Institutio Oratoria

An example of this may be found in the theme which runs as follows.

A wife has stated to her husband that her stepson has attempted to seduce her and that a time and place have been assigned for their meeting: the son has brought the same charge against his stepmother, with the exception that a different time and place are mentioned. The father finds the son in the place mentioned by the wife, and the wife in the place mentioned by the son. He divorces her, and then, as she says nothing in her own defence, disinherits the son.

However, what is common to both sides of the case will be stated, and then arguments will be drawn from a comparison of

Still we must not ignore the fact that there are some cases which do not admit of any form of gloss, but must be defended forthright. An example is provided by the case of the rich man who scourged the statue of a poor man who was his enemy, and was subsequently indicted for assault. Here no one can deny that the act was outrageous, but it may be possible to maintain that it is not punishable by law.

If, however, part of the statement of facts tells in our favour and part against us, we must consider whether in view of the circumstances of the case the parts in question should be blent or kept apart. If the points which are damaging to our case be in the majority, the points which are in its favour will be swamped. Under those circumstances it will be best to keep them apart and, after setting forth and proving the points which help our case, to meet the rest by employing the remedies mentioned above.

If, on the other hand, it be the points in our favour which predominate, we may even blend them with the others, since thus the traitors in our camp will have less force. None the less these points, both good and bad, must not be set forth naked and helpless: those in our favour must be supported by some argument, and then reasons must be added why the points which tell against us should not be believed; since if we do not distinguish clearly between the two, it is to be feared that those which are favourable may suffer from their bad company.

Further rules are laid down with regard to the

If our statement is to be clear and brief, almost anything can be justified sooner than digression. And if we do introduce a digression, it must always be short and of such a nature that we give the impression of having been forced from our proper course by some uncontrollable emotion. The passage in Cicero [*](pro Clu. vi. 15. ) about the marriage of Sasia is a good example of this.

What incredible wickedness in a woman! Unheard of in the history of mankind till she dared the sin! What unbridled and unrestrained lust, what amazing daring! One might have thought that, even if she had no regard for the vengeance of heaven and the opinion of man, she would at least have dreaded that night of all nights and those torches that lighted her to the bridal bed: that she would have shrunk in horror from the threshold of her chamber, from her daughter's room and the very walls that had witnessed her former marriage.

As to addressing another in place of the judge, it may be a means of making a point with greater brevity and give it greater force. On this subject I hold the same view that I expressed in dealing with the exordium, as I do on the subject of impersonation. This artifice however is employed not only by Servius Sulpicius in his speech on behalf of Aufidia, when he cries

Am I to suppose that you were drowsed with sleep or weighed down by some

v4-6 p.109

heavy lethargy?

You will give so much to enter, etc.

Again in the pro Clueniio [*](pro Clu. xxvi. ) does not the conversation between Staienus and Bulbus conduce to speed and enhance the credibility of the statements ? In case it should be thought that Cicero did this without design (quite an incredible supposition in his case), I would point out that in the Partitiones [*](ix. 31.) he lays it down that the statement of facts should be characterised by passages which will charm and excite admiration or expectation, and marked by unexpected turns, conversations between persons and appeals to every kind of emotion.

We shall, as I have already said, never argue points in the statement of facts, but we may sometimes introduce arguments, as for example Cicero does in the pro Ligario, [*]( ii. 4. Ligarius was accused of having fought for the Pompeians in Africa. Cicero points out that he went out to Africa before the outbreak of war was dreamed of and that his whole attitude was discreet. ) when he says that he ruled his province in such a way that it was to his interest that peace should continue. We shall sometimes also, if occasion demand, insert a brief defence of the facts in the statement and trace the reasons that led up to them.

For we must state our facts like advocates, not witnesses. A statement in its simplest form will run as follows,

Quintus Ligarius went out as legate to C. Considius.

Quintus Ligarius,

set out for Africa as legate to Gaius Considius at a time when there was no thought of war.

he says,

Not only not to war, but to a country where there was no thought of war.

Quintus Ligarius would not suffer himself to be entangled in any transaction,

for he had his eyes fixed on home and wished to return to his own people.

I am therefore all the more surprised at those who hold that there should be no appeal to the emotions in the statement of facts. If they were to say

Such appeals should be brief and not on the scale on which they are employed in tile peroration,

Why should I not, if it is possible, obtain that effect at the very opening of the case which I am anxious to secure at its conclusion, more especially in view of the fact that I shall find the judge far more amenable to the cogency of my proof, if I have previously filled his mind with anger or pity?

Does not Cicero, [*](Verr. v 62. A Roman citizen might not be scourged. cp. St. Paul. ) in his description of the scourging of a Roman citizen, in a few brief words stir all the emotions, not merely by describing the victim's position, the place where the outrage was committed and the nature of the punishment, but also by praising the courage with which he bore it? For he shows us a man of the highest character who, when beaten with rods, uttered not a moan nor an entreaty, but only cried that lie was a Roman citizen, thereby bringing shame on his oppressor and showing his confidence in the law.

Again does he not throughout the whole of his statement excite the warmest indignation at the misfortunes of Philodamus [*](ib. i. 30 ) and move