Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

II. It is a most natural and frequently necessary proceeding, that after preparing the mind of the judge in the manner described above we should indicate the nature of the subject on which he will have to give judgment: that is the statement of facts.

In dealing with this question I shall deliberately pass over the divisions made by certain writers, who make too many classes and err on the side of subtlety. For

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they demand an explanation dealing not only with the facts of the case which is before the court, but with the person involved (as in the sentence, [*](Sall. Hist. iv. 25. )

Marcus Lollius Palicanus, a Picentine of humble birth, a man gifted with loquacity rather than eloquence

) or of the place where an incident occurred (as in the sentence [*]( Cic. Verr. xxiv. 63. )

Lampsacus, gentlemen, is a town situated on the Hellespont

), or of the time at which something occurred (as in the verse [*]( Verg. G. i. 43. )

In early spring, when on the mountains hoar
The snows dissolve),

or of the causes of an occurrence, such as the historians are so fond of setting forth, when they explain the origin of a war, a rebellion or a pestilence. Further they style some statements of fact

complete,

and others

incomplete,

a distinction which is self-evident. To this they add that our explanation may refer to the past (which is of course the commonest form), the present (for which compare Cicero's [*](pro Rosc. Am. xxii. 60. ) remarks about the excitement caused among the friends of Chrysogonus when his name was mentioned), or of the future (a form permissible only to prophets): for hypotyposis or picturesque description cannot be regarded as a statement of facts.

However let us pass to matters of more importance. The majority regard the statement of facts as being indispensable: but there are many considerations which show that this view is erroneous. In the first place there are some cases which are so brief, that they require only a brief summary rather than a full statement of the facts.

This may apply to both parties to a suit, as for instance in cases where there is no necessity for explanation or where the facts are

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admitted and the whole question turns on a point of law, as it so often does in the centumviral court, as for example when we discuss, whether the heir of a woman who has died intestate should be her son or brother, or whether puberty is to be reckoned by age or by physical development. The same situation arises also in cases where the facts admit of full statement, but are well known to the judge or have been correctly set forth by a previous speaker.

Sometimes again the statement of facts can be dispensed with only by one party, who is generally the plaintiff, either because it is sufficient for him to make a simple summary of his case or because it is more expedient for him to do so. It may, for instance, suffice to say,

I claim repayment of a certain sum of money which was lent on certain conditions

I claim a legacy in accordance with the terms of the will.

It is for the other party to explain why these sums are not due to the plaintiff.

Again it is sometimes sufficient and expedient to summarise a case in one sentence such as

I say that Horatius killed his sister.

For the judge will understand the whole charge from this simple affirmation: the sequence of events and the motive for the deed will be matters for the defence to expound.

On the other hand in some cases the accused may dispense with the statement of facts, when for instance the charge can neither be denied nor palliated, but turns solely on some point of law: the following case will illustrate my meaning. A man who has stolen from a temple money belonging to a private individual is accused of sacrilege: in such a case a confession will be more seemly than a full statement of facts:

We do not deny that the
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money was taken from the temple; but the accuser is bringing a false accusation in charging my client with sacrilege, since the money was not consecrated, but private property: it is for you to decide whether under these circumstances sacrilege has been committed.

While however I think that there are occasional cases where the statement of facts may be dispensed with, I disagree with those who say that there is no statement of facts when the accused simply denies the charge. This opinion is shared by Cornelius Celsus who holds that most cases of murder and all of bribery and extortion fall into this class.

For he thinks that the only statement of facts is that which gives a general account of the charge before the court. Yet he himself acknowledges that Cicero employed the statement of facts in his defence of Rabirius Postumus, in spite of the fact that Cicero denies that any money came into the hands of Rabirius (and this was the question at issue) and gives no explanations relating to the actual charge in his statement of facts.

For my part I follow the very highest authorities in holding that there are two forms of statement of facts in forensic speeches, the one expounding the facts of the case itself, the other setting forth facts which have a bearing on the case.

