Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

Sometimes we shall even have to hoodwink the judge and work upon him by various artifices so that he may think that our aim is other than what it really is. For there are cases when a proposition may be somewhat startling: if the judge foresees this, he will shrink from it in advance, like a patient who catches sight of the surgeon's knife before the operation. On the other hand, if we have given him no preliminary notice and our words take him unawares, without his interest in them having been previously roused by any warning, we shall gain a credence which we should not have secured had we stated that we were going to raise the point.

At times we must not merely avoid distinguishing between the various questions, but must omit them altogether, while our audience must be distracted by appeals to the emotion and their attention diverted. For the duty of the orator is not

v4-6 p.141
merely to instruct: the power of eloquence is greatest in emotional appeals. Now there is no room for passion if we devote our attention to minute and microscopic division at a time when we are seeking to mislead the judgment of the person who is trying the case.

Again, there are certain arguments which are weak and trivial when they stand alone, but which have great force when produced in a body. We must, therefore, concentrate such arguments, and our tactics should be those of a sudden charge in mass. This, however, is a practice which should be resorted to but rarely and only under extreme necessity when reason compels us to take a course which is apparently irrational.

In addition it must be pointed out that in any partition there is always some one point of such special importance, that when the judge has heard it he is impatient with the remainder, which he regards as superfluous. Consequently if we have to prove or refute a number of points partition will be both useful and attractive, since it will indicate in order what we propose to say on each subject. On the other hand, if we are defending one point on various grounds partition will be unnecessary.

If you were to make a partition such as the following,

I will not say that the character of my client is such as to render him incapable of murder, I will only say that he had no motive for murder and that at the time when the deceased was killed he was overseas,
in that case all the proofs which you propose to bring before this, the final proof, must needs seem superfluous to the judge.

For the judge is always in a hurry to reach the most important point. If he has a patient disposition he will merely make a silent appeal to the advocate,

v4-6 p.143
whom he will treat as bound by his promise. On the other hand, if he is busy, or holds exalted position, or is intolerant by nature, he will insist in no very courteous manner on his coming to the point.

For these reasons there are some who disapprove of the partition adopted by Cicero in the pro Cluentio, [*]( iv. 9. Oppianicus had been indicted by Cluentius for an attempt upon his life and condemned. The previous judgments referred to were condemnations of his accomplices, which made Oppianicus' condemnation inevitable. Oppianicus was condemned, and it was alleged that this was due to bribery by Cluentius. Cluentius was now on his trial for the alleged murder of various persons. ) where he premises that he is going to show, first,

that no man was ever arraigned for greater crimes or on stronger evidence than Oppianicus,
secondly,
that previous judgments had been passed by those very judges by whom he was condemned,
and finally,
that Cluentius made no attempt to bribe the jury, but that his opponent did.
They argue that if the third point can be proved, there is no need to have urged the two preceding.

On the other hand you will find no one so unreasonable or so foolish as to deny that the partition in the pro Murena [*](v. 11.) is admirable.

I understand, gentlemen, that the accusation falls into three parts, the first aspersing my client's character, the second dealing with his candidature for the magistracy, and the third with charges of bribery.
These words make the case as clear as possible, and no one division renders any other superfluous.