Institutio Oratoria

Such are birth, for persons are generally regarded as having some resemblance to their parents and ancestors, a resemblance which sometimes leads to their living disgracefully or honourably, as the case may be; then there is nationality, for races have their own character, and the same action is not probable in the case of a barbarian, a Roman and a Greek;

country is another, for there is a like diversity in the laws, institutions and opinions of different states; sex, since for example a man is more likely to commit a robbery, a woman to poison; age, since different actions suit different ages; education and training, since it makes a great difference who were the instructors and what the method of instruction in each individual case;

bodily constitution, for beauty is often introduced as an argument for lust, strength as an argument for insolence, and their opposites for opposite conduct; fortune, since the same acts are not to be expected from rich and poor, or from one who is surrounded by troops of relations, friends or clients and one who lacks all these advantages; condition, too, is important, for it makes a great difference whether a man be famous or obscure, a magistrate or a private individual, a father or a son, a citizen or a foreigner, a free man or a slave, married or unmarried, a father or childless.

Nor must we pass by natural disposition, for avarice, anger, pity, cruelty, severity and the like may often be adduced to prove the credibility or the reverse of a given act; it is for instance often asked whether a

We must also consider the personal ambitions of individuals, for instance whether they wish to be thought rich or eloquent, just or powerful. Past life and previous utterances are also a subject for investigation, since we are in the habit of inferring the present from the past. To these some add passion, by which they mean some temporary emotion such as anger or fear; they also add design, which may refer to the past,

present or future. These latter, however, although accidents of persons, should be referred to that class of arguments which we draw from causes, as also should certain dispositions of mind, for example when we inquire whether one man is the friend or enemy of another.

Names also are treated as accidents of persons; this is perfectly true, but names are rarely food for argument, unless indeed they have been given for some special reasons, such as the titles of Wise, Great, Pious, or unless the name has suggested some special thought to the bearer. Lentulus [*]( Publius Cornelius Lentulus Sura, Catilinarian conspirator. cp. Sail Cat. c. 46. ) for instance had the idea of conspiracy suggested to him by the fact that according to the Sibylline books and the Responses of the soothsayers the tyranny was promised to three members of the Cornelian family, and he considered himself to be the third in succession to Sulla and Cinna, since he too bore the name Cornelius.

On tile other hand the conceit employed by Euripides [*]( Phoeniss. 636. ἀληθῶς δ᾽ ὄνομα Πολυνείκη πατὴρ ἔθετό σοι θείᾳ προνοίᾳ νεικέων ἐπώνυμον, with truth did our father call thee Polynices with divine foreknowledge naming thee after 'strife.' ) where he makes Eteocles taunt his brother Polynices on the ground that his name is evidence of character, is feeble in the extreme. Still a name will often provide the subject for a jest, [*](See vi. iii. 53.) witness the frequent jests of

I now pass to things: of these actions are the most nearly connected with persons and must therefore be treated first. In regard to every action the question arises either Why or Where or When or How or By what means the action is performed.