Institutio Oratoria

For practically all those who have set forth the law of speaking as though it were a profound mystery, [*](cp. v. xiv. 27. ) have tied us down not merely to fixed topics for argument, but to definite

propose after making a few preliminary remarks on the subject to give a frank expression of my own views, or in other words to set forth what I perceive to have been the practice of the most distinguished orators.

Tile term enthymeme [*](For this chapter see note prefixed to Index.) is applied not merely to the actual argument, that is to say, the matter adduced to prove something else, but also to its expression, the nature of which, as I have already pointed out, is twofold. [*](cp. v. x. 2. ) It may be drawn from denial of consequents, when it will consist of a proposition immediately followed by a proof, as in the following passage from the pro Ligario; [*]( vi. 19. The cause helped by heaven is that of Caesar. cp. Lucan's victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni. )

At that point the justice of the cause was doubtful, since there was something to be said on both sides. But now we can only regard that cause as superior, which even the gods supported.

It may on the other hand be drawn from incompatibles, in which case the proof will be much stronger; indeed some restrict the title of enthymeme [*](cp. v. x. 2. ) to this form of argument. The following passage from the pro Milone [*](xxix. 79. The death is that of Clodius.) of Cicero will provide a parallel:

You are then sitting there to avenge the death of a man whom you would refuse to restore to life, even if you thought it within your power to do so.

This form of argument may even at times consist of a number of clauses, as in the following passage from the same speech [*](xvi. 41.) :

Was he resolved then to kill to the dissatisfaction of some a man whom he refused to kill to the satisfaction of all? Are we to believe that he did not hesitate, in defiance of the law and

v4-6 p.351

despite the unfavourable circumstances both of time and place and the risk involved to his own life, to kill one whom he did not venture to kill when he might have done so legally, at his own time and place and without the least danger to himself?

The most effective kind of enthymeme seems however to be that in which a reason is subjoined to a dissimilar or contrary proposition as in the following passage from Demosthenes [*](in Androt. § 7; in Aristocr. § 99. ) :

For if at any time an act has been committed contrary to law and you have imitated it, it does not therefore follow that you should go scot free; on the contrary it is an additional reason why you should be condemned. For if any of those who transgressed the law had been condemned, you would not have proposed this, and further, if you are condemned, no one else will propose anything of the kind.

As regards the epicheieme, some authorities hold that it consists of four, five, and even six parts. Cicero [*](de Inv. I. xxxvii. 67. ) urges that there are not more than five at most, i.e. the major premise and its reason, the minor premise and its proof, and fifthly the conclusion. But since at times the major premise does not require a reason nor the minor a proof, while occasionally even the conclusion is not necessary, he holds that the epicheireme may consist of only four, three, or even two parts.

Personally however follow the majority of authorities in holding that there are not more than three parts. For it follows from the very nature of reasoning that there must be something to form the subject of enquiry and something else to provide the proof, while the third element which has to be added may be regarded as resulting from the agreement of the two previous

Let us then take an example from Cicero [*](de Inv. 3. xxxiv. 58. ) of the epicheireme consisting of five parts.

Those things which are controlled by reason are better governed than those which are not.

But there is nothing better administered than the universe.

The fifth place they assign to the conclusion which either merely makes the necessary inference from the preceding parts ( i.e.

Therefore the universe is governed by reason

But if on the one hand things that are controlled by reason are better governed than things which are not and on the other nothing is better administered than the universe, then it follows that the universe is governed by reason.

I have said that the epicheireme consists of three parts: its form is not however invariable. There is

The soul is immortal, since whatever derives its motion from itself is immortal. But the soul derives its motion from itself. Therefore the soul is immortal.

For cases and questions always have first a major premise, such as

You have committed sacrilege,

Not everyone who has killed a man is guilty of murder.

There is another form of conclusion which is not actually identical with the major premise, but has the same force

Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved into its elements is devoid of' feeling, and that which is devoid of feeling is nothing to us.

All animate things are better than inanimate, but there is nothing better than the universe, wherefore the universe is animate.

The universe is animate, for all things animate are better than inanimate,

This major premise is either an admitted fact as in the last example or requires

He who wishes to live a happy life, must be a philosopher

But all men wish to live a happy life,

That which is dissolved into its elements is devoid of feeling,

There is no difference between the epicheireme and the syllogism, except that the latter has a number of forms and infers truth from truth, whereas the epicheireme is frequently concerned with statements that are no more than credible. For if it were always possible to prove controversial points from admitted premises, the orator would have little to do in this connexion.