Institutio Oratoria

secondly it signifies a proposition with a reason, and thirdly a conclusion of an argument drawn either from denial of consequents or from incompatibles [*](v. viii. 5; xiv. 2. n.) ; although there is some controversy on this point. For there are some who style a conclusion from consequents an epicheireme, while it will be found that the majority hold the view that an epicheireme is a conclusion from incompatibles: [*](See v. xiv. 2, VIII. v. 9.) wherefore Cornificius styles it a contrarium or argument from contraries. Some again call it a rhetorical

syllogism, others an incomplete syllogism, because its parts are not so clearly defined or of the same number as those of the regular syllogism, since such

that is an attempt. It would however, in my opinion, be truer to say that it is not our handling of the subject, but the thing itself which we attempt which should be called an ἐπιχείρημα, that is to say the argument by which we try to prove something and which, even if it has not yet been stated in so many words, has been clearly conceived by the mind.

Others regard it not as an attempted or imperfect proof, but a complete proof, falling under the most special [*]( The last or lowest species. p. § 56 and VII. i. 23. ) species of proof; consequently, according to its proper and most generally received appellation it must be understood in the sense of a definite conception of some thought consisting of at least three parts. [*](i.e. the major and minor premisses and the conclusion. See v. xiv. 6 sqq. ) Some call an ἐπιχείρημα a reason,

but Cicero [*](de Inv. . xxxi. 34. ) is more correct in calling it a reasoning, although he too seems to derive this name from the syllogism rather than anything else; for he calls the syllogistic basis [*](See III. vi. 43, 46, 51.) a ratiocinative basis and quotes philosophers to support him. And since there is a certain kinship between a syllogism and an epicheireme, it may be thought that he was justified in his use of the latter term.