The universe is animate, for all things animate are better than inanimate,

This major premise is either an admitted fact as in the last example or requires

He who wishes to live a happy life, must be a philosopher

But all men wish to live a happy life,

That which is dissolved into its elements is devoid of feeling,

There is no difference between the epicheireme and the syllogism, except that the latter has a number of forms and infers truth from truth, whereas the epicheireme is frequently concerned with statements that are no more than credible. For if it were always possible to prove controversial points from admitted premises, the orator would have little to do in this connexion.

For what skill does it require to say,

The property is mine, for I am the only son of the deceased,

I am the sole heir, since possession of the testator's estate is given by the law of property in accordance with the terms of his will: the property therefore belongs to me

But when the reason given is itself disputable, we must establish the certainty of the premises by which we are proposing to prove what is uncertain. For example, if our opponent says

You are not his son

You are illegitimate

You are not his only son

You are not his heir

The will is invalid

You are not entitled to inherit

You have co-heirs,

But when a reason of unusual length intervenes, it is necessary to state the final conclusion, otherwise the major premise and the reason would suffice.

Laws are silent in the midst of arms, and do not require us to await their sanction when the circumstances are such that he who would await their sanction is certain to be the victim of an unjust penalty before ever the just penalty can be claimed.

The laws are silent in the midst of arms.

We may also begin with the reason and then proceed to the conclusion as in another passage from the same speech [*](ib. iii. 9. ) :

But if the Twelve Tables permitted the killing of a thief by night under any circumstances, and by day if he used a weapon to defend himself, who is there who will contend that the slayer must be punished under whatever circumstances a man has been killed?

When he sees that the sword is sometimes placed in our hands by the laws themselves.

On the other hand, he places the various parts in the regular order in the following instance:

How can it be unjust to kill a robber who lies in wait for his victim?

What is the object of our escorts and our swords?

Which we certainly should not be permitted to have, if we were absolutely forbidden to use them.

This form of proof may be countered in three ways, that is to say it may be attacked in all its parts. For either the major premise or the minor or the conclusion or occasionally all three are refuted. The major premise is refuted in the following case:

I was justified in killing him, as he lay in wait for me.

whether it is right that he who confesses that he has killed a man should look upon the light of day.

The minor premise is refuted by all the methods which we mentioned in dealing with refutation. [*](In the preceding chapter.) As to the reason it must be pointed out that it is sometimes true when the proposition to which it is attached is not true, but may on the other hand sometimes be false although the proposition is true. For example,

Virtue is a good thing

Because it brings us wealth,

With regard to the conclusion, we may either deny its truth when it infers something which does not logically result from the premises, or we may treat it as irrelevant. The truth is denied in the following case:

We are justified in killing one who lies in wait for us; for since, like an enemy, he threatens us with violence, we ought to repulse his attack as though he were an enemy: therefore Milo was justified in killing Clodius as an enemy.

But while the major premise and the reason

Some call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, while others regard it as a part of the syllogism, because whereas the latter always has its premises and conclusion and effects its proof by the employment of all its parts, the ethymeme is content to let its proof be understood without explicit statement.

The following is an example of a syllogism:

Virtue is the only thing that is good, for that alone is good which no one can put to a bad use: but no one can make a bad use of virtue; virtue therefore is good.

Virtue is a good thing because no one can put it to a bad use.

Money is not a good thing; for that is not good which can be put to a bad use: money may be put to a bad use; therefore money is not a good thing.

Can money be a good thing when it is possible to put it to a bad use?

The following argument is couched in syllogistic form:

If money in the form of silver coin is silver, the man who bequeathed all his silver to a legatee, includes all money in the form of coined silver: but he bequeathed all his silver: therefore he included in the bequest all money in the form of coined silver.

Since he bequeathed all his silver, he included in his bequest all his silver money.

I think I have now dealt with all the precepts of those who treat oratory as a mystery. But these rules still leave scope for free exercise of the judgment. For although I consider that there are occasions

For in the former we are confronted with learned men seeking for truth among men of learning; consequently they subject everything to a minute and scrupulous inquiry with a view to arriving at clear and convincing truths, and they claim for themselves the tasks of invention and judgment, calling the former τοπική or the art of selecting the appropriate material for treatment, and the latter κριτική or the art of criticism.

We on the other hand have to compose our speeches for others to judge, and have frequently to speak before an audience of men who, if not thoroughly ill-educated, are certainly ignorant of such arts as dialectic: and unless we attract them by the charm of our discourse or drag them by its force, and occasionally throw them off their balance by an appeal to their emotions, we shall be unable to vindicate the claims of truth and justice.

Eloquence aims at being rich, beautiful and commanding, and will attain to none of these qualities if it be broken up into conclusive inferences which are generally expressed in the same monotonous form: on the contrary its meanness will excite contempt, its severity dislike, its elaboration satiety, and its sameness boredom.

Eloquence therefore must not restrict itself to narrow tracks, but range at large over the open fields. Its streams must not be conveyed