Institutio Oratoria

Further arguments drawn from place may serve to secure approval or the reverse. Ajax for instance in Ovid [*](Met. xiii. 5. Ajax had saved the ships from being burned by the Trojans. The dispute as to whether the arms of Achilles should be awarded to him or to Ulysses is being tried there. Ajax's argument is, Can you refuse me my due reward on the very spot where I saved you from disaster? ) says:—

1. What! do we plead our cause before the ships?
2. And is Ulysses there preferred to me?

Such arguments may also carry weight in deliberative oratory, as may those drawn from time, which I shall now proceed to discuss. Time may, as I have said elsewhere, [*](III. vi. 25.) be understood in two different senses, general and special. The first sense is seen in words and phrases such as

now,

formerly,

in the reign of Alexander,

in the days of the siege of Troy,

in summer,

in winter,

by night,

by day,

in time of pestilence,

in time of war,

during a banquet.

Certain Latin writers have thought it a sufficient distinction to call the general sense

time,

times.

For questions of law turn on time, while it also determines the quality of actions and is of great importance in questions of fact; for instance, occasionally it provides irrefragable

Further, all kinds of arguments may easily be drawn either from facts previous to a certain act, or contemporary or subsequent. As regards antecedent facts the following example will illustrate my meaning;

You threatened to kill him, you went out by night, you started before him.

Some writers have shown themselves over-subtle in their classification of the second class of circumstances, making

a sound was heard

a shout was raised

You hid yourself, you fled, livid spots and swellings appeared on the corpse.

In these considerations are included everything in connexion with words and deeds, but in two distinct ways. For some things are done because something else is like to follow, and others because something else has previously been done, as for instance, when the husband of a beautiful woman is accused of having acted as a procurer on the ground that he bought her after she was found guilty of adultery, or when a debauched character is accused of parricide on the ground that he said to his father

You have rebuked me for the last time.

With regard to accidental circumstances, which also provide matter for arguments, these clearly belong to subsequent time, but are distinguished by a certain special quality, as for instance if I should say,

Scipio was a better general than Hannibal, for he conquered Hannibal

He was a good pilot, for he was never shipwrecked

He was a good farmer, for he gathered in huge harvests

He was a prodigal, for he squandered his patrimony

His life was disgraceful, for he was hated by all.

We must also consider the resources possessed by the parties concerned, more especially when dealing with questions of fact; for it is more credible that a smaller number of persons were killed by a larger, a weaker party by a stronger, sleepers by men that were wide awake, the unsuspecting by the well-prepared, while the converse arguments may be used to prove the opposite.

Such considerations arise both in deliberative and forensic oratory: in the latter they occur in relation to two questions, namely, whether some given person had the will, and whether lie had the power to do the deed; for hope will often create the will to act. Hence the well-known inference in Cicero: [*](pro Mil. x. 29. )

Clodius lay in wait for Milo, not Milo for Clodius, for Clodius had a retinue of sturdy slaves, while Milo was with a party of women; Clodius was mounted, Milo in a carriage, Clodius lightly clad, Milo hampered by a cloak.

With resources we may

To these we may add manner, the Greek τρόπος, in regard to which we ask how a thing was done. Manner is concerned sometimes with quality and the letter of the law [*](See § 40. Also III. vi. 55 and 66.) (we may for instance argue that it was unlawful to kill an adulterer by poison), sometimes with questions of fact, as for example if I argue that an act was committed with a good intent and therefore openly, or with a bad intent and therefore treacherously, by night, in a lonely place.

In all cases, however, in which we enquire into the nature and meaning of an act, and which can be considered by themselves apart from all considerations of persons and all else that gives rise to the actual cause, there are clearly three points to which we must give attention, namely Whether it is, What it is and Of what kind it is. But as there are certain

places

places

Arguments, then, may be drawn from definition, sometimes called finitio and sometimes finis. Definition is of two kinds. We may ask whether a particular quality is a virtue or make a definition precede and ask what is the nature of a virtue. Such a definition is either stated in general terms, such as Rhetoric is the science of speaking well, or in detail, such as Rhetoric is the science of correct conception, arrangement and utterance, coupled with a retentive memory and a dignified delivery.

we may define a word by giving its content as in the preceding instances, or by etymology: we may for instance explain assiduus [*]( Paulus (exc. Fest.) gives the following explanation of this absurd derivation, for which Cicero tells that Aelius Stilo was responsible: Some think that assiduus was originally the epithet applied to one who served in the army at his own expense, contributing an as ( i.e. instead of receiving it)! ) by deriving it from as and do, locuples [*](locheples ( wealthy ) is derived from locus = the posses sors of many places. ) by deriving it from copia locorum, pecuniosus [*](pecuniosus ( moneyed ) is derived from pecus = rich in herds. ) from copiapecorum. Genus, species, difference and property seem more especially to afford scope for definition, for we derive arguments from all of these.

Genus is of little use when we desire to prove a species, but of great value for its elimination. A tree is not necessarily a plane tree, but that which is not a tree is certainly not a plane tree; again, a virtue is not necessarily the virtue of justice, but that which is not a virtue is certainly not justice. We must proceed from the genus to the ultimate species; [*](cp. § 5. ) for example, to say that man is an animal will not suffice; for animal merely gives us the genus: nor yet will the addition of the words

subject to death

On the other hand species will give us clear proof of genus, but is of little service for its elimination. For example, justice is always a virtue, but that which is not justice may still be a virtue, such as fortitude, constancy or self-control. Genus therefore cannot be eliminated by species unless all the species included in the genus be eliminated, as for instance in the following sentence: That which is neither rational

To these they add property and difference. Properties serve to establish definitions, differences to overthrow them. A property is that which happens to one particular object and that alone; speech and laughter for instance are properties of man. Or it may be something specially belonging to an object, but not to it alone; heating for instance is a property of fire. The same thing may also have a number of properties: light and heat are both properties of fire. Consequently, the omission of any property in a definition will impair it, but the introduction of a property, whatever it may be, will not necessarily establish a definition.

We have, however, often to consider what is a property of some given object; for example, if it should be asserted, on the ground of etymology, that the peculiar property of a tyrannicide is to kill tyrants, we should deny it: for an executioner is not ipso facto a tyrannicide, if he executes a tyrant who has been delivered to him for the purpose, nor again is he a tyrannicide who kills a tyrant unwittingly or against his will.

What is not a property will be a difference: it is, for instance, one thing to be a slave, and another to be in a state of servitude; hence the distinction raised in connexion with persons assigned to their creditors for debt: A slave, if he is manumitted becomes a freedman, but this is not the case with one who is assigned. There are also other points of difference which are dealt with elsewhere. [*](VII. iii. 26. Also III vi. 25.)