Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

IV. After the statement of facts some place the proposition [*](III. ix. 5; xi. 27.) which they regard as forming a division of a forensic speech. I have already expressed my opinion of this view. [*](III. ix. 2.) But it seems to me that the beginning of every proof is a proposition, such as often occurs in the demonstration of the main question and sometimes even in the enunciation of individual arguments, more especially of those which are called ἐπιχειρήματα [*](See v. xiv. 14.) But for the moment I shall speak of the first kind. It is not always necessary to employ it.

The nature of the main question is sometimes sufficiently clear without any proposition, especially if the statement of facts ends exactly where the question begins. Consequently the recapitulation generally employed in the case of arguments is sometimes placed immediately after the statement of facts.

The affair took place, as I have described, gentlemen: he that laid the ambush was defeated,
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violence was conquered by violence, or rather I should say audacity was crushed by valour.
[*](pro Mil. xi. 30. )

Sometimes proposition is highly advantageous, more especially when the fact cannot be defended and the question turns on the definition of the fact; as for example in the case of the man who has taken the money of a private individual from a temple: we shall say,

My client is charged with sacrilege. It is for you to decide whether it was sacrilege,
so that the judge may understand that his sole duty is to decide whether the charge is tantamount to sacrilege.

The same method may be employed in obscure or complicated cases, not merely to make the case clearer, but sometimes also to make it more moving. This effect will be produced, if we at once support our pleading with some such words as the following:

It is expressly stated in the law that for any foreigner who goes up on to the wall the penalty is death. You are undoubtedly a foreigner, and there is no question but that you went up on to the wall. The conclusion is that you must submit to the penalty.
For this proposition forces a confession upon our opponent and to a certain extent accelerates the decision of the court. It does more than indicate the question, it contributes to its solution.

Propositions may be single, double or manifold: this is due to more than one reason. For several charges may be combined, as when Socrates was accused of corrupting the youth and of introducing new superstitions; while single propositions may be made up of a number of arguments, as for instance when Aeschines is accused of misconduct as an ambassador on the ground that he lied, failed to

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carry out his instructions, wasted time and accepted bribes.

The defence may also contain several propositions: for instance against a claim for money we may urge,

Your claim is invalid; for you had no right to act as agent nor had the party whom you represent any right to employ an agent: further, he is not the heir of the man from whom it is asserted that I borrowed the money, nor am I his debtor.

These propositions can be multiplied at pleasure, but it is sufficient to give an indication of my meaning. If propositions are put forward singly with the proofs appended, they will form several distinct propositions: if they are combined, they fall under the head of partition.

A proposition may also be put forward unsupported, as is generally done in conjectural cases:

The formal accusation is one of murder, but I also charge the accused with theft.
Or it may be accompanied by a reason:
Gaius Cornelius is guilty of an offence against the state; for when he was tribune of the plebs, he himself read out his bill to the public assembly.
[*]( The speech is lost. In 67 B.C. Cornelius as tribune of the plebs proposed a law enacting that no man should be released from the obligations of a law save by decree of the people. This struck at a privilege usurped by the senate, and Servilius Globulus, another tribune, forbade the herald to read out the proposal. Cornelius then read it himself. He was accused of maiestas, defended by Cicero in 65 B.C. and acquitted. ) I In addition to these forms of proposition we can also introduce a proposition of our own, such as
I accuse him of adultery,
or may use the proposition of our opponent, such as
The charge brought against me is one of adultery,
or finally we may employ a proposition which is common to both sides, such as
The question in dispute between myself and my opponent is, which of the two is next-of-kin to the deceased who died intestate.
Sometimes we may even couple contradictory propositions, as for instance
I say this, my opponent says that.
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We may at times produce the effect of a proposition, even though it is not in itself a proposition, by adding after the statement of facts some phrase such as the following:

These are the points on which you will give your decision,
thereby reminding the judge to give special attention to the question and giving him a fillip to emphasise the point that we have finished the statement of facts and are beginning the proof, so that when we start to verify our statements he may realise that he has reached a fresh stage where he must begin to listen with renewed attention.

V. Partition may be defined as the enumeration in order of our own propositions, those of our adversary or both. It is held by some that this is indispensable on the ground that it makes the case clearer and the judge more attentive and more ready to be instructed, if he knows what we are speaking about and what we are going subsequently to speak about.

Others, on the contrary, think that such a course is dangerous to the speaker on two grounds, namely that sometimes we may forget to perform what we have promised and may, on the other hand, come upon something which we have omitted in the partition. But this will never happen to anyone unless he is either a fool or has come into court without thinking out his speech in detail beforehand.

Besides, what can be simpler or clearer than a straightforward partition ? It follows nature as a guide and the adhesion to a definite method is actually of the greatest assistance to the speaker's memory. Therefore I cannot approve the view even of those who lay down that partition should not extend beyond the length of three propositions. No doubt there is a danger, if our partition is too complicated, that it

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may slip the memory of the judge and disturb his attention. But that is no reason why it should be tied down to a definite number of propositions, since the case may quite conceivably require more.

There are further reasons why we should sometimes dispense with partition. In the first place there are many points which can be produced in a more attractive manner, if they appear to be discovered on the spot and not to have been brought ready made from our study, but rather to have sprung from the requirements of the case itself while we were speaking. Thus we get those not unpleasing figures such as

It has almost escaped me,
I had forgotten,
or
You do well to remind me.
For if we set forth all that we propose to prove in advance, we shall deprive ourselves of the advantage springing from tile charm of novelty.

Sometimes we shall even have to hoodwink the judge and work upon him by various artifices so that he may think that our aim is other than what it really is. For there are cases when a proposition may be somewhat startling: if the judge foresees this, he will shrink from it in advance, like a patient who catches sight of the surgeon's knife before the operation. On the other hand, if we have given him no preliminary notice and our words take him unawares, without his interest in them having been previously roused by any warning, we shall gain a credence which we should not have secured had we stated that we were going to raise the point.

At times we must not merely avoid distinguishing between the various questions, but must omit them altogether, while our audience must be distracted by appeals to the emotion and their attention diverted. For the duty of the orator is not

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merely to instruct: the power of eloquence is greatest in emotional appeals. Now there is no room for passion if we devote our attention to minute and microscopic division at a time when we are seeking to mislead the judgment of the person who is trying the case.

Again, there are certain arguments which are weak and trivial when they stand alone, but which have great force when produced in a body. We must, therefore, concentrate such arguments, and our tactics should be those of a sudden charge in mass. This, however, is a practice which should be resorted to but rarely and only under extreme necessity when reason compels us to take a course which is apparently irrational.

In addition it must be pointed out that in any partition there is always some one point of such special importance, that when the judge has heard it he is impatient with the remainder, which he regards as superfluous. Consequently if we have to prove or refute a number of points partition will be both useful and attractive, since it will indicate in order what we propose to say on each subject. On the other hand, if we are defending one point on various grounds partition will be unnecessary.