Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

To these proof's some authorities would add those which they call pathetic or emotional. Aristotle [*](Rhet. I. ii. 4. ) indeed holds that the strongest argument in support of a speaker is that he is a good man. This no doubt is the best support, but to seem good is also of value, though the semblance is but a bad second to the reality.

Of this nature is the noble defence of Scaurus.

Quintus Varius of Sucro asserts that Aemilius Scaurus has betrayed the interests of the Roman people: Aemilius Scaurus denies it.
A similar defence is said to have been employed by Iphicrates [*]( At. Rhet. II. xxiii. 7. ) : he asked Aristophon who was accusing him on a similar charge of treason whether lie would consent to betray his country for a bribe: when Aristophon replied in the negative, he continued,
Have I then done what you would have refused to do?

We must however take the character of the judge into consideration and seek out such arguments as will appeal to him. I have already spoken of this in the rules which I laid

v4-6 p.305
down for the exordium and for deliberative oratory. [*]( IV. i. 17 sq., III. viii. 36 sq. )

Another form of proof is provided by asseveration as in

I did this,
You told me this,
or
O outrageous crime!
and the like. Every pleading should contain some such asseverations; if it does not, the loss will be considerable. Still asseverations must not be regarded as supports of the first importance, since they can be produced by either party in the same case with the same emphasis.