I agree that a sentence such as

I did not kill the man

does not amount to a statement of facts: but there will be a statement of facts, occasionally, too, a long one, in answer to the arguments put forward by the accuser: it will deal with the past life of the accused, with the causes which have brought an innocent man into peril, and other circumstances such as show the charge to be incredible.

For the

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accuser does not merely say

You killed him,

but sets forth the facts proving his assertion: tragedy will provide an example, where Teucer accuses Ulysses of murdering Ajax, and states that he was found in a lonely place near the lifeless body of his enemy with a blood-stained sword in his hands. To this Ulysses does not merely reply that he did not do the deed, but adds that he had no quarrel with Ajax, the contest between them having been concerned solely with the winning of renown: he then goes on to say how he came to be in the lonely place, how he found Ajax lying lifeless and drew the sword from the wound. Then follow arguments based on these facts.

But even when the accuser says

You were found on the spot where your enemy was killed

and the accused says

I was not,

a statement of facts is involved; for he must say where he was. Consequently cases of bribery and extortion will require as many statements of this kind as there are charges: the charges themselves will be denied, but it will be necessary to counter the arguments of the accuser either singly or all together by setting forth the facts in quite a different light.

Is it, I ask you, irrelevant for one accused of bribery to set forth his parentage, his past life and the services on which he relied for success in his candidature? And if a man is indicted for extortion, will it not be to his advantage to set forth not merely his past record, but also the reasons which have made the whole province or the accuser or a witness hostile to himself?

If these are not statements of facts, neither is the first portion of Cicero's [*](V. 11.) defence of Cluentius, beginning with the words

Aulus Cluentius Habitus.

For there he says nothing about the charge

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of poisoning, but confines himself entirely to setting forth the reasons for the hostility of Cluentius' mother to her son.

There are also statements which do not set forth the facts of the case itself, but facts which are none the less relevant to the case: the speaker's purpose may be to illustrate the case by some parallel, as in the passage in the Verrines [*]( V. 3. The shepherd was crucifed because the carrying of arms was forbidden. ) about Lucius Domitius who crucified a shepherd because he admitted that he had used a hunting spear to kill the boar which he had brought him as a present;

or he may desire to dispel some charge that is irrelevant to the case as in the passage of the speech for Rabirius Postumus, [*]( X. 28. The charge in question was that Rabirius had worn the Greek pallium instead of the Roman toga. But as an official of the king he was forced to wear Greek dress. ) which runs as follows:

For when he came to Alexandria, gentlemen, the only means of saving his money which the king suggested to Postumus was that he should take charge of the royal household and act as a kind of steward.

Or the orator may desire to heighten the effect of his charges, as Cicero [*](Verr. v. 10. ) does in his description of the journey of Verres.

Sometimes a fictitious statement is employed either to stir the emotions of the judges, as in that passage of the proo Roscio Amerino [*](xxii. 60.) dealing with Chrysogonus to which I referred just recently, or to entertain them with a show of wit, as in the passage of the pro Cluentio [*]( xx. 57 sqq. ) describing the brothers Caepasius: sometimes again a digression may be introduced to add beauty to the speech, as in the passage about Proserpine in the Verrines, [*]( IV. 48. The words quoted do not occur in our MSS of Cicero. ) beginning

It was here that a mother is once said to have sought her daughter.

All these examples serve to show that he who denies a charge may not necessarily refrain from stating, but may actually state that very fact which he denies.

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Even the assertion which I made above to the effect that a statement of facts familiar to the judge is superfluous, is not to be taken too literally. My meaning is that it may be dispensed with, if the judge knows not merely what has been done, but takes a view of the facts which is favourable to our case.

For the purpose of the statement of facts is not merely to instruct, but rather to persuade the judge. Therefore, when we desire to influence him in some way or other, although he may require no instruction, we shall preface our statement with some such remarks as these:

I know that you are aware of the general nature of the case, but I trust you will not take it ill if I ask you to consider each point in detail.