Institutio Oratoria

There are also a number who are in doubt as to a form of defence which I may exemplify as follows:

If I murdered him, I did right; but I did not murder him.

But if we have any doubts as to being able to prove the stronger argument, we shall do well to rely on both. Different arguments move different people. He who thinks that the act was committed may regard it as a just act, while he who is deaf to the plea that the act was just may perhaps believe that it was never committed: one who is confident of his powers as a marksman may be content with one shaft, whereas he who has no such confidence will do well to launch several and give fortune a chance to come to his assistance.

Cicero in the pro Milone reveals the utmost skill in showing first that Clodius laid an ambush for Milo and then in adding as a supernumerary argument that, even if he had not done so, he was nevertheless so bad a citizen that his slaying could only have done credit to the patriotism of the slayer and redounded to his glory.

I would not however entirely condemn the order mentioned above, [*](§ 13.) since there are certain arguments which, though hard in themselves, may serve to soften those which come after. The proverb,

If you want to get your due, you must ask for something more,

is not wholly unreasonable. Still no one should interpret it to mean that you must stop short of nothing. For the Greeks are right when they lay it down as a rule that we should not attempt the impossible. But whenever the double-barrelled defence of which I am speaking is employed, we must aim at making the first argument support the credibility of the second. For he who might without danger to himself have confessed to the commission of the act, can have no motive for lying when he denies the commission.

Above all it is important, whenever we suspect that the judge desires a proof other than that on which we are engaged, to promise that we will satisfy him on the point fully and without delay, more especially if the question is one of our client's honour.

But it will often happen that a discreditable case has the law on its side, and to prevent the judges giving us only a grudging and reluctant hearing on the point of law, we shall have to warn them with some frequency that we shall shortly proceed to defend our client's honour and integrity, if they will only wait a little and allow us to follow the order of our proofs.

We may also at times pretend to say certain things against the wishes of our clients, as Cicero [*](lii.) does in the pro Cluentio when he discusses the law dealing with judicial corruption. Occasionally we may stop, as though interrupted by our clients, while often we shall address them and exhort them to let us act as we think best. Thus we shall make a gradual impression on the mind of the judge, and, buoyed up by the hope that we are going to clear our client's honour, he will be less ill-disposed toward the harder portions of our proof. And when he has accepted these,

he will be all the readier to listen to our defence of our client's character. Thus the two points will render mutual assistance to each other; the judge will be more attentive to our legal proofs owing to his hope that we shall proceed to a vindication of character and better disposed to accept that vindication because we have proved our point of law.

But although partition is neither always necessary nor useful, it will, if judiciously employed, greatly

For it is a pleasure to be able to measure how much of our task has been accomplished, and the knowledge of what remains to do stimulates us to fresh effort over the labour that still awaits us. For nothing need seem long, when it is definitely known how far it is to the end.

Quintus Hortensius deserves the high praise which has been awarded him for the care which he took over his partitions, although Cicero more than once indulges in kindly mockery of his habit of counting his headings on his fingers. For there is a limit to gesture, and we must be specially careful to avoid excessive minuteness and any suggestion of articulated structure in our partition. If our divisions are too small,

they cease to be limbs and become fragments, and consequently detract not a little from the authority of our speech. Moreover, those who are ambitious of this sort of reputation, in order that they may appear to enhance the nicety and tile exhaustive nature of their division, introduce what is superfluous and subdivide things which naturally form a single whole. The result of their labours is, however, not so much to increase the number of their divisions as to diminish their importance, and after all is done and they have split up their argument into a thousand tiny compartments, they fall into that very obscurity which the partition was designed to eliminate.

The proposition, whether single or multiple, must, on every occasion when it can be employed with profit, be clear and lucid; for what could be more discreditable than that a portion of the speech, whose sole purpose is to prevent obscurity elsewhere, should itself be obscure? Secondly it must be brief and must not be burdened with a single superfluous word; for we are not explaining what we are saying, but what we are going to say.

We must also ensure that it is free alike from omissions and from redundance. Redundance as a rule occurs through our dividing into species when it would be sufficient to divide into genera, or through the addition of species after stating the genus. The following will serve as an example:

I will speak of virtue, justice and abstinence.

Our first partition will be between admitted and disputed facts. Admitted facts will then be divided into those acknowledged by our opponent and those acknowledged by ourselves. Disputed facts will be divided into those which we and those which our opponents allege. But the worst fault of all is to treat your points in an order different from that which was assigned them in your proposition.