Institutio Oratoria

Even the assertion which I made above to the effect that a statement of facts familiar to the judge is superfluous, is not to be taken too literally. My meaning is that it may be dispensed with, if the judge knows not merely what has been done, but takes a view of the facts which is favourable to our case.

For the purpose of the statement of facts is not merely to instruct, but rather to persuade the judge. Therefore, when we desire to influence him in some way or other, although he may require no instruction, we shall preface our statement with some such remarks as these:

I know that you are aware of the general nature of the case, but I trust you will not take it ill if I ask you to consider each point in detail.

At times again we may pretend that we are repeating the facts for the benefit of some new member of the jury, [*]( i.e. introduced to fill the place of a juror who had had to leave the jury. ) at times that we do so with a view to letting every bystander as well realise the gross unfairness of our opponents' assertions. Under these circumstances our statement must be diversified by a free use of figures to avoid wearying those to whom the facts are familiar: we shall for instance use phrases such as

You remember,

It may perhaps be superfluous to dwell on this point,

But why should I say more, as you are well acquainted with the fact?

You are not ignorant how this matter stands

Besides, if we are always to regard as superfluous a statement of facts made before a judge who is familiar with the case, we may even go so far as to regard it as superfluous at times to plead the case at all.

There is a further question which is still more frequently raised, as to whether the statement of facts should always follow immediately on the