Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

As for digression (egressio, now more usually styled excessus ), if it lie outside the case, it cannot be part of it, while, if it lie within it, it is merely an accessory or ornament of that portion of the case from which digression is made. For if anything that lies within the case is to be called part of it, why not

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call argument, comparison, commonplace, pathos, illustration parts of the case?

On the other hand I disagree with those who, like Aristotle, [*](Rhet. ii. 26. ) would remove refuation from the list on the ground that it forms part of the proof: for the proof is constructive, and the reputation destructive. Aristotle [*](Rhet. iii. 13. ) also introduces another slight novelty in making proposition, not statement of facts, follow the exordium. This however he does because he regards proposition as the genus and statement of facts as the species, with the result that he holds that, whereas the former is always and everywhere necessary, the latter may sometimes be dispensed with.

It is however necessary to point out as regards these five parts which I have established, that that which has to be spoken first is not necessarily that which requires our first consideration. But above all we must consider the nature of the case, the question at issue and the arguments for and against. Next we must consider what points are to be made, and what refuted, and then how the facts are to be stated.

For the stalement of facts is designed to prepare the way for the proofs and must needs be unprofitable, unless we have first determined what proofs. are to be promised in the statement. Finally we must consider how best to win the judge to take our view. For we cannot be sure until we have subjected all the parts of the case to careful scrutiny, what sort of impression we wish to make upon the judge: are we to mollify him or increase his severity, to excite or relax his interest in the case, to render him susceptible to influence or the reverse?

I cannot however approve the view of those who

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think that the exordium should actually be written last. For though we must collect all our material and determine the proper place for each portion of it, before we begin to speak or write, we must commence with what naturally comes first.

No one begins a portrait by painting or modelling the feet, and no art finds its completion at the point where it should begin. Otherwise what will happen if we have not time to write our speech? Will not the result of such a reversal of the proper order of things be that we shall be caught napping? We must therefore review the subject-matter in the order laid down, but write our speech in the order in which we shall deliver it.

X. Every cause in which one side attacks and the other defends consists either of one or more controversial questions. In the first case it is called simple, in the second complex. An example of the first is when the subject of enquiry is a theft or an adultery taken by itself. In complex cases the several questions may all be of the same kind, as in cases of extortion, or of different kinds, as when a man is accused at one and the same time of homicide and sacrilege. Such cases no longer arise in the public courts, since the praetor allots the different charges to different courts in accordance with a definite rule; but they still are of frequent occurrence in the Imperial or Senatorial courts, and were frequent in the days when they came up for trial before the people. [*]( In the permanent courts ( quaestiones perpetuae ). There were separate courts for, different offences. In cases brought before the Senate or the Emperor a number of different charges might be dealt with at once. ) Private suits again are often tried by one judge, who may have to determine many different points of law.

There are no other species of forensic causes, not even when one person brings the same suit on the same grounds against two different

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persons, or two persons bring the same suit against one, or several against several, as occasionally occurs in lawsuits about inheritances. Because although a number of parties may be involved, there is still only one suit, unless indeed the different circumstances of the various parties alter the questions at issue.

There is however said to be a third and different class, the comparative. Questions of comparison frequently require to be handled in portions of a cause, as for instance in the centum viral court, [*]( A civil court specially concerned with questions of inheritance. ) when after other questions have been raised the question is discussed as to which of two claimants is the more deserving of an inheritance. It is rare however for a case to be brought into court on such grounds alone, as in divinations [*](Divinatio is a trial to decide between the claims of two persons to appear as accuser, there being no public prosecutor at Rome. cp. Cicero's Divinatio in Caecilium. ) which take place to determine who the accuser shall be, and occasionally when two informers dispute as to which has earned the reward.

Some again have added a fourth class, namely mutual accusation, which they call ἀντικατηγορία Others, however, regard it as belonging to the comparative group, to which indeed the common case of reciprocal suits on different grounds bears a strong resemblance. If this latter case should also be called ἀντικατηγορία (for it has no special name of its own), we must divide mutual accusation into two classes, in one of which the parties bring the same charge against each other, while in the other they bring different charges. The same division will also apply to claims